

Sino-India Relations: With Special Reference to Border Disputes

(Arunachal Pradesh & Axsai Chin)

Thesis Submitted to Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University

For the Award of the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled, “**Sino-India Relations: With Special Reference to Border Disputes (Arunachal Pradesh & Aksai Chin)**” which is being submitted to Department of Political Science, School For Ambedkar Studies, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow in partial fulfillment of the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy** has previously not formed the basis for award of any such degree by any university.

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis entitled “**Sino-India Relations: With Special Reference to Border Disputes (Arunachal Pradesh & Aksai Chin)**” submitted by Anand Pratap Singh for the award of Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Department of Political Science, School For Ambedkar Studies, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University is his original work. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been published or submitted to any other university for the award of any other degree.

We recommend that this thesis be placed before the examiners for evaluation.

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1.	AAPSU	All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union
2.	ACD	Asian Cooperation Dialogue
3.	AFSPA	Armed Forces special Powers Act
4.	ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
5.	AMPB	Assam Military Police Battalions
6.	BOT	Build, Operate and Transfer
7.	BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
8.	BRDB	Border Road Development Board.
9.	BDCA	Border Defence Cooperation Agreement
10.	BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
11.	BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
12.	BSF	Border Security Force
13.	CBMS	Confidence Building Measures
14.	CNNC	China National Nuclear Corporation
15.	CWPC	Central Water and Power Commission
16.	CLAWS	Center for Land and warfare Studies
17.	CAS	Chinese Academy of Sciences
18.	CRS	Congressional Research Service
19.	DDD	Delimitation, Delineation and Demarcation
20.	ETIM	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
21.	FMCT	Fissile Cut-off Treaty
22.	FTA	Free Trade Agreement
23.	FPAG	Foreign Policy Advisory Group
24.	GRAF	General Reserve Engineering Force
25.	IAF	Indian Air Force

26.	ITBP	Indo-Tibetan Border Police
27.	IMG	Islamic Militant Groups
28.	IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
29.	ETIM	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
30.	ICWA	Indian Council of World Affairs
31.	IDSA	Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
32.	IFAS	Indian Frontier Administration Service
33.	JD	Janata Dal
34.	JWG	Joint Working Group
35.	LAC	Line of Actual Control
36.	LOC	Line of Control
37.	MST	Ministry of Surface Transport
38.	MGC	Mekong Ganga Economic Cooperation
39.	MD	Ministry of Defence
40.	MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
41.	MWS	Ministry of Water Resources
42.	MoU	Memoranda of Understanding
43.	NSG	Nuclear Supplier Group
44.	NDA	National Democratic Alliance
45.	NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
46.	NEDC	North East Development Council
47.	NEFA	North Eastern Frontier Agency
48.	PLA	People's Liberation Army
49.	PRC	People's Republic of China
50.	PRA	Port of Singapore Authority
51.	PTD	Panchsheela of Tribal Development
52.	PPAP	Peoples Party of Arunachal Pradesh

53.	SRO	Space Research Organisation
54.	SRs	Special representatives
55.	SDP	Sub Divisional Magistrate
56.	SCPC	Shuotian Canal Preparatory Committee
57.	TAR	Tibet Autonomous Region
58.	UPP	United Peoples Party
59.	UPA	United Progressive Alliance
60.	ULFA	United Liberation Front of Assam
61.	UNI	United News of India
62.	UNSC	United Nation Security Council
63.	WDS	Western Development Strategy
64.	WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

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2. *Major Power Playground : A Game In Southeast Asia*, **Shodh Hastakshep** A Multilingual and Multidisciplinary Research Journal , Varanasi (ISSN No. 2231.4644)
3. *India and China: Interactions Between the Two Major Emerging Asian Powers*, **Shodh Sanchayan**, an International Research Journal, Kanpur, ISSN 0975 1254(Print Version) RNI No. DELBIL/2010/31292.

Chapter-1

Introduction

Border disputes are major causes of tensions between neighbors' worldwide. In modern times, the problem started with the rise of Nation-States in the wake of Westphalia Treaty in 1648 in Europe. This paved way to the birth of several sovereign states in Europe. The making and unmaking of sovereign independent states are still going on. The European Colonial powers fought several battles including two World Wars and Cold War and to a large extent they have successfully managed their border issues. But the legacies in the form of border disputes in several colonial and semi-colonial countries remained unsettled and got erupted in the aftermath of the end of the Colonial System after the end of the Second World War in 1945. Sino-India dispute is one of such issues still haunting Global Politics in 21st century. The issue has to be studied, researched and analysed in a broader perspectives. The issue under research is historical, descriptive and empirical attempt to understand the dispute badly affecting the two most important civilizations of the World. Never in the long annals of Asia, India and China have ever fought any kind of battle; rather have exchanged ideas and many more things with each other.

When the British Colonial power withdrew from India, it left a dangerous legacy of carelessly or arbitrarily drawn borders. In case of the Sino-India border tensions between India and China occasionally flare up, especially along India's far western border (Axsai Chin area) and eastern border along the state of Arunachal Pradesh. In recent years, much to India's fury, the Chinese officials have taken to calling a part of this area as "South Tibet" in, what is deemed as, a bid to imply a Chinese claim to that territory.

The McMahon Line boundary dispute is at the heart of discordant relations between India and China. China has land and sea boundary issues with 14 neighboring nations, mostly for historical reasons. The Chinese have two major claims on what India considers its own territory. One claim, in the western sector, is on Axsai Chin in the north-eastern section of Ladakh District in Jammu and Kashmir. The other claim is in the eastern sector over a region included in the British-designated North-East Frontier Agency, the disputed part of which India renamed Arunachal Pradesh and made it a state. In the fight over these areas in 1962, the well-trained and well-armed troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army overpowered the ill-equipped Indian troops, who had not been properly acclimatized to fight at high altitudes.

The border between China and India has never been officially delimited. China's position on the eastern part of the border between the two countries is consistent. Not a single Chinese Government recognizes the "illegal" McMahon Line. For China, the McMahon Line stands as a symbol of imperialist aggression on the country. The so-called "Arunachal Pradesh" dispute is

China's most intractable border issue. Geographically, this area is flat and rich in water and forest resources. However, the wide gap between the positions of China and India on this issue makes it difficult for both nations to reach a consensus that might be mutually beneficial.

The era of the late 19th century and the early 20th century was developed with the European colonial powers finding new ways of exercising their influence in Asian region and dividing it up. Tibet was no exception to it. At that time, many kings and empires, from Muhammad Tughluq to the British, had tried to twist Tibet from China, with no significant achievements. Finally, the British came up with a deceitful strategy to divide Tibet from within, so as to create a buffer country between British India and China, just as Mongolia had been divided and part of it made into a buffer country between Russia and China. Sir Henry McMahon proposed the division of Tibet into an '*inner*' and '*outer*' Tibet. The Chinese representative saw through British grand designs and smelt a rat and thus left the Shimla Conference. But the matter didn't end there. A note was affixed to the Shimla Accord, which enclosed a map display a part of Tibetan territory as Indian, based on a thick red line known as the McMahon line. Additionally, China was barred from any rights and privileges of the Accord with respect to Tibet.

The major territories which are disputed between these two countries can be divided into three distinct parts:

- 1) The **Western Sector** - Axsai Chin, which lies to the east of the Kashmir valley, covering an area of about 37,250 sq.km (14,380 sq.mi) – It is administered by China as part of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, but is also claimed by India as a part of the Ladakh district of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The historical claims on the Axsai Chin areas are more doubtful. There has never been any solid demarcation of this region. British Bharat was concerned about Russian designs in this area, and hereafter proposed to make the Karakorum Pass as the boundary, so as to again make a buffer country between Xinjiang/China and India.

In early 1880, India and China agreed the Karakoram Pass as the stable point of boundary, while leaving both sides of the Karakorum pass indefinite. In the mid-1890, again China claimed Axsai Chin as its own territory, and voiced the claim to McCartney¹ line in 1896, whose

¹ Sir George Macartney, (19 January 1867 –19 May 1945), was the British general in Kashgar at the end of the 19th century. He was succeeded by Sir Clarmont Skrine. Macartney arrived in Xinjiang in 1890 as interpreter for the

sketched part of the British boundary in the Himalaya. Sir McCartney presented the privilege to the British who decided with his comment that the part of Axsai Chin was in China and part in British territory. For now, the forward school of British strategists in London proposed that the British should not only include the whole area of Axsai Chin, but also all the area given to Kashmir in 1865.

In 1899, the British proposed to China that the whole of Axsai Chin would remain Chinese territory and the boundary would be along the Karakorum Range. Till date, this remains the status quo. The Karakorum pass falls precisely on the boundary of territory controlled by India and China, marking the northern end of Sino – Indian border, known as the Line of Actual Control. The boundaries at the two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well defined, but the Axsai Chin area in between lay undefined. However, at that time, China did not reply to this proposal; something which it would regret for years. If it had responded, the fate of Axsai Chin would have been sealed then and there. Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian prime minister, for his part, appeared willing to play down the Indian claims to the Axsai Chin. He tried to delay disclosure of the news that the Chinese had built a road in that area. After the news had been exposed, he sought after to play down the economic significance of this area, describing it as “*barren tundra*” and where “*not even a blade of grass grows*”. He flat went so far as to cast doubt on the validity of the Indian claim to Axsai Chin.

In statements to the Indian Parliament during early 1959, Nehru pointed out that

“...during British rule, this area was neither inhabited, nor were there any outposts,this place, Axsai Chin area, is distinguished completely from other areas. It is a matter for argument which part belongs to us and which part belongs to somebody else. It is not clear”².

- 2) **The Middle Sector** – There are a few small part of territory in between the Eastern sector and Western sectors, but they are essentially irrelevant when compared to these two main distinct territories. This Area stretches from the Southern extremity of Kashmir to Nepal and covers the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Sikkim. These borders shared by Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand with Tibet. Shipki La and Kaurik areas in

Younghusband expedition. He remained there until 1918. Macartney first proposed the Macartney-MacDonald Line as the boundary between China and India in Axsai Chin.

² “*A Brief History of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute and the role of Tibet*” Hidden Harmonies China Blog, <http://blog.hiddenharmonies.org/2010/03/a-brief-history-of-the-sino-indian-border-dispute-and-the-role-of-tibet/> Accessed date May 12, 2012

Himachal Pradesh and parts around Pulam, Barahori, Kungri Bingri La, Thag La, Laphthal and Sangha are disputed.

- 3) **The Eastern Sector** - The Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh) is other portion of the Sino-Indian boundary disputes from the Bhutan tri-junction in the West to the Myanmar tri-junction in the East. The affected Indian state is NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh). In this Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls South Tibet, China disputes India's state over 90,000 square kilometer, most of the disputed part in Arunachal Pradesh. Tawang, Asaphi La, Bomdila Bum Laand Lo La are among the sensitive areas in this region. Strategically vital Tawang stays the key to the defence of the entire sub-Himalayan space in this region.

The McMahon line is the source of the Indian claim to this area which was formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency, and has since developed the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. It was drawn with a complete contempt for cartographic methods and the geography of the area. The scale used in NEFA was eight miles to an inch.

The Shimla Conference treaty map is topographically vague (as the treaty was not accompanied with demarcation), and the treaty includes no oral description of geographic features nor description of the peak ridges. There is no scientific method which uses cartographic methods to identify the geographical location of the line. The McMahon line was exactly a line on paper.

The status of the boundary at the time of India's independence along the Chinese border is clear from the maps (dated as late as 1950) produced by New Delhi. Four official maps showed the boundary from the Indo-China-Afghanistan tri-junction to the India-China-Nepal tri-junction as undefined, while all four depicted the McMahon Line as the boundary in the east.

The undefined boundary in the western sector reflects the British failure to successfully negotiate a boundary-settlement with China. The frontier in this sector includes a large piece of territory known as Axsai Chin projecting out to the north-east. The altitude of this area is over 16000 feet and the composition of its soil make it unfit for human habitation but has considerable strategic value to the Chinese for forming the shortest road link between Tibet and Sinkiang.

In the eastern sector, the McMahon Line came into existence in 1914 at Shimla which was accepted by India and Tibet but not by China though the Chinese representative at the Conference had not at any time complained about this bilateral agreement between India and

Tibet defining 850 miles of their borders. Independent India's policy towards its north-eastern border particularly Tibet was under sporadic consideration even before the civil war in China ended as it was felt that a strong Chinese Government would advance claims to the region below the McMahon Line.

China has continued its occupation of the Aksai Chin area, through which it built a strategic highway (G 219)³ linking Xizang and Xinjiang autonomous regions. China has a vital military interest in maintaining control over this region, whereas India's primary interest lay in Arunachal Pradesh, its state in the northeast bordering Xizang Autonomous Region. Booming bilateral trade has come to be the strong pillar of India- China rapprochement.

This has not only since overtaken the pace of political confidence-building but also has a substantial impact on their mutual perceptions. Their border trade has especially brought about a noticeable transformation in their remote and problematic border regions. This has contributed to overall tranquility and peace in the area and has as well facilitated progress in their border negotiations. This boom in trade has also introduced new trends. The two states are no longer only the recipients of foreign direct investment but have entered into a new phase of being investors, both mutually as also in other regions. In this new context, the increasing deficit in the energy sector and the competition to capture new markets present major challenges to sustaining this boom in their bilateral trade

India China relations have "strategic significance" and "global impact" as both are large developing countries and emerging markets. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang told as much to the visiting external affairs minister Salman Khurshid in May 2013, and on his return, the minister, in a press interview, said that "**India and China have to collaborate for the Asian century**". Shaping this vision should be the top agenda of the high-level dialogue later this month.

Changing the political relationship between two rising powers seeking to establish their territorial integrity, identity and rightful place in world affairs requires that both countries use the opportunity provided by their shared interest in global governance reform to develop close

³ It is one of the highest motor-able mountain roads in the world. China National Highway 219 (G 219) runs along the western border of the People's Republic of China, from Kargil in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It is 2,743 kilometers in length. Construction of this road was started in 1951. It was completed in 1957. The road passes through disputed area of Aksai Chin, an area administered by the People's Republic of China but also claimed by India, and its construction was one of the triggers for the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

cooperation, which will lead to a demarcated border rather than let a colonial legacy dominate bilateral relations.

Both sides have differences in perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Sino-India border areas. Both sides carry out patrolling activity in the Sino-India border areas. Beyond the limits the LAC are taken up through diplomatic channels at Border Personnel Meetings/Flag Meetings. India and China seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question through peaceful Meetings.

Sino- India Border disputes are the only issue which has a potential conflict/Threat. If ever, India and China go to war one day, it will be on this issue. India considers recurring Sino-Indian border clashes a potential threat to its security. Since the last war, each side continued to improve its military and logistics capabilities in the disputed regions.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The comparative study of the Sino-India border disputes in Arunachal Pradesh and Axsai Chin requires an in depth study to find out the reality and verify justifications for the claims and counter claims of both the countries. This study will also attempt to find the reasons as to why the India China border disputes have yet not been settled and what have been its effects on Sino-India relation. It also aims to examine the progress in the settlement of the India China border disputes.

There are major issues regarding Axsai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in the border disputes, and these issues are related to each other. These are: what has transpired in the political negotiations so far between India and China, and to what extent these have resolved the Himalayan border disputes. Also how valid is the McMahon Line and the worship of the Axsai Chin region.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The current study on the Sino-India relation with special reference to border disputes focuses on the two main border conflict issues (Arunachal Pradesh and Axsai Chin). Much work has been done by different scholars and researchers on these issues. Various authors have given different approaches in their books and articles which have been accessed for this thesis topic and with the help of which the thesis conclusion has been extruded. The gaps which were found during the research and analysis provide the scope for this literature. In this regard I have made a

humble attempt to study different trends and changes which took place in bilateral border disputes after Indian independence.

This study uses secondary sources as a basis to analyse the two focal areas of this research. Seeing that the research is a qualitative analysis, the texts have not only been used in a cognitive manner to put the observations in a context, but also to work as a foundation open for interpretation. This research is concerned with the nature and processes of the Sino-Indian relations, and, this study is conducted in order to make a comprehensive contribution to understanding the current state of the disputed areas. A major part of the secondary sources used in the research, has mostly been journals and articles.

The advantage of using journals and articles is that they are concise and narrowed down, which makes it easier to find relevant material to cover the specific issue area, in this case, the border dispute as well as the political and economic interdependence. As this research is based on earlier research, analyzing areas which have been studied before requires the research to be critical towards the literature, since all secondary sources to some extent are biased by the author's opinion. To reduce this risk as much as possible this research has used a wide range of sources with different approaches to the Sino-Indian relations. Some of the literature has thus leanings towards either the neo-liberal or neo-realist perspectives. As for the more cognitive parts of the research, for example, the historical background of the Sino-India relation and Sino-India Border Disputes, a more formal and objective selection of sources has been applied⁴.

Neville Maxwell, Jonathan Holslag, B. L. Sali, Robert G. Wirsing, Brig. J.P. Dalvi, Julie G. Marshall, Ronald Bruce St. John and Clive H. Schofield, Sudha Ramachandran, David C. Kang, Jo Johnson and Richard McGregor, Deshakalyan Chowdhury, Junwu Pan, Amardeep Athwal, Chi-kin Lo, David M. Malone, Subir Bhaumik, A.G. Noorani, Dorothy Woodman, Francis Weston, John W. Garver, Karunakar Gupta, Mohan Guruswamy, Alastair Lamb and many other writers have suggested that in the border disputes of China, different countries including India have become inseparable aspects of China's foreign policy. China's foreign policies advocate that their bilateral relation and disputes border issues with India should be treated in a separate manner. Chinese analysts never combine these two. This phenomenon produced a solid ground to maximize China's relations in the political, economic, and bilateral

⁴ I. M. Holme and B.K Solvang, (1996), "*Forsknings-metodik; Om kvalitative och kvantitative metoder*", third edition, TANO A.S. Oslo, pp. 126-129.

technological and some other spheres. Broadly, the literature can be divided into various categories;

Neville Maxwell's "*India's China war*"⁵ (1970): Its distinguishing feature is that it is the first analysis of India China war by a foreign scholar and clearly written from both perspectives. The author acknowledges that most of his sources are accurate and gives a comprehensive account of the 1962 India China war and, therefore, it is hardly surprising that he reaches some provocative conclusions. This book gives out the exact details about the 1962 war between India and China. It has got the Chinese point of view in going for war against India. It gives an insight into the era when China suddenly turned hostile against India after initial years of friendship. The information's therein leads us to think again about who was actually responsible for the debacle. It also gives out the details of the history which led to confusions, strife's and eventually the war. The book starts with a historical narrative of the Sino-India border dispute, and analyzes it from a theoretical perspective. The border conflict between China and India continued to be the most contentious issue after the independence between these two countries. The intricate connection of this dispute with the Tibetan issue suggests that it disturbs China's identity construction and regime legitimacy, thus adding to the security dilemma. The author does show some sympathy towards India and his writing hints at his having far greater access to Indian information than to the Chinese. However, Maxwell contests the "Defenseless and Aggrieved India" interpretation favored by both the U.S. and Soviet blocs. Carefully examining the imperially conditioned history of the boundaries, recent diplomatic documents, news reports, interviews, and analysis of the Sino-Soviet rift, and other geopolitical events, he reviews India's newly found good fortune and increased aid receipts after losing the war, and concludes that for India the war was "**A political ploy, not a war.**"

Maxwell's book does seem to ignore the Indian point about the differences noticeable between the maps of 1956 and 1959 drawn by the Chinese in respect of the claimed Aksai Chin frontier. True, India at the time did not make an issue of this whilst claiming the whole Aksai Chin and, just as China did not make an issue of India's misquotation of the 1899 proposal because it did not want to imply approval of the proposal, Delhi made only a brief mention of the map differences. Nevelle Maxwell concluded that the whole of Aksai Chin was a no-man's land, which was an unacceptable and unsatisfactory conclusion.

⁵ This book was first published in India by Jaico Publishing House, Bombay in 1970, eight years after the 1962 war between India and China. The current edition has been published by Mrs. Veena Arora, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun in 2010.

K. Warikoo's "*Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives*" (2008-Taylor & Francis US): The Himalaya, which is a great natural frontier for India, symbolises India's spiritual and national consciousness. The Himalayan region displays wide diversity of cultural patterns, languages, ethnic identities and religious practices. Along the Himalayas, converge the boundaries of South and Central Asian countries, which lend a unique geopolitical and geo-strategic importance to this region. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of historical, geo-political and strategic perspectives on the Himalayan Frontiers of India. Drawing on detailed analyses by academics and area specialists, it explains the developments in and across the Himalayas and their implications for India.

M. Taylor Fravel's "*Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes*" (2008- Princeton University Press): As China emerges as an international economic and military power, the world waits to see how the nation will assert itself globally. Yet, as the writer points out, global concerns, that China might be prone to violent conflict over territory, are overstated. The writer, in this first comprehensive study about China's territorial disputes, further contends that contrary to what many scholars and analysts expect, China, over the past sixty years has more often compromised in the conflicts with its Asian neighbours than used force. By developing theories of cooperation and escalation in territorial disputes, the writer explains China's willingness to either compromise or use force. When faced with internal threats to regime security, especially ethnic rebellion, China has been willing to offer concessions in exchange for assistance that strengthens the state's control over its territory and people. By contrast, China has used force to halt or reverse decline in its bargaining power in disputes with its militarily most powerful neighbors or in disputes where it has controlled none of the land being contested. Drawing on a rich array of previously unexamined Chinese language sources, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation* offers a compelling account of China's foreign policy on one of the most volatile issues in international relations.

Alastair Lamb's "*British India Tibet: 1766-1910*" (1960- Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd): The distinguishing feature of this book is that it is the first analysis of the northern frontier of British Indian empire along the Himalayas, in contrast with the north west frontier which separated British territory from Afghanistan to Burma. During this period emerged Nepal, which was a model of a buffer state, between Bhutan and Sikkim. This period also saw many conflicts originating in the Himalayan range, like, a number of crises in Tibetan-Nepalese relations between 1788 and 1856 and the war between Tibet and the state of Jammu and Kashmir (not yet under the British influence) in 1841-42. The impact of such conflicts on British India was

extremely indirect and produced at most a minor measure of British diplomatic activity. This is a useful but limited contribution to the origin of the border disputes specifically in western sector.

Junwu Pan's *"Toward a New Framework for Peaceful Settlement of China's Territorial and Boundary Disputes"* (2009-Martinus Nijhoff Publishers): As China becomes more integrated in global economic and political systems, it has become inevitable that it engages fully and actively in the international legal system. Notably missing in China's international engagement is its participation in international institutions on third party settlement of disputes, including territorial and boundary disputes. This work argues that, contrary to conventional understanding, much could be gained by China if it were to have a more positive attitude towards third-party settlement of its territorial and boundary disputes. This volume examines both the problems and opportunities China is confronting within the changing international context and offers new frameworks for settlement of China's major territorial and boundary disputes.

Amardeep Athwal's *"China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics"* (2008): This book analyses the modern-day dynamics of the Sino-Indian relationship, economics, energy and elite bilateral dialogue. The book first explores the crucial post-independence history of Sino-Indian relations to provide the appropriate contextual background. Thereafter, it explores the geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean in the light of soaring global energy demands. While acknowledging the credibility of neorealist insights in the realm of maritime rivalry by detailing China's and India's naval build-up and naval strategy, it finds that the security dilemma argument is overstated. Therefore, it seeks alternative explanations for both Chinese and Indian activities in Southern Asia. In the economic realm, Sino-Indian bilateral trade is rapidly expanding every year. The book highlights how China and India are beginning to coordinate energy policy to transform the Sino-Indian relationship from a framework of conflict and competition to cooperation. The book concludes that there are serious mitigating factors in the Sino-Indian relationship, but argues that an exclusively neorealist outlook is impoverished.

David M. Malone's *"Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy"* (2011-Oxford University Press): India today looms large globally, where it hardly loomed at all twenty years ago. It is likely to be a key global actor throughout the twenty-first century and could well emerge soon as one of the top five global powers. Does the Elephant Dance? Seeks to survey the main features of Indian foreign policy. It identifies elements of Indian history relevant to the topic, examines the role therein of domestic politics and internal and external security challenges, and of domestic and international economic factors; and in successive chapters delves into the specifics of India's policy within its South Asian neighborhoods, and with respect

to China, the USA, East Asia, Russia, and multilateral diplomacy. It also touches upon Indian ties with Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. India's "soft power", the role of migration in its policy, and other cross-cutting issues are analyzed, as is the role and approach of several categories of foreign policy actors in India.

George J. Gilboy, and Eric Heginbotham's *“Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm”* (2012- Cambridge University Press): This book offers an empirical comparison of Chinese and Indian international strategic behavior. It is the first study of its kind, filling an important gap in the literature on rising Indian and Chinese power and American interests in Asia. The book creates a framework for the systematic and objective assessment of Chinese and Indian strategic behavior in four areas: (1) strategic culture; (2) foreign policy and use of force; (3) military modernization (including defense spending, military doctrine, and force modernization); and (4) economic strategies (including international trade and energy competition). The utility of democratic peace theory in predicting Chinese and Indian behavior is also examined. The findings challenge many assumptions underpinning western expectations of China and India.

Tsering Shakya's *“The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947”* (1999- Columbia University Press): Since 1950, Tibet has been sandwiched between the British India and China. India, upon absolving itself of its colonial dominion, was finding its legs as a newly independent nation. China was seeking to simultaneously consolidate its new communist regime and engender a "motherland", and the United States, was striving to contain the perceived threat of international communism. The writer gives a balanced, blow-by-blow account of Tibet's desperate attempts to maintain her independence and safeguard her cultural identity amidst all this. The writer provides the first detailed account of behind-the-scenes political developments in Tibet and the Tibetan, Chinese, and British personalities involved, the first complete account of the CIA's involvement in Tibet and the establishment of a secret military base in the Nepalese Himalayas, the first description of Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's involvement following the Chinese invasion, and his failure to recognize the truth of what was happening in Tibet and the first detailed account of the negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government during the late 1970s and early 1980s and full assessment of the agenda behind the current and future developments in Tibet.

Parshotam Mehra's *“Essays in Frontier History: India, China, and the Disputed Border”* (2007- Oxford University Press): This focused upon the long simmering boundary disputes between Asia's two emerging major powers. The book came at a time when India and

China were constructively engaged in furthering strategic bilateral ties. Written over a span of nearly fifty years, the book reflects the circumstances and political mood of the period. The collection of essays which form the book is divided into two sections: The first is bibliographical notes and the other is summaries of individual essays.

Bhawna Pokharna's "*India-China relations: Dimensions and Perspectives*" (2009- New Century Publications): Border problem and Tibet factor are hurdles in the way of India-China relations. India and China are emerging superpowers of the world and together they can make 21st century an Asian Century. Immense scope lies for both India and China for constructive and cooperative partnership in various fields. This book examines India-China bilateral relation from various angles including regional and global perspectives. Border problems require solutions on lasting basis if bilateral economic cooperation between the two countries is to be promoted. This book also explores the cooperation such as culture, education, health, military, science and technology.

Rammanohar Lohiya's "*India China and Northern Frontiers*", (1963- B R Publishing Cooperation): This book is the collection of Lohiya's speeches and writings on India's northern frontiers and on Kashmir, Nepal and Tibet particularly; none of which date earlier than 1949. After the withdrawal of the British Power from India, western sector was under the incompetent governance of Nepal, while Tibet needed to be strong internally and externally.

A. G. Noorani's "*India- China Boundary Problem: 1846-1947 History and Diplomacy*" (2011-Oxford University Press): India-China boundary issues have always occupied a central focus in the relations. This book highlights the role of history, policy and diplomacy and traces the origin and escalation of India-China boundary problems during the British Period. The writer shows how the British efforts to secure a defined boundary in the western sector began immediately after the creation of Jammu and Kashmir, while in the eastern sector, such an exercise began only sixty six years later when the Chinese threat was perceived. This book evaluates the relevance of the Indian independence and explains how the diplomatic history in last hundred years shaped the boundary problem between India and China.

Eugene L. Rasor's "*The China-Burma-India Campaign, 1931-1945: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography*", (1998- Greenwood Press): In this book the discipline is of history, and historiography. This book is divided into two major sections; first is the historiographical narrative section, including a general survey and review of everything collected during the visit to India, China, Burma (Myanmar). Second is Annotated Bibliography. This involved the

provision of screening defences at the Line of Actual Control and the building of strong defence nodes at key points along the frontier. While the forces to man the defences were ready, the nodes were not, and India's greatest weakness was in this area (Axsai Chin), that is, the servicing road network had not been built.

Jonathan Holslag book "*China and India*", is a useful but limited contribution to this small genre of literature on contemporary Sino-Indian Border relations. The principal strength of his book is that it covers the historical, diplomatic, economic, and strategic dimensions of that relationship. The limitations of the work are equally obvious. At a structural level, he sets up a dubious parallelism between political developments in China and India, where some of his interpretations of Indian politics are questionable, and on other occasions he dismisses Indian security concerns. Finally, the work could have benefited from the services of an able copyeditor. The book is riddled with infelicities of expression and a number of howlers.

B. L. Sali's "*India China Border Dispute*", (1998- A P H Publishing House) has focused upon Arunachal Pradesh minerals and forests resources, from the defence point of view. Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern Sector) can be considered as the main gate of that front. Suppose Arunachal Pradesh ceases to exist then it will be immediately Assam, and if Assam is taken, then it will be Bihar and then West Bengal, and thus India itself will cease to exist.

Robert G. Wirsing's "*India, Pakistan and the Kashmir: on regional conflict and its Resolution*" (1998- Palgrave Macmillan): Various new equations were coming in the border disputes, and in such a case, the first task was to identify and define the fundamental boundary-related issues that are in contention today over Kashmir and second to present clearly and to evaluate as fairly as possible the arguments advanced by various sides in regard to these issues. The purpose is diagnostic, and if it were done successfully, it would have laid a part of the foundation for later discussions focusing on the problem of designing a peaceful settlement of the disputes.

Brig. J.P. Dalvi's "*Himalayan Blunder: the curtain-raiser to Sino-Indian war of 1962*" (1969- Natraj Publishers, Dehradun). This book is based on Chinese military attack on India. Because there were no other feasible defensive locations north of Tawang, the Government had more or less decided that in the event of a new war, they would abandon the town and prepare for battle at the Se La Pass to its East. It was decided by the military strategists that it was important to defend Tawang in a future conflict. The army made it clear that the only viable line of defence for Tawang would be along the Hathung La ridge. In 1983, an Intelligence Bureau

team went to the pasturage of Sumdorong Chu which is north-east of the confluence of the Namka Chu and Nyamjiang Chu. The defence forces stayed through the summer and returned in winter. This procedure was followed for two years. In 1986, Indian forces found that the Chinese had preceded them and set up semi-permanent structures there.

Julie G. Marshall's "*Britain and Tibet 1765-1947 Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan*" (2005-Routledge, New York): He writes about historical border disputes. In 1826 the British acquired Assam from the Burmese following their victory in the first Anglo-Burmese war. Before the first Anglo- Burmese war, this region was mainly regarded as a buffer between Assam and Tibet. There was interest, however, in major triage routes which connected Tibet and Assam. One route runs from Lhasa through Tawang and over the Se La, while the second route connected Rima in eastern Tibet with Sadiya in Assam by the way of the Lohit River. Most interest centered in the Lohit river route as this was the shortest route through Tibet to China.

Ronald Bruce St. John and **Clive H. Schofield's** "*The Land of Boundaries of Indochina*" (1998) has connected to the border disputes. Economic relationship and the effectiveness of the 1993 and the 1996 political and military CBM agreements critically depend on the delineation of the LAC. India has indicated it wants stable and growing ties with China and is not averse to reasonable compromises. The Chinese initiative so far has stressed on economic cooperation and 'friendly' political ties, but has been woefully short of substance in areas that shape the dynamics of the relationship.

Sudha Ramachandran in his article "*China plays long game on border disputes*" (June 27, 2011) has concluded that China's strategy for resolving its border disputes and the nature of its border-resolution mechanism provide useful pointers to what lies ahead. In the past, "it is when the contestant state is weak that China has moved quickly to resolve the dispute," points out Kondapalli. The way it went about handling its territorial disputes with the Soviet Union is indicative. Although China did discuss them with the Soviet Union, it was only when the USSR disintegrated that Beijing moved quickly to achieve resolution. This has implications for the resolution of the Sino-Indian territorial dispute.

David C. Kang's "*China Rising: Peace, Power and the order in East Asia*" (2007-Columbia University Press). The writer has dealt on East Asian peace stability and accommodation of China because international relation theorists have traditionally associated the rise of great power with war and instability realism in all its variants with its emphasis on balance of power politics while showing consistently pessimistic expectation for East Asia.

Jo Johnson and **Richard McGregor** in their article *“China Raises Tension in India border disputes”* have concluded that the country's navy chief said there was "no evil intent" in trilateral naval exercises with Japan and the US along the Pacific coastline of East Asia. India has also held exercises with China, Russia and south-east Asian states. India cancelled a confidence-building visit to China by 107 elite civil servants after China denied a visa to an official from Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that he was "Chinese" and did not need one. Analysts said the denial of the visa was intended to reinforce China's claim to the entire state, not just disputed land around Tawang, which it has long asserted to be part of Tibet, being itself annexed in the 1950s.

Deshakalyan Chowdhury in his article *“China Chips 1600km Border, Treats JK out of India”* highlights how just two days after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit, China had taken a U-turn in border disputes with India, saying that Sino-Indian border was only 2,000-km long. China has shortened nearly 1600 kms of the Indian border, which means Jammu and Kashmir has been taken from India.

Claude Arpi *“1962 and the McMahon Line Saga”* Lancer Publishers LLC: In this book the author writes about the India-China war period. India went through a tragic event which has created a deep scar in the country's psyche: a border war with China. During the author's archival peregrinations on the Himalayan border, he went into some relatively little known issues, such as the checkered history of Tawang; the British India policy towards Tibet and even the possibility for India to militarily defend the Roof of the World. The author also looks into why the Government still keeps the Henderson Brooks Report under wraps and what were Mao's motivations for 'teaching India a lesson'. Throughout this series of essays, the thread remains the Tibet-India frontier in the North-East and the Indo-Chinese conflict. The more one digs into this question, the more one discovers that the entire issue is intimately linked with the history of modern Tibet; particularly the status of the Roof of the World as a de facto independent nation.

Anna Orton's *“India's Borderland Disputes: China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal”* (2010- Epitome Books): Boundaries are manifestations of national identity. They can be tripwires of war. This is all the more important if the involved parties are nuclear powers. It threatens to inflame long-standing boundary disputes that India has with China, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. This book attempts to examine all the major aspects of these disputes. Going deep into their historical legacies, it discusses at length their causes, consequences and the ways to how to solve them.

David Smith's *"The Dragon and the Elephant: China, India and the New World Order"* (2010- Profile Books): The rise of China and India will be the outstanding development of the 21st century, raising fundamental questions about both the structure of the world economy and the balance of global geopolitical power. Will China still be a repressive and undemocratic regime, embracing free market economics but only when it suits? How aggressive a superpower will it be? And what about India, whose huge and growing population and economic prospects appear to guarantee prosperity? David Smith analyses the ways in which the world is tilting rapidly eastwards, and examines all the implications of the shift in global power to Beijing, Delhi and Washington.

Chih H. Lu's *"The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Legal Study"* (1986- Greenwood Press): This book explores the roots of the Sino-Indian border dispute and proposes a settlement that might be acceptable to both China and India. Lu provides the historical perspective necessary for a complete understanding of the problem, beginning with the seventh century, when China and Tibet first made contact. He argues that a settlement of the dispute is necessary not only for the peace of the Indian subcontinent but for other parts of the world as well. He explains why and how Great Britain came to be involved in Sino-Tibetan relations and pays particular attention to the failure of the Simla Conference of 1913-1914 between Britain, China, and Tibet to define a common boundary between China and India. The author explores Indian involvement in Sino-Tibetan relations and why India intervened against China's reoccupation of Tibet. He traces the border incidents and military clashes between China and India and the failure of the two powers to negotiate a settlement of their differences. Finally, he discusses the Sino-Indian border dispute from the perspectives of international law, effective occupation, and watershed. In conclusion, he offers some reasonable, practical measures based on international law and political reality that could be taken to settle the border dispute.

Jeff M. Smith's *"Cold Peace: China India Rivalry in the Twenty First Century"* (2013- Lexington Books): This book updates and deepens our understanding of the China–India relationship by unraveling the complex layers of the contemporary China–India rivalry. This book draws from over 100 interviews with subject-matter experts, Government officials, and military officers in India, China, and the United States between November 2011 and July 2013. It also benefits from rare and unique field research at the disputed China–India border in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh; at the contested town of Tawang in the Himalayas; at Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan Government in Exile; at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands; and on Hainan Island, which administers China's South China Sea territories. With 14 chapters dedicated to

issue-specific studies, including threat perceptions in China-India Relations, the border dispute, Tawang, Tibet, the Dalai Lama succession issue, maritime security, and the role of the United States and Pakistan in Sino-Indian relations, cold peace provides a comprehensive examination of the evolution of China-India relations. The twenty-first century is likely to witness Asia's two largest civilizations, China and India, join the United States in an elite club of global superpowers. By some economic indicators, the two Asian giants are already the second and third largest economies in the world, and they are developing world-class militaries to complement that economic clout. While Beijing and Delhi have spent the past half-century free from armed conflict and enjoy cordial diplomatic relations, elements of rivalry have shadowed the relationship since the two countries went to war in 1962 over their disputed Himalayan border. In the twenty-first century, that rivalry has evolved in unpredictable ways, advancing in some arenas and retreating in the face of growing cooperation in others.

K. N. Raghavan's [*“Dividing Lines: Contours of India-China Conflict”*](#) (2012- Leadstart Publishing Pvt Ltd): India and China, the inheritors of two ancient civilizations and aeons of neighbourly bonds cemented by Buddhism and the bridge-building missions of Fa-Hien, Huen Tsang, Tagore and Kotnis, never witnessed strife between themselves till the fateful autumn of 1962, when they fought a short but bitter border war on the desolate heights of the Himalayas. Mutual suspicion and sporadic face-offs have ever since bedeviled relations between the two Asian giants, based on their still-unsettled borders. What caused the tragic estrangement of Asian leading lights? In this cogent and comprehensive analysis, the author traces the origins of the discord to a legacy flawed by the flip-flops of imperial Britain unilateral border delineation, and the ebbs and flows of Chinese activism in Tibet. The gripping narrative carries us from the post-1947 scenario of initial Panchsheel bonhomie, yielding place to mutual distrust, aggravated, among other causes, by Chinese paranoia over Tibet and the unrelenting pressure of Indian public opinion. India cataclysmic defeat in the war, which remains as a historic national humiliation, is attributed to the ill-advised forward policy and failure of the politico-military leadership at that time, revalidating the Clemenceau adage, that war is too important a matter to be left to generals.

Nimmi Kurian's [*“India-China Borderlands: Conversations beyond the Centre”*](#) (2014- Sage Publications India): The book will be of primary interest to those working on international relations, border studies, comparative regionalism and India-China relations. Despite the compelling immediacy of a 4,056 km long border, it is intriguing that when we think of India and China, we typically think of Delhi and Beijing and not locations along the shared border.

The book engages with this interesting puzzle through a critical comparative analysis of India–China relations at the sub-regional level. It will locate the massive state-led developmental thrust that India’s northeast and China’s western border regions are witnessing under the rubric of the Look-East policy and the Western Development Strategy respectively. As India and China re-imagine their borders as bridges, what role will border regions play in the evolving foreign policy orientation? The book offers a new orientation to the study of India–China relations by bringing people back into the centre of these sub-regional conversations of change.

Shishir Gupta’s [“The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte”](#) (2014-Hachette UK): Even if bilateral trade between India and China goes beyond \$100 billion in the coming years, China’s posture towards India is adversarial and will perhaps remain so in the future, with Beijing viewing New Delhi through the prism of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-exile. A rising China, inflexible on boundary dispute resolution and with strong tentacles across South Asia and beyond, could encroach on India’s strategic space and lead to a potential crisis this decade. In April 2013, Indian troops sighted an advance patrol of the Chinese People Liberation Army (PLA) 19 km deep within Indian Territory, a considerable distance from the Line of Actual Control, the de facto border claim line that was drawn up after the 1962 war between the two countries. That war still traumatizes the mind of India’s political and military establishment. Protracted negotiations led to the withdrawal of Chinese troops, but the incursion laid bare the intent of the world largest standing army. Despite recent advances in the bilateral relationship, highlighted by the nearly \$70 billion trade between the two countries, China continues to regard Indian interests as secondary, and India as a regional adversary. The author details here various advances made by Beijing, particularly the PLA, in encircling India and stifling the latter’s bid to break out as an aspiring superpower and also discusses Indian political, diplomatic and military responses to China’s assertion in the subcontinent and beyond, and the various course corrections India must undergo in its foreign and defense policies to counter Chinese might and influence on matters of India’s national security. In describing how India must realize and counter Chinese clout over India’s friends and enemies in order to achieve superpower status, Gupta sheds new light on Indo-China relations. *The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian riposte* is an important reminder of the realigned geopolitics of the modern world, where the two most populous nations on the planet are essentially battling each other over their share of the global pie at the world’s highest battlegrounds.

Archana Upadhyay *“India's Fragile Borderlands: The Dynamics of Terrorism in North East India”* (2009- I. B. Tauris): This book examines the long term effects of border state terrorism on the population of north east India - where the best-known conflict is the Naga tribe's ongoing campaign for a greater Nagaland - as well as its international consequences. India's Fragile Border traces the development of terrorist groups within the region from small domestic groups to internationally connected and financed organizations. This book examines comprehensive and penetrating study three major components of terrorism, the condition of terrorism, in their national, global and historical context; the nature and manifestations of this phenomenon in India's north eastern frontiers. Third is trends within counter-terrorism and security and their effectiveness, both within this region and internationally. Eastern borders Share with China, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and Bhutan, the region is abound with nationalist, separatist and even religious organizations that have used terrorism as a strategy to achieve their aims. Archana Upadhyay explores the complex and specific ideologies of these groups while highlighting the cross-border links and connections with organized crime that fund the violence in the region.

Ewan W. Anderson's *“International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas”* (2003- Psychology Press): This book is a comprehensive study of borders and border vulnerability and this important resource clearly chronicles and maps territorial boundaries of the world's nations. In the light of resurgent nationalism, the fall of communism, and the lingering legacy of colonialism, territorial boundaries remain a contentious issue for many states. Arranged by country, this timely atlas examines in detail the topography and geography of borders, as well as treaties and other diplomatic maneuverings that have set modern-day territorial boundaries. Featuring measurements of the political, economic, social, and military relationships between states, combined with a measure of geographical accessibility, the atlas also explores the probability of conflict. In this book various details about treaties and other important legal settlements have been given that have set today's borders; each boundary is explained both with descriptive text as well as visually on maps that provides an assessment of geopolitical vulnerability for each boundary. In a time when over 70 percent of international conflicts are related to boundaries--from local tensions such as those over Abu Musa, to macro-political issues involving trans-boundary flows of drugs, arms, and terrorism.

Robyn Meredith's *“The Elephant and the Dragon”* (2008-Viva books Private Limited): This work explains that China has continued to wave the banner of communism while simultaneously transforming itself into a commercial juggernaut that inspires fear and envy in

workers and CEOs worldwide. Although China has modernized its economy partly by getting foreign firms today, its politics are stuck in the past, with no democracy in sight, while courting a countrywide environmental catastrophe. *The Elephant and the Dragon* is the essential guide to understanding how India and China are reshaping our world with labor now unbound from geographic borders. We are seeing startling shifts in how—and where—nearly everything we buy is made. In a compelling mix of history and on-the-ground reporting, veteran journalist Robyn Meredith untangles the complex web of business and politics, as well as environmental and cultural issues that entwine India, China, and the West.

Yukteshwar Kumar's *"A History of Sino-India Relations: 1st century AD to 7th century AD"* (2005- A P H Publishing Corporation, New Delhi): India and China have been friendly and neighborly nations for more than two thousand years; their culture having mutually influenced each other for more than two millennium and we do not find any parallel of this kind in the history of mankind. This book is the result of the writer's effort to research the cultural and social interface between two nations in every century.

Mohan Guruswamy & Zorawar Daulet Singh (2009), *"India China Relations: Border Issue and Beyond"* Viva Books Private Limited: This book has revisited the seemingly intractable India China border dispute from a contemporary conflict resolution perspective. The work also points out several issues that Indian scholars need to further examine. One such is the exact thinking in New Delhi that led to the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 in which India appeared to have signed away more than it received in return as also the decision to pursue a forward policy in the late 1950s that increasingly lost any military logic and perhaps more studies need to be carried out in due course of the causes that that led to diplomatic rapprochement between India and China that culminated in the Rajiv Gandhi visit of 1988 and resulted also in the major breakthrough agreements on the boundary of 1993 and 1996. Indeed, more important in the larger picture, than understanding the Sino-Indian dispute itself, is to comprehend the process of Indian decision-making on China, to examine whether the miscommunications between branches of the executive or the blatant disregard of the views of one by another that led to "the debacle of 1962" still continue. The authors, meanwhile, have clarified that the Parliamentary resolution of 1962 did not necessarily tie the Government's hands in achieving a settlement of the dispute with China that involved ceding territory. While the core of the book is indeed a historical exposition of the dispute with little by way of new insights, the usefulness of the book lies in putting together an accurate, fairly objective account

that serves as a useful primer for both the scholar and practitioner on the one hand as well as the lay reader on the other.

Namrata Goswami in her article *“Ending Sino-Indian Border Dispute Essential to Continued Prosperity”* (16-1-2013) has given her views in article on the Sino-India border disputes and economical relation. Sino-India border tensions have been increasing. At present, both China and India are major global economies. Trade between them was negligible in 1962. After war India China relation start on 1988. Today, it stands at \$75 billion and will soon pass the \$100-billion mark. However, despite growing bilateral economic relations, the border dispute appears Stubborn. Sino-Indian relations are still affected by some thorny divergences over issues like the McMahon line, Chola Incident and the presence of the "Tibetan Government-in-exile." These contradictions are further complicated by border negotiations held in a climate of Indian apprehensions that the 1962 border war between India and China could be repeated.

Yuki Kawaguchi in his article *Arunachal Pradesh Territorial Dispute between India and China* (2005) has described that a long time ago, before the territorial dispute between China and India emerged in Arunachal Pradesh, the first ancestors of the tribal groups migrated from Tibet during pre-historic period. In 1962, the Chinese had a claim on what India deemed its own territory called Arunachal Pradesh. China sent many well-trained and well-armed troops to the disputed region. On the other hand, India had only ill-equipped troops there, which made them more difficult to beat Chinese troops. The Sino-Indian (Indo-China) war was started by China on October 16, 1962 on account of the territorial dispute against India. This article describes the history of Arunachal Pradesh and territorial disputes.

Sumedh Lokhande in his article *Sino- Indian border disputes* has described that India and China relation has been like a rollercoaster ride since India became independent (1947) and the Chinese revolution (1949). The relation and border disputes are moving parallel after one war. As a result the border issue is still disputed as this region is most important for both to meet their economic ambitions than merely for nationalist emotions attached to it. In the present circumstances when India is also rising along with China and aspires to be a great power in its own right, a solution to the boundary question seems to be a far cry.

H. Srikanth in his article *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: Overcoming Nationalist Myopia* (2012) has projected India's defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962 as the country being a victim of Chinese aggression. India's experience of the 1962 indicates that war cannot resolve the border dispute. It is true that after the 1962 war, India has diverted much of its meager

resources to substantially increase its military capabilities over the decades. India is not the only country that has a sentimental attachment to the Himalaya. India does not need to cite the McMahon Line to argue its case for Arunachal Pradesh; the fact that the people of the state have since independence remained a part of India, voluntarily associated and identified themselves with the Indian Union and demonstrated their allegiance to India by participating in national political processes is enough to argue that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of the India nation state. The exact border alignment between Arunachal Pradesh and China can be decided after joint surveys and consultations. This article argues that only a give-and-take policy will put an end to the vexed dispute between India and China.

Liu Zongyi in his article *Border Conflict Stirs Old Resentments over 'Incursions' in Indian media* (13-5-2013) has alleged the Indian media for fuelling rumours about Chinese insurgency into the Indian territories. The India-China border dispute is heating up again. A "tent confrontation" between the Chinese army and the Indian army has been continuing near the Line of Actual Control (LAC). From an Indian perception, the Chinese army has invaded Indian Territory, and this time it is the most serious invasion in the past 25 years. Some Indian media outlets claim that China has invaded Indian Territory 600 times in the past three years. This article shows Chinese point of view and blames Indian media.

NATURE AND SCOPE

The analytical study of these bilateral relations of Sino-India with special reference to border disputes is giving an opportunity to the researcher to study the problem in a changing scenario of international policy of liberalism. The researcher has provided the historical background of the existing disharmony, sprouting out of seizure of Tibet by China. Empirical study based on field survey has been used by the researcher to draw the findings.

The area of Arunachal Pradesh and Axsai Chin has been taken as a case study. The major reason behind that is an area of thinking about the Sino-Indian border dispute and its effect on their relationship, and in order to provide an understanding of the relative importance of trade and cooperation that might have a bearing upon the security setting between the two countries. The focus of this research thus lies in the contemporary relations between China and India, which hopefully will show what role trade and cooperation have had in moving the attention away from border security-related issues on to more positive fields.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The proposed study would look into the below mentioned points -

- ❖ To evaluate Chinese strategy and approach towards Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin.
- ❖ To study the role of developed countries in Sino-India border disputes.
- ❖ To analyse whether Sino-India border clashes pose a potential threat to their border security.
- ❖ To identify the various initiatives for resolving the border disputes in the Sino-India dispute.

HYPOTHESIS

- ❖ The border disputes play a very crucial role in shaping and organizing relationship between the two countries.
- ❖ Geo-political and colonial factors are responsible for the Sino-India border disputes.
- ❖ Pakistan plays as a fulcrum in the Sino-India Dispute.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The present study has involved historical, empirical and descriptive study of the Sino-India border dispute. It has attempted data-based quantitative analytical approach to the nature and main characteristics of the subject under study. Among the primary sources are documentary information and Government material related to peace treaties and these have been supplemented by reports from embassies and information about leading international figures who took an active part in giving India and China a definite shape in international scenario. The discussions and interviews conducted time and again with ambassadors of both the countries have framed the crucial part of the existing research problem. The field survey was conducted during the research that has strengthened the study.

Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin are taken as case studies of the radical change in the critical situation of international scenario. The independent variables are the national interest, their political objectives, developmental approach, massive support in favour of them and the dependent variable consists of stability factor of the Government, changing pattern of 21st

century international politics, and the increasing ratio of border disputes at the same time economic relations.

A quantitative analysis has been conducted to determine the main features of the neighbouring countries, their performance, economic reforms in the pre-war and post-war period and the ever changing political interests over the decades. In the present research both primary and secondary sources have been used. Secondary sources include books, journals, magazines, newspapers, abstracts to give appropriate shape to the findings.

This research has been conducted as a qualitative study, as this research aims to give a wide understanding of the Sino-Indian relationship, rather than trying to generalize and measure variables with statistics. As qualitative methods focuses on giving text-based answers, usually based on historical reflections, events and processes, it suits the purpose of this research well. Additionally, this research will have a holistic perspective where emphasis will not be laid on single variables, but rather on the whole, thus placing the analysis in a historical, temporary, as well as international context.⁶

The research will interpret the relationship, in order to give a further understanding and emphasis on the area studied. As this research will take an interpretive approach, it is important to make conscious choices of what is relevant and not. The Interpretive approach also reflects the more ‘soft’ aim of the research to ‘understand’ processes, rather than to explain objective phenomenon. Thus, looking at the actors’ interaction, in this research being China and India, as part of the social world where nothing can be concrete or certain, it logically leads the research towards an understanding of the situation, rather than giving explanations.

SCHEME OF CHAPTERIZATION

The present research work on Sino India relation with special reference to border disputes focuses on the border disputes and bilateral relations of these two nations. The work has been divided into five analytical body chapters. In these chapters we have discussed those changes which have come in the relations of both of the nations with the passing of time. Brief description of the chapters has been given here:

Chapter - I: The first chapter is the *introduction*, one which deals with the highlighting of the present research, its objectives, hypothesis, methodology and crucial historical background upon

⁶ A. Vromen, (2012), “*Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches*”, in *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, 3rd Edition, by D. March and G. Stoker, Palgrave Macmillan p. 249, 257.

which the entire study will move on to the present context. Review of the literature has been discussed as the necessary part of it to make it clear how much work has been done on this topic from varied angles and where it has found the gaps which provide the scope to the researcher to add his contribution through the present study.

Chapter-II: The Second chapter entitled *The Origin of Sino-India Border Issues*, explains the origin of the fundamental issues, broadly divided into two parts. It gives the details of the areas of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, specifically focusing upon the eastern, middle, and western sectors and the related controversies over it. Aksai Chin, its geographical location, details about the Pamzai Pass, its relevance to the present controversies, observatory remarks of travellers and researchers and the status of border disputes in post-independence era have also been included and discussed here in a detailed manner.

Chapter-III: The third chapter entitled *Causes of Sino-India Border Disputes*, explains the geo-factor as a potential cause of threat to the territory of both the countries and specifically the disputed areas and north-east frontier province of Assam state. The continuously increasing tension along the LAC have affected the ties between the two rising nations which share a major part of their boundary lines since their origin as new states in the International Politics. Although the tensions have been created due to construction of roads to maintain regional connectivity at border Areas. This chapter summarizes these factors in a rational, historical and empirical manner. Foreign trade and investment partnership, sports activities and active defence system and threat from the USA are such causes as such discussed to take closer to these two nations beyond the boundary problems.

Chapter-IV: The Fourth chapter entitled *McMahon Line in Security Perspective & Its Implications on Conflict Resolution*, focuses upon the security aspects of the McMahon line border area. It is considered as a variable in Indo-China border conflict resolution. Geo-strategic relevance of the area is the focal point in this chapter that extends itself to the transportation and communication also and analyses the part of both India and China. Different routes of transactions and their possible impacts, Indian defence preparedness in the area of Tibet and potential threat from the other side have been included here. Problem of settlement of refugees and tribal development through administrative efforts have been done to what extent, and moreover, the status of state for eastern sector is how much relevant is discussed in this chapter.

Chapter-V: The fifth chapter entitled *Melting Sino-India Deadlock*, clearly changes the dimension of the whole discussion as it moves itself towards the political

initiative that has been taken in the field of conflict resolution. Peace treaties, bi-lateral negotiations, round table conferences, peace policy pacts between the two countries.

Chapter- VI: The sixth chapter entitled *Pakistan as a Factor in Sino-India Relations* discusses in depth Pakistan as one of the most prominent factors in the dispute between the two countries.. Sino-Pak defence cooperation, nuclear deal, and Chinese presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, different power projects, and infrastructural developments have been probed very carefully and attempts have been made to decipher the implications of all exchanges between China and Pakistan.


Chapter-VII: The Seventh chapter entitled *Political Initiatives to Resolve Conflict in Border Areas*, discusses in depth all the initiatives of UPA and NDA Government's foreign Policy with China and vice versa. Foreign policies of both the coalition Governments and their success rate in achieving defined targets, their stand at the time of opposition and its changing features have also been highlighted here. The present NDA Government under the Prime Minister ship of Mr. Narendra Modi and its policies towards China has been given due attention in the research work. The current situation and the sensitivities due to movements by the Chinese forces at the border has been also documented and probed carefully.

Chapter-VIII: The Eighth chapter entitled *Conclusion* has brought together all the finding in the logical, rational manner so that the underlying truth of the Sino-India Border Disputes may be understood properly and a positive approach may be adopted in the direction of conflict resolution. In this chapter, attempts have been made to test the validity of the hypothesis and also to come out with certain suggestions acceptable to the parties concerned in the long drawn conflict in South Asia. Also it focuses upon the major findings and conclusions of this research in a scientific manner without any prejudices and malign.

Chapter-2

The Origin of Boundary Problem

The entire length of the Sino-Indian boundary lines along the great Himalayan massif-virtually is inaccessible mountains. For most of its length, the boundary follows the dividing watershed between Tibet to the North and five states of India from the West to the East. The Indian States from West to East are - Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. The inhospitable terrain combined with nearly perpetual inclement weather had prevented any meaningful administrative control over the border areas by either side. The Sino-Indian border dispute along the entire length of the boundary is subdivided into three sectors - Western, Middle and Eastern. The dispute in each of these three sectors is different and unique.



Map 2.1. Sino-India Disputed Sectors

In the above map we can see that the Western sector pertains to the boundary between the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Chinese province of Sinkiang (Xinjiang) and Tibet (Xizang). Towards the North-East corner of Jammu and Kashmir (province of Ladakh) are two prominent and near parallel mountain ranges, both running in a North-West to South, South-East direction. The Northern range is the Kuen Lun, while the Southern is called the Karakorum Range. Between these two ranges is enclosed the area known as 'Axsai Chin' meaning 'a desert of white stones.'

The Aksai Chin area is further subdivided into two geographically distinct sub-regions by a line of low lying hills running from West to East. The Southern portion is the Lingzi Tang (salt) plains. The Northern portion is mountainous and through it runs the strategically important Aksai Chin highway linking the Sinkiang region to Tibet. In essence, the dispute is as to whether the boundary lies along the Kuen Lun range or the Karakorum Range (South and East of the Karakorum Pass).

The Sino-Indian boundary, west of the Karakorum Pass is presently the de facto Sino-Pakistani boundary since Pakistan occupied the area in 1947-48, known thereafter as 'Pakistan Occupied Kashmir' (POK) or 'Azad Kashmir.' Despite strong protests by India, this segment of the boundary (West of the Karakorum Pass) has been formally delimited and subsequently demarcated following the Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement signed in 1963. The implications of this agreement on the overall border issue will be addressed in detail at later stage.

The middle sector relates to the border in that part of the Himalayas through which the river Sutlej flows on its way from the Tibetan plateau to the Indus valley. The pilgrimage route to the Hindu places of worship in the vicinity of Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarover, both inside Tibet, as also the trans-border trade routes, lie within this sector of the boundary. As the border has been relatively in constant use by traders and pilgrims, the boundary has over the years been known on ground by both sides. As a result, the dispute in this sector is of a minor nature vis-a-vis the other two sectors. Geographically, this sector stretches from the Southern extremity of Kashmir to Nepal and encompasses the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. The Eastern sector is the remaining portion of the Sino-Indian boundary from the Bhutan trijunction in the West to the Burmese (now Myanmar) tri-junction in the East. The affected Indian state is Arunachal Pradesh.

The segment of the Sino-Indian boundary in this sector, falling in the state of Sikkim that has been kept outside the purview had been formalized and demarcated following the 1890 Anglo-Chinese treaty. The Tibetan indentation, known as the Chumbi Valley, borders Sikkim. In a sense, the Sino-Indian boundary alignment in the Eastern Sector too had been legally formalized at the tripartite (British-Tibet-Chinese) Shimla Conference held in 1913-14 under the aegis of Sir Henry McMahon - the British foreign secretary. The boundary in this sector is frequently referred to as simply

the 'McMahon line.' The present communist regime of China does not recognize the Shimla Treaty and hence terms the boundary as the so-called 'illegal McMahon line'.

The Sino-Indian border dispute is essentially the outcome of the failure of India and China to mutually agree upon the exact alignment of their common boundary within the complexities of the great Himalayan ranges. The dispute first surfaced publicly in July 1958, when issue no. 95 (See the Map no. 2.7.) of China Pictorial carried a map showing large portions of Indian Territory as Chinese. This was strongly objected to by the Indian Government, to which the initial Chinese response was that the boundary had been drawn as per old maps and that the new Chinese Government was yet to undertake new surveys. A flurry of diplomatic exchanges ensued and in his letter dated 8 September 1959, Premier Chou En Lai for the first time acknowledged that there indeed existed 'differences' between the two sides over. The areas of dispute have been described and classified in their geographical context.

The 1962 India-China war was fought in this territory. An agreement to resolve the border dispute was concluded in 1996, including "*confidence-building measures*" and a jointly agreed Line of Actual Control. In 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India specified that all of Arunachal Pradesh is in Chinese territory.⁷ This was followed up with a military build-up,⁸ and many incursions into Sikkim, some penetrating by more than a kilometer.⁹ In 2009, India announced it would position extra military forces along the border¹⁰.

Axsai Chin

Axsai Chin is one of the two main disputed border areas between India and China, the other being Arunachal Pradesh. It is administered by China as part of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, but is also claimed by India as a part of the Ladakh district of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

⁷ "Arunachal Pradesh is our territory: Chinese envoy", Rediff India Abroad, November 14, 2006.

⁸ Subir Bhaumik's "India to deploy 36,000 extra troops on Chinese border", BBC, 23 November 2010.

⁹ Sudha Ramachandran, "China toys with India's border", Asia Times Online, Jun 27, 2008.

¹⁰ Wall Street Journal "The China-India Border Brawl" <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124578881101543463.html>, June 24, 2009.

Axsai Chin, Chinese (Pinyin) **Aksayqin**, is a portion of the Kashmir region, at the Northern-most end of the Indian subcontinent in South-central Asia. It constitutes nearly all the territory of the Chinese-administered sector of Kashmir that is claimed by India to be a part of the Ladakh area of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Geographically, Axsai Chin is a South-Westward extension of the Plateau of Tibet. The territory administered by China is situated largely in the southernmost part of the Uygur autonomous region of Xinjiang, China, with a small portion on the Southeast and South sides lying within the extreme Western limit of the Tibet autonomous region. With an average elevation of some 17,000 feet (5,180 meters), Axsai Chin consists largely of a high, isolated, inhospitable, and mostly uninhabitable plain bordered to the West and Southwest by the Karakoram Range and to the North and Northeast by the Kunlun mountains. Its terrain is more rugged to the Northwest, and there is internal drainage into small alkaline lakes in the East. The climate is cold and dry, with most of the little precipitation the region receives falling in the summer months of July and August.

Because of its remoteness and isolation, Axsai Chin was long an ignored corner of the subcontinent, but the Chinese built a military road through it in the 1950s in order to connect Tibet with Xinjiang. The Indian discovery of the road and objection to the Chinese presence in the sector was one of the factors leading to sharp border clashes between the two countries in 1962. At the conclusion of the conflict, China retained control of about 14,700 square miles (38,000 square km) of territory in Axsai Chin. The area remained a point of contention between the two countries.


In 1846 and 1847, the British Commissioners drew a boundary from a little North of the Pangong lake to the Spiti river, but they stopped there, and of the terrain to the North, between the Pangong lake and the Karakoram Pass, one of the British commissioners observed that it 'must be viewed as *Terra incognita*' so that in that direction of the Northeast boundaries Tibet cannot be correctly defined. That the alignment of the line there was not of much consequence was to be belied. It was the heart of the Sino-India boundary dispute just over one hundred fifty years later.

A boundary alignment that filled the gap between the Pangong Lake and the Karakoram Pass was provided by W. H. Johnson¹¹ (An officer of the Survey of British India), who visited Khotan Area in 1865 and Travelled back across Axsai Chin; the name means '*Desert of white stones*'. Where nothing grows and no one lives, lying between the towering ranges of the Karakoram and the Kuen lun, this solitude area was to be the bone of conflict between the India and the People's Republic of China in the twentieth century.

Axsai Chin is a high altitude desert. In the Southwest, the Karakoram Range forms the *de facto* border (Line of Actual Control) between Axsai Chin and Indian-controlled Kashmir. Glaciated peaks in the mid portion of this boundary reach heights of 6,950 meters (22,800 ft). In the North, the Kunlun range separates Axsai Chin from the Tarim Basin, where the rest of Hotan County (in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) is situated. According to a recent detailed Chinese map, no roads cross the Kunlun Range within Hotan Prefecture, and only one track does so, over the Hindu Kush pass.

The Northern part of Axsai Chin is referred to as the Soda Plain and contains Axsai Chin's largest river, the *Karakosh*, (the river), which receives melt water from a number of glaciers, and crosses the Kunlun farther Northwest, in Pishan County (in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) and enters the Tarim Basin.

¹¹ William H. Johnson was a British surveyor active in the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia, who became Governor of Ladakh (Jammu & Kashmir).



Map 2.2. Boundary Lines in Aksai Chin Area

Source: Dorothy Woodman (1969) *Himalayan Frontiers* & Neville Maxwell (1970) *India's China War*

The Eastern part of the area contains some small endorsee basins. The largest one of them is that the Aksai Chin Lake, which is known by the river name. About 17,000 feet elevation, the misery of Aksai Chin had no human importance other than an oldest trade route that crossed over it, provided that a brief pass during summer for convoys of yaks between Xinjiang and Tibet.¹²

¹² Neville Maxwell, (1970) *India's China War*, New York: Pantheon, Reprinted 2010, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, p. 26 .

One of the oldest treaties regarding this Axsai Chin boundaries in the Western sector was issued in 1842. The Sikh Federation of the Punjab region in India had occupied Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834. In 1841, they occupied some areas of Tibet with an army. Chinese army defeated the Sikh army and in turn arrived Ladakh and besieged Leh. Once being checked by the Sikh armies, the Chinese and the Sikhs signed an accord in September 1842, which specified no interference in the other country's frontiers.¹³ When the British came, they defeated Sikhs in 1846 resulting into the transference of sovereignty over Ladakh to the British Rule, and British officials attempted to meet with Chinese officials to discuss the border they now shared. However, both sides were apparently adequately satisfied that a traditional border was recognized and clear by natural elements, and thus the border was not specifically demarcated.¹⁴ The boundaries at the two margins, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were well-defined, but the Axsai Chin area in between lay undefined.¹⁵

The region between Pangong Tso and Linghithang (Southern Axsai Chin) is known for its pasture lands. The graziers from Phobrang, Man, Kaksek, Marak, Spangmik, Tankse, used to visit Kyam, Hot Spring and then cross Kongka Pass upto the frontiers of Lanak La Pass. They also took their flocks to the area of Spanggur Lake and both sides of Pare River.

The strategic significance of Chang Chenmo ridge lies in providing artery for trade since ancient times through its land which is rich in grass and fuel. There were two historical trade routes which ended at Shahidullah which till end of 19th century was part of Kashmir kingdom as a frontier outpost.

Pamzal pass

Pamzal on the old trade route to Kashgar to the North-West and to Khotan (Singkiang) to the North-East from Leh (Ladakh, India). A camping ground near the left bank of the Changchenmo River, at the junction of Rimdi that comes down from

¹³ Alfred P. Rubin, *The Sino-Indian Border Disputes*, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan., 1960), pp. 96-125.

¹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁵ Mohan Guruswamy, (January 2006). *Emerging Trends in India-China Relations*. India: Hope India Publications. p. 222. Retrieved 2010-09-12.

the North of Marsmik La along Western limits of Chang Chenmo valley-Malikshah to Shahidullah.

Demchok Area

Indian and Chinese Governments delimit the Eastern boundary of Ladakh in Demchok area. The differences are in the status of border village of Demchok. The **treaty of Tingmosgang** signed in 1683 between the King of Ladakh and the Government of Tibet is noteworthy as the earliest historical record on the boundary. As per the treaty, the Rudok and Guge (region of Western Tibet adjoining Ladakh) were given to Tibet with frontier at Lhari stream at Demchok. The treaty of 1846 at Lahore between Government of Lahore and Emperor of China after the defeat of Dogras led to the appointment of a boundary commission to determine the Eastern limits of the Kingdom.



Map 2.3. Demchok Area

Lanak La Pass

“The boundary continues along top of the ridge so as just to leave to Ladakh the little rivulet running by Rahnang and leading upto the pass called the Tsakala as also the Chushool rivulet running down the other side into the Lake Pankung.¹⁶”

¹⁶ Virendra sahai verma,(2010) *sino-Indian border dispute at Axsai Chin A middle path for resolution*, <https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDQOFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2FchinaIndiaborderdispute.files.wordpress.com%2F2010%2F07%2Fvirendraverm%2Fpaperborderdispute.pdf&ei=7pDjUZDCNITrQf2l4GYDw&usq=AFQjCNGLn52OglY75btuo9r8a3Q52uAd1w&sig2=woMTeeBFWNei7nflQ7eC9g>

The pass called 'Tsakla' (probably Lanakla) is at its (boundary's) Eastern extremity. His description beyond this pass makes it clear that Changchenmo valley is within Ladakh before it joins Karakoram Range. Agnew's was the first description of the traditional boundary by a responsible officer of the Government of India.

He makes it clear that the water shed of Shyok and its tributaries such as Chip Chap were in the Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir. These valleys are in South of Laktsang ridge in Changchenmo region.

Lanak La has also been described as the accepted border between Ladakh and Tibet by several travellers. Notably amongst them are as follows:-

a) **Capt. H. H. Godwin** – He was working for topographical survey and sketched upper Changchenmo and Northern border of the Pangong dist in Eastern Ladakh in 1862-1863. He assumed the frontier at village Pal as the Zimskang of Rudok, having pitched his tent on the opposite side of stream at Pal and Ladakh Government requested him with a letter and gifts from the Governor not to cross the border.¹⁷

b) **Capt. M S Wellby**. He had left Leh for Tibet in May 1896, and wanted to cross the border at Wapula La Pass (18434 ft), a shorter route. However, Tibetan officials stopped him and guided him to the East side of Lanak La (our frontier). Capt Wellby mentions the Lanak La as the then accepted border between Ladakh and Tibet.¹⁸

c) **A D Carey** made the same point in his diary on August 21, 1885,

“Gentle ascent to head of Lanoka pass. From top of this pass slight descent into valley with wood, water, and little grass. At 5th mile a grassy swamp crossed. Route now lies in independent Tibet.”¹⁹

d) **Capt C G Rowling and Sven Hedin** are two European travellers of 20th century who crossed over Lanakla and noted it as the frontier mark. June 11, 1902, “A four miles brought us to Lanakla 18,000 feet high. The ascent was easy. So the tents were

¹⁷ Dorothy Woodman, (1887), *A Journey round Chinese Turkistan and along the Northern frontier of Tibet*, quoting, A D Carey, Proceedings of the R.G. S., Volume 9, pp 62.

¹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹ *Ibid* p. 66

pitched but few feet below the summit of the pass and about seven miles beyond the boundary pillar between Ladakh and Tibet.”²⁰

The Johnson Line

By middle of 19th century British and Indian Governments were very keen to fix the Northern boundary in view of Russian threat to advance towards Tibet and India. The border drawn by the British Indian Empire is shown in the dark purple and pink band with Shahidulla and the Kilik, Kilian and Sanju Passes North of the border.

W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of British India planned the "Johnson Line" in 1865, which placed the Aksai Chin in Kashmir. This was the time of the Dungan revolution, when China did not administrate Xinjiang, so this line was never accepted to the Chinese. W. H. Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Kashmir, who then demanded the 18,000 square kilometers contained within,²¹ and by some other territory further North as far as the Sanju Pass in the area of Kunlun mountains. Johnson's work was rigorously criticized for unrefined imprecisions, with description of his boundary as "*patently absurd*", and Johnson was admonished by the British Government and resigned from the Survey.²² The Maharajah of Kashmir deceptively sent a few soldiers to man the uncontrolled fort at Shahidulla (modern-day Xaidulla) at one point, by the time most sources placed Shahidulla and the upper Karakash River resolutely within the territory of Xinjiang. According to Francis Younghusband, who discovered the region in the late 1880, there was only an uninhabited fort and not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was there, it was just a suitable staging post and a suitable headquarters for the traveler Kirghiz. The uncontrolled fort had apparently been built a few years earlier by the Kashmiris. In 1878 the Chinese had recontrol Xinjiang, and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the dispute was decided. By 1892, China had created boundary line at Karakoram Pass.

²⁰ Dorothy Woodman (1894) *A Journey across Tibet*, London: quoting Bower Hamilton ,p 64.

²¹ Francis E. Younghusband, (1896) *The Heart of a Continent*, London. Facsimile reprint: (2005) Elbiron Classics, pp. 223-224.

²² Fernand Grenard (1904), *Tibet: The Country and its Inhabitants*, London: Hutchison and Co., Reprint: Cosmo Publications. Delhi. 1974, pp. 28-30.

Ardagh Line


British military officer, Sir John Ardagh, proposed a boundary line in 1897, along the crest of the Kun Lun Mountains North of the Yarkand River.²³ At the time Britain was concerned at the danger of Russian expansion as China weakened, and Ardagh argued that his line was more logical. The Ardagh line was effectively a modification of the Johnson line, and became known as the "*Johnson-Ardagh Line*".

The Macartney & MacDonald Line

Mid 1890 British and China were allies because Britain was principally worried that Axsai Chin not fall into Russian hands. In 1899, when China exposed an interest in Axsai Chin, Britain planned a revised boundary, initially advised by George Macartney,²⁴ which placed most of Axsai Chin in Chinese territory, and the border, along the Karakoram Mountains, was planned and supported by British officials for various motives. The Karakoram Mountains formed a natural boundary, which would agree the British borders up to the Indus River watershed though leaving the Tarim River watershed in Chinese control, and Chinese control of this territory would present a further problem to Russian advance in Central Asia. The British offered this line to the Chinese in a Note by Sir Claude MacDonald. The Chinese did not reply to the Note, and the British took that as Chinese agreement. This line, known as the Mcartney-McDonald line, is approximately the same as the present Line of Actual Control.²⁵

Karakoram Pass

Not a single boundary line is used West of the Karakoram Pass, where China link up Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan area. On October 13,



²³ Dorothy Woodman, (1969). *Himalayan Frontiers*. Lon

Map 2.4. Karakoram pass & Shaksgam Valley

²⁴ James Barnard Calvin, (April 1984) "*The China-India Border War*", Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved 2011-10-14.

²⁵ Mohan Guruswamy, "*The Great India-China Game*", Rediff.com, June 23, 2003.

1962, China and Pakistan started talks over the boundary West of the Karakoram Pass. In 1963, the China-Pak settled their boundaries mostly on the basis of the Macartney-MacDonald Line, which missing the Trans Karakoram Tract in China, while the agreement providing for renegotiation in the event of a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. India does not identify that Pakistan and China have a common border, and claims the tract as part of the domains of the previous 1947 state of Jammu and Kashmir. However, India's claimed area does not encompass as far North of the Karakoram Mountains as the Johnson Line.²⁶

Government of China Published a map from 1917 to 1933 the “*Postal Atlas of China*” (map no. 2.7.) in Beijing had shown Kuen Lun as the boundary. The boundary was decided at Lakhsang range not because British felt Chinese had a claim on region North of it. In this map it was done to make China strong in Kashgar-Yarkand to become a bump to Russian advance in this line. However, when the Chinese revolution in 1911 became weak, it made the British reevaluate Northern frontier of Kashmir. Ardagh/Johnson line again became the frontier. Times Atlas and Oxford Atlas included shown Aksai Chin as part of British territory.

In short Aksai Chin had become a disposable commodity, the main motive being to protect British Empire in India from fear of Russian advance and boundary kept moving forward to Kuen Lun or to Lakhsang.

Shaksgam Valley

Shaksgam Valley is not a part of the Sino-India Border disputes. About 5200 square kilometer was ceded to China by Pakistan in March 1963 after four years of closed-door negotiations with Pakistan. As part of the deal, China ceded to Pakistan about 1942 sq. kilometers in the Oprang Valley and dropped its claims to an additional 1554 sq. kilometers in Kashmir.²⁷ India, which still claims the Shaksgam valley, insists that Pakistan lacked the authority to transfer the disputed territory to China. Beijing maintains that the 1963 agreement remains subject to change pending any final agreement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.


²⁶ Neville Maxwell, (1970) *India's China War*, New York, Pantheon, Reprinted 2010, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, p 54.

²⁷ Ananth Krishnan (feb 16, 2012) “*Month after Border Talks, Chinese paper Says Aksai Chin is a closed Chapter,*” the Hindu, Accessed date: march 6, 2013.

Arunachal Pradesh

Arunachal Pradesh or the 'land of the rising sun' is a state situated in the North East of India, bordered by Tibet in the North, and Myanmar in the East. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, several people believed that the border dispute between China and India was over. In fact, the region was granted an 'independent political status' after the war and came under the administration of the Indian Government under the name 'Arunachal Pradesh'. To make matters more coherent, the 'Arunachal Pradesh Bill' was passed in the Indian Parliament in 1986, and in 1987, it was declared the 24th state of India. Despite the fact that Arunachal Pradesh is administered by India, China still claims that a large spread of land in the region belongs to them.

Several historians date the origins of the dispute between China and Arunachal Pradesh to 1911. Following the Chinese Revolution of 1911, when the last emperors of the Qing dynasty resigned, China, Mongolia and Tibet became three,



Map 2.5. The Eastern Sector (McMahon Line)

Source: Dorothy Woodman (1969). *Himalayan Frontiers*

equivocal

countries. However, internal disputes amongst the three continued to take place. The Mongols wanted control of the entire territory. However, the Han Republicans challenged their leadership resulting in no definitive or clear demarcation between the three states. Thereafter, the British dominated India defined the area bordering Tibet as NEFA (North Eastern Frontiers Association). However, the uncontrollable immigration

of thousands of tribal people across the border was not under the control of the British Government. As a result, in 1914, Sir Henry McMahon, drew up the 550-mile border, indicating the division between India and China. Despite this clear difference denoted between the two countries, China refused to accept the border, and declined its existence in 1947 (When India became independent). Subsequently, in 1959, the Chinese troops crossed the McMahon line, and retreated in 1961. However, the end still wasn't in sight because China did want to establish Arunachal Pradesh as a state in its own territory and further intruded in to the country.

Therefore, in 1962, the Chinese troops crossed the McMahon border again, but this time, by force – this led to the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war. It was this one war that characterized international relations between India and China.

The Northern border of Arunachal Pradesh chase the McMahon Line, a border delineated in the Shimla Accord that was signed by the British India and Tibet in 1914 but not by China (since Tibet was not Chinese-controlled at that time). After 1959 China controlled Tibet then People Republic of China (PRC) claim the Northern portion of Arunachal Pradesh as a part of the former provinces of the Tibet and Xikang or Sikang. The PRC often refers to the claimed areas as South Tibet.

The history of North Eastern Frontier Agency remains covered in mystery. Oral histories possessed to this day by many Arunachali tribes of Tibet-Myanmar stock are much richer and point unmistakably to a Northern origin in modern-day Tibet. Again validation remains difficult. From the point of view of substantial culture it is clear that most native Arunachali groups arrange in a line with Myanmar hill areas tribes, a fact that could each explainable in terms of a Northern Myanmar origin cultural diffusion.

If we see from the same perspective, the most unusual Arunachali group by far-off is the Puroik/Sulung, whose old-style staple main food is sago palm and whose primary old-style productive strategy is scavenging. While speculatively considered to be a Tibet-Myanmar population, the individuality of Puroik culture and language may well represent unsubstantiated reflection of a distant and all but unknown pre-Tibet-Myanmar, Tai and Indo-Aryan past.

According to the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, the region was mentioned in the Hindu epic books Kalika Purana and Mahabharata, and is showed to be the

Prabhu Mountains of the Puranas, and was where sage Parashuram washed away sins, the sage Vyasa meditated, King Bhishmaka founded his kingdom and Lord Krishna married his consort Rukmini.²⁸

Documented history from an external perspective only became available in the Ahom chronicles of the 16th century. The Monpa and Sherdukpen do keep historical archives of the existence of homegrown chiefdoms in the Northwest as well. Northwestern parts of this zone came under the control of the Monpa kingdom of Monyul, which flourished between 500B.C. and 600A.D. This region after that came under the movable control of Tibet and Bhutan, particularly in the Northern areas. The remaining parts of the Arunachal, particularly those bordering Myanmar, came under the nominal control of the Ahom and the Assamese until the takeover of India by the British in 1858. However, most Arunachali tribes remained in exercise largely autonomous up until Indian independence and the reinforcement of India administration in 1947.

Current excavations of ruins of Hindu temples such as the 14th century Malinithan at the placed of the Siang hills in West Siang have been associated with the ancient history of Arunachal Pradesh, in as much as they drop within its modern-day political borders. However, such temples are generally South-facing, never happen more than a few kilometers from the Assam plains area, and are perhaps more likely to have been associated with Assam plains-based slightly indigenous Arunachali populations. Another important heritage temple is Bhismaknagar, has led to suggestions that the Idu (Mishmi) had a modern culture and administration in pre-historical times. Although, no evidence directly have been associates Bhismaknagar with this or any other known culture. The third heritage place is the 400 year old Tawang Monastery in the extreme North-West of the state, provides some historical evidence of the Buddhist tribal people. The sixth Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso was born in Tawang.²⁹


In 1913-1914 British, China and Tibet representatives negotiated a treaty in India, the Shimla Accord. This agreement's objective was to define the borders

²⁸ Tourism in Arunachal Pradesh website.

²⁹ [仓央嘉措生平疏议](#) (Biography of Gyaco Cangyang; in Chinese)

between inner and outer Tibet as well as between outer Tibet and British India. British representative, Sir Henry McMahon, drew up the 550 miles McMahon Line as the border between British India and outer Tibet during the Shimla accord. The Tibetan and British representatives at the conference agreed to the line, which ceded Tawang and other Tibetan territory to the British Empire. The Chinese representative had no difficulties with the border between British India and outer Tibet. Even then on the issue of the border between outer Tibet and inner Tibet the talks could not successful. Thus, the Chinese representative denied the treaty and walked out. The Tibetan Government and British Government went ahead with the Shimla Accord and declared that the benefits of other articles of this agreement would not be given on China as long as it stays out of the purview.³⁰ The Chinese representative position was that Tibet was not independent from China, so Tibet could not have independently signed agreements, and per the Anglo-Chinese (1906) and Anglo-Russian (1907) agreements, any such treaty was invalid without Chinese assent.

Shimla accord was initially rejected by the Government of British India as incompatible with the 1907 Anglo-Russian Pact. However, this agreement (Anglo-Russian Pact) was renounced by




Map 2.6. Map of British India 1937, India office Record “Administrative Divisions”. Adopted from plate 21 of the revised (1931) atlas of the Imperial Gasetteer of India. This map is not to be taken as an authority for boundaries.

³⁰ Alastair Lamb, (1966) *The McMahon line: a study in the relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*, London, p. 529.

Russia and Britain jointly in 1921. However, with the ruin of Chinese power in Tibet the McMahon line had no serious challenges as Tibet had signed the agreement, and therefore it was forgotten to the scope that no new maps were published before 1935, when British civil service officer Olaf Caroe called attention to this issue. The British Survey of India published a map showing the McMahon Line as the official boundary in 1937.

In 1938, the British finally published the Shimla Convention as a bilateral accord two decades after the Shimla Conference. In 1938 the Survey of India published a detailed map showing Tawang as part of NEFA.

In 1944 Britain established administrations in the area, from Dirang Dzong in the West to Walong in the East. Tibet, however, altered its position on the McMahon Line in late 1947 when the Tibetan Government wrote a note presented to the newly independent Indian Ministry of External Affairs laying claims to the Tibetan district (Tawang) South of the McMahon Line. The situation developed further as India became independent and the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. With China poised to take over Tibet, India unilaterally declared the McMahon Line to be the boundary in November 1950, and forced the last remnants of Tibetan administration out of the Tawang area in 1951.³¹ The PRC has never recognized the McMahon Line, and claims Tawang on behalf of Tibetans. The 14th Dalai Lama, who led the Tibetan Government from 1950 to 1959, was quoted in 2003 as saying that



Map 2.7. Postal Map of China: A map published by the Government of China at Peking
in 1917

Tawang was "actually part of the Tibetan administration" before the Shimla Accord.³² He clarified his position in 2008, saying that as far as Tibet was concerned "Tawang is part of India". According to the Dalai Lama, "In 1962 during the India-China war, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) already occupied all these areas (Arunachal Pradesh)

³¹ Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, New York, Pantheon, 1970, Reprinted 2010, Natraj Publishers, Dehradun, p 48.

³² "Tawang is part of India: Dalai Lama". TNN. 4 June 2008.

but they announced a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew, accepting the current international boundary.³³"

Besides, as early as 1917, The Government of China had also published the "Postal map of China", in Peking. "It shows the whole Northern Boundary of India more or less according to the traditional Indian alignments".

This map was actually an imperialist map of China, which, besides depicting Aksai Chin as part of India, incidentally depicted all the pre-1947 Himalayan princely states in India, including inter alia Nepal, Sikkim, and what is now Arunachal Pradesh as integral parts of India.

British India and China added a common border in 1826, with British capture of Assam in the Treaty of Yandabo at the end of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826). Subsequent occupations in further Anglo-Burmese Wars stretched out China's borders with British India Eastwards, to include the border with Myanmar. In 1913-14, Governments of British Bharat, China, and Tibet attended a conference in Shimla, India and drew up a treaty concerning Tibet's position and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary between British Bharat and Tibet for the Eastern sector, was drawn by British representative sir Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement. All three Governments initiated the agreement, but China immediately objected to the proposed Sino-Tibet boundary and rejected the agreement. After approving a memorandum which stated that China could not rights under the agreement unless China ratified it, the British Bharat and Tibetan representatives signed the Shimla Agreement as a bilateral accord. Neville Maxwell states that McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with Tibetans if China refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and then kept the agreement secret.

Mr. Singh says that the base of these boundaries, which is accepted by British Bharat and Tibet, was that the historical boundaries of India were the Himalaya and the territories, South of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian and related with British India. The tall watershed of the Himalayas was projected as the border between British

³³ "Dalai Lama's visit to Arunachal nostalgic: Top aide" Hindustan Times dated Dharamsala, November 08, 2009

India and its Northern neighbour nations. India's Government thought the view that the Himalayas were the natural boundaries of the Indian subcontinent and therefore should be the up-to-date boundaries of British India and later the Republic of India.³⁴

Newly created Chinese Republic boundary, stood near Walong until January 1914, when T. O'Callaghan, an assistant commissioner of North Eastern Frontier Agency, displaced them North to locations closer to the McMahon Line (although still South of the Line). Then he went to Rima, meet with Tibetan administrators, and saw no Chinese effect in this area.³⁵

Before signing the Shimla treaty with Tibet, the British had violated the Anglo-Russian Pact of 1907, in which both revelries were not to talk with Tibet, "**except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government**", as well as the Anglo-Chinese Pact of 1906, which certain the British Government "**not to annex Tibetan territory.**"³⁶ Because of doubts concerning the legal standing of the treaty, the British Bharat did not put the McMahon Line on their maps before 1937 and they did not publish the Shimla Agreement in the treaty record before 1938. Refusing Tibet's 1913 announcement of independence, China claimed that the Shimla Agreement and McMahon Line were illegal and that Tibetan administration was just a local Government without treaty-making powers. In 1947, Tibet requested to India permitted Tibetan authority in the trading town of Tawang, South of the McMahon Line. Tibet did not purpose to any other portion of the McMahon line. In reply, the Indians queried Tibet to continue the connection on the basis of the earlier British Government.

Tibetan administrators continued to administer Tawang and declined to concede region during talks in 1938. The governor of Assam declared that Tawang was "*undoubtedly British*" but well-known that it was "**controlled by Tibet, and none of its inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan.**" Period of World War II, with

³⁴ <http://dictionary.sensagent.com/origins%20of%20the%20sino%20Indian%20border%20dispute/en-en/>

³⁵ James Barnard Calvin (April 1984). "*The China-India Border War*". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved 14-10-2011.

³⁶ Karunakar Gupta (Jul. - Sep., 1971) "*The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy*". The China Quarterly, No. 47. pp. 521-545.

India's Eastern part threatened by Japanese armies and with the risk of Chinese imperialism, British army secured Tawang for additional defence.

After India's freedom China claim on South areas of the McMahon Line, included in the North East Frontier Agency, were created on traditional boundaries. India believes that the China proposed boundaries in Ladakh area and Arunachal Pradesh have no written base and no documentation base of taking by anyone apart from China. Indian claim that China's claims these territory on the basis that it was under Chinese imposing control in the past,³⁷ while Chinese claim that Indian claims these territory on the basis that it was under British imposing control in the past.³⁸

India's claimed line in the Eastern area tracks a modified type of the McMahon Line. The unique line drawn up by Sir Henry McMahon on the Shimla Agreement map starts at 27°44'30''N, starting at the trijunction between India, Bhutan and China. Maximum of the clashes in the Eastern area before the start of the 1962 India China war would take place North of the McMahon line. Yet, India's claim that the resolved of the accord was to follow the highest points of the Himalaya. China claimed that the South of the highest points should be Indian terrain and North of the highest point should be Chinese region. In the Indian claim, the India and Chinese armies would be divided from each other by the highest mountains in the world.

In the 1950's when India start patrolling the above areas, it found that at so many locations, the highest points chop North of the McMahon Line as displayed in the agreement map and in its own maps, and it improved its maps to cover Northward to take in features such as Longju, Thag La, and Khinzemane as Indian territory. Therefore, the Indian type of the McMahon Line changes the India-Bhutan-China injunction North to 27°48'N. India wanted that the accord map ran along topographies such as Thag La, though the actual treaty map itself is topographically vague (at that

³⁷ V. K. Singh *resolving the boundary dispute*, <http://www.India-seminar.com/2006/562/562-vk-singh.htm> Accessed date 04/10/2012

³⁸ A. Stahnke (Nov 1970) "*The Place of International Law in Chinese Strategy and Tactics: The Case of the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute*", *The Journal of Asian Studies*. Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 95-119.

time accord was not accompanied with demarcation), and the accord includes no oral description of geographic features nor description of the highest points.³⁹

Blow by Blow 1899 to Since 1950

When the British officials came to know of Soviet officials surveying the Axsai Chin for Sheng Shicai, General of Xinjiang in 1940-1941, they again supported the Johnson Line. At this stage the British had still made no efforts to establish outposts over the Axsai Chin, nor was the issue forever argued with the Governments of China or Tibet, and the boundary continued un-demarcated at India's independence.

The Johnson line, Ardagh line and the Macartney & MacDonald lines were all showed on British maps of India. Until at before 1908, the British acquired the MacDonald line to be the boundary, but in 1911, the Xinhai revolution resulted in the downfall of central power in China, and by the end of World War I, the British officially show on map the Johnson Line. However they took no steps to establish assert actual control on the ground. In 1927, the line was remarked again as the Government of British India uncontrolled the Johnson line in favor of a line laterally the Karakoram Range further South. Yet, the maps were not updated and still showed the Johnson Line.⁴⁰

In the post-independence period, the Government of India accept the Johnson Line as the basis for its official boundary in the West, which encompassed the Axsai Chin From the Karakoram Pass (at that time this area was not in dispute), the Indian claim line extends Northeast of the Karakoram Mountains through the salt flats of the Axsai Chin, to set a boundary line at the Kunlun Mountains, and integrating part of the Karakash river and Yarkand river water sheds. From there, it runs East along the Kunlun Mountains, before rotating Southwest complete the Axsai Chin salt flats, through the Karakoram Mountains, and formerly to Pangong Lake.

³⁹ T. S. Murty, Neville Maxwell, (Apr. - Jun., 1971) "*Tawang and The Un-Negotiated Dispute*", *The China Quarterly*, No. 46, pp. 357-362.

⁴⁰ James Barnard Calvin, (April 1984). "*The China-India Border War*". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Retrieved 2011-10-14.

On July 1, 1954 Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memorandum directing that the maps of Republic of India be revised to display definite boundaries on all boundaries. Up to this point, the boundary in the Axsai Chin sector, based on the Johnson Line, had been defined as "un-demarcated."⁴¹

During the 1951 to 1957, the People's Republic of China built a 1,200 km (750 miles) NH G219 road connecting Xinjiang and Western Tibet, of which 179 km (112 miles) ran south of the Johnson Line through the Axsai Chin region demanded by India. Axsai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese, but for India it was more difficult to reach the other side of the Karakoram. The Indians did not have any information about the reality of the road until 1957, which was confirmed and they only got to know about it when the road was shown in Chinese maps published in 1958. The Indian situation, as stated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was that the Axsai Chin was considered as a **"part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries"** and that this Northern border was a **"firm and definite one which was not open to discussion with anybody"**.

The Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai said that the Western border had never been delimited, that was the Macartney-McDonald Line, which left the Axsai Chin within Chinese borders was the only line ever proposed to a Chinese Government, and that the Axsai Chin was already under Chinese administration, and that negotiations should take into account the existing Condition.

Middle Sector

The Middle Sector border dispute relates to the part of the Himalayas through which the river Sutlej flows on its way from the Tibetan plateau to the Indus valley. The pilgrimage route to the Hindu places of worship in the vicinity of Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarover, both inside Tibet, as also the trans-border trade routes, lie within this sector of the boundary. As the border route has been relatively in constant use by traders and pilgrims, the boundary has over the years been known on ground by both sides. Geographically, this sector stretches from the Southern extremity of Kashmir to

⁴¹ A.G. Noorani, (30 August-12 September 2003), *"Fact of History"*, *Frontline* (Madras: The Hindu group) **26** (18), retrieved 24 August 2011

Nepal and encompasses the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and Sikkim. India's annexation of Sikkim in 1975 was rejected by China at the time. The Sino-Indian Memorandum of 2003 was greeted as a tangible Chinese acceptance of the annexation. China published a map showing Sikkim as a part of India and the Foreign Ministry deleted it from the list of China's "counties and regions".⁴² However, the Sikkim-China border continues to be the subject of dispute and military activity.

Chinese Claims

In boundary talks in 1960 Chinese officials had shown a map drawn by General Staff of Chinese Army in 1918 showing whole of Aksai Chin as Chinese. Another document presented by them was a map of Bureau of Survey of Chinese Ministry of National Defence of 1943 which had shown Aksai Chin as part of China. Arunachal



Map 2.8. Chinese Map

Pradesh chase the McMahon Line at the ending point and touch the Myanmar; a border delineated in the Shimla Accord that was signed by the British India and Tibet in 1914 but not by China (since Tibet was not Chinese-controlled at that time). After China's controlled Tibet, the People Republic of China claim the Northern portion of Arunachal Pradesh as part of the former provinces of the Tibet Area, the PRC called this areas as South Tibet.

Status of Border Disputes after Independence

The Himalayas is regarded as a Northern frontier of India since the ancient period. The Northern frontier of India, mostly based on the crest line of the Himalayan range, has been universally recognized as a frontier of India for well over 300 years.

⁴² D. S. Rajan, (June 10,2008)"China: An internal Account of Startling Inside Story of Sino-Indian Border Talks", South Asia Analysis Group, p 47.

Indeed, Himalayas being a natural barrier, kept away India and China from any political, military confrontation for centuries. India gained her freedom on 15th August, 1947. India accepted the Himalayan frontier as a part of her inheritance. China achieved success on 1st October, 1949. From 1949 to 1958 China never objected about her traditional frontier with India till 23rd January, 1959.

By the end of 1950, roughly the frontier area between India and China was as follows, India's Northern frontier was a traditional one.



Map 2.9. Comparative Map

In the Western sector from North-West of Kashmir, it was passing along the watershed formed by the Mustagh, the Karakoram and the Kuen Lun range to a point East of longitude 80⁰. Thereafter it was turning South and running along the Chang-Chenmo range. Cutting along the Pangang Tso and the Spanggur Tso, it was passing through the Chang Pass and along the Kailash Range. It then turns Southwest near Demchok and skirting the Hanle Mountains, cut across the Para Chu river South of Chumar. It then follows the watershed between the Ganga and Sutlej to the Tri-junction of India, Nepal and China. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet is also watershed, while the crest of the Himalayas forms the boundary between Bhutan and Tibet. The Northeast Frontier of India is about 710 miles long from the Eastern limits

of Bhutan to a point near the Talu Pass is the Northern watershed of Brahmaputra excepting where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri and Namjang river break through.⁴³

India was still trying to consolidate its position as a sovereign independent nation and was preoccupied with its own internal problems in the wake of her partition, and accepted the Himalayan frontier as a part of its inheritance. The Government of India did not open any outpost right along the traditional frontier because the area was sparsely inhabited in Western sector. Being a successor state and part of its inheritance, they accepted that Northeast frontier between Tibet and Northeastern India had already been fixed at the Shimla Conference in 1914. Development program of building roads, airstrips and hospitals in area was undertaken to provide administration and political control over the tribal people in NEFA.

Chinese also were engrossed in their teething issues. As soon as they consolidated themselves, on September 30, 1950, they decided to “liberate Tibet”. The Chinese were deeply involved in Tibetans affairs. They had never raised any doubts or questions about her border with India. Once they grabbed Tibet, it was only thereafter that India deployed her forces along the traditional border. Then for the first time, Indian and Chinese forces faced each other.

⁴³ K. Krishna Rao, (1963) *“Sino-Indian Border Question and International Law”*, New Delhi :Information Service of India, P.1

Chapter-3

Causes of Sino-India Border Disputes

*Now, it is a question of fact whether this village or that village or this little strip of territory is on their side or on our side. Normally, whenever there are relatively pretty disputes, well, it does seem rather absurd for two great countries to immediately rush at each other's throats to decide whether two miles of territory are on this side or on that side, and especially two miles of territory in the high mountains, where nobody lives. But where national prestige and dignity is involved, it is not the two miles of territory; it is the nation's dignity and self-respect that become involved. And therefore this happens.*⁴⁴

Geopolitics asserts- the study of relationship among politics and economics, especially international relations, as influenced by Geographical factors. Geography remains entwined with Geopolitics. I would like to highlight powerful echoes that Markham and Mackinder would have recognized the urgent need of political responsibility. In great powers and Geo political change, Jakub Gragiel suggested that the international relations are dominated by Social scientific perspectives on power and ignores the natural scientific insides. These are the characteristics of the Geopolitics. Geopolitics is defined as the operating mode of a Government's foreign policy that evaluates places beyond its boundaries. It is a set of strategic assumptions that a Government makes about other states in forming its foreign policy.

In October 1962, the People's Republic of China launched a series of massive surprise attacks against India's frontier forces in the western provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA). The Chinese overran all Indian fortifications north of the Brahmaputra Valley before halting their operations.⁴⁵ In Asia, India is the only country which can challenge the supremacy of China. India is the dominant power in South Asian region and China has been emerging as an influential East Asian power respectively. Chinese are willing to be the dominant power in the South Asia too. China has settled her border disputes with India's neighbours (Pakistan, Mayammer Nepal and very soon, even Bhutan). Amongst the South Asian countries, the border dispute with India only has assumed the proportion of a “**Prestige issue**”.

The Sino-India border dispute invented from the British and Russian expansion in Central Asia in the early 20th century. Since the 1950, the border dispute has always directly or indirectly shadowed the ebb and flow of the India- China relations. The simmering border dispute evolved

⁴⁴ P. Jawaharlal Nehru, lok Sabha, September 4, 1959.

⁴⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States (1961–1963 Volume XIX, South Asia), *which publishes several telegrams from the Department of State to the US Embassy in India.*

after of the revolt the Dalai Lama circle engineered in 1959. The Central Intelligence Agency supported to revolt in Tibet, India supported the Dalai Lama, and India-hosted Tibetan Government-in-exile turned out to be one of the main causes of the border war in 1962. Nehru's policy of no-dispute and no- negotiation and his carrying forward policy became a direct cause of the border war. These are the reason that India- China relationship dramatically moved toward hostility and confrontation from association and friendship and entered an era of cold war which lasted nearly two decades.

In the era of 21st Century, there has been a shifting pattern in Chinese mischief along the Indian borders: Arunachal Pradesh, then Sikkim, and now it is Ladakh. But more curiously, when reports of Chinese incursions hit the headlines, China denied them while India played them down. This has been a familiar pattern for decades. To cite few instances, When Arunachal Chief Minister Mukut Mithi claimed in 2000 that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had made 'repeated incursions' along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and built a mule trail at Kaila Pass in Dibang Valley district, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government played down the reports and China denied them. In June 2003, when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was on a visit to China, PLA soldiers made a massive intrusion and detained an Indian security patrol in the eastern sector. Again, China denied the allegation.

In 2007, when BJP MP Kiren Rijju made a startling claim about Chinese intrusion 20 km inside the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government denied the allegation. In 2008, India denied the incursion in Sikkim's 'Finger Area' and called it 'a minor and local matter', China denied the charge. In August 2009, the Indian Government denied reports of Indian and Chinese armies being locked in sporadic exchanges of fire at Nathu La in Sikkim.

The latest controversy erupted when the army spokesperson of the Udhampur-based Northern Command admitted on August 31, 2009 that Chinese helicopters had violated Indian airspace along the LAC in Ladakh and that Chinese MI-series helicopters had hovered in Indian territory for nearly five minutes and left telltale signs and also air-dropped some canned food containing frozen pork and brinjal in the plains near Chumar on June 21, 2009. There were also reports about PLA soldiers painting 'China' in Cantonese on boulders and rocks in the Chumar area on July 31, 2009.

While the Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor, acknowledged the violation, the Ministry of External Affairs downplayed the intrusion reports and Beijing once again flatly denied its choppers having violated Indian airspace.

The whole India-China boundary has never been officially delimited by any mutually-accepted agreement. There had existing a boundary Line of Actual Control between the both countries. It took shape on the base of the extent of each other organizational jurisdiction over a long course of time. The entire boundary has been usually divided into three sectors, the eastern sector, the middle sector, and the western sector with all in dispute. The western sector involves the dispute over the Aksai Chin area India's claims as part of Kashmir and China claims as part of Xinjiang. The middle sector contains a dispute over numerous points between the Tibet-Himachal Pradesh border junction and the Nepal-Tibet-Uttara khand- Sikkim border junction. The eastern sector includes a dispute over the area between the Before 1914 Outer Line and the McMahon Line.

In the eastern sector, the British Indian administration had observed the hills of the Himalayas as the "*Surface Line*" of its Chinese administrative jurisdiction by 1914. While the Chinese-Tibetan specialists had claimed the tribal areas outside the British Outer Line within the Tibetan influence, their Governmental authority actually covered only Tawang area, the Walong area along the Lohit valley, and some other distributed territories in the tribal areas.

Now the Line of Actual Control observed by both sides follows to the McMahon Line. The disputed area between the before 1914 Outer Line and the McMahon Line covers a total area of about 90,000 square kilometers. According to China, this area is collected of Tibetan three districts of Monyul, Loyul and lower Zayul. According to India, this region is its Arunachal Pradesh, previously the North-East Frontier Agency of Assam State.

In the western sector (Aksai Chin area), the line of actual control runs incompletely along the Karakoram Range, in compliance to the Chinese claim. The Indian administration claim that the boundary line runs along the Kunlun range from the Karakoram Pass. The disputed region is the Aksai Chin region between the two series, covering a total region of about 33,000 square kilometers. This region falls mainly in China's Xinjiang and part of it belongs to the Ari District of Tibet. India Government claims that it is part of the Ladakh area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This area, lightly inhabited, attends as the traffic route linking Xinjiang and Tibet.

Thus, in terms of the over-all India-China border dispute, the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and Axsai Chin area in the western sector have been central to the negotiations on the expenditure of the border dispute.

Geopolitical Importance of Axsai Chin

Many times Chinese army unit of troops cross the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh area and put up their tents for the night. These events, which is not a lonely incident, produced much consternation in the Indian media, and symbolises the joint suspicion that both countries have towards each other. These opinions of mistrust are expressed in the circumstance that both sides have been building up their military incidence along the Line of Actual Control in recent years. Because India and China are rising nations and shared 3700 kilometer long border of which large parts remain disputed, there is worry that increased cross Line of Actual Control tensions could become a cause of possible instability.

Similar India's struggle with Pakistan above Kashmir, the dispute above Axsai Chin is almost as old as India itself. The root of this argument date back to the British India which failed to demarcate the proper border between its colony and China definitively. Today's border issue circles around two main boundary area that have been put forward by the British India. First is the Johnson-line, places Axsai Chin under Indian control, second is the MacDonald-line, control it in Chinese territory. However, none of these boundaries had ever been anchored in a binding bilateral agreement. And so, the status of the India-China border in the western sector at the time of Indian independence continued unsolved. India accepted the Johnson-line as its national border, where as China accepted the MacDonald line. Axsai chin area became a upbringing ground for conflict. In the 1950's, after the PLA had occupied Xinjiang and Tibet, Chinese Government ordered the construction of a road to link Xinjiang and Tibet. Because the road, known as highway NH 219,⁴⁶ runs through Axsai Chin, this meant that China ongoing to take effective control of that area. Still, it was not until 1957 that the Indians known about the road. Chinese president Zhou Enlai proposed a proposal to settle the border disputes by recognising Indian control above Arunachal Pradesh and Chinese control above Axsai Chin. It was rejected

⁴⁶ It is one of the highest mountable roads in the world. China National Highway 219 (G 219) runs along the western border of the People's Republic of China, from Kargil in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It is 2,743 kilometers in length. Construction of this road was started in 1951. It was completed in 1957. The road passes through disputed area of Axsai Chin, an area administered by the People's Republic of China but also claimed by India, and its construction was one of the triggers for the Sino-Indian War of 1962

by Jawaharlal Nehru. India's change for a forward policy to retain the Chinese forces in check and ultimately push them out of Aksai Chin⁴⁷ (that time the Indians recognize as an integral part of Ladakh) was met with a Chinese military operation that rushed both countries in a brief but gory war in 1962 which finished in an embarrassment for India. Since then the MacDonal line has been become the de novo border in the western sector.

Since the border war, India china relations have slowly but confidently improved, especially in economic sector. India and China opened up their economic sector for foreign trade and investment. Certainly, economic trade has probably been the main cause for a defrost in bilateral relations. Between From 1990-91 to 2006-07 economic trade has grown up with an impressive 522 times.⁴⁸ India positions as the number ten economic trading partner for China, whereas China has grown into the second most important economic trading partner for India. It thus look like, as the liberal school of international relations theory postulates, that improved trade linkages have pacified both countries because it simply sorts war a too expensive affair.

Yet, movement on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control increase in latest years has been followed with great doubt in India. In 2008, before the Olympics games when China expected strife in Tibet and Xinjiang and national highway 219⁴⁹ was renovated. In adding to, military surveillance posts and quarters as well as landing strips have been set up in Aksai Chin. These facilities increase China's rapid mobilisation capabilities. This the reason India, has decided to position a tank formation in Ladakh and gave training a 40,000 troop strong 'mountain strike corps,'⁵⁰ and to make a plan to turn the airstrip in Nyoma into a well-developed air force base.⁵¹ The Indian Ministry of Defence claims that these taken measures are required responses to China's military built-up and also to its transformed military doctrine.⁵² The final seems to be a situation to China's growing assertiveness in the South and South China Sea with

⁴⁷ Handgrave, R.L., Kochanek, S.A. (2008) "*India: Government and politics in a developing nation*" Stanford: Cengage Learning. p504

⁴⁸ Factsheets of EU bilateral trade http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113390.pdf and http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf

⁴⁹ Op. Cit. NH G219

⁵⁰ Rajat Pandit (Jan 13, 2013) "*China-wary Army for mountain strike corps*" , TNN http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-01-13/india/36311136_1_new-infantry-divisions-12th-army-plan-mountain-strike-corps Accessed date 5 /5 2015

⁵¹ China's new Stealth Wars (April 14, 2013) <http://stratrisk.com/geostrat/11843>

⁵² China's new Stealth Wars (April 14, 2013) <http://stratrisk.com/geostrat/11843>

admiration to its territorial claims. China, states that its military growing is appropriate with its “**international standing and meets the needs of its security and development interests.**”⁵³

Coincidentally, the People Liberation Army published a White Paper at around the same time as when the Chinese army unit trespassed and crossed the LAC into Indian Territory. It elaborates upon the PLA’s policies and priorities in the foreseeable future, but does not describe a revolutionarily new doctrine; it is essentially a continuation and updated version of existing military strategic thinking. For example, the decade-old focus on ‘national defence’ which includes the principle of ‘active defence’, an option that allows conducting defensive pre-emptive strikes, are found in the latest White Paper too. Similarly, the statement that the PLA is primarily trained to ‘win local wars’ is an idea that was put forth by Deng Xiaoping in 1985 already.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the PLA’s efforts to expand its navy’s blue water capabilities are a policy that was started under Hu Jintao in order to be able to protect Chinese interests overseas. However, the paper does give an interesting insight into the priorities that it establishes. The US’s increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu (or Senkaku, in Japanese) islets with Japan are given a high priority in its strategic considerations.

Paradoxically enough, these strategic priorities are fully compatible with the doctrinal principles that have been explained above. As Jonathan Holslag explains in his book *Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise*, China’s strategic considerations are affected by its geographic position.

For, it’s demographic, industrial, and financial hearts are concentrated on its eastern coast. Stability and prosperity in this heartland are vital for stability in the rest of the country. Around China’s heartland is a belt of water and land that China only partially controls but which provides both threats (Japan, Taiwan, and the Korean peninsula) and opportunities (the resource rich waters of the South and East China Sea), and which are crucial for the stability, prosperity and sovereignty of the heartland. The next layer is what Holslag calls the belt of uncertainty, and which is approached by China “**with a strong sense of geographical claustrophobia.**” In this belt of uncertainty, India is located at or near three so-called corridors of peril: the Sino-Pakistani border through which opium and Islamist extremists could enter Xinjiang; the Tibetan plain which

⁵³ PLA White Paper: The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces

⁵⁴ Chieh-cheng Huang, A. (2001) “*Transformation and refinement of Chinese military doctrine: Reflection and critique on the PLA’s view*” In: Seeking truth from facts: A retrospective on Chinese military studies in the post-Mao era by James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Young (eds.) Santa Monica: RAND.

connects Tibet with the Tibetan refugees in India, Nepal and Bhutan; and the maritime corridor.⁵⁵

Incapable to claim rightfulness from open and fair-minded democratic authority, the Communist Party of China grows much of its rightfulness from the state's capacity to generate economic development that permits advanced standards of living for its population. The oceanic supply ways with Africa and the Middle East Europe are consequently not only critical for China's economy but also for its national stability. With a disputed South China Sea and Malacca Strait that is successfully under control of the United State and Singapore, and Indian navy that is one way to increase its capabilities to protect the supremacy in the Arabian Sea and Indo-Pacific. It is come to no wonder that China is trying to spread its logistics lines. The other supply routes through Pakistan from its harbor in Karachi and Baluchistan, Gwadar to Kashgar in Xinjiang via the National Highway 219 in Gilgit and Baltistan. China has devoted greatly in infrastructure projects in Pakistan in order to wide-ranging the realisation of this substitute supply route. It has placed some thousands of People Liberation Army in the area. Though China claims that these Army man are only to assistance in the construction efforts, but various foreign experts believe that the People Liberation Army is to stay – a prearrangement that would suit both Pakistan and China.

Pakistan's entanglements with democracy do not infuse into Gilgit and Baltistan, which is under control of Pakistan, and where the Pakistan armies has far-reaching power. This indications to more unhappiness among the native population against the Pakistan Government. Conversely, the fact that a constant Gilgit and Baltistan, being the entrance between China and Pakistan, is important to make the logistics supply route over Pakistan. China has no interest in any type of potential instability in that area, whether nationally or globally. People Republic of China may therefore routine its army presence in Gilgit and Baltistan as a control to significantly growth the beginning for India to involve in a army clash in that area as it may increase the threat of a military log jam with both China and Pakistan. In the same attitude does Axsai Chin provide China a control to exert pressure on India, specifically not to undertake any actions, it is just like Arabian Sea or Indo-Pacific, which may damage essential Chinese economic and security interests.

In addition to China's vested interests Axsai Chin out of security concerns that relate to its economic interests, Beijing would be highly unlikely to let go of Axsai Chin because, firstly,

⁵⁵ Holslag, J. (2011) *Trapped giant: China's military rise*. London: Routledge.

highway 219 is the only veritable all-weather road that connects Tibet and Xinjiang. In that capacity, the road not only facilitates the ability to mobilise troops, but it also provides connectivity between two of China's least developed regions. Infrastructure allows the increase of trade volumes and the movement of people and thereby contributes to regional development. Secondly, Axsai Chin is located at the north-western part of the Tibetan plain, clamped between the Kunlun mountain range to its north that separates Tibet from Xinjiang, and the Karakoram Range of the Himalayas to its west which forms a natural barrier between China and India. If it was to fall under Indian control, it would leave China strategically exposed.

China's interests in Axsai Chin are plentiful. The question that remains is whether the military build-up along the LAC significantly raises chances for armed conflict between India and Pakistan. This does not seem to be the case. With the memories of 1962 still alive, New Delhi would be unlikely to conduct a cross-LAC attack. For, the Indian armed forces are arguably in the weaker position in terms of military capabilities vis-à-vis the PLA's. And secondly, India would alienate its most important import trade companion and its second most important overall trade companion. Equally, Beijing will be ill-interested in charming in armed skirmish with India. Initially, China's claims that its growth is benign will lose authority. The pressures between India and China could simply spill over to the Pacific region and would give a aim to the countries in that region to rush defensive expenditures and expand security arrangements between each other against China. Additionally, an armed conflict is likely to push India and the US closer together. Both scenarios diametrically oppose China's priorities and concerns as states in the White Paper.

China's way in its path to becoming a solid global power are closely shadowed by the international community, and India is no exemption. The build-up of military abilities along the Line of Actual Control in Axsai Chin looks to be mainly designed to protection People Republic of China economic and security interests in Pakistan, or other specifically in Gilgit-Baltistan, and in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. The bigger military attendance in Axsai Chin as a warning and a lever that permits China to exert force on India to not carry out any action that could harm its interest.

India's military build-up on its side of the Line of Actual Control is of conservative nature, which is the consequence of a typical example of the security problem that has pushed India to take on action in Ladakh. Although pressures have flaring up, chances of sighted another Sino-India border war in the predictable future look to be far-fetched because the forces that bond the both countries together look to be superior to the forces that ambition them apart.

Geo-Political Importance of Arunachal Pradesh

Arunachal Pradesh is situated in the North-Eastern part of India with 83743 square kilometers area and has a long international border. It stretches from snow-capped mountains in the north to the plains of Brahmaputra valley in the south. Arunachal is the largest state area-wise in the north-east region, even larger than Assam which is the most populous.

It is situated between latitude 26° 30' N and 29° 30' N and longitude 91° 30' E and 97° 30' E. Itanagar is the capital of Arunachal Pradesh and located at an altitude of 530 meters above MSL. It is named after Itanagar meaning fort of bricks built in 14th century A.D.

Arunachal Pradesh covers an area of 83743 square kilometers. It is bound by international borders with China (known as McMahon Line), Bhutan and Myanmar, running to over 1630 kms. Its inner line borders are with Assam and Nagaland. Till 1971, this part of the land was known as North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). In 1972, it became a Union Territory with the name Arunachal Pradesh. In 1987, it became the 24th State of India with capital in Itanagar derived from the historical Itanagar Fort.

Arunachal Pradesh is one of the most strategically placed states because of its common international border with China, Bhutan and Myanmar. Historically, India has paid a very heavy price for neglecting her frontiers whether it is in the North-west or North East. Foreign invasions have taken place in the past on account of such neglect. After independence, India's sense of security was rudely shaken by the Chinese invasion through the unprotected North Eastern region. Arunachal is in fact the Gateway to India in the Northeast. After Chinese aggression it has become strategically most important. Additionally, armed insurgency and anti-national activities in the neighboring states of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram during the last two decades or more have also made Arunachal vulnerable to insurgency if left unguarded. The geo-political importance of the region is such that it has naturally attracted the attention of foreign elements inimical to India. Also the entire region is rich in minerals and other natural resources like oil and coal and in the cultivation of Tea, Coffee and other cash crops. Revenue from plywood and other forest products is substantial and adds to the economy of the region. All these valuable assets of the state also attract the evil eyes of the greedy foreign elements.

China has a long-standing border dispute with India in the eastern sector of the Himalayas along India's north-east and China's south-western boundaries. The impenetrability of these terrains along with undefined, ambiguous borders has resulted in overlapping claims of ownership from the two Asian giants. The 1962 Sino-Indian war was the first salvo in what has

become a troubled history. Since then, relations between India and China have tended to concentrate on maintaining the status-quo on the borders, leaving the onus for resolving these disputes on future generations. However, with China's growing assertiveness in territorial disputes in recent years, the border has once again become a battleground for the testing of wills and resilience.

China's claims initially extended only to Tawang, a part of Arunachal Pradesh, where the sixth Dalai Lama was said to have been born. Since the 2000s, however, China has been claiming Arunachal Pradesh in its entirety, a surprising claim given that independent India has been exercising sovereignty over it since 1955 (it became a union territory in 1972 and a state in 1987). It is worth noting that China's stance is directly motivated by its desire to put a lid on Tibetan nationalism (which it believes is fueled by support from India). Arunachal Pradesh is also strategically located at the confluence of the international borders of the PRC, Myanmar and Bhutan, giving it strategic importance. This extension of territorial claims and increasing aggression indicate a concerted strategy of widening the PRC's ambit of influence and control, consistent with its stance on the East and South China Sea disputes. Beijing's border disputes with India thus represent a wider strategic shift in its thinking, far removed from Deng Xiaoping's "keep your head down" policy, through which it seeks to revive its ancient glory as the Middle Kingdom.

The McMahon Line: Mystery Behind the Story

Russia successfully divided Mongolia into Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia as a buffer region between China and Russia, the British-Indian Government fantasized the same dream and try to divide Tibet into Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet, and made the Outer Tibet as a buffer zone between India and China. To reach such an objective, the Shimla accord was held in 1914, with British representative Sir Henry McMahon, Chinese representative Chen Ivan, and Tibetan representative Lonchen Shatra.

There were truly two equivalent conferences at Shimla, the talks first concentrating on the division of Tibet, and the second was the secret one, keeping Chinese representative Chen Ivan out of the negotiations on the Indian-Tibetan boundary. Some fact said that early 1914, Sir Henry McMahon and Tibetan representative Lonchen Shatra secretly talked on the division of Tibet. The secret treaty was gotten over and done with a secret exchange of records in Delhi on

March 24 and 25, 1914. After that boundary line known as the McMahon line, was publicized on a map in two sheets.

Lacking the approval of the Chinese representative Chen Ivan, under McMahon's threat and force, started the draft convention on April 27, 1914. But with the strong understanding that **“to initial and to sign are two different actions,”** and that this word would not bind his administration, whose opinions Chinese Government would immediately seek.⁵⁶ The following day, the Chinese administration instructed Chen Ivan that

“The Chinese representative was forced to initial the draft convention. The Chinese Government cannot accept it. You should declare it invalid.”⁵⁷

After that the Chinese representative Chen Ivan declined to sign the Shimla agreement, it was then revised and initialed by British representative Sir McMahon and Tibet representative Lonchen Shatra on July 3, 1914. The map attached to the Shimla agreement, the McMahon Line was drawn just across the Tawang town, the Shimla agreement map indicating that the area to the north of Tawang would drop inside the Tibetan territory.

At that time the British-Indian Government did not accept the Shimla agreement. Viceroy Hardinge dispatched Sir Henry McMahon report to London on July 23, 1914, declaring that the British Indian Government accepted that a consideration of the northeastern boundary did not part of the meanings of the talks, after the viewing proposal put forward might be observed as personal to Sir Henry McMahon, not carrying the authorisation of the Government of India. Chinese representative Chen Iven was also speak out that the Chinese Government

“would not recognize any treaty or similar document that might now or hereafter be signed between Great Britain and Tibet.”⁵⁸

The Tibetan Government tacit that without safeguarding the Sino-Tibetan boundary, they could not accept the Indo-Tibetan boundary.

⁵⁶ *“Chen Ivan's Notes Concerning the Shimla Conference,”*(1959) in A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue , Beijing: Xinhua News press, p.299

⁵⁷ *“The Chinese Foreign office's telegraph”* (April 28, 1914) to Chen Ivan in A Selection of Documents and Materials Concerning the Tibet Issue, p. 301.


⁵⁸ Frederic A. greenhut II, (1982) *The Tibetan frontiers Question* New Delhi: S. Chand & Company Ltd., p.41.

The Dalai Lama recognized the logical connection between the Tibet status and the McMahon Line. In 1959, Dalai Lama address to the ICWA, he opposed that

“if Tibet had no sovereignty when the Shimla convention laid down the McMahon Line, that line was invalid.”

He encounter the Nehru that


“if you deny the sovereign status to Tibet, you deny the validity of the McMahon Line.”⁵⁹



Map 3.1. Frontier Proposals at the Shimla Conference (March 24, 1914)


Source: The Survey of India

⁵⁹ The times of India, September 8, 1959.



Map 3.2. The McMahon Area (April 27, 1914)

Source: The Survey of India



Map 3.3. Map referred to in Article 9 of the convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet (3rd July 1914)

Source: the Survey of India

These are three maps related to the Shimla conference. One is devoted to the March 24 convention, second is the April 27 convention, and third is the July 3 convention. As far as the Tawang Region is troubled, these three maps display the McMahon line fairly different. In the first map the McMahon Line was displayed running along south of the Thagla range, north of Tawang. On the second map, it is not shown in the Tawang tract; and the third one, it is covered on the word “Tawang”.

In 1936, Basil Gould, a political officer in Sikkim, was sent to Lhasa and discussed the Tawang disputes with the Tibetan administration. The Tibetan arrogance was Tawang had been Tibetan up to 1914 and they observed the modification of the Tibet-Indian boundary issue as part and portion of the general modification and resolve of boundaries planned in the 1914

convention. If they could, with British Bharat help, secure a sure Sino-Tibetan boundary, they would see the India-Tibet border as defined in 1914 Shimla Convention.

In 1944-45, just earlier the British leave from India, Basil Gould up-to-date the Tibetan Government that the British-Indian Government was prepared to modify the McMahon Line so as to ignore Tawang from the territory it demanded. British also planned that the Se. La. Range should be a new boundary line. But, the Tibetan Government did not accept it and continuous to collect incomes in the Tawang tract and continued in administrative control over the Tawang region.

In February 1951 that the Indian administration acquired the Tawang tract by force before the People Liberation Army entered and enlightened Tibet. The Tibetan Government organized protest rallies in Tawang and Lhasa against India's occupation of the Tawang region, but to no benefit.⁶⁰ As for as the motive of the Shimla conference was troubled, it was certainly abandoned. The McMahon Line was not even recognized by the British-Indian Government. After the Shimla accord, from 1914 to 1935, on the official maps published by the Survey of India, the McMahon Line was not publicized, (see the map 2.6. and 6.3.) but instead the Outer Line along the hills of the Himalayas was shown. The Tibetan Government continued to exercise administrative authority in the tribal areas as they did earlier. The Shimla conference went depressed in history as an unaccomplished reason.

The first official record of the Shimla Conference appeared in Volume XIV in 1929 version of Aitchison's Treaties⁶¹. It did not mention to the McMahon Line, but the argument on the Sino-Tibetan boundary. It was specified that a tripartite agreement was drawn up and personalized in 1914, but the Chinese Government declined to permit its representative to continue to full signature.

Olaf Caroe, deputy secretary of the Foreign Department of the British-Indian Administration in 1935 revealed a secret documents of the Shimla accord in allocating with a case, relating the illegal access in Tibet through the Tawang territory. Olaf Caroe realized that the north eastern border might be a problem of dispute with the Chinese in the near future. He

⁶⁰ Xuecheng Liu, (1994)*The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations* Lanham:University press of America, Inc., p.62.

⁶¹ Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison was a Scottish. He was a Lieutenant Governor of Punjab. He served as Chief Commissioner of British Crown Colony of Burma from 1878 to may 1880.

planned to revise the official record of the Shimla agreement in the Aitchison Treaties and display the McMahon Line on the authorized maps. The British administration accepted his proposal. In the revised edition, it was specified that the Shimla accord exchanged an agreement on the standing of Tibet and the frontier of Tibet with both India and China. That map had three copies of original 1929 version continued. All three map copies in Peking Library, Harvard University Library, and third one is in Indian Office. Such an amendment was nothing but shocking diplomatic forgery. After that the McMahon Line began to seem the Indian official maps. Though, it was still clear as “*Undemarcated Boundary*.”

The Puzzle of Aksai Chin

India-china border dispute in the western sector has centered on the Aksai Chin area. The British leftover Aksai Chin region as “*undefined*” at that time of the transfer of power in 1947. Nehru himself once asked that

“it is a matter of argument as to what part of it (Aksai Chin) belongs to us and what part of it belongs to somebody else.... The point is, there has never been any delimitation there in that area and it has been a challenged area.”⁶²

Previously the British left India, the British-Indian Government had displayed no boundary at all in that region on its certified maps. In Volume XII of Aitchison⁶³ Treaties published in 1931, it was specified that “**The northern as well as the eastern boundary of the Kashmir state is still undefined.**”⁶⁴ The British Survey of India maps published in the 1900 and 1930 did not designate any boundary line or show any colour modification in this region, and wide areas between Kashmir and Xinjiang province and between Ladakh and Tibet were shown blank.⁶⁵ British Indian Foreign Secretary Louis Dane, asked clearly in a letter to the Indian office that Aksai Chin was Xinjiag part. The area of the Lanak Pass at the crown of the Changchenmo valley was imaginary to be the maximum northerly boundary point on the Kashmir-Tibet

⁶² *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations* (1961) New Delhi: Government of India. Vol. 1, pp. 148-149.

⁶³ Sir Charles Umpherston Aitchison was a Scottish. He was a Lieutenant Governor of Punjab. He served as Chief Commissioner of British Crown Colony of Burma from 1878 to May 1880.

⁶⁴ Sir Charles U. Aitchison, (1931) *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Volumr XII, New Delhi: The Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, P.5.

⁶⁵ Karunakar Gupta, (1982) “*Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*”, Calcutta: New Book Center, p.82.

border.⁶⁶ The Indian Army in its “**A top secret file**” submitted in 1947 to the British Cabinet Assignment accepted the Karakoram Range as the northern boundary line of India in the western sector.⁶⁷

However, in 1954 Tibet signing the trade agreement, ensuing Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru instructions, After Independence Survey of India again show the map an international boundary in the western region running along the peak of the Kunlun Range, which for the first time located the entire Axsai Chin region within the Indian Territory. According to Sir H. A. F. Rumbold, in 1929 the Simon Commission desired to comprise map of India in Volume I of their report. Rumbold found nobody in the India office to justify the border line in the Kunlun area shown on some maps. The Simon Commission consequently agreed a line roughly along the top of the Karakoram area, without the Axsai Chin area.⁶⁸ Pandit Nehru, stated in the Lok Sabha on August 28, 1959, that

**“This was the boundary of the old Kashmir state with
Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody had marked it.”⁶⁹**

On the other side maps, Chinese have displayed the Karakoram area as its boundary in the western sector later the 1920. Nearby was no confirmation that the British-Indian Government ever borderline here with the British administration before they left India in 1947.

The broadly recognized new concept of boundary design involves three steps: delimitation, delineation and demarcation. In delimitation defining the boundary in written terms through treaties and agreements. Delineation comprises sketching the boundary in maps through multiparty boundary surveys. Demarcation contains marking the boundary line on the ground through posts, cables and other symbols.

Revising the historic realities for the whole India-China border, this one can be believed that India-China boundary has never existed, still both side has prepared its individual territorial privileges. Historical realities have also displayed that, in the longstanding days, wide deserted

⁶⁶ Alastair Lamb, (1989) “*Tibet, China & India, 1914-1950*”, Hertfordshire, Great Britain: Roxford Books, p.390.

⁶⁷ Karunakar Gupta, (1982) “*Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*”, Calcutta: New Book Center, p. 24.

⁶⁸ Karunakar Gupta, (November 29, 1978) “*Myths About a Frontier Dispute*,” The Statesman.

⁶⁹ “*The Sino-Indian Boundary Question*” (1962) Peking: The Foreign Languages Press, p. 56.

tracts in the great mountains between the both countries were actually inaccessible. Therefore, the India-China border dispute has been the clash on the “zone” rather than the “line” in the eastern and western regions. Joint understanding and acknowledgment of such historical progress of the India-China border should become the initial point for the future border discussions.

Whereas we are carefully optimistic about the steady enhancement in the mutual relations between the both rising Asian giants, we are progressively concerned about the penalties of their geopolitical rhetoric and strategic doubt creating primarily from the unresolved India-China border dispute.

China's Interests in the Kashmir Dispute

Its current professed neutrality apart, China retains a continuing interest in the resolution of the dispute for several reasons. First, the status of the over 2,000 square miles of territory ceded by Pakistan to China under the Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement of 1963 would come up for renegotiation under the terms of the Agreement if India and Pakistan resolved their dispute over Kashmir and India became the sovereign power over the ceded area. Second, in the event of a resolution and India regaining control over the Northern Areas, this would cut all land connections between China and Pakistan and put traffic through the KKH also under Indian control. This would imply losses or at least a degree of wariness for China on several strategic fronts, including its plans of routing energy supplies from West Asia through Gwadar. Third, even if resolution of the Kashmir dispute comes in the form of an acceptance of the current status quo, but with soft borders or “irrelevant” borders as is now being mooted, India will certainly demand greater access to the Northern Areas (and indeed, the rest of Pakistan), beginning with economic access, which could challenge Chinese plans in the region. But fourth, and more positively, resolution—even if on the basis of status quo—can actually lead to greater possibilities for economic interactions between India and China, as outlined above, and certainly these could prove more profitable from the Chinese point of view than those with Pakistan. Further, there could conceivably be added impetus for the resolution of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute as well.

It remains to be seen whether resolution or stalemate on the basis of status quo will be the case. In the meantime, there have been calls for Chinese involvement in the Kashmir dispute from Kashmiris on both sides of the divide. Abdul Majeed Mallick, the former Chief Justice of the High Court of Azad Kashmir and leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League, has


claimed that the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan had promised him that China would return Aksai Chin if Kashmir were to become independent.

Similarly, in 2006 during the World Social Forum in Karachi, Indian Kashmiri leader and Hurriyat Chairman Mirwaiz Umer Farooq called for China to be made a party to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, since it not only occupies a part of Kashmir, but is also one of the major powers in the region. The Pakistani Foreign Office, however, ruled out any role for China, saying that only India and Pakistan were parties to the dispute according to the relevant UN resolutions. During his visit to Pakistan in November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao too did not refer to any Chinese role in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, saying only that his country supported Pakistan and India resolving the issue through dialogue. However, in December 2006, Umer Farooq repeated his call for China's involvement and indicated that his group was thinking of visiting Beijing in this regard.

The Strategic Importance of the Himalayan Rivers

Conventionally, the Chinese people's admiration for their Emperor rise multiple when the monarch starts projects that no human mind can even consider. After all, the Emperor is the Son of Paradise, and only in Paradise can projects such as the Grand Canal, the Great Wall or the three Valleys Dam to Yarlung Tsangpo to be proposed.

The Yarlung Tsangpo (or Brahmaputra in India) has an immense bearing on the life of hundreds of millions in the sub-continent. It is



Map 3.4. The Yarlung Tsangpo or Brahmaputra: Dam and Canal Plan in Tibet.

the main river on the Tibetan plateau, originating from a glacier close Mount Kailash. It is measured to be the longest river on world with an ordinary altitude of 4,000 meters. It runs about 2,058 kilometers in Tibet earlier flowing into India, where it converts the Brahmaputra in India. One of its fascinating features is the sharp U turn. It takes at the closeness of Mount Namcha Barwa near the Indian boundary. Similar the Nile in Egypt, the Yarlung Tsangpo has nourished the Tibetan civilization which flourished beside its valleys, mainly in Central Tibet.


The Yarlung Tsangpo River arrives in India in Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh. Once it enters Assam, it is merged by two new rivers (Dihang and Lohit). Inflowing Bangladesh, the river merged with the Ganga and is identified as the Padma, before attractive the Meghna-Brahmaputra after merging the river Meghna. Lastly it splits into hundreds of channels to form a massive delta which movements end into the Bay of Bengal. When the Tsangpo spreads its eastern most point in Tibet, it takes a sharp U turn known as the Great Curve.

Xinhua News Agency pointed out in May 1994

“Chinese geologists claim that the remote Tibetan canyon is the world’s largest, bigger and deeper than the Grand Canyon. The Yarlung Zangbo Canyon, in the vast Himalayan range that encircles China, averages 3.1 miles (5 km) in depth and extends 197 miles (318 km) in length.”⁷⁰

First Project

There are dual types of the Great Western Diversion. The first is the Yarlung Tsangpo project will have two components, first is the construction of the world’s biggest hydroelectric plant that would produce double electricity by the Three Valleys Dam. The hydroelectric plant on the Great U Turn of Yarlung Tsangpo River will dwarf all other projects with an intended capacity of 40,000 Megawatts. The second component of the River project will be the diversion of the



Map 3.5. The Yarlung Tsangpo or Brahmaputra Diversion Plan in Tibet.

⁷⁰ Tibet World News (May 4, 1994), China Claims Tibetan Canyon is Largest.

waters of the Yarlung Tsangpo which will be pushed northward hundreds of kilometers of mountainous areas to China's northwestern provinces of Xinjiang and Gansu.

For India, the terrible nature of the structure and its nearest to the Indian border cannot be unnoticed. It is not only the pure flagrancy of the project which has to be considered, then again the fact is that if it is accomplished it will have ominous penalties for lots of people downstream.⁷¹

Its Implications

An artificial lake for a 40,000 Megawatts capacity dam would generate a artificial inundating massive areas of virgin forest within the chasm and outside. The artificial lake would spring hundreds kilometers upstream of the Yarlung Tsangpo into the Kongpo district. Rare type of flora and fauna within the valley⁷² will be vanished for scientific study. The Chinese Government themselves confess that the Valley is the home for more than sixty percent of the organic resources on the Tibetan Plateau.

While the population in the valley is small, the native people will hurt great hardship and be mandatory to leave their inherited lands, of course this may not be a problem for China who has 're-settled' more than hundred lakh Chinese Hans since the inauguration of the construction of the Three Valleys Dam.

Furthermore, the water diversion system is probable to be a very inefficient and extravagant workout with billions of cubic meters of water being vanished to evaporation, leakage, percolation, etc. Through the 800 kilometers long inland waterway and aqueducts. If the water project comes to completion, Tibet and the world would have vanished this virgin area and its valley.

⁷¹ The Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, Mr. Jaswant Singh, speaking on the Motion of Thanks to the President's Address, on March 5, 2008 said, "*Sir, it is about the External Affairs Minister again. It is a very intriguing thing. I should not really be raising it until the discussion takes place on his statement. There is just one rather concise but intriguing sentence that the honourable Prime Minister made during his visit to the People's Republic of China*". This is exactly what it says, "*PM also took up the issue of trans-border rivers.*" I would like to caution you, Sir, that the question of the Brahmaputra and the great bend of the Brahmaputra before it debouches into Assam in the North East is a serious situation. "*Sir, I have obtained for myself maps from the Space Research Organisation and they show that this gorge of the Yarlung Tsangpo and thereafter the Namcha Barwa mountain, has a drop of 2,000 metres. It is a narrow gorge, and 2,000 metres in a distance of about 15 km, which gives an enormous resource intimate to the people of China. I know there are plans to build a dam there. I would like to know what the response of the People's Republic of China is about that.*"

⁷² It is based on xinhua news Agency and indian national news papers.

India and Bangladesh would be the mercy of China for satisfactory release of water during the thirsty season, and for safety from floods for the duration of the rainy season. India recognises from its personal internal difficulties how hard it is to resolve a water dispute.

Other Project on Himalayan Waters

Another project on Himalayan Water which acquired a lot of media attention in the recent years is the Shuotian Canal. It is similarly connected with the Great Western Route. The project is the innovation of Guo Kai, the general secretary of the Shuotian Canal Preparatory Committee. Guo Kai's main assignment is to protect the China with Tibet's waters. He planned that if the Salween, the Mekong, the Yangtse, the Yalong and the Dadu waters (last two are Yangtse's branches) were diverted and directed supply to the Ngawa Region of Amdo Province (Qinghai), the problem of water in north and northwest China could be resolved. Don't forget that the Yellow River is in need of water for more than two hundred fifty days in a year. Guo Kai is not only operated closely with specialists from the Ministry of Water Resources and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, but he also complete some on-the-spot investigations and inspections, before coming up with the facts of his pharaonic plan.

According to Guo Kai, the '**Great Western Route**' diversion could resolve the lack of water in north China, getting drinkable water to Tanjing and even secure northwest provinces to the desertification. That is why it is measured so dynamic to the country's tactical security.

On July 27, 2006 the Chinese newspaper Southern Weekend⁷³ described some of Guo Kai explanations that the complete of the Railway line to Lhasa means that about 230,000 engineering staff involved to this project could nowadays be shifted to work on the Shuotian Canal. The Shuotian name comes from the contraction of the source of the canal near Shuomatan on the Yalung Tsangpo (near the Tsetang town) and the end of Tianjing city. According to the Chinese newspaper Southern Weekend,

“A strategic perspective, the Great Western Route offers a tentative plan for the solution of the water shortage problem. However, neither side is able to present convincing data based on meticulous field surveys.”

In November 2006 Chinese President Hu Jintao visit to India with Chinese Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng, declared that the project was “**unnecessary, unfeasible and**

⁷³ The Southern Weekend or Nanfang Zhoumou., China's largest circulation weekly is very popular for its investigative journalism.

unscientific.” He added that it had no Government backing, “**There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects.**” However Wang Shucheng admitted that “**There may be some retired officials that support the plan, but they are not the experts advising the Government.**” For the first time, it was not a point blank rejection.⁷⁴

The Arunachal Floods

An event which occurred in June 2000 could be an illustration at a very reduced scale of what could happen if the Tsangpo project is someday completed. At that time, the breach of a natural dam in Tibet led to severe floods and left over a hundred people dead or missing in Arunachal Pradesh. It is not difficult to understand that areas downstream in Arunachal or Assam are extremely vulnerable to what takes place upstream in Tibet.⁷⁵

Geopolitics Situation between India and China

China had already occupied bulk of the Ladakh territory, and threatened mobilization across the McMahon Line. With China becoming a nuclear power, the relevance of the non-aligned geopolitical code was put to test that needed a more pragmatic geopolitical code which could rival China’s approach.

The Indian sub-continental plate has a tendency to continuously rub and push against the Eurasian tectonic plate, triggering friction and instability in the whole Himalayan Mountains, the bilateral relationship with India and China is also a delicate, hidden, but continuing and deeply manipulated impact, the effects of which have left an intricate lineage. Border disputes between the both countries have come to encouragement the whole thing from their military and security policymaking to their economic and diplomatic scheming, with implications for wary neighbours

⁷⁴ In 2002, India and China agreed to exchange data on the trans-border rivers. In April 2005, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Premier signed a Joint Declaration with his Indian counterpart. One article mentions the water issue: “In response to concerns expressed by the Indian side, the Chinese side agreed to take measures for controlled release of accumulated water of the landslide dam on the river Pareechu, as soon as conditions permit. It was noted with satisfaction that an agreement concerning the provision of hydrological data on Sutlej was concluded during the visit and that the two sides had also agreed to continue bilateral discussions to finalize at an early date similar arrangements for the Parlung Zangbo and Lohit Rivers.”

⁷⁵ “*Breach in Tibet Dam Caused Arunachal Floods*”, (July 8, 2000) The Times of India; “*India Blames Flash Floods on Chinese Dam*”, (July 10, 2000) Agence France Press; “*Arunachal floods—dam breach in Tibet, China ‘hushed’ it up*”, (July 10, 2000) Indian Express.

and faraway partners alike. The India China relationship is complicated by layers of competition, mistrust, and irregular cooperation, not to mention actual border disputes.

India and China grow into next-door neighbours with challenged frontiers and unclear histories in 1950, after the People's Liberation Army occupied Tibet, rest of the world taking note of China's enlargement during the past period of the twentieth century, India has been suspiciously observing China's rise continually a territorial dispute flare up in a brief but full-size war in 1962, shadowed by skirmishes in 1967 and 1987.

After the India China war, several rounds of border talks held since 1981 have unsuccessful to resolve the disputed disputes. During the last visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India, in 2010, dashed any hopefulness of initial border settlement, affirming that it would take a very long time to resolve the boundary disputes, a condition that in various ways works to China's advantage. An unsettled border offers China the strategic influence to keep India uncertain about its purposes, and worried about its abilities, despite the fact that India exposing helplessness and weaknesses, and hopeful India's, good behaviour on matters of dynamic concern. As well, as the continuing discontent and growing incidents of self-immolations by monks in Tibet show, China has not so far flourished in peace-making and Sinicizing Tibet. The clear outcome is that the 2,520-mile Sino-Indian boundary, one of the extensive inter-state boundaries in the world, rests China's lone undefined land border. It is also flatteringly militarized, as pressures rise over China's forceful patrolling on the line of actual control and its military movements, with live ammunition, for a possible air and land movement to detention high-altitude mountain passes in Tibet.

Ended the latter decade, the Chinese have put in place a heavy military set-up in the Tibet Autonomous Region touching India: five operational air bases, some helipads, a widespread rail network, and about thirty five thousand miles of roads, providing them the facility to rapidly set up thirty divisions along the border, a three-to-one benefit over India. China has not only bigger its military existence in Tibet but it is also ramping up its nuclear store. In addition, the People Liberation Army strategic choices against India are set to increase as Chinese land and rail links with Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, and Bangladesh expand.

Expansions on the disputed Himalayan borders are essential to India's internal discussion about the integrity of its strategic warning and whether to experiment nuclear weapons again. India is extreme more worried about the inclusive military balance sloping to its disadvantage. India realises China universally because of China's adopt he-xiao-gongda policy in South Asia;

bonding with the Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma, and Sri Lanka to counter the large India. When united with Chinese nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan and construction of Naval port around India's outside edge, and a dramatic increase in the People Liberation Army incursions and transgressions across the Line of Actual Control, the official Indian awareness of China has experienced a dramatic change since 2006, with China now being broadly seen as presenting a major security risk in the small to medium term rather than over the lengthy term.

The Indian military, lengthily preoccupied with war-fighting situations against Pakistan, has accordingly twisted its attention to the Chinese border, and started a massive force transformation program, to cost \$100 billion over the next era, that consist of the construction of some strategic roads and the enlargement of rail networks, helipads, and airfields near the Line of Actual Control. Additional measures range from raising a new 'mountain strike corps' and doubling force levels in the eastern sector by one lakh troops to the deployment of Sukhoi - 30MKI aircraft, spy drones, helicopters, and ballistic and cruise missile squadrons to protect its north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, area is three times the size of Taiwan that the Chinese attacked in 1962 and now claim autonomy over as -Southern Tibet.

Thrust incidents related to the border issues, Chinese disapproval to the US-India nuclear energy deal, India's trouble over the increasing trade shortage due to alleged Chinese partial trade practices, possible Chinese tactics to dam the Brahmaputra River, and the conflict talk in the authorized Chinese media in the period of 2007 to 2009 (Article title was "*reminding India not to forget -the lessons of 1962*"), mutual suspicion between the Indian and Chinese people is increasing. Obviously, China's surprising economic grow over the last thirty years has improved the changing aspects of the relationship. India and China had parallel average earnings in the late 1970s, but three decade later they discover themselves at entirely different periods of development. China's economic reforms started in 1978, nearly thirteen years earlier India's in 1991 changed their succeeding growth trajectories by knocking China far gaining of India in all Socioeconomic indices. China's unrefined local product and military spending are now three times the size of India, latest surveys conducted by Pew Global Research display a development in popular suspicion, through just 25 percent of Indian holding a satisfactory viewpoint of China in 2011, down from 34 percent in 2010 and 57 percent in 2005. Similarly, just 27 percent of Chinese hold a satisfactory view of India in 2011, down from 32 percent in 2010, with studies of Internet at ease viewing a huge degree of enmity and dislike for India.

Reacting to the long-range Agni-V ballistic missile test launch in mid-April, named the - China assassin by India's news media, a Chinese daily noted that India positions no chance in an

whole arms race with China, because China's nuclear influence is stronger and more reliable. The unsatisfactory strategic calculation, in specially the Chinese view of India as a land of incompatible socio religious cleavages with a naturally unbalanced society and weak leadership that is simply contained through proxies, intensifies tensions between the both countries. In 2010, an official re-evaluation of China's abilities and targets directed the Indian military to approve a two-front war policy against what is notorious as a collusive threat posed by both carefully make straight nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan.

India is also re-joining by solidification its strategic relations with Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, Vietnam, and Myanmar countries on China's outside edge. James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, in evidence to the US Senate in February 2009, noted that

“The Indian military is strengthening its forces in preparation to fight a limited conflict along the disputed border, and is working to balance Chinese power projection in the Indian Ocean.”

That balance contains a strategic slope toward the United States that has also had a negative effect on India China relations.

Even though leaders from India and China over and over again repeat the ritualized forswearing of conflict and highlight increasing trade relations, some of common place cannot obliterate the trust shortage. Few of China's strategic thinkers look like to hold positive views of India for China's future. Chinese tacticians keep a suspicious eye on India's great power visions, its military expenses and weapons achievements, and the growths in India's naval and nuclear doctrines. A leading theme in Chinese explanation in the last period is that India's growing strength backed by the United States, could tip Asia's balance of power left from China.

unpredictably, bilateral relations between India and China remain, Zhang Yan, China's ambassador to India, in his word **“very fragile, very easy to be damaged, and very difficult to repair.”** Mutually have huge manpower resources, a scientific and industrialised base, and million-plus militaries. Within the more than fifty years first time, both countries are moving increasing simultaneously on their comparative power trajectories. As the essential power in South Asia, India recognises itself much as China has by tradition recognises itself in relation to East Asia. Both countries desire a peaceful safety atmosphere to focus on economic development and avoid rivalry or conflict.

Yet, the volatile negotiators of nationalism, history, ambition, strength, and produce a secretive chemistry. No power is comfortable with the rise of the other power. India and China seek to encase neighbours through their national economies. Both are nuclear and space powers with rising ambitions. Both desire for a multipolar world that will be responsible for them the space for progress and freedom of achievement. Both struggle for leadership positions in local and international organizations and have tried to launch a sort of Monroe Doctrine in their relevant neighbourhoods without more success.

And the both Countries continue doubtful of each other's long-standing agenda and targets. Each observes the other as following domination and entertaining grand ambitions. India and China are non-status quo powers, in terms of China territory, power, and influence and in terms of India position, power, and influence. Both countries seeking to increase their power and influence in and beyond their areas at each other's overhead. China's -Malacca paranoia is similar by India's -Hormuz dilemma. If China's navy is working south to the Indian Ocean, India's navy is successfully going east to the Pacific Ocean. Both countries suffer from a barrier mentality born out of their influential acute awareness of the troublesome trends that make their countries' current political unity so fragile. After all, much of Indian and Chinese history is made up of long times of internal conflict and chaos, when centrifugal forces carried down even the greatest empires. Each has its defencelessness local conflicts, poverty, and religious separations for India; the inconsistency between the economy and Leninist politics for China. Both countries are snowed under with local linguistic, ethno-religious, and politico-economic error lines that could be their downfall if not succeeded properly.

In other words, India and China are protected in a typical security dilemma: one nation understands its actions as defensive but the equal actions seem forceful to the other. China fears that an abandoned Indian power mainly one that is provide backing by the West and Japan would not only threaten China's security along its restless Tibet and Xinjiang. But also barricade China's expansion southwards. Tackled with exponential growth in China's power and effect, India sensations the need to take counter balancing actions and introduced strategic initiatives to develop as a great power, but these are superficial as stimulating and threatening in China.

China's used local and global organizations to institutionalize its influence while any denying India entree to these marginalizing India within them has supplementary a new modest dynamic to the relationship. In last decade, India has establish itself reached against China at the United Nation Security Council, East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Asian Development Bank. In 2009, China use veto power for a

development plan for disputed Arunachal Pradesh, thus internationalizing a bilateral territorial dispute. In a tit-for-tat response, India has kept China out of India-led multidimensional frameworks such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Collaboration, the India-Brazil-South Africa Negotiation, and the Mekong–Ganga Collaboration forums, and prohibited China's appeal to be comprised as observer into the 33-member Indian Ocean Naval Convention, started in India in 2008.

The insufficiency of resources has supplemented a maritime dimension to this geopolitical conflict, As the dependence of China and India is ever increasing on the Middle East, both are aggressively seeking to forge closer defence and security agreement with resource supplier nations (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Iran), and to improvise suitable naval capabilities to govern the sea lanes through which the bulk of their business flows. As seventy-seven percent of China's oil comes from the Middle East and Africa, Beijing has enhanced its actions in the Indian Ocean area by investing in coastal states economies, construction of ports and infrastructure, providing armaments, and attaining energy resources. Approximately ninety percent of Chinese arms sales go to those nations placed in the Indian Ocean region. Beijing is financing excessively in developing the Gwadar deep-sea port in Pakistan, and marine bases in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Whether someone calls it a -string of pearls at which China's navy can base or simply be resupplied, that navy is setting up sustenance infrastructure in tactical positions along the same sea lanes of communication that could deactivate India's geographical benefit in the Indian Ocean region.

A fresh observation from the authorised Xinhua News Agency called for setting up three type of navy supply bases in the northern Indian Ocean, the western Indian Ocean, and the southern Indian Ocean. It stated, China needs to establish external strategic support stations for adding ship fuel, re-supply of required items, staff break time, repairs of apparatus, and weapons in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, which will be the essential support bases in the North Indian Ocean supply line, Oman, Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, Tanzania, and Mozambique, which will be the main support bases in the West Indian Ocean supply line; and Seychelles and Madagascar, which will be the main support bases in the South Indian Ocean supply line. For its part, India is following the same policy as China and generating its own web of associations with the coastal states, both bilaterally and multilaterally, through the Indian Ocean Naval Convention, to confirm that if the military need ascends, the essential support infrastructure and network will be in place.

India has also walked up defence support with Oman and Israel in the west, while advancing military agreement with the Maldives, Madagascar, and Myanmar in the Indian Ocean, and with Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, Australia and the United States in the east. In December 2006, Admiral Suresh Mehta, then Indian naval chief, prolonged the conceptual theory of India's-greater strategic neighbourhood to comprise possible sources of oil and gas imports situated across the world from Venezuela to the Sakhalin Islands in Russia. The Indian navy at this time has a stronger naval presence on the Indian Ocean more than China. It is solidification its port infrastructure with new southern ports, which allow greater prediction into the Indian Ocean. Taking a leaf out of China's book, the new focus is to develop anti-access and area-denial skills that will spoil any Chinese attempt at sea-access denial.

The maritime competition is increasing as Indian and Chinese navies display the flag in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean with greater frequency. This conflict could spill into the couple of decades, when one Indian aircraft carrier will be positioned in the Pacific Ocean and one Chinese aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean, ostensibly to protection their separate trade and energy routes.

After 1991, India's Look East policy is a appearance of its own strategic determined to compete for influence in the wider Asia-Pacific region. As like China will not admit India's primacy in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India look like unwilling to agree to take Southeast and East Asia as China's sphere of effect. As like China's rise is observed positively in the South Asian region situated the small countries surrounding India with which India has had challenging relations, India's rise is observed in positive terms among China's neighbours all over East and Southeast Asia. Above the last two decades, India has required to enhance its economic and security agreement with those Northeast and Southeast Asian nations (as like South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia) that worried about China more than any other developed power.

As China's increasing strength creates discomfort in the region, India's emotional Stability is welcome within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in order to effect China's behaviour in supportive directions. Though the Southeast Asian leaders seek to daunt China from make use of its growing strength for forced purposes and to keep regional sovereignty, Indian strategic specialists favour an Indian naval existence in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean to counter Chinese naval existence in the Indian Ocean. On the maritime security,

Southeast Asians look like more eager to cooperate with India than China, mainly in the Strait of Malacca.

The important element of India's Pacific outreach has been consistent naval exercises, port calls, security negotiations, and more than a dozen defence cooperation treaties. India has greeted Vietnam's offer of docking rights in Na Trang Port in the South China Sea, and news broadcast reports advise that India might offer BrahMos cruise missiles and other military hardware at relationship prices to Vietnam. The assessment is that of free-trade treaties with South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, and the ASEAN, coupled with India's contribution in multilateral forums such as the East Asia Summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus Eight defence minister's meetings, have also strengthened strategic agreement. India's resolve to strengthen its strategic partnership with Vietnam and Japan, promise to pursue joint oil investigation with Hanoi in the South China Sea waters in the aspect of Chinese opposition, and an importance on the freedom of navigation are signs of India manoeuvring to be understood as a counterweight to Chinese supremacy in East Asia. India is also climbing up defence agreement with Japan, South Korea, and Australia.

The India-US partnership is also developing as an important factor of India's strategy to balance China's power. India look for US economic and technological support. This relationship grown that India's long time security concerns with China and Pakistan, also now occur to be the United States long-standing and direct strategic concerns as well. Both the US President Bush and Obama Governments have giving support to India involvement in a broader Asian security to balance a growing China and declining Japan. Speciously, US weakness actual or perceived Chinese confidence. The United States does not desire to see Asia controlled by a single hegemonic power, India's economic growth is seen as helping US long-term interests by safeguarding that there be countervailing powers in Asia: China, India and Japan, with the US on-going to act as an involved offshore power balancer.

The developing India's factor is progressively more inflowing the ongoing US policy debate over China. Asia-Pacific is currently the Indo-Pacific, a term highlighting the centrality of India in the new calculus of local power. India's Look East policy, which predicts high-level appointment with China-wary nations (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia and Indonesia), merges with the US policy of establishing closer agreement with countries beyond US traditional accord partners to maintain United State predominance. The US-Indian strategic appointment, attached with India's increasing naval and nuclear capabilities and vast economic potential, have made India appear larger on China's radar shade. An editorial in

Shanghai daily newspaper last November 2012 mourned the fact that India will not permit itself to stay silently between the United State and China. It wants to play three-way relationship affairs with the pair, and will do whatever it can to maximize benefit out of it. So, China will discover it hard to buy India finished. The Chinese terror that the Indian-American cooperation in defence, high-tech, nuclear, space, and maritime scopes would extend US hegemony and avoid the establishment of a post-American, Sino-centric hierarchical local order in Asia. This constricted relationship, and the possibility that what is currently a slope on India's part could turn into a complete alignment, is a main reason for new deterioration in Indian Chinese relations.

Even though these relations keep on unstable and competitive, both side have required to reduce tensions. Despite India China border disputes, rejection of market access, and strict words against the Dalai Lama, leaders of the both countries realise the dangers of permitting problems to overpower the relationship. Burgeoning economic agreement between the global two fastest-developing economies country have become the most prominent aspect of their bilateral relationship. Bilateral Trade flows have increased rapidly, from a worthless in 1993, \$350 million to \$70 billion in 2012, and could exceed \$100 billion in 2015. Some joint projects in power generation, consumer goods, chemicals, minerals, steel, mining, transport, info-tech, infrastructure and telecommunication are in the whole thing. Increasing trade, commerce, and tourism could ultimately raise the risk factor for China in its relationship with India. The positive side, both share mutual interests in maintaining local stability (for example, combating Islamist fundamentalists), manipulating economic opportunities, and maintaining access to energy bases, and markets.

Although, there exist ever-increasing bi-lateral trade capacities, however there is as up till now no tactical evenness between India and China. As in the status of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese agreement, Sino-Indian has been replete with modest inclinations, embedded with geopolitics and nationalism, are unlikely to be easily offset even by increasing economic and trade links. Factually the trade relationship is excessively twisted. The substance of Indian exports to China comprise of iron ore and other raw materials, whereas India ingresses frequently manufactured goods from China-a classic illustration of the dependency model. Most Indian see China as greedy in trade. India has lodged the highest number of anti-dumping cases against Beijing in the World Trade Organization. India is having a stronger stand on following bi-lateral trade dependencies with Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations through

extended trade, investment, infrastructure growth, and aid to bolster economic and diplomatic ties across Asia that will counter Chinese power.

Although a range of economic trade and transnational issues take them closer together, the combination of core issues of firmness (Kashmir issue and Tibet), arguments over region, struggle over resources (water, oil and gas), foreign markets and bases, external corresponding spheres of influence, rival coalition relationships, and ever-extending geopolitical horizons foresee the possibilities for an original Sino-Indian arrangement. Given the wide range of negative attitudes and insights every nation has for the other, it is in fact outstanding that China and India have been able to keep strategic ties from distressing. Such type of situation cannot remain for a longer period of time as every nations are constantly active in what would once have been seen as the other's back-yard and both engage in strategic exercises to defeat each other.

Chapter-4

McMahon Line in Security Perspective & Its Implications on Conflict Resolution

China, from the geo-strategic and political point of view is a very important neighbour of India and share a four thousand kilometer (approximately due to prevailing dispute) border with her. The border dispute and the relationship between India and China are grave security concern of this region. Social political milieu and geographical conditions play a very vital role in ensuring security of the border areas during the times of war. Security of a nation is not merely guarding the country against external aggressions but involves larger issues of protecting it against internal sub version of and fissiparous tendencies. Hence, while evaluating the importance of the area adjoining McMohan Line, the internal as well as external threat dimensions must be realistically assessed. It would also be fatal to minimize the insidious specter of threat from within when one is discussing our relationship with China. It is thus imperative that the assimilation of the border population in the main stream of national life is total-not only from economic but social point of view also. Further, for the successful conduct of the present study, it is highly essential to comprehensively study the border area from different angles.

Geo-Strategic Importance of McMahon Line Area

India's border with China is geographically contiguous with a number of Indian States such as Jammu & Kashmir, Himanchal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. Arunachal Pradesh, the union territory of India, was known as NEFA till 1987. On the 20th of February 1987, Arunachal Pradesh became the 24th state of the Union of India. Arunachal Pradesh, comprising the mountainous areas laying to the north and east of Assam, is located between the cultivable plantations and oil-minerals-natural resources rich basin of Brahmaputra-Lohit and the Tibetan frontier⁷⁶. Some of the features that this territory includes are of international importance and these are–

1. The Western trijunction where Bhutan, China (Tibet) & India meet.
2. A trijunction in the east where Myanmar (Burma), China (Tibet) and India co-terminate. This trijunction point is the most important both strategically and geographically. It is important from the point of defence and access to the territories



Map 4.1. Show the contiguity of Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh) with Bhutan, China (Tibet) & Myanmar (Burma)

⁷⁶ Government of Arunachal Pradesh, (1989) “Arunachal Darshan glimpses of the land and people” Doctorate of Information & Public relation, P 8.

of the above mentioned three countries. On this Eastern sector, Arunachal Pradesh border area forms the northern border of India and is the most important one, as it is an immediate land border with all these neighbouring countries at the same time.

From the defence point of view, Arunachal Pradesh can be considered as the main gate of the fort. If Arunachal Pradesh ceases to exist then it will be immediately Assam, and if Assam is taken, then it will be Bihar and then West Bengal. Thus India itself will cease to exist. Arunachal Pradesh is very rich in terms of the minerals and forests resources. It has a great potential for electricity and a number of areas have surplus paddy production and potential for agro based industries. The forest of this area are rich in terms of raw material for production of Veneer plywood, decorative wood, hard board and paper pulp which is essential for news prints. A high quality of tea can be produced in the hills of Arunachal Pradesh.

This sector of India and China border (Arunachal Pradesh) has already occupied an important place in the petroleum map of India. Oil India Limited was busy in conducting geological survey of Nao Dehing area. At present Oil India Limited has been successful in extracting crude oil from six wells in the Nao Dehing area. Annually the Government of Arunachal Pradesh is earning Rs.1, 65, 000 per Annam as a license fee from Oil India Limited. This sector has become a new area of hopes in India's quest for oil.⁷⁷

Electricity is highly essential for industrial development and hence there is wide scope for industrialization. Recently the investigation team of the Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC) has discovered potential for hydro-electric scheme in the Kameng District of Arunachal Pradesh. It is estimated that this scheme can gradually develop to produce 600 MW. So this region has the capacity for raising a biggest hydro-electric station in the country than the Bhakra-Nangal project or Damodar Valley scheme. Besides that, it could also supply electricity to state of Assam, Meghalaya, West Bengal and even Bihar. Thus, this power potential area is strategically very important to the frontier sites of India in the north east⁷⁸. Regarding agriculture, cultivation of crops is limited but there is a good environment for plantation and development of horticulture which could be resorted to for the development of area. The McMahon Line follows the watershed line of Himalayan

⁷⁷ Dr. P.C Dutta,(1993) "*Arunachal Pradesh: an Overview*" Directorate of Research. Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar p. 56.

⁷⁸ P. N. Luthra ,(1968) "*Strategy for the North-east Frontier Areas in the Seventies*" The USI Journal, New delhi: United services Institution of India Kashmir House, PP. 496-97.

mountain ranges between India and China (Tibet) and therefore it doesn't require extensive resources to demarcate the border.

Secondly, as the McMahon Line is located at a considerable altitude there is no requirement of creating a separate "NO MAN LAND" area along the international border between India and China. It is also supportive and congenial to ensure secured environment along the international border. From the point of view of China, the state of Arunachal Pradesh is strategically very important. This area connects geographically Myanmar and Bhutan and is in close proximity to Bangladesh and the Indian Ocean. Strategically China had planned to approach the Rim land of southern Asia and encroach towards the resourceful areas of Afro-Asia.

Thirdly China might plan to link the two major oceans of the world i.e. Pacific and the Indian Ocean. According to Eastern Panorama quoted:

"China is building three naval base⁷⁹ off the Burmese coast (Myanmar) at Hainggyi Island on the mouth of the Irravady River, Coco Islands near Andamans Islands and at Mergui on the southern tip of the Burmese coast not far from the Sumatra Island of Indonesia"

Fourthly, annexation of Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern sector) could give China accessibility to the low lying areas of the NorthEastern states of India. Therefore it would have been very easy to penetrate these states to create security problems and diverge the local population from mainstream India. Fifthly, India could have lost its geographical advantage of blocking the invaders at the border itself. Therefore, at the time of hostility during 1950-60, Arunachal Pradesh was very important to China so that she could annex large areas along the boundary and defeat India's strategic planning for defence.

Prior to 1962, communication in border areas was poorly developed as we have already seen during the Chinese aggression of 1962. India considered Arunachal Pradesh of great importance from the point of view of its economic development and cultural assimilation. In western sector of Ladakh, Chinese are already in possession of most of the



Map4.2. Chinese Naval Bases in Myanmar Coast

⁷⁹ That three bases will be equipped with the three R.I.E. (Repairs, Radar and Refuel Facilities)

claimed area. They have already maintained a strategic highway which links Tibet and Sinkiang and the Karakoram highway. Some important passes are also located here.

In the case of Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern Sector), after crossing the passes at the border, the major routes follow the five major river valleys, Kameng, Subansiri, Lohit, Siang and Tirap. To be able to make an impact, two major offensives may have to be launched in conjunction with some subsidiary offensives. About four to five corps of 12 to 16 divisions may be deployed. Depending on the resistance put up by the defender, even more troops may be required.

It's easier for China to invade in India with the root of Northern Burma (Now Myanmar). The passes to be negotiated are very low and are open throughout the year. Further, the old alignment of the Ledo road is available. The other route that is available is Tamu-Imphal Axis. For large scale operations, these routes need improvements, particularly the Ledo Road. The Chinese could employ three to four corps of 12 division along these routes. Once the attacker crosses the hills and land onto the plains, he would be tackling Arunachal Pradesh from the rear.⁸⁰

To that intent, China provided military support to Kachins and Shans to create disturbance in Northern Burma. The Chinese Government and the communist party denied the Burmese Government control over these areas.⁸¹ There have also been reports of infiltrators from Burma into Indian Territory. For many years it has been noticed that the Chinese have been running animal transport services and various kinds of shops which go to show that the economy of Northern Burma is in their hands. Thus it leads to the surmise that the Chinese may attack India through the Northern Burma Ledo road.

Construction of a highway which links the heartland with the frontier area has always occupied important place in China's strategic military planning. In fact it was not until she had completed linking Tibet with two highways that China put into effect its Tibet and Indian Policies.

⁸⁰ General K V Krishna Rao (Retd), (1991) "Prepare for Perish", New Delhi: Lancer Publishers Pvt Ltd, pp 290-92

⁸¹ R C Sharma, Editor, (1991) New Delhi: Management Issues and operational Planning for India's Border Scholar Pub., p.15.

China has excellent roads leading to its front including good lateral roads, whereas on Indian side, the road network is not that well developed; one has to climb from plains to a plateau. India is thus at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis China.

Analysing the McMohan Line Border

On 20th October, 1962, China attacked Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. The Chinese invasion showed that a determined enemy can always overcome even natural difficulties. It shows that the concept of natural defence of India's northern border has to be completely changed due to the advancement of science and technology. India's northern frontier despite the geographical reality i.e. the Himalayas, is not a homogeneous region in terms of geographical imperatives of India's security. The area analysing consist to description of the area and an estimate of likely effects on geographical condition of the area upon likely action of enemy.

Tactically the Himalayan region is hard and difficult to maintain the passes and ranges. It is impossible to patrol every inch of the McMohan Line area. The jungle of Arunachal Pradesh are equally favorable to attack as well as defend. Arunachal Pradesh has limited road, dense vegetation and rugged mountain areas, which offers an excellent opportunity to capitalize on aviation support.

The Indian armed forces have been called to fight on the McMohan Line border area. The snow covered Himalayas as well as the jungles of Arunachal Pradesh require the well trained armed forces with sophisticated weapons, equipment's and spirit of fighting.

Transportation and Communication in Border Area

(a) Indian Scenario

After the 1962 war which strained the relations with China, it produced a new awareness towards the construction of road up to the borders for strategic reasons. After 1962, a new organization was established which was named as the Border Roads. The main objectives of this organisation were to provide the road communications and transportation facilities in the border region. On 28th January 1993, the then Defence Minister Mr. Sharad Pawar informed that steps were being taken to mechanise and diversify the "BORDER ROADS ORGANISATION" in the operational role. Further, he stated that in spite of tightening the budget, the Organisation has been able to meet the time schedules and maintain a standard of

work. Since 1960, the BRO has constructed and upgraded over 23,000 kilometers of roads and was able to maintain about 17,000 kilometers, mostly in the north and northEastern border areas. These roads are useful for both the civil and military purposes and serves as strategic linkages.⁸²

“*General Reserve Engineering Force*” which is a part of “Border Roads Organisation”, came into being in 1960. The aim of GREF is to fulfill the requirement of Army in border region, that is, to construct roads and bridges in border areas. During war, the task of GREF is to assist the Army by constructing temporary bridges and roads in the McMahon Line area (i.e. in Arunachal Pradesh). However, the GREF (General Reserve Engineering Force) has the following problems:

- To manage transportation and communication.
- To manage the construction material.
- To seek cooperation from the local people, which is a very difficult task. Locals being tribal, are not easy to convince to cooperate.
- To manage the man power recruited for their help which is also a difficult task.

The latest achievement of GREF along McMahon Line is the construction of a road up to “Anini border area village” (part of Dibeng valley district) which passes through difficult mountain terrain.⁸³

In Arunachal Pradesh there are four main valley routes coming into Assam from the Tibetan plateau.

- First is via Tawang and is twin routed one via Bomdila to Tezpur.
- Another is along with Manas River through Bhutan.
- Rest of the three routes are along Subansiri valley, Siang Valley and Lohit valley.

The Chinese roads come right up to the border. This enables the Chinese to exert pressure at various points along the border.⁸⁴

⁸² *The times of India* (29 Jan, 1993) New Delhi Edition

⁸³ Interview with R Srinivas Rao, (29 June 1993)The Times Of India (New Delhi)

⁸⁴ General K V Krishna Rao (Retd.) Op. cit., p. 384.

India's Rail heads

Tinsukhia to Rima -----	250 Km
Siliguri to Nathula-----	200 Km
Tezpur to Tawang-----	300 Km
Kaika to Shipkila-----	400 Km
Jammu to Leh-----	700 Km
Bareilly to Garlayang-----	400 Km

Indian positions are thus only 2 to 6 days away from her rail heads whereas China's are fifteen or more than that in the three western sub sectors. In a strategic situation (if war takes place between India and China) China can launch no serious offensive on account of terrain. But on the contrary Indian enjoys the benefit of a broad gauge rail route all along the sector up to the foothills. In view of the geographical situation, certain major geographical land marks which are considered strategically critical are Kaurik and Shipki La passes in the Himachal Pradesh and Mna, Tangijan La, and Lipulekh Passes in the Uttarakhand.⁸⁵

As compared to China, India has many roads for communication and transportation with border areas. Apart from the McMahon Line area in the western and middle sector to the Eastern sector, *India never built a road in some areas along the McMahon Line because:*

- Terrain is so difficult, no major PLA attack can be delivered, or even if delivered, it cannot be sustained through East Arunachal Valleys.
- India's decision about Walong and Tawang (planned) was not to advance; only to defend. Lack of roads would also impede Chinese advance onto the Indian side.
- India has a large number of advance landing grounds in areas where roads do not run towards the boundary such as Central/East Arunachal Pradesh. These partially make up for the lack of roads. After all, attack in areas like Tawang, there is a problem, only up to the border from where good road communications start. India has a large helicopter lift capability to cover such gaps.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Ravi Rikhye, (1988) "The Indo-Tibetan Border Today: Some Military Implications", China Report :24:3, New Delhi: sage Publications, Vol 24. No. 3, p. 290.

⁸⁶ Ravi Rikhye, op.cit., pp 290-292

B. **Chinese Scenario**


The highways that are now in operation which connect China's heartland with southwestern Sinkiang are as follows-

The Kashgar: Shu Fu (Silk) Route

This links Kashgar with Turfan (89° 45'E) on the main Lanchow-Urmachi Railway. The road is approximately 850 miles long. Kashgar to Gilgit is another 400 miles of which the first 250 are on the Chinese side of the mountains. This part passes through a difficult terrain across the Mintaka Pass at an altitude of 16,000 feet. Pamirs is usable throughout the year, although the pass is snow bound for about four month in a year. The Chinese however claim that it is an "all weather" road and the vehicles of 3 to 5 ton capacity could negotiate even the mountain stretches throughout the year.

Takla Makan Route

Second road link from the heartland to southern western Sinkiang runs Southeast of Takla Makan Desert and connects Anshi with Yarkand



Map 4.3. Chinese Road Opposite to McMahon Line Border

(So-Chi) a distance of about 1100 miles. Anshi is on the rail route between the Lanchow-Urumchi railways. From Yarkand there is no road direct to Gilgit across the Khunjareb Pass across which is the old silk route pass. The Kunjareb Pass is at a height of 16000 feet and is vulnerable to being snow bound. The road was opened in 1960. Thus to reinforce the southwestern zone of Sinkiang, whichever route the Chinese may take, a distance of over 1100 miles will have to be traversed. For entry into subcontinent, a further 200 miles across none too an easy route would have to be negotiated.

The Tsinghal-Tibet Route

For entry in to Tibet, the most convenient route is from Lanchow to Hsing and Karerhas (Golmo) to Lhasa. The railway head for this highway is at Mahai in the oil field

region and about 150 miles North of Golmo. From Golmo to Lhasa is about 700 miles of hilly terrain.

Szechwan- Tibet Route

This route connected Hsining (on the Lanchow-Urumchi rail) with Lhasa across 1500 miles of very hilly terrain. In view of the difficult nature of the road and its distance from the main rail heads and heartland of China, it is unlikely to be a major route for reinforcement. Its value however lies as being used for relocating strategic material manufacturing units, which would be shielded by the mountains. This area is also a secure command post and storage point for waging a nuclear war.

The Chengtu-Lhasa Route

This route enters Tibet in bits from the southEastern corner from Chengtu and Yaan and links up with the Szechwan route. It is also about 1,700 miles across a none-too-easy terrain and is likely to be of marginal importance only in reinforcing the garrison in Tibet.

In short, to launch into India, the Chinese will have to first maintain for themselves for a requisite period. This requires a certain infrastructure which Chinese have been developing ever since they moved into Tibet and particularly during the last decade.⁸⁷

China's Rail Head near Border Area

China's Rail heads are quite far away from the front as follows (Distances are approximate):

❖ Urumchi to Rudok	2,500km
❖ Chengtu to Rima	2,000km
❖ Golmo to Chumbi Valley	1,500km

Chinese roads in Tibet are generally single lane and unpaved. However, "single lane" does not make difference in most of the cases as the terrain is flat. Hence overtaking vehicles is no problem. But the unpaved road surface impedes major and heavy movement of Vehicles. Even rail heads are more than 2,000 kilometers from the front.

⁸⁷ Mark Kitto (August 8, 2012) "*You'll never be Chinese*", The Prospect Magazine, <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/mark-kitto-youll-never-be-chinese-leaving-china> Accessed date 15 may 2015.

Geographical Location: A Major Turn

China is a vast country offering “Defence on Depth” which is a great geographical asset to any country. The main industrial centers of China are far away for the conventional armed forces of India. India’s military preparedness against China should essentially be defensive in nature because geography does not allow for direct offensive, being confined primarily to being the guardians of Himalayan passes. The geographical compulsion would make it virtually impossible for India to fight a conventional war with China on the Chinese territory because from the geographical point of view it is much easier for the Chinese Army to descend the sub Himalayan region than for the Indian army to proceed up the hill to Tibet.

The geography of India’s northern frontier indicates that its security would be primarily ensured by defending the mountain passes. The geographical compulsion for India is that the Indian army could merely act as a “Holding Force” against the Chinese Forces until such a time that they are on the Ganga- Brahmaputra plains where India’s conventional military forces can engage them profitably with the Chinese having extended their lines of communication to the extent where the war would turn unprofitable to them.

It is clear that mountain topography has always been against the development of transport and communication facilities and the Himalayan region is against the development of such type of transport facilities. For development of transport and communication facilities in Himalayan region, huge finance and manpower are required. In this region, the General Reserve Engineering Force is working very actively. The GREF faces tremendous problems from practical point of view to work smoothly in this Himalayan region. These problems are due to its characteristics i.e. remote interior deep valley river streams and dense forests. “Daring” construction of roads and bridges have cost the GREF many lives. In spite of practical difficulties GREF is working smoothly by achieving the targets assigned to it.⁸⁸ After the detailed study of McMahon Line area, the Ex-chief of Army staff General K. V. Krishna Rao came to the conclusion that:

“Fate to any war on the McMahon Line area would depend absolutely and entirely on the ability to keep the troops supplied with their needs for fighting as well as for living.”

⁸⁸ Interview with R. Srivastava Rao (AEE GREF) By Research Scholar M L Sali. Interview taken at GREF Battalion office “Roing” Debang Valley District.

Further he concludes that for better defence on McMahon Line area the basic requirements are as follows:

- ❖ Rail heads and air heads in the Brahmaputra valley.
- ❖ Roads heads at Bomdila, Tawang, Ziro and Daporijo to use as firm bases.
- ❖ Shelters for living and bunkers in the vicinity of the McMahon Line covering likely approaches for fighting.
- ❖ All the above tiers to be interconnected with roads tracks and signal communication.
- ❖ The “firm bases” and the forward posts to be stocked with rations clothing ammunition fuel etc. for at least three months.⁸⁹

The basic requirement of better security is that the area should have a good network of communications such as railways, airfields and roads, and should also be able to produce adequate quantity and variety of consumer goods and agricultural commodities to feed the troops to ensure security. Like the western sector, the middle sector also has a better transport and communication network i.e. lateral road from Dehradun to Tanakpur covering the entire west sector. India has no need for shifting troops laterally in the mountains but since the plains are just a day’s journey by road the Assam valley lateral road and rail lines are perfectly adequate. China has no railroad along any part of its front opposite Arunachal Pradesh. At Walong the road is being converted into a track route both from along and northwards from Walong to Tezu. Hence it would be no longer correct to say that the road in this area stops 70 kilometers short of Walong. Similar road building activity is being started at other places. This is true even today as compared to China, India is not having link road to connect her logistic bases. But this inadequacy is being fulfilled by helicopters. At Sukhna (near Siliguri, West Bengal) the Headquarters of 33 Corps is located which is mainly responsible for security and defence of the State of Sikkim. The Headquarter of 4 Corps is located at Tezpur and 3 Corps at Nagaland. These three Corps are working under the Indian Army’s Eastern Command based at Kolkata. Every Corps of Eastern Command has three Divisions (a total of 8 Divisions) in addition to the logistic units. Kibithoo is the last military post of India which has sophisticated Artillery means of communications, weapons and equipment.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ General K V Krishna Rao (Retd.), (1991) “Prepare or Perish” New Delhi: Lancer Publishers Pvt. Ltd. P 104.

⁹⁰ Tanaji Kotte (1992) “Punachalamchi Seema” Mumbai: loksatta new Paper

India must remember that Tibet is a province of China which is distant from China's production centers with no indigenous motorized transport resources; China as a whole is deficient in motorized transport.

The following are the disadvantages:-

- (1) The Golmo-Chengdu-Lhasa road crosses fourteen mountain ranges.
- (2) The Golmo-Lhasa road climbs from the plains up to 13,000 feet and generally traverses that altitude.
- (3) Urumchi Rudok road is 2,500 kms long and about 500 kms out of this is at an altitude of 13,000 feet.

Limitations on Stocking

Foremost, China cannot deploy more than eight divisions or equivalent strength for an offensive at one time on account of difficult terrain. Additional divisions will be required if the Chinese intend to prolong the war with India, and there is as yet no indication that the Chinese are planning for any prolong war with India because both the countries are interested in maintaining cordial relations at present.

Another problem is that for any war the huge quantity of supplies that have to be stocked will be required to be moved to the front. Assuming that Indian interdiction will not be particularly effective, the supplies nonetheless will be subject to heavy interdiction when they move. Given India's air supremacy, after the first seventy two hours most of the supplies will not get through in any case.

Defence Strategy in Tibet

If the strategic situation requires China to undertake an offensive against India, the Chinese first will have to maintain their war-resources for the requisite period. This requires a certain infrastructure which the Chinese have continued to create ever since they occupied Tibet in 1951. There are three major highways linking Tibet with the rest of China for the specific purpose of defense. These are:

- **Western Highway:** from Urumchi –Lhasa (3885km).
- **Central Highway:** from Xining –Lhasa (1965km) and from Hungliyuan –Lhasa (2000km).
- **Eastern Highway:** from Chengdu to Lhasa (Northern) (2418km) and from Chengdu to Lhasa (Southern) (1900km).

From the above highways, feeder roads have been constructed particularly towards passes leading to the claimed areas. A railway line has been planned from Xining to Lhasa via Gormo about 2200 km. long. Of this, work has been completed up to Gormo, sometime ago, that is, a distance of about 834 km. The construction is in progress. On completion of this railway line the logistic capability in Tibet would increase to a considerable extent. Also it is reported that Yunan is being linked with Lhasa.

Oil Reservoirs in Tibet

An oil pipe line from Gormo to Lhasa about 1250 km long has been completed. This enables significant forces to be maintained in Tibet for considerable periods.

Air Force Facilities at Tibet

There are five major operational airfields located at Hoping, Kongka, Donshoon, Pangta and Nagchuka. These are capable of taking all types of aircrafts. In addition to these airfields outside Tibet such as Khotan Gormo Chengdu and Paoshan are also available. From the airfields in and around Tibet Chinese aircrafts can cover large portions of India's northern territory.



Map 4.4. Chinese Strategic Position near Indian Border

Note: Ten Chinese People Liberation Army Air Force Base and Seven Missile Base near the Sino-India Border.

The Chinese present strategy must examine in depth China's motivation about Tibet. The missile age has liberated warfare from absolute geographical constraints and Chinese war planning and military activity has to be reassessed in the light of the tactical and intercontinental nuclear missiles which have been deployed in Tibet. According to Tibetan-exile sources one of China's nuclear base has been moved from Nagchukha in North Eastern Tibet to Kangpo Nyitr in Southern Tibet much nearer to the Indian border. In short China's capability to support major operations from Tibet has increased substantially in recent years.

All such efforts at developing superior nuclear armour asymmetrically with strategic and tactical orientation can have significant implications for India. Indian military potential should take care of the challenge posed by the deployment of nuclear missiles in Tibet as well as the important logistical capability of the Chinese by permitting increased deployment of forces against India. India lags behind China in nuclear and missile capabilities.⁹¹

Air-Potential between India and China

For effective action against India, China's air force would have to operate from bases in Tibet. The average height of Tibetan table lands being 10,000 to 11,000 feet, the safe all-up weight of an aircraft would be considerably less than that for the same aircraft at sea-level. Chinese fighter and bombers are usually located at a high altitude even before they take off; the plateau is about 13,000 feet high, so their payloads are severely restricted, whereas India's aircrafts will fly off large bases in plains. Again there is a matter of logistic. A single F-6 sortie requires a direct and indirect support of approximately 10 tons. A single squadron flying one sortie per aircraft per day will use up as much tonnage as a light division in action. China will be put to a very hard flying even at hundred sorties a day for three weeks.⁹²

It has been reported that the direct air link between Shanghai and Kathmandu passes through extremely sensitive areas in the Himalayas including the Indian territories under illegal Chinese control. Earlier reports from Kathmandu indicate that Chinese have been changing the crew constantly on each flight to train large number of airborne military personnel for any future

⁹¹ Major Gen. Rajendra Nath, Shayam Khosla & Ashok Malik (1990) "*India's Security Threats and Strategies*" Chandigarh: Institute of Panchand Research, pp. 66-67.

⁹² Col Rama Rao, op.cit. pp 292-295.

military operations. Increasing Chinese air activity was also reported from areas like Borahoti and other points strategically important for India.⁹³

The Indian Air Force may be superior to the Chinese power even after allocating adequate forces against Pakistan. The IAF can spare 450 first line and 100 second line aircrafts for the Northern border. China by contrast has about 150 second line aircrafts in Tibet. It can reinforce this contingent to be sure but the addition in all will be F-5s and F-6s ancient types that the IAF will have no difficulty in handling.

A vital aspect of the IAF is the logistical support it gives to Army; something the Chinese cannot do both in terms of quality and quantity. In combat, the IAF could attach a Mi-8/-17 unit of 12 helicopters for a division. The squadron could provide either sufficient tonnage for an entire day's combat (250 tons) or an air lift of 1500 troops in ten sorties. In the context of the Northern border the IAF can play her role more effectively; a single Mi-26 can lift as much as an AN-12 could lift provided some distance for rolling, landing and takeoff is available. Two Mi-26s can do the work of an entire MI 8/17 squadron.

The Indian Air Force has formidable air transport fleet. IL-76 can drop 25 tons of supplies or 150 men at high altitude air field while the An-32 can manage 3 tons or 20 men at an advance air landing ground. Aging China has nothing to match this. One of the dangerous factors for the IAF is the "monsoon". During the monsoons when India's helicopters will be largely grounded, fighting will be primarily done by Infantry. In contrast, the un-mechanised Chinese are prepared to organize thousands of porters and mules for supply. India also has to manage in the same way.⁹⁴

The Chinese air force is the third largest air force in the world and has about 500,000 soldiers divided in the seven military air regions which cover the entire country. Indian Air Force had intensively employed during 1947-48, 1962 (in limited sense) 1965 and 1971. India's bombing capacity is based on Canberra which is (outdated) limited to targets in Tibet and can do only minor damage to China. The potential of Indian Air Force can be improved by Jaguar, Miraj-2000 and MIG -23, 25 and 29. Indian aircraft could deliver a bomb and her space technology is well developed and in a position to transfer the existing rocket technology to

⁹³ Dewan Berindranath, (oct 1978) "China's Absurd demands" Delhi: Blitz, p 10.

⁹⁴ Ravi Rikhye (1987) "Sino-Indian Border: military Balance" New Delhi: Hindustan Times, p. 10.

intermediate range ballistic capability with comparatively sophisticated additional effort. Indian Air Force has only adequate air defense with missile system.⁹⁵

On the other hand, China has its air bases in Tibet and capable of attacking targets in central and northern India through her nuclear missiles. Chinese nuclear missile is already stationed in Tibet and can cover an important city of India. India has “**No Immediate Answer Against Nuclear China**”. Though the necessary fuel and technology which is essential for nuclear weapon programme is available with India. If the “decision” were taken to go for nuclear weapon, “then only” India could acquire nuclear weapons. China has already nuclear weapons and the capability to devastate maximum cities of India within short period.

Strategic Deliberation and Accessible Localities

The border of Arunachal Pradesh adjoining Tibet (China) the NEFA passes are much less well known than the western and middle sectors. The people on both sides of the Indo-Tibetan border used to continue the trade with each other. Tibetan (Sin) salt was once a necessity for the local people of Arunachal Pradesh and even now they prefer it.

The Thagla area of Kameng and the Walong area of Lohit form the two most obvious invasion routes from Tibet into the Brahmaputra Basin in the following ways:

- The strategic importance of Kameng district can be summed up succinctly; the most direct from India to Lhasa is the route going north from Tezpur.
- The two easiest invasion routes from Tibet into the Brahmaputra valley are the Lohit valley route in the east and the Manas valley route through Bhutan. The latter route could be used to cut off Assam from Bengal as well as to gain entry into Bengal.
- **Subansiri**- The strategic interest is the border area in the Trasri valley which is one of the Subansiri tributaries. The “average height of the main watershed in this area is about 15,000 feet. In the valley, some 5,000 feet lower, lie two interesting settlements.
 - (a) Migyitun (9,630 feet) on the Tibetan side.
 - (b) Longju (9,000 feet) on the Indian side.

They are about four miles apart, separated by the river Longju.

⁹⁵ Gopal Ji Malviya (1992) “ Sino-Indian relations : Security Environment in Nineties” the director, Publication Division, University of Madras, p 68.

- The North-east Frontier of Siang and the North West frontier of Lohit border the Tibetan district which is on the southern side of Himalayan axis. The McMahon Line at this point diverges from the Himalayan Crest. As a result of the 1914 Shimla Convention, Pemaco, one of the Tibetan district, existed here. The McMahon Line diverged from the Himalayan Crest in another area of the Siang frontier to include the Tibet district of Panchakshiri. There was only one route within Tibetan territory to invade India. Another route was by crossing Dihang to the Subansiri basin by way of the Nyugla (11000feet)
- Lohit is in the north-east corner of Arunachal Pradesh separated by mountain ranges from Sinag on the West, from Pemaco (Tibet) on the northwest and from other districts of Tibet and from Burma on the south east.

Rima is one of the most important towns on the Tibetan side and Lohit on the Indian. Six Tibetan villages with a few hundred inhabitants in all are found in the Waling and Kibithoo administrative areas. Rima is the largest cantonment of Tibet.

The route from Rima down the Lohit valley offers to a modern army, a relatively easy avenue of invasion into the Assam valley. The Indo-Tibetan boundary in this area was stabilized in 1914 as a part of Shimla Convention. Walong with its hills and its air strips is of vital importance to the defense of the Eastern Sector including North east part of India. At Walong the Tibetans are settled and on the basis of this Tibetan population, the Chinese are claiming Walong.

The area of Tirap provides easy accessibility to the Kachin area of Myanmar (Burma). This area has come under increasing attention of the Naga insurgents because it has easier access to the plains of Assam Nagaland and Manipur. The insurgents are using Tirap and Changlang Districts to cross over to Myanmar as the “corridors” for all underground activities.⁹⁶

Siliguri Corridor:

The Siliguri Corridor (30 Kilometers wide) is India’s only link with Assam and the surrounding areas. It is quite possible for either China or Bangladesh or together to close this corridor at will. There is no answer to this visible



Map 4.5. India's Chicken Neck

⁹⁶ Lt. Gen V. K Nayar (Retd.) (1985) “Threat from within: India’s Internal Security Environment” New Delhi: Lancer Publisher, p 187.

threat.

A determined Chinese Zong through Chumbi Valley (also called Tomo Valley) could cut off the whole of Assam, Arunachal and the rest of the North-East region from the rest of India. Here the Chinese are only 40 kilometers away from the capital of Sikkim and less than 100 kilometers away from India's border with Bangladesh⁹⁷. To reach the Eastern sector, Siliguri Corridor is the only land route.

Security Preparation in the Border Area

To provide security and maintain peace, law and order in the border region, a number of measures were taken by the Government of India. Firstly, frontier police units were renamed as "Assam Military Police Battalions" under the inspector general of police. Afterwards, a number of improvements and changes were made by the respective Governments. The Police Battalions were reorganized and came to be known as "Assam Rifles" in due course of time. The status size and functions of the Assam Rifles appear to have undergone a substantial change from 1947 to 1959. In NEFA the Assam Rifles served as a "Police Force", protecting the newly established administrative centers in the Hills and keeping peace between the tribes as well as acting as a frontier guard besides maintaining dozens of outposts which were established on major access routes in the vicinity of McMahon Line. The Assam Rifles operate as civil police in advanced areas under the operational control of the Army but structurally the Assam Rifles are working as part of NEFA administration which is responsible for maintenance of law and order and border guard deployed in forward areas including the 20 kilometers over South of the McMahon Line. New Police Force, the Border Security Force, the Indo Tibetan Border Police are engaged along the border as well as within the state i.e. acting like a police force.⁹⁸

Tirap and Changlang, the boundary districts of Arunachal Pradesh, through which joins the Indo-Myanmar Sector (boundary), have no serious insurgency problems. The Naga insurgents have fomented trouble in these two districts of Arunachal while they use these two districts as corridors to cross over to Myanmar (Burma). The insurgents collect money by threatening the local people of Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh. The people

⁹⁷ Balakrishnan Nair, (1985) "Facts of Indian Defence" New Delhi: S Chand & co. p. 56

⁹⁸ Leo Rose and Fisher, (1967) "The NEFA of India" institute of International Studies, University of California, pp 57-59.

of these districts also receive mail from the insurgents in which they ask people for youths for underground training.

The Government of Arunachal Pradesh has already taken adequate security measures. Arunachal Pradesh brought this problem to the notice of the Central Government and requested them to deploy the Army in the area. The District Superintendent of Police has also been informed to be vigilant against the insurgency movement. To meet this type of challenge, a “Commando Force” has also been set up to combat insurgency, and patrolling in the border region has been intensified.⁹⁹

Tawang, due its strategic location, has always been an important factor during the Sino-Indian border talks. During the Chinese aggression of 1962, Tawang was captured by them and vacated when they declared cease fire on 21st November 1962.

Since 1962, the civil administration has made significant headway. There are many video halls in the area. A sense of security pervades the local population which realizes that the Indian Administration can provide them all the modern facilities. The Indian security system works satisfactorily in Tawang.¹⁰⁰

At Zimithang, there is an Indian helipad very close to Somdurong Chu Valley and at 10 minutes flight-time from Tawang. The border check posts are managed by Subsidiary Intelligence Branch who is given protection by Special Security Branch, while it is responsible for gathering information and passing on to Delhi immediately. When the Chinese entered Somdurong Chu Valley they immediately passed this information to Delhi.¹⁰¹

The people along the Somdurong Chu Valley were being harassed by the Chinese but there was no panic among them. The local people have formed what is known as “*Taiyar Janata Mazbut Fauj*” against the Chinese. The local tribes of Tawang and Monpas feel embarrassed if anyone calls them “*Tibetans*” and even oppose the resettlement of Tibetan refugees in Arunachal Pradesh. Monpa children do not understand the Tibetan language but speak Hindi. It seems that the citizens of Tawang want to be Indians though many of them still have relations on other side

⁹⁹ “Highland Observer”, Vol I, No.IX P 7.

¹⁰⁰ “Patriot”, (Aug. 1986) Arunachal Unaffected by Chinese Intrusion.

¹⁰¹ Ganshyam Pardeshi, (Aug 1986) “*Nobody in Tawang wants war with China*” Stateman

of the border and have ethnic cultural and religious affinity with Tibet. They have also developed close ties with India and are true and loyal citizens of India.

However India's defence in border areas and along the Line of Actual Control are well prepared. The single Corps of the Indian Army has established a multi-tier set-up which allows them instant communication with the Northeast and even Delhi. The Indian Forces have well planned defences organized by the Mountain Divisions. The fire power includes 105 mm medium artillery guns and Boforce batteries which are supported by sophisticated electronic systems. Indian troops have been fully acclimatized and trained to survive and strike despite the extremes of temperatures ranging from 15 to 50 degree Celsius and winds roaring at 200 kms per hour.¹⁰²

Political Equations and Security Issue

Like other areas of the Northeastern region, creation of Arunachal Pradesh has never witnessed any serious insurgency movement. From 1947 to date, maximum period has been dominated by the Congress party over the politics in India. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, was aware of the problems of the Border States. He attempted to bring these tribes in the main national stream by various means, "*Panchsheela of Tribal Development*" being one of them. Arunachal Pradesh was one of the first states where Nehru's Tribal Policy was implemented by the Congress Government. Due to constantly being in power, the Congress Party gave more importance to Arunachal Pradesh as compared to the other states. This part was known as a North East Frontier Tract, later renamed as the North East Frontier Agency-then a Union Territory and granted status of a "state" on 20 February, 1987. Throughout the abovementioned stages the Congress Government always paid attention to the overall development of this region, and particularly the "interests of the tribal people" which ultimately resulted in the tribal inclination towards the Congress Party.

Since its inception as a state, there was no significant political opposition to the Congress party. The people of Arunachal Pradesh have become politically conscious. At present, the following political parties exist in Arunachal Pradesh:

1. Congress (I)
2. Janata Dal.
3. Bharatiya Janata Party

¹⁰² Yogendra Bali (Jan 1,1990) "*Keeping Vigil on top of the world*" The Times of India.

4. United Peoples Party.
5. Peoples Party of Arunachal Pradesh
6. All Arunachal Pradesh Students Union (student's organization)

The people of Arunachal Pradesh have been allocated as workers and members in various political parties. But the Congress (I) party is more active popular and faithful has as compared to others. The party has always dominated the politics of this region.¹⁰³ At the regional level, there are a number of issues which are linked up with these parties. Firstly, the political parties are not ready to interfere in their social life. They have their own customary laws and willingness to continue according to their traditions. They have systems like "Lok Adalat". Justice is meted out in front of the people. The administration of justice in Arunachal Pradesh is done in accordance with a 1945 Regulation. The local system of Adalat and cases between the villagers are settled by the village council. Whichever case are not settled by at the village council are supposed to be settled in the District Court. The Deputy Commissioner appoints a judicial officer under whom there are some legal experts who dispose of the cases.

The Peoples Party of Arunachal Pradesh was once considered as a major opponent to the Congress (I) in the region. From reliable sources it was learnt that the leader of this Party had been in contact with foreign agents. At the time of Elections in 1976, lakhs of rupees were spent by some foreign agents to bring the Party in power. Though it could not get a majority, they succeeded in bagging eight seats in a house of thirty.¹⁰⁴

The PPA registered a strong protest against the statehood of Arunachal Pradesh and further decided to boycott then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's proposed visit to Arunachal in connection with the formal declaration of the Union Territory as a full-fledged India's 24th State.¹⁰⁵ Whatever be the objections that were pointed, the behavior of PPA was totally against national interest. In March 1995 when the elections were held for Legislature Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh, Congress (I) won 40 seats out of 56 in the state. The victory of Congress (I) shows that people still believed and preferred Congress (I) party.

¹⁰³ Field Trip to Arunachal Pradesh in 2015 by research Scholar (Anand Pratap Singh) Information is in text based on observation of the Local people and Politicians during his Field Trip.

¹⁰⁴ "organizer" (April 10, 1978) BBC and VOA exercised over Arunachal by Imphal Correspondent.

¹⁰⁵ "People party to boycott PM Arunachal Visit" (12 June 1987) Guwahati correspondent.

Freedom of Indigenous Faith Bill of 1978

“*Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Indigenous Faith Bill of 1978*” was introduced in Arunachal Legislative Assembly on 18th May, 1978. As soon as the Bill was passed by Arunachal Assembly a lot of hue and cry was created by neighbouring states and western countries. The President and Prime Minister of India received a number of telegrams from Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Kerala and western countries against the Indigenous Faith Bill.

According to the Indigenous Faith Bill of 1978

“The problem of conversion from one indigenous Faith to any other faith or religion by use of force or by inducement or by fraudulent means has been creating unhealthy and undesirable friction in the unsophisticated and simple tribal communities of Arunachal Pradesh threatening social peace and public order”.

The object of Government of Arunachal Pradesh:

“To provide for prohibition of conversion from one religious faith to any other religious faith by use of force or inducement or by fraudulent means for matters connected therewith”¹⁰⁶.

This bill seeks to provide for the punishment of those who indulge in such conversion by force or by inducement or fraudulent means in Arunachal Pradesh. In short the major aim of this bill was to ensure that innocent tribal would not be enticed away from their ancestral faith by unfair inducement under the existing regulations. The Bill further defines Indigenous faith as Buddhism as, prevalent among the Monapas, Membas, Sherdukpens, Khambas, Khamptis, and Singhphos, and Vaishnavism as prevalent among other indigenous communities of Arunachal Pradesh.

Chinese Attempts at Subversion of Local Population

The Chinese interference in Northeastern region of India is well known and is a matter of criticism. China has been clandestinely giving moral and physical support to most of the insurgent groups in various parts of India. There is now a growing suspicion of Chinese

¹⁰⁶ “*The Arunachal Pradesh Code* ” Vol III, (1982) (Acts made by the Arunachal Pradesh Legislative assembly, Government of Arunachal Pradesh Law and Judicial Department, Itanagar)

involvement in Punjab and Darjeeling District of West Bengal with AK 47 rifles which has been viewed with concern by both the Indian Parliament as well as the press.¹⁰⁷

Chinese recruited some agents for Peking from among the unsophisticated heterogeneous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh. During Chinese invasion of 1962 the political agents of Peking were busy in recruiting some elements who could be “Induced” to operate at the biddings of Peking. During the invasion, Chinese were trying to pursue innocent people in a different language.

“You are our own people, you have been badly neglected. No one has shown you the right way to do things. We are here to help you and show you what to do”.¹⁰⁸

Through liberal expenditure of money and various inducements they tried to impress some elements from among the tribal of Arunachal Pradesh. Whatever contact they had established at that time was sought to be utilized, fanning anti-Indian sentiments in the later years. Taking advantage of the topography and the terrain, the Peking leaders tried to persuade some younger elements to cross the international border surreptitiously with the assurance of a general hospitality if and when they went over to the other side; some young elements did avail themselves of this “generosity”. However it seems this did not pay much dividend to the Peking leader, so after sometime this modus operandi was abandoned. By then the Government having, doubted against few people of Arunachal Pradesh, launched a series of raids. During the raids by spies, audio cassettes of anti-India speeches were discovered in various places of Arunachal Pradesh even after NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) was upgraded to a Union territory and Council of Ministers was formed. Besides the cassette, the literatures extremely prejudicial (to the interest of this country), were regularly posted to some individual persons, in Arunachal Pradesh. These were found mailed from different places including Bangladesh.

A group of young boys was persuaded to cross the border clandestinely and go to Peking. They stayed in China for some time, enjoyed hospitality of Peking, but were not much impressed. So on coming back it appears that these youth have not done anything along Peking expectations. Peking leaders looked out for alternate sources of creating troubles in Arunachal Pradesh and efforts were continued to seek opportunities for fishing in India’s troubled waters.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Ramkrishana Rao and R. C. Sharma (1991) “*Indian Border: Ecology and security Perspective*”, New Delhi: Scholar Publisher p. 128.

¹⁰⁸ Leo Rose and Fisher, op. cit. p.68.

¹⁰⁹ H. K. Sareen, (1981) “*Insurgency in North- East India: A Study of Sino American Role*” New Delhi: Sterling Publisher Pvt Ltd, pp. 15-16.

Even after that, China continued here attempts to subvert the population residing in the border areas. Firstly, Monpa tribes were attracted towards the Chinese propaganda. The Chinese had indeed developed an effective intelligence system in the Monpa area of Arunachal Pradesh. Actually Monpas were able to know about the details of the security arrangement of the Indian armed forces. The numbers of Chinese in addition came to Arunachal Pradesh in the disguise of Tibetan refugees. The Indian spies came to know that such type of opportunities offered by the structure of border trade which took NEFA tribesmen into Tibet each year.

India's Efforts to Prevent Subversion of Local Population

To forestall such unfortunate consequences and delink in the future, Arunachal administration has established fair-price shops at most of the major pass areas between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet, which previously had served as channels for Anti-Indian elements. The objective of establishment of fair price shops in the area of major passes by India was to compete with Chinese fair price shops which lie immediately across the borders and to decisively defeat Chinese attempts to woo the locals. In this manner India has been able to cut off trade with Tibet without causing undue hardship to the local population in the border area and in this way frustrate Chinese efforts which were directed at both subversion and the gathering of intelligence from Arunachalis.

That the Monpas were deceived by the Chinese, was realized by them, when the Chinese entered Tibet and started unnecessary harassment and tortured innocent Tibetans and broke the promises which they had given to them. And the Monpas came to know the reality of the Chinese policy. Now they are the loyal citizens of India.¹¹⁰

Settlement of Refugees

Migration is an old phenomenon even when there was neither emergence nor development of the concept of "Nation-State". In due course of time, owing to the concept of Nation-State, restrictions came to be imposed on free migration of the citizens from one nationality to another. Arunachal Pradesh is surrounded by countries like China, Bhutan, Tibet, Myanmar and Bangladesh, out of which most countries are poor and backward in terms of economic development. India is more developed and stable compared to them. Therefore, Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern sector) has been a victim of gross infiltration by foreigners from its

¹¹⁰ Leo Rose and Fisher, op. cit. p.66.

neighboring countries. According to 1991 census, the total population of refugees in Arunachal Pradesh is 50,000 i.e., Tibetan, Chakmas, Hajongs, Nepalis and others.¹¹¹

Owing to internal problems, harassment by People's Liberation Army of China during the period from 1950 to 1959, thousands of Tibetans took shelter in India. In 1959, Dalai Lama entered into India and took asylum. The question of Tibetan refugees can be settled through political dialogue and the refugee Tibetans are also willing to return to their homeland provided autonomy is granted to their area. The Chakamas also came to India during 1964 owing to internal compulsions and harassment by the Muslim of Chittagong Hills of Bangladesh. The then Relief and Rehabilitation Minister of India, Mr. Mahavir Tyagi granted asylum on the basis of "cash doles" to Chakma refugees to settle down in Bihar. But they realized that Bihar State would not suit for their settlement and Government of India contemplated a scheme to accommodate them in NEFA for 20 years w.e.f. 1964, without the knowledge of the people¹¹² (when Arunachal Pradesh was neither a state nor a Union Territory). In addition the refugees from Bhutan and Nepal also existed in Arunachal Pradesh.

The population of this Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh) is totally against the existence of any outsiders, and are not allowing them to settle in their own state because-

1. These foreigners have been creating havoc for the local people by destroying forests and consuming all varieties of vegetables and animals thereby creating an ecological imbalance.
2. On 24th Sep. 1995, the Honourable Home Minister of the State, i.e. Arunachal Pradesh, Mr. Neelam Taram while addressing a rally of "All Arunachal Pradesh Student Union" said:

"The Chakmas have been making lethal weapons and accumulating arms ammunitions. Besides setting up bunkers in their areas of settlement, the Chakma youth are getting arms training in Assam and Myanmar".¹¹³

3. The problem of these refugees i.e. foreigners, may threaten the existence of the indigenous people of the state. The existence of foreigners in the Eastern sector, in due

¹¹¹ "Highland Observer" (Nov 15, 1994) Hindustan Offset Ltd. And Published from Naharlagun, Itanager, Vol 1, No. IX p. 21.

¹¹² "Highland Observer" (Nov 15, 1994) Hindustan Offset Ltd. And Published from Naharlagun, Itanager, Vol 1, No. IX p. 21.

¹¹³ "Highland Observer" (Nov 15, 1994) Hindustan Offset Ltd. And Published from Naharlagun, Itanager, Vol 1, No. IX p. 9.

course of time, may pose a serious identity crisis among the local population. The Student Union have the following demands:

- Withdrawal of trading licenses and land allotment permits from non-Arunachalis immediately.
- Deportation of all foreigners (refugees) from Arunachal Pradesh immediately.
- Strict checking of infiltration of foreign nationals in Arunachal Pradesh.

The educated youth and students of Arunachal Pradesh are members of “All Arunachal Pradesh Student Union” which is popularly known as “AAPSU”. This student union has been backed by the politicians of Arunachal Pradesh. This student organization is very alert, active and reacting very sharply against the existence of foreigners (refugees) in their state. They have organized demonstrations, rallies and conferences on the issue of “Refugees”. To make the common people aware about it, they painted slogans on buses and walls in various towns.¹¹⁴

On 2nd December 1992, the Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh adopted a resolution reiterating the basic demand of the deportation of the Chakma and Hajong refugees from Arunachal Pradesh. The problem has brought to the notice of the Central Government by the State Government of Arunachal Pradesh, which had asked these refugees to be sent to any other bigger state. The negotiation for settlement of this problem is continuing between the Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Government of India and Government of Bangladesh respectively.¹¹⁵

Process of Assimilation

Since the Independence of India, an attempt of the Government of India has always been to bring the overall population of Arunachal Pradesh into the main, national stream. As one of the founders of modern India, first Prime Minister Mr. Jawaher Lal Nehru was very much aware about the reality of these border area states. His attempt was to bring these tribes in the main national stream by various means. He introduced five fundamental principles for development of Arunachal Pradesh which afterwards came to be known as a Panchsheela of Tribal Development.

Five Principles for Tribal Development

¹¹⁴ Fieldtrip of Arunachal Pradesh in 2014. Mentioned facts given in text quoted photograph no. 15 supporting the facts.

¹¹⁵ “*The Arunachal News Letter*” (Oct 1982) Directorate of Information & Public Relation, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, Itanagar, Vol. V, no. 124.

1. People should develop along the lines of their own genius and the Government should avoid imposing anything on them. It should try to encourage in every way, their traditional arts and culture.
2. Tribal rights in land and forests should be respected.
3. The Government should try to train tribal to do administrative and development work. Some technical personnel from outside will no doubt be needed especially in the beginning. But introducing too many outsiders into tribal territory should be avoided.
4. The Government should not over administer these areas or overwhelm the people with a multiplicity of schemes. It should rather work through and not in rivalry to their social and cultural institutions.
5. The result should be judged not by statistics or the amount of money spent, but by the quality of human character evolved.

Arunachal Pradesh was one of the first areas where Nehru's tribal policy was implemented by officers specially chosen from volunteers assisted by Dr. Varier Erwin and a number of specialists included therein belonged to the fields of anthropology and linguistics. Now Arunachal Pradesh is progressing on the lines indicated by Nehru. At the time of India's independence Arunachal Pradesh was known as a "**North Eastern Frontier Tract**". The first five- year plan was implemented in 1951 for welfare, administration and progress in NEFA. During the first five-year plan, the expenditure of Government was near about Rupees Three Billions.¹¹⁶

Reorganisation of NEFA and its Administration

From 1951 onwards, rapid development in the administrative fields was experienced. When the results were satisfactory, the Government of India introduced reorganization programme for NEFA which went into effect in early 1951. Under the 1954 reorganization programme, NEFA was divided into six divisions with headquarters in the hills, and these were:

- Kameng (formerly Sela) with headquarters at Bomdi La,
- Subansiri with headquarters at Ziro.
- Siang (formerly Abor Hills) with headquarters at Along.
- Lohit (formerly Mishi Hills) with headquarters at Tezu.
- Tirap with headquarters at Khela (later transferred to Khonsa about 7 miles away); and

¹¹⁶ Leo Rose and Fisher, (1967) "*The Nefa of India*" institution of international studies, University of California, p. 38.

➤ Tuensang, with headquarters at Tuensang village.

Provisions were also made for the appointment of six political officers and eighteen Associated Political Officers who were equally divided between the six divisions.

The “Indian Frontier Administration Service” was established in 1956. Attempts by the Government of India continued by various means, policies and programmes from each and every point of view.

By the beginning of 1959 all of NEFA had been brought under effective administrative control, and administration centers had been established throughout the northern half of the Agencies, although some of them were primarily dependent upon airdrops for logistics. Twelve border posts had been set up along the major trade routes between NEFA and Tibet. Meanwhile Chinese attacked NEFA and Ladakh during 1962. The Chinese invasion compelled India to take appropriate measures. One of the measures was that five divisions were subdivided into two units, headed by political officers and behind political with approximately equal powers.¹¹⁷

Status of “State” to the Arunachal Pradesh

There are various stages of Arunachal Pradesh becoming the 24th “State” of India. Firstly, it was known as “Frontier Tract” in 1954, then, it came to be known as a North East Frontier Agency. The next stage was a status of “Union Territory”. The NEA attained the status of a Union Territory in January 1972. After that Parliament of India passed the 37th Constitution Amendment Bill. Mr. Om Mehta, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs came to inaugurate the first Legislative Assembly of Arunachal Pradesh. The new Council of Ministers headed by Prem Khandu Thungon was installed on 15th August, 1975. Lt. Governor of the Territory, Mr. K.A.A. Raja addressed the first session of the legislature on 18th August 1975. The Council of Ministers was formed with the existing five counselors. Arunachal Pradesh (Union territory) has a full-fledged legislative assembly and a council of Minister, while the people had a full voice in the management of their own affairs.¹¹⁸

Owing to its strategic location and importance of this Union territory and being a sensitive area, the Central Government had a special responsibility to see that the people here were equally developed with the rest of the country. The Government of India approved a “Statehood” to this

¹¹⁷ Ibid pp. 30-31

¹¹⁸ Pradeep Dasgupta (1976) “*Arunachal’s year Achievement*” New Delhi: national Herald.

Union territory of India and on 20th Feb. 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi declared this Union territory as the 24th state of India which was already known as a Arunachal Pradesh.¹¹⁹

Chinese Reaction

When the Government of India granted a statehood to this union territory on 20th Feb. 1987, the Chinese reacted very sharply by alleging that upgrading Arunachal Pradesh to a full state, India had made an attempt to legalize its occupation of Chinese territory through consequences in the case of this most disputed Eastern sector of the Sino-Indian boundary. This current situation was ominous, no Indian will forget the Chinese aggression of 1962 in Indian Territory.

Development of the Eastern Sector

Since its inception as a full-fledged state in 1987, Arunachal Pradesh has made phenomenal progress in all the spheres of development. Arunachal Pradesh i.e. Eastern sector, is already a prosperous land of natural resources, raw material and minerals. Natural Resources, Raw Material & Minerals are the base of Industrial and economical development of the country and are considered as most important elements of national power.

The Eastern sector of India-China border i.e. Arunachal Pradesh is very rich in terms of minerals and resources. The 1981's report of Geological Survey of India begins with the following observations:

“Poor accessibility, difficult terrain condition and very limited knowledge about geology of the region had prohibited detailed investigation of any mineral deposit in the state till recently”.

After great efforts by Geological Survey of India, it found a number of occurrences of coal, peat, iron, sulfides, clay, asbestos, and salt in the state (Easter sector).

On 19th April 1981 the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh was talking to the newsmen in New Delhi; he stated that Arunachal Pradesh was a *“sleeping giant of natural resources”*. Further he informed that five oil wells had been successfully dug into by Oil India Ltd. in the Kharsang area of Tirap District. Later he pointed out new vistas of oil production in Arunachal Pradesh. Lastly he confirmed the existence of oil and natural gas reserves over a vast area in Arunachal Pradesh.

¹¹⁹ Aurnachal become 24th State, New Delhi: Patriot.

The Geological Survey of India has recently intensified its operation in this area and have discovered lime which is suitable for cement, graphite which is useful for pencils or electrical machineries, cobalt and copper otherwise which are imported at high cost from foreign countries.¹²⁰ The uranium bearing areas have been discovered in the belts of Himalayan region (border area). Petroleum is found in narrow strip across western Uttar Pradesh, the Ganga delta and Brahmaputra Valley and Assam.¹²¹

Chinese focused their giant eyes on the rich mineral and the oil bearing valley of Brahmaputra. During 1962 war they advanced up to the rich mineral land and due to deep penetration, China's logistics were extended beyond capabilities and they withdrew from NEFA. China ranks first in world as far as human population is concerned. Hence she wants all the lands which are strategically important for her onward march towards development and expansion. The Chinese require "living space" for their rapidly growing population. So India-China border area, especially Arunachal Pradesh, is a disputed territory and China claims that this territory has always been an integral part of the Chinese empire in the past.¹²²

Transport is the default barometer of economic, social and commercial progress and is an indispensable part of culture and the hall mark of civilization. It is transport and communicable systems which enables the region to get rid of natural isolation from the rest of the world.

Constructions of roads and bridges in the Eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh) were a very difficult task on account of the "Terrain". The hills are high and steep and rivers are turbulent and difficult to negotiate. In spite of these severe problems, 6,000 kilometers of motor able roads and more than 4,000 kilometers of track bridle path etc. had been constructed.¹²³

The Government has been giving top priority to developing road and communication and to bring the inaccessible to the mainstream of a country. It has been planned to connect 75% of the remote areas by 2000. A major bridge over the Noa-Sihing River has also been approved. This bridge will solve the communication (Road) problem of the Tirap, Changlang, Lohit and Dibang Valley District. Central Government has also allocated some amount from the central

¹²⁰ P N Luthra op. cit. p 496.

¹²¹ Muthib (1987) "A social and Economic Atlas of India "

¹²² Rana Satya Paul (1963), "Our Northern Border" , India China Border disputes, New delhi: The Books Times Group, P 15.

¹²³ Field trip to Arunachal Pradesh (Tawang & Bomdila) in 2014 . information is Based on Personal Observations.

fund under central highway programme for national highway from Pasighat to Panigin. At present a number of district headquarters are connected by Vayudoot air service.

Energy is the basic key factor for social and economic development of a country. The availability of electrical energy and its per capita consumption determines the national standard of living in the present day civilization. Progress in energy, production and power are as follows:

- i. To reduce the gaps of demand and generation, mini Hydel projects are taken up at various places;
- ii. Improvement of existing micro Hydel projects;
- iii. To supplement the power shortage, schemes for the development of diesel and gas generation taken up;
- iv. A total of 1625 villages had been electrified under Rural Electrification Programme at the end of March 2006;
- v. Minimum Energy Need Programme linking bio-mass production and use of improved chullah taken up.

This Eastern sector of India-China border has a potential of Hydel Power. Micro Hydel Schemes have been commissioned with an installed capacity of 14.86 Mw. In respect of diesel generation, an installed capacity of 9.74 has been achieved. The important Hydel project i.e. Ganga, Tago Sessa, Kameng, Ranganadi, Pake Yembung and Nuranang are working smoothly. There is a plan to construct 132 K.V. transmission line from Tawnag to Tirap. Regarding Rural Electrification out of 3257 villages, 1560 villages have been covered and remaining work is under progress.

As against 10,000 KW of power in 1981, today Arunachal Pradesh has the capacity of 50,000 KW. The difference shows improvement of power production capacity of Arunachal Pradesh. As a part of Government of India's liberalized economic policy for allowing "private sector" in power generations, Memorandum of Understanding with M/S Intercrop Industries Limited was signed, the latter being in collaboration with M/S Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporations of Australia. The Central Government and the State Government of Arunachal Pradesh is attempting for execution of Kameng Hydro Electric Project with an installed capacity

of 600 MW and gas power plant at Kharsang with a setup capacity of 48.0 MW under the liberalized economic policy of Government of India.¹²⁴

The State as well as the Central Government has given top priority for Industrial development of Arunachal Pradesh. The main concentration has been on the establishment of medium, small scales and village industries including mines, mineral and sericulture.

Oil India has been extracting crude oil from Ningri Oil field in Kharsang and Coal India Ltd. will soon be producing coal from Namchick and Namphuk areas. Oil India has also been issued license for exploring oil in Pasighat and Diabang valley. A mini oil refinery is being set up at Kharsang to exploit the oil potential. The Arunachal Pradesh Industrial Development and Financial Corporation Limited have been making important strides in the field of Industrialization.

The Industrial Policy of Government of Arunachal Pradesh is to promote and develop the traditional Handloom and Handicrafts Industries i.e. small scale, medium and large scale in addition to the mines and mineral based industries. Industry Department of Arunachal Pradesh, under the centrally sponsored scheme, submitted a project report to Government of India for an estimated amount of Rs. 20 crores at Niglok Ngorlung to develop industrial infrastructure for industrialization of the state. Principally the proposal has been accepted by the Government of India.¹²⁵

Arunachal Pradesh is having 62% of its geographical area under forest, right from tropical evergreen to alpine. The percentage of forest area in Arunachal Pradesh is 6 H.a. as against 0-09 H.a. for the entire country. The main effort of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh is not only to maintain the existing forest cover through scientific management but also to enhance the economic potentiality of forests and forest land.

Arunachal Pradesh is widely known to be covered with lush green forests which occupy 62% of the total geographical area of the state. The preservation of environment and conservation of natural resources has been given top priority. The activities of forest department are geared up to bring in more and more areas under forest cover. The department is making all possible efforts to

¹²⁴ "Arunachal News Letter" (Aug 15, 1994) Special Issue Vol- 5, No. 138, Naharlagun, Itanagar, Directorate of Public Relations, Government of Arunachal Pradesh P. 12

¹²⁵ "Arunachal News Letter" (Feb 20, 1993) Special Issue , Directorate of Public Relations, Government of Arunachal Pradesh, p. 12

protect the forests from illegal felling and indiscriminate destruction. Commercial cultivation of orchids has been attempted by the forest department which generated additional revenue in 1991.

Agriculture and Horticulture

In 1947-48, people used to rush for rations and had to wait for air drops. But today Arunachal Pradesh is in a better position in terms of food grains. This change in agricultural is attributed to the improvement of surface communications, better technical know-how, better quality of seeds and hard work of farmer. This Eastern sector of India-China border has become self-sufficient in food and is in a position to contribute subsequently to the Government storage.

“Foundation” has been laid for horticulture development and commercial crops. Accelerated work of the agriculture and horticulture with sophisticated means and techniques has started changing the entire system. Arunachal Pradesh has been able to export potato seeds to neighboring states. Horticulture development has been introduced since 1989 and maximum area that has been brought under fruits at the end of the sixth plan was estimated at 7544 hectares, which had increased to a level of 1700 hectares by the end of Seventh Plan. The production during this period also increased from 14723 to 35000 MT registering a growth of 137% over the last plan period. Likewise the vegetable production has also reached a level of 62000 MT including potato. Various steps have been taken to increase the production of food grains. For example, transfer of improved technology to the farmer trains the farmers for better application of available technology. Against a production level of 184 Thousand MT during 1992-93, the department had set a target of 248 Thousand MT of food grains for the year 1993-94. And it was achieved.

Development in Education

Books, school, education were unknown in this sector till 1947. After 1947, education facilities have been made available at every level. In 1947, after independence, there were only 3 schools with a strength of 50 students. Priority and importance were given to education by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh. In 1975, there was only one college, 18 higher secondary schools and 626 other schools.¹²⁶ Today the State has the following such as R.K. (Ram Krishna) Mission, Donyi-polo Mission and Vivekananda Kendra. For the removal of illiteracy from the

¹²⁶ Dr. P C Dutta, Op. cit. p. 54.

state, District Adult Education officers have been oriented for implementing effective measures to bring 100% literacy in Arunachal Pradesh.¹²⁷

A large number of boys and girls of Arunachal Pradesh are studying in various disciplines like medical, engineering, post-graduation in arts, science and journalism, law etc. outside the state. Such rapid educational development in Arunachal Pradesh has awakened the tribal population of the state and this is creating new hopes and aspirations for further development.

The Arunachal Pradesh Police battalions were raised in between 1987 and 2005 which are helping the civil police in the maintenance of law and order in the state. Police has gained the confidence of the people and there is demand for opening more police stations and outposts. It is the youngest police force in the country and it is coming up ready to face the challenges of the fast changing society in Arunachal Pradesh. In the past 28 years, the police maintained law and order, peace and tranquility within the state very successfully. Crime remained well under control. Police officers and men managed various elections held in the Arunachal Pradesh and looked after the security need of the state including VIPs successfully and without any untoward incident.¹²⁸

Variable in Conflict Resolution

Arunachal Pradesh (Eastern Sector) has always occupied an important place in the process of India-China border conflict resolution. Arunachal Pradesh is a land of natural wealth and strategically too important for India vis-à-vis China. Eastern sector is variable in terms of geographic and political sense:

In Arunachal Pradesh a range of watershed, catchment area. During winter, rivers in the Himalayas flow very stagnantly. To choose the exact watershed range for the determination of the boundary, it becomes difficult due to “variable”.

¹²⁷ “Arunachal News Letter” (Feb 20, 1993) Special Issue , Directorate of public Relations, Government of Arunachal Pradesh p. 3.

¹²⁸ “Arunachal News Letter” (Feb 20, 1992) Special Issue Vol- 5, No. 126, Naharlagun, Itanagar, Directorate of public Relations, Government of Arunachal Pradesh PP. 14-16.

In terms of India

China border conflict resolution, the Eastern sector is variable from the Chinese side. China claims (over all Arunaichal Pradesh) Eastern sector but also offers to give up Eastern sector in return if India relinquishes her claim on the western sector (i.e. Axsai-Chin area) because the western sector is most important for China than Eastern sector. Eastern sector is variable from Chinese side in terms of “border conflict resolution”. Chinese claim in the Eastern sector is one of the Chinese tactics to exert pressure on India to compel her to forego her claim on the western sector. For China western sector is more easily accessible than the Eastern sector. Axsai-Chin is another lifeline for China due to its linkages between Sinkiang and Tibet, in view of its control over the Tibetan population. Eastern sector is difficult to access for China as compared to India.

It is apparent that neither India would withdraw from her positions in the Eastern sector nor China would withdraw from Axsai Chin Area. Irrespective of India’s full control in the Eastern sector since the beginning, and the spectacular development of the border areas and most importantly, the aspirations of the local population to be an integral part of Indian union, China still claims the Eastern sector and considers McMahon Line as an illegal international boundary which, of course, is the purpose of diplomatic maneuver. This argument of China is very relevant to the China’s “package deal”¹²⁹ which intimately reflects Eastern sector as a variable in the process of India China border conflict resolution.

¹²⁹ Chinese recognition to McMahon line which they called “Line of Actual Control” and in return India has to forgot her claim on Chinese occupied Axsai chin.

Chapter-5

Melting Sino-India Deadlock

India and China share one of the longest undemarcated borders in the world. Not a single treaty has ever officially delimited the disputed boundary, which affects over 125,000 sq. km in three different sectors (Eastern, Middle and Western). The border dispute was the main cause for the Sino-Indian conflict in the late 1950s and led to a brief but unpleasant border war in 1962. This war left a deep blemish on bilateral relations. After that, India and China clashed several times in the 1970s and 1980s, with the stalemate at Sumdorong Chu in the eastern sector from October 1986 to March 1987 being the most serious of them. In this occurrence, the Indian army conducted a large-scale military exercise, code-named *Checker Board*, near the Sino-Indian border area. China responded by assembling its troops, which principal to an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. As the crisis intensified, cooler heads succeeded and both sides draw back. Both side troops were removed from their progressive posts and back to their old outposts in the spring of 1988.¹³⁰

Since the late 1970s, China and India have also required to resolve the issue through border negotiations and Confidence Building Measures. In 1976 the both countries exchanged ambassadors. In February 1979, Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. Slowly and unsure steps were taken to decrease tension and the both countries began to explore ways to resolve their boundary disputes. After that Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to the People's Republic of China in December 1988 was the first started by an Indian prime minister since 1954. Yet marked with substantial fanfare, with the inevitable trip to the Great Wall, the undertakings of the visit were modest, primarily the making of a Joint Working Group instructed to seek a solution to the long-standing border issue. The both nations also decided to broaden cultural, education, and scientific relations. Finally, as stated in the ambiguous language of a diplomatic communique, India and China agreed to maintain "peace and tranquility" along the border. From the Chinese viewpoint, the most significant achievement was the clear acknowledgment by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that Tibet is an internal matter of China. Chinese enthusiasm to obtain this Indian authorisation was no doubt closely linked to the recent political stirrings in Tibet.

¹³⁰ Robert G. Sutter, *China-India Border Friction: Back-ground Information and Possible Implications*, CRS (Congressional Research Service) Report for Congress 87-514F (Washington, D.C.: CRS, June 19, 1987).

The Eight Round Border Talk

The Indian representatives who were closely attached with the process of border talks between 1981 and 1988 bunch the eight rounds into two groups. Although the detailed division differs, they all reach a decision that the first four deal with "*basic principles*" and the last four deal with "**the situation on the ground.**"

The First Round Talk

The first round talks start in December 1981 with the Chinese proposing the so-called offer, a proposal by Deng Xiaoping had put two visiting Indian journalists. Pared to the bone, this proposal required freezing the status quo on the ground, with slight concessions by two sides. In detail, according to a senior Indian official carefully connected with this round, the Chinese did not seem interested in rotating it into anything more than a propaganda exercise. When the Indian side seemed less than excited about the proposal, the Chinese proposed that the border disputes to be frozen and development be made on other areas such as scientific and cultural exchanges. Indian Foreign Minister Rao denial the Deng proposal, opposing that it equated the attacker with the victim, left without the authenticity of the McMahon Line, and in no way assuaged India's 1962 humiliation. In fact, in the opinion of an Indian representative who has been related with the border talks, there are the so-called "settlers" (of the dispute) and "non-settlers" in the Ministry of External Affairs.

The Second Round Talk

The first round talk finished without achieving much out there agreeing to meet again. By the second round talk, which was held in New Delhi (India), Chinese representative had cooled considerably and little become apparent then.

The Third Round Talk

India's position was that it would not discuss the legality of the case as the legal situations of the two sides had been fairly well documented. The one noticeable concession that the Indian side was eager to make was seek some common area without abandoning its legal situation.

The Fourth Round Talk

In this round, the Indian side agreed to the Chinese proposal that normalization should continue in other sphere of influence without essentially linking them to the border talks. The fourth round led to a considerable expansion of relations in areas of including science, culture, and trade. A main agreement was also reached on how the border talks would be conducted, specifically, that they would advance on a sector by sector basis.

The Fifth Round Talk

The Chinese situation had become softer somewhat and according to an Indian official faithfully connected with the talks, the Chinese seemed agreeable to settling the border dispute along the McMahon Line in the Eastern sector with slight Indian concessions. They also required certain pieces of Indian Territory in the Aksai Chin region. This suggestion was discussed at some stretch, but in the end Indian national politics led to an abandonment of the proposal. Wu Xueqin also carried Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang's wish to hold talks with Rajiv Gandhi, and in due progress these talks were held (October 1985) in New York. Zhao Ziyang's renewed the invite to Rajiv Gandhi to visit China, but Gandhi stated that little would be reached by such a trip unless the proper introductory work had been done.

The Sixth Round Talk

The Chinese back with the package proposal in the sixth round. They also put advancing their old claim that the old boundary line to the East entered well south of the McMahon Line, that is, the Himalayan peak. In December 1985 the External Affairs Minister asked in the Rajya Sabha that the determination of the border problem was a requirement for a fully normalization of relations¹³¹. Basically, the Chinese put forward that as a significance of British and Indian forward policies **"an actual line of control between the two sides has taken place on the Chinese side of the boundary."** There was a quick Indian response to this perceived Chinese make softer, with reports to the effect that grounds had finally been found for an acceptable settlement and that the Foreign Minister might visit China at the end of the year, even though it should be well-known that this belief in a Chinese "become softer" was not commonly shared in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs¹³².

¹³¹ Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea, "India-China: The Year of Two Possibilities," in Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy, 1985-1986, Satish Kumar, ed. (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987), p. 153.

¹³² Interview with an Indian FSO, March 1989, Washington, D.C. done by Sumit Ganguly

The Seventh Round Talk

The seventh round talks were held as scheduled in July 1986. The Sumdurong Chu incident, which had made the Indian side pretty cautious and the Chinese side inflexible, was aggressively discussed in this round. The set proposal was simply not stated and little fundamental agreement was reached.¹³³ Succeeding the round, the new Indian Foreign Minister, Shiv Shankar, meet with Wu Xueqian in New York where both decided on the need to stop incidents of the kind that had just happened. It is supposed that Mr. Shiv Shankar planned that one way of resolving tension in the area might be for the Chinese to pull out from Wangdong in the Sumdurong Chu valley in winter, it was decided that the Indian patrols would not coming back to the area until the snows melted.

The Eighth Round Talk

In this round of talks, need to avoid military conflict was seemingly stressed on both sides, and better interest in economic cooperation and trade was stated. Clearly, the outcome of the talks seem like to be that the border disputes could not be resolved at the bureaucratic level and that a political initiative was necessary. After this talk, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi decided to visit China in December 1988.

In 1993 and 1996, though, India and China signed two important agreements to maintain peace and tranquility and decrease pressures along the Line of Actual Control, including force decreases and confines on military activities. In addition, last three decades, the process of Sino-Indian normalization and confidence building have slowly but surely evolved, marked by the following distinct, yet reinforcing, activities:

Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity, 1993

The consolidation of diplomatic relations between the two countries with the path breaking visit of the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988, established the Joint Working Group (JWG), the groundwork for defence cooperation and military engagement. A milestone in the military relationship between the two countries was the visit of Sharad Pawar, the then Defence Minister to China in July 1992. It was the first ever visit by a Defence Minister of India to China. During the visit Mr. Sharad Pawar was agreed to develop academic, military, scientific and technological exchanges between the both countries. It is also

¹³³ Interview with a senior (retired) Indian FSO, January 1989, New Delhi. done by Sumit Ganguly

believed that during Mr. Pawar's visit, the Chinese military leadership emphasised the importance of reduction of troops in the border region due to prohibitive cost. The visit fructified in the signing of the *Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-India Border* area on September 7, 1993 during the visit of the then Prime Minister P.V. Narashima Rao. The agreement¹³⁴ was indeed a breakthrough. In view of its importance, it is worthwhile to elucidate the salient features of the agreement in greater detail.

Before elucidating the main features of the first major agreement between the two countries, it is worthwhile to have a conceptual clarity as to the meaning of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The LAC is understood to be the line up to which troops of the two sides exercise effective control. It has not been demarcated, but the term was first used by the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, well before the 1962 war, in a letter written in 1959 to the then Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru. The Chinese put forward the line as its understanding of the de facto position of the two sides. Beijing claimed India and China did not have a delineated boundary, but there was a well-recognised LAC. Early delineation of the LAC has, therefore, emerged as an option for establishing the border regions and securing a working boundary that the military forces on both sides would respect.¹³⁵

In the first place, the agreement avowed the view that the Sino-India boundary disputes shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly discussions and that neither side shall use or threaten to use force beside the other by any means. Yet another important highlight of the agreement was that it specified

“Pending an ultimate solution of the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly observe the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two sides and that no activities of either side shall overstep the LAC. In case of personnel of one side cross the LAC, upon being confirmed by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side of the LAC.”

It additionally provided that when necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the LAC when they have different views as to its alignment.

Second, the agreement specified that each side would keep its military forces in the area along the Line of Actual Control to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good

¹³⁴ Brahma Chellaney (2010) *“Asian Jugergrnaut”*, Harper Collins, pp. 296-300.

¹³⁵ Anna Orton, (2010) *“India's border land disputes, China, Pak, Bangladesh and Nepal”*, New Delhi: Epitome Books, pp. 4-5.

neighbourly relations between the two countries. It further iterated that the both sides agree to reduce their military forces along the Line of Actual Control in conformism with the requirement of the principle of mutual and equal security to ceilings, and that the decrease of military forces shall be passed out in stages in mutually agreed geographical locations, subdivision wise, within the area along the Line of Actual Control.

Third is based on military exercise, the agreement cited that every side shall give the other prior notice of the military exercises of stated levels near the Line of Actual Control allowable under the agreement.

Fourth, in case of possibility or other problems rising in the area of the Line of Actual Control, the both sides shall deal with them through meetings and friendly discussions between the border personnel of the both countries.

Fifth, the both sides also decided to take passable measures to ensure that air incursions across the Line of Actual Control do not take place and that the both sides shall start mutual discussion in case incursions occur.

As a follow up of this agreement, a senior level Chinese military delegation aimed at fostering CBMs between the defence forces of the two countries made a six day visit to India in December 1993. The visit was reciprocated by the Indian Army Chief Gen. BC Joshi in July 1994. Since then, regular exchanges have been taking place at various levels.

Confidence Building Measures for the Line of Actual Control, 1996

Three years later, the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-India Border Area was followed by the Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-India Border Areas¹³⁶ on November 29, 1996 during the visit of Chinese President Ziyang Zemin to India. The agreement while repeating and reiterating the determined and spirit of the 1993 agreement, inter-alias, specifies that the major categories of mobilization to be reduced or limited include combat tanks, combat vehicles, missile base, guns with 75 mm or bigger caliber, mortars with 120mm or bigger caliber, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles and other weapon system.

¹³⁶ Brahma Chellaney (2010) "*Asian Jugergrnaut*", Harper Collins, no. 33, pp 301-308.

In order to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-India border areas and to avoid any tension in the border area due to misunderstanding by either side of the other side's intentions, Article IV of the agreement provides that both sides shall avoid large-scale military exercises including more than one Division (approximately 15,000 troops) in close proximity of the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-India border areas. However, if some exercises are to be conducted, the direction of the main Army involved shall not be en route for the other side. If either side conducts a military exercise involving more than one Brigade Group in close proximity of the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-India Border areas, in that situation it shall give the another side prior notification with regard to type, level, planned duration and area of exercise as well as the number and type of units or formations participating in the exercise. The date of close of the exercise and de-induction of troops from the area of exercise shall be furtive to the other side within five days of completion or de-induction.

With a view to preventing air interruptions across the LAC in the Sino-India border area and facilitating flights and landings by military aircrafts, the agreement provides that both sides shall take suitable measures to ensure that air interruptions across the LAC do not take place. However, if an intrusion does take place, it should be stopped as soon as detected and the incident shall be promptly investigated by the side operating the aircraft. The results of the enquiry shall be immediately conversed, through diplomatic channels or at border personnel meetings, to the other side. It further proposes that combat aircraft (to include fighter jet, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft) shall not fly within ten kilometers of the Line of Actual Control. Under the covenant, unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopters are permitted to fly up to the Line of Actual Control. No military aircraft of either side shall fly across the Line of Actual Control, except by prior permission. Military aircrafts of other side may fly across the line of actual control or fly over the other side's airspace or land on the other side only after obtaining the latter's prior permission after providing the latter with detailed information on the flight in accordance with the international practice in this regard. In emergency situation however the condition will be relaxed and for the sake of the safety of flight, the authorities designated by the two sides may contact each other by the quickest means of communications available.

Similarly, in order to prevent dangerous military activities along the LAC in the Sino-India border area, Article VI specifies that neither side shall open fire, cause bio-degradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometers from the Line of Actual Control. This prevention shall not be applicable to routine

firing activities in small arms firing ranges. If there is a need to conduct explosion within two kilometers of the Line of Actual Control as part of progressional activities, the other side shall be informed through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, most possibly five days in advance. While conducting exercises with live ammunition in areas close to the LAC, required safety measures shall be taken to ensure that a bullet or a missile does not unintentionally fall on the other side across the Line of Actual Control and cause harm to the personnel or property of the other side. If the border personnel of the two sides are exposed to a face-to-face situation on account of differences on the alignment of the LAC for any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an intensification of the situation. Both sides shall also immediately start consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to think about the situation again and keep checking any escalation of pressure.

Article VII of the agreement provides for flag meetings between their border representatives at designated places along the LAC and for maintaining and expanding telecommunication links between the border meeting points at designated places along the LAC and to establish systematic medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities of the two sides.

Article VIII of the Agreement proposes that if the personnel from one side cross the Line of Actual Control and enter the other side on account of any circumstances like natural calamities, the personnel from the other side shall provide all possible support to them and notify their side, as soon as possible about the forced or unintentional entry across the Line of Actual Control. The structured plan of the return of the concerned personnel to their own side shall be established through reciprocal discussions. It further indicates that the two sides shall offer each other, at the earliest possible, information related to natural calamities and rampant diseases in adjoining border area, which might disturb the other side. The interchange of information will be done either through diplomatic networks or at border personnel consultations.

Article X indicates that recognising the full application of some of the provisions of the present treaty will depend on the two sides reaching at a mutual understanding of the *alignment of the line of actual control* in the Sino-India border areas, the two sides reach on an agreement to speed up the process of interpretation and validation of the Line of Actual Control. As a preliminary step in this process, they are expounding the alignment of the LAC in those sectors where they have different observations. They also came to an agreement to exchange maps specifying their respective observations of the entire alignment of the LAC as soon as possible. It

also envisions that delaying the completion of the procedure of clarification and approval of the LAC, the two sides shall work out modalities for executing confidence-building measures visualized under this agreement on an interim basis, without biasness to their respective positions on the orientation of the Line of Actual Control as well as on the boundary dispute.

Therefore, it can be understood from various provisions of different treaties and accords signed between India and China that every possible aspect of military contingency has been thoughtfully unexpected, and ways and means to skillfully handle them without precipitating the matter have been envisaged. There was against this background of signing of various treaties providing for CBMS that a slide of visits at various levels between the both countries were undertaken.

The most significant of the visit was that of the then Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, to China in April 2003. The visit of Mr. Fernandes took place after a gap of more than one decade. It helped ease the post- Pokhran tension.

Defence cooperation and military engagement between the two countries further received a boost during the visit of the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in June 2003. It may be mentioned that during the erstwhile short-lived Janata regime, Vajpayee had visited China in 1979. He, however, had to cut short his visit to China when war broke out between China and Vietnam, as a mark of solidarity with the latter. The joint declaration between the two countries signed on June 23, 2003, *inter alia*, mentioned,

“...they agreed on the need to broaden and deepen defence exchanges between the two countries, which will help enhance and deepen mutual understanding and trust between the two armed forces. They confirmed that the exchange of visits by their Defence Ministers and of military officials at various levels should be strengthened”.¹³⁷

It may be mentioned that even after almost 16 years, there is not much progress in clarification of the alignment of the LAC, and except the Central Sector, exchange of maps has not taken place.

¹³⁷ Brahma Chellaney (2010) “*Asian Jugergrnaut*”, Harper Collins, no. 33, p. 317.

Protocols on CBMs along the LAC, 2005

The upward swing of defence cooperation and military engagement between the two countries was given a further impetus during the visit of the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in April 2005. The Protocol on CBMs between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Modalities for the Executions of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the Sino-India Border Areas signed on April 11, 2005. This Protocol sought to further elucidate certain provisions of the 1996 confidence building accord while reiterating verbatim some of the bilateral commitments in the accord. Some of the amplified provisions which merit attention are as under:

Article III of the Protocol envisages the following provisions¹³⁸:

- A. The time of meeting an alleged air intrusion of its controlled air space by the military aircraft of the another side, either side may seek a Flag Meeting within 48 hours of the alleged air intrusion in order to pursue a clarification. The investigation shall be completed by the other side and its results communicated through a Flag Meeting within a period of four weeks.
- B. If a military or civilian aircraft of either side is required to fly across the LAC or to fly the airspace of the other side, earlier permission shall be sought from the other side according to processes and formats to be mutually arranged upon.
- C. If a emergency situation, military or civilian aircraft of either side is required to fly across the LAC or to land on the other side of the LAC, the both sides will safeguard flight safety in such situations by adhering to procedures to be equally agreed upon.

Article V provides the following:

- A. The two sides shall hold two supplementary border meetings each year at Spanggur Gap in the Western Sector, Nathula Pass in the Sikkim area and Bum La in the Easter Sector correspondingly in celebration of the National Day or Army Day of either side. Some definite preparations shall be decided through mutual negotiations between the border forces of the two sides.
- B. The two sides are, in attitude, have to expand the mechanism of border negotiations points to comprise of Kibithu-Damai in the Eastern Sector and Lipulekh Pass/Qiang La in the Middle Sector. The specific locations of these border summits points will be decided through mutual discussion.

¹³⁸ Brahma Chellaney (2010) "*Asian Jugergrnaut*", Harper Collins, no.33, pp. 322-327

- C. The two sides shall conduct interactions between the relevant Military Regions of China and Army Commands of India. Some particular arrangements shall be done upon through reciprocal discussions between the relevant agencies under the Ministries of Defence of the two sides.
- D. The two sides shall reinforce exchanges between establishments of preparations of the two armed forces, and conduct exchanges between organisations of sports and culture of the two armed forces. Detailed arrangements shall be finalized through mutual consultations between the pertinent agencies under the Ministries of Defence of the both sides.

Memorandum of Understanding, 2006

It was against this background of what may be called the heightened engagement between the two countries that the then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited China on a five-day visit in May/June 2006 and held wide ranging talks with Chinese leaders including Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and his Chinese counterpart General Cao Gangchuan.

The high point of the visit was the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which is the first ever of its kind between the two countries. The MOU envisions the establishment of a mechanism to ensure common and regular exchanges between leaders and officials of the Defence Ministries and the armed forces of the both countries in addition to developing an annual calendar for holding consistent joint military exercises and training programmes. The Defence Minister also stayed the sensitive Lanzhou Military Area Command, which controls the largest physical area of China's seven military regions. The region holding the nuclear research and missile testing facilities comes under the Command of this area. Mr. Mukherjee's visit to the headquarters of the Lanzhou Military Command was an important step in the process of structure bilateral trust and confidence on the part of China.

These improvements were additionally consolidated during the second visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in November 2006. In the Joint Declaration signed between the two countries on November 21, 2006. It was said,

“...the exchange of visits in the field of defence has resulted in the building of mutual trust and enhancement of mutual understanding between the defence establishments of the two countries. Both sides shall fully implement the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding

for Exchanges and Cooperation in the field of defence signed on May 29, 2006, which provides a sound foundation and institutional framework for further development of defence cooperation”.¹³⁹

Positive tangible steps were taken as a follow-up of the CBMs. For example the armed forces of the both side held a friendly meeting at a new border point in Arunachal Pradesh, on November 18, 2006, on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s official visit to India. The both sides meet at Kibithu in Anjwa district of Arunachal Pradesh, and discussed modalities for the conduct of troops along the eastern border. A Chinese official press release claimed, **“The meeting and exchanges were characterised by great warmth and bonhomie. It marks another milestone in the growing relationship and military exchanges between the armed forces of the two countries.”** India-China Border meetings between officers of the armed forces of the both countries have traditionally been held at Chusul in Ladakh, Nathu La in Sikkim, and Bum La in Kamang district of Arunachal Pradesh.¹⁴⁰

Hand-in-Hand 2008: The Sino-India Joint Military Exercise

Encouraged by the success of the first ever joint military exercise between China and India in Kunming in Yunnan in 2007, a week long China-India joint anti-terrorists training kicked off on December 6, 2008 in Belgaon in Karnataka with the performance of the Chinese *Tai Chai* and Indian martial arts. Qin Xiangyon, in charge of the Chinese soldiers participating in the sessions, said during the opening ceremonies that the joint training was aimed at promoting the two army’s mutual understanding and trust.

He also said that it was a way for the armies to develop their friendship, and expand the fields for exchanges and cooperation. After the ceremony, Chinese and Indian soldiers displayed their weapons. Moreover, Chinese soldiers performed *tai chai* and anti-terror shooting skills, while their Indian counterparts put on display the country’s traditional martial arts. Commenting on the importance of the joint military exercise, Quyang Wei, a professor at the University of National Defence said in an interview to Xinhua,

¹³⁹ Lok Sabha Debate “*Suo Moto Statement by Shri Pranab Mukherjee, Minister of External Affairs Chinese President’s visit to India*”, November 28, 2006.

¹⁴⁰ “*Warm meeting at new border point*”, (November 21, 2006) The Hindu, <http://www.hindu.com/2006/11/21/stories/2006112115401000.htm>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

“China and India are the world’s biggest developing countries. Peace and Friendship between them is not only in the interests of both the countries, but also important for bringing peace, stability and prosperity to South Asia”.

Highlighting the need for the joint training, the Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Huang Xueping said that such training ‘was intended to enhance mutual understanding and trust and advance development of relations between Chinese and Indian armies.’

Emphasising the importance of such exercises Lt. General Ma Xiaotian, Head of the Chinese Military Observer delegation and also the Deputy Chief of the PLA said, ‘It showcased the resolution of the two sides to safeguard regional peace and stability and create a harmonious environment for development together.’¹⁴¹ An editorial in *China Daily* hailed the joint training programme and said, ‘China and India are looking after their fences, turning the Himalayas, the highest mountains on the earth, into a friendly border.’¹⁴² The joint military exercise was carried out according to the Memorandum of Understanding for Exchange and cooperation in the field of Defence signed in 2006 and listed in the annual exchange plan for 2008.

Exchange of Defence Delegations

Defence cooperation between India and China maintained a healthy momentum till 2009. The issue of stapled visa, however, compelled India to suspend the visit of the Northern Command, Lt General B.S. Jaswal to China in July 2010 as he was issued a stapled visa and not a proper visa on the ground that the “sensitive region” of Kashmir was under his charge. The issue was resolved when Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh met President Hu Jintao on the side lines of BRICS summit in Sanya in April 2011. Subsequently an eight member delegation led by Maj General Gurmeet Singh, General Officer Commanding of the Delta Force, paid a visit to China in June 2011. The Delta Force is part of Rashtriya Rifles counter-insurgency unit of the army, battling rebels in Doda and adjoining areas of Kashmir and is part of the Northern Command.

¹⁴¹ News From China, 20(12), December, 2008.

¹⁴² “India, China military exercise landmark development: Report”, <http://expressindia.com>, December 22, 2007, accessed on September 21, 2010.

China's refusal to interact with the Northern Command chief was just one of the irritants that had buffeted ties between the both countries. The delegation both countries visited Beijing Urumqi, the capital of Muslim majority Xinjiang region, and Shanghai.

Welcoming the visit of Indian military delegation, the foreign ministry spokesperson of China said,

“The military exchange is an important part of China-India relations.... The significance is that any hiccups in any field should not derail our bilateral relations”, he said, adding that defence exchanges needed to become “the most powerful stabiliser of our bilateral relations”.

Chinese experts welcomed the resumption of defence agreement as a sign that the both countries had put difficulties such as the visa issue behind them but warned against high expectations among persevering mistrust on a range of issues. This visit was further about symbolism, taking forward confidence-building measures and addressing ground concerns somewhat than a platform to resolve larger undecided issues. Hu Shisheng, a South Asia Scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) told the Beijing based correspondent of an Indian English daily that, it was better **“not to burden such military-to-military exchanges with too much expectations”** and a political agenda. The scope of such exchanges, he said, was not to solve problems, but **“to enrich each other's understanding on each other's positions on different issues in a correct way”**.¹⁴³

In a communist system like that of China, where the Party commands the gun, in recent times the PLA has become more assertive and strident in wielding influence on the foreign policy.

There is, thus, an imperative need to engage the PLA. The PLA has been “an official foreign policy actor” throughout the history of the People's Republic of China, according to Linda Jakobson of the Stockholm International Peace research Institute, who authored a report on different actors shaping China's foreign policy.¹⁴⁴

Nevertheless, in spite of hiccups, exchange of defence delegations between the two countries continued. After the visit of Maj. General Gurmit Singh to China in June 2011, New Delhi received an eight-member PLA delegation led by Lt General Lang Youliang from Tibet Military Command of Chengdu Military Region in the first week of November 2011. The

¹⁴³ Ananth Krishnan, (June 22, 2011) *“Military delegation's visit marks thaw in India China ties”*, The Hindu.

¹⁴⁴ Ananth Krishnan, (September 29, 2010) *“India to engage China's military as influence expands”*, The Hindu.

Chinese military delegation during their stay in India visited defence installations in New Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai. The visit of this delegation was followed by yet one more delegation of mid-career officers of PLA led by Maj. General Jin Lechang in December 2011.¹⁴⁵ Among other places, the delegation visited the IDSA also, and interacted with scholars.

A 15-member Indian military delegation left for Beijing on January 10, 2011 after the size of the delegation was trimmed to almost half, which excluded an air force officer from Arunachal Pradesh, as he was not issued a visa by the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi.

The Annual Defence Dialogue

The Defence Secretary led a high-level Indian delegation for the third Annual Defence Dialogue held in Beijing on January 6, 2010.¹⁴⁶ The fourth Sino-India Annual Defence Dialogue was held in New Delhi on December 9, 2011. The Indian side was led by the Defence Secretary Shashi Kant Sharma and the Chinese side was led by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Deputy Chief of General Staff, Gen Ma Xiaotian. Ma is an important PLA general, who visited India in 2008 to participate in the Hand-in-Hand Joint Military exercise conducted in Belgaon, Karnataka.

The Ministry of Defence said that while sharing regional and global security perceptions, talks between the two sides were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and both sides were frank, and constructive in their approach during the deliberations. Acknowledging that the existing CBMs on the LAC had been successful in maintaining peace and tranquility on the borders, both sides agreed to continue with them besides further strengthening dialogue and communication to ensure stability.

“Both sides agreed that the provision of the 2005 Protocol for implementation of CBMs on LAC should be strictly adhered to by both sides so that peace and tranquility are maintained in the border areas. It was also noted that the strengthening of the institutional mechanism for border discussions, which is expected to be operationalized soon through the establishment of a working level mechanism, would improve communications on important border related issues.”

¹⁴⁵ “Boost for military-to-military interactions between India, China”, (November 11, 2011) The Pioneer, <http://dailypioneer.com/nation/19543-boost-for-militaryto-military-interaction-between-Sino-India.html>, accessed on December 30, 2012.

¹⁴⁶ Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report, 2009-2010.

Besides meeting the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Naval staff, Admiral Nirmal Verma, the Chinese delegation also called on Defence Minister A.K. Antony who expressed satisfaction at the talks held in a positive and constructive atmosphere. Mr Antony while extending an invitation to his Chinese counterpart said that both sides needed to work towards increasing mutual trust and confidence, which would benefit both countries. It is believed that the two sides are working for training of their defence personnel in training colleges in either country.¹⁴⁷

Line of Actual Control or Line of Actual Concern?

Although these military engagement and CBMs have somewhat helped in diffusing tension across the border, incidents regarding border incursions are reported from time to time. Every month, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police reports around a dozen unannounced Chinese military patrol in the disputed border areas, and this number has not reduced over the last decade. Maximum of these incidents are inoffensive. Frequently border-Police do not even make straight contacts, but leave behind understated traces of their incidence, like piles of stones, cigarette packets or cans. From that period to time, Chinese military officials reportedly enter the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control in civilian dresses and vehicles. Virtually on a weekly basis, small Chinese boats tour around in Lake Pangong Tso and Ladakh region.¹⁴⁸

In more recent times, India is worried about a significant increase in the number of stand-offs between Indian and Chinese border patrols and more aggressive posturing by Chinese soldiers along the border. Sometime in early September 2010, a stand-off between the two sides along the LAC took place, when Chinese soldiers carried a bulldozer into a disputed area in the Ladakh region to build a road. After that the Indian side objected to it and queried the Chinese to take it back, the PLA unduly behind the pulling out of the machine and took it away only four days later. The delay by the Chinese was uncommon, but it fell into the trend noticed in 2010, of better assertiveness by the People Liberation Army soldiers, reported a leading newspaper quoting senior officials. In 2010 summer noted an almost 100 percent increase in the number of

¹⁴⁷ <http://www.newkerala.com/news/2011/worldnews-123683.html>.

¹⁴⁸ Jonathan Holslag, (December, 2009) “*The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India*”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(6), p.817.

stand-offs between the patrols of the both sides. These peaceful stand-offs were reported from Demchok, Depsang, and Pangong Tso areas in Ladakh region in recent times.¹⁴⁹

In yet another incident reported by the news agency PTI on January 9, 2011, it was mentioned that Chinese troops entered the Indian Territory in the end of 2010 along the LAC in Southeastern Ladakh region and threatened a contractor and his team to halt work on constructing a 'passenger shed'. The Chinese troops, which included motor-cycle borne personnel of the PLA entered Gombir area in Demchok region in Jammu and Kashmir and threatened the civilian workers who were building a shed, the plan for which was cleared by the state rural development department.

The incident took place in a village about 300 km south-east of Leh district headquarters. An official report which was prepared after a meeting of officials from the civilian administration, the army, central security agencies and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, stated that a passenger shed was approved at an estimated cost of Rupees Two Lakh, to be built at 'T' point in village Gombir under the Border Area Development Project of Ministry of Home affairs. The Chinese army personnel came to the 'T' point and asked the contractor to stop work.

While such incidents have been down played by the Government, Defence Minister A.K. Antony told Rajya Sabha on December 21, 2011 that

“On July 13, a PLA patrol attempted to cross a 200 feet long wall of loose stones constructed 250 m on our side of the LAC in Yantse area of Tawang, which was prevented by our troops.”

He also informed the House that

“The stone wall was partially damaged by the PLA and as per the established mechanism with China a strong protest was lodged with the Chinese side in a Flag Meeting of the two armies.”

The wall was erected to cut chilly winds and prevent animals from straying into the Chinese territory.

News report from Itanagar, however, rejected the media reports on alleged Chinese intrusions in the Tawang sector in Arunachal Pradesh. A regional TV channel also telecast footage of the Chinese army damaging the 'wall' constructed on the Indian side of the border. Following the telecast, the local army official said that there had been no such incident reported on the international border at the Tawang district. He said that the information about the Chinese

¹⁴⁹ The Times of India, September 27, 2010.

intrusion was nothing but rumour. The Deputy Commissioner of the area, while explaining his concern on the rumour assured that the news footage given in the TV channel was false. He said such “unfounded news items may create panic and apprehension in the minds of the people”.¹⁵⁰

Defence Minister Mr. A.K. Antony in a written reply to the Rajya Sabha in the month on 30 November 2011 said,

“Our nomads grazing in Kakhung near Nyma Sector of Ladakh had been disturbed by Chinese patrols in December 2008. A strong protest regarding the same was lodged with the Chinese Garrison Commander and since then Chinese patrols have not visited the area again. Our nomads are grazing in the area currently without any problem.”

Replying to the question on 21 December 2011, Rajya Sabha he, however, said that the areas along the LAC are being kept under surveillance by regular patrolling by troops and other means. He further said that there are no confirmed reports of aerial intrusion from Chinese side in to Indian airspace during the last month. He added that there is no commonly delineated LAC between India and China and that there are a few areas along the border where India and China have different perceptions of the LAC. Both sides patrol up to their own perception of the LAC. Specific incidents of transgression due to differences in the perception of the LAC are taken up with the Chinese side through established mechanisms such as Hot Lines, Flag Meetings, Border Personnel Meetings and normal diplomatic channels. Effective border management is carried out through surveillance and regular patrolling, he said further.

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, while refuting the views of Samajwadi President Mulayam Singh that China was making all-out efforts to attack India and had marked some posts across the border, said in the Lok Sabha in mid-December 2011 that his Government did not share the views that China was out to attack India. Asserting that there were problems on the border, he said that largely, the border remains peaceful. He, however, acknowledged, **“There are some times intrusions according to us”**. But the Chinese perception of LAC sometimes differs. Therefore, I think some confusion is created. These matters are sorted out between the area commanders on both the sides.¹⁵¹

¹⁵⁰ “Army contradicts Antony on China?”, (December 24, 2011) The Pioneer <http://dailypioneer.com/nation/30072-army-contradicts-antony-on-china.html>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁵¹ Lok Sabha Debate, December 14, 2011.

A reported by the Indian media that in August 2011 two Chinese helicopters carrying seven to eight troopers interrupted into Indian territory along Line of Actual Control in Ladakh and damaged “*unused bunkers*” before flying back unopposed. The Leh district administration reported this to the state Government highlighting that while the Indo-Tibet border Police and the Intelligence Bureau sent the report on this incident to the Union Home Ministry, the local administration was kept in the dark. The Leh Deputy Commissioner T. Angchuk told the media that he had sent a report on the incident to the state Government and deputed the Sub Divisional Magistrate (SDM) as station house officer to visit the spot, and verify the facts and file a report.

The Leh district (Kashmir) administration remembered about the incident (which took place on August 25) on September 9 and the SDM was deputed on a fact-finding mission.¹⁵² However, the Indian army denied any such incident having taken place. Official sources, however, maintained that the two choppers landed in the Chumur area, 200-300 ft on the Indian side of the LAC. They were there for 20-25 minutes. It was also reported that on June 21, 2009, two Chinese choppers were reported to have intruded into the area and according to the army stepped up patrolling in Chumur. The Indian army’s taked position, often articulated by the top commanders, is that

“These are not incursions but transgressions, which take place because of the varying perception of the LAC.”¹⁵³

The General Officer in Command, 4 Corps Lt Gen Shakti Gurung during a meeting with Chief Minister Nabam Tuki said that everything was normal along the border. He expressed concern over the report of Chinese troops damaging a wall constructed by Lok Sabha Debate, December 14, 2011. The Army was in Tawang area. He said that it was, however, not a major issue as the area is disputed with regard to Chinese claims over it. Besides, he said, the wall was a temporary structure of loosely placed stones stacked by jawans to protect themselves from harsh cold during the patrolling and to prevent cattle from wandering into Chinese territory. The same had been re-erected and is an old issue now, he added.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² <http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Jammu%20Sec/Two-Chinese-helicopters-entered-India-in-August/Article1-745222.aspx>

¹⁵³ Arun Joshi, (14 September, 2011) “*Two Chinese helicopters entered India in August*”, Hindustan Times, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Jammu%20Sec/Two-Chinese-helicopters-entered-India-in-August/Article1-745222.aspx> accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁵⁴ <http://indianmilitarynews.wordpress.com/tag/a-k-antony/>

Naval Confidence Building Measures

As it can be seen, most CBMs have been in the domain of the army and the air force, and there is no mention of the navy. At a time when the navies of the two countries are poised to expand beyond their territorial waters with possibilities for conflict and cooperation, it is only prudent that there are CBMs between the navies of the two countries. In recent times while China has been active in the Indian Ocean, India has also been active in the in the Asia-Pacific. Only in September 2011 the *Financial Times* of London reported that an Indian ship Airawat was challenged by the Chinese Navy in the South China Sea.¹⁵⁵

In view of the Indian Navy's increasing engagement in the Asia-Pacific, and particularly in view of the ONGC Videsh oil and natural gas exploration bid in the disputed and the sensitive South China Sea, there is an imperative need for Naval CBMs between the two countries. The Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement saying that

“At a distance of 45 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast in South China Sea, it was contacted on an open radio channel by a caller identifying himself as the Chinese Navy stating that you are entering Chinese waters.”

The statement further said that there was no controversy involving INS Airawat. The occurrence of such incidents cannot be ruled out.

It was in this backdrop that some time back the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Nirmal Verma broached the idea of a 'hot line, direct and dedicated telephone and fax lines between the two naval headquarters'. The idea was given some shape in March 2012 during the visit of the Foreign Minister of China, Yang Jiechi to New Delhi prior to the BRICS Summit. The proposed mechanism seeks to involve the Coast Guards, the Navies and the Air Forces in action against pirates. The modalities are being worked out by a joint group that will include the two Foreign Offices, besides the Ministries of Defence, Shipping and Oceanography.

Defence cooperation and military engagement between India and China is an aspect of the complex bilateral relations between the two Asian giants. It is based on the presumption that there is a security dilemma between the two countries. It recognises the framework and postulates of what is called cooperative security. It is quiet ironical that while the CBMs envisaged for troops reduction and scaling down of military build-up on the border, there is in

¹⁵⁵ “*Chinese warship confronts Indian navy vessel: Report*”,(September 1, 2011) Times of India, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-01/india/29953009_1_indian-warship-south-china-sea-vessel, accessed on December 31, 2012.

fact, bolstering of defence forces by both India and China, which clearly suggest that there is persistence of a security dilemma between the two countries. It is all the more imperative therefore, that there are institutional and structural mechanisms for effective dialogue and communication. CBMs basically, refer to maintaining peace and tranquility in the land border and to some extent it also takes care of air intrusions, but the complex Sino-India relationship subsumes under its rubric other important issues which determine the success or failure of the Sino-India relationship. Border disputes sometimes are symptoms of the disease and not the disease itself. This is true as much in the case of India, as in similar cases elsewhere.

Chapter-6

Pakistan as a Factor in Sino- India Relations

The nature and dynamics of Global Politics over the years, particularly after the end of the Cold War have changed a great deal. The idioms and vocabulary of Global Politics have also changed as much as the paradigm of geo-politics. There is a greater realization that in a globalised world, there is no substitute for cooperation and mutual interdependence. The Sino-India relationship is one of the most fascinating relationships between two major powers in spite of certain differences between the two countries. The way they have managed the relationship ever since the war of 1962 is a matter of great attention. The border between the two countries, notwithstanding occasional intrusions, remains peaceful and tranquil and this speaks of the salience of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) between the two countries.

One of the continuing and persistent features of South-Asian geopolitics is what is described as ‘the all-weather friendship’ between China and Pakistan. While China’s relationship with the USA, Russia- erstwhile USSR, Japan and many other countries in the region and the world around has oscillated between friendship, estrangement, conflict and vice-versa, its relationship with Pakistan with the possible exception of North Korea has been warm and cordial all through. China and Pakistan have been close allies since the 1962 war between India and China.

As far as Pakistan factor in Sino-India Relations is concerned, it is quite evident that despite all the pressure pose by external factors, friendly relations with each other remain cornerstone of both countries foreign policies. Despite the fact that in the post-cold war era, Pakistan- China relations did undergo a slight sift, but the overall content and strategic relevance has not been affected. Reason being the geopolitical significance of Pakistan for China is hard to be ignored for anyone. Pakistan’s friendship with China has been termed as “**higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the oceans.**” It was in fact the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations following the 1962 war that Pakistan and China came closer to forge common strategic understanding.

It is interesting to refer to various metaphors used to describe the enduring Sino-Pak relationship. In February 2006, while speaking before the Pakistan-China Business Forum, the then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf described that their bilateral relationship ‘is deeper than the oceans, and higher than the mountains’.¹⁵⁶ After the killing of Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani territory of Abbottabad on May 2, 2011, when the US-Pak relationship suffered a severe jolt, and China swiftly extended solidarity to Pakistan, Prime Minister Gilani coined yet

¹⁵⁶ “18th round of talks on China-India Boundary Question held in New Delhi” (23-3-2015) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/photo/2015-03/23/c_134090739.htm Accessed Date 5/7/2015.

another metaphor when he described the relationship between the two as ‘one nation, two countries’.¹⁵⁷

If Pakistan has used the choicest metaphors to describe its enduring friendship with China, it is worthwhile to refer to China’s description of its relationship with Pakistan. While the term ‘all-weather friendship’ is invariably invoked by China with reference to its relationship with Pakistan, the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao described Pakistan as its ‘brother forever’ while addressing the members of the Pakistani Parliament after completing his visit to India. He further said,

“China-Pakistan friendship is full of vigour and vitality, like a lush tree with deep roots and thick foliage. China-Pakistan relationship is strong and like a rock standing firm, despite the passage of time”.¹⁵⁸

It was like repackaging the oft-quoted metaphor ‘all-weather friendship’.

This enduring alliance nurtured over the years witnessed its full blossom in April 2005 when China and Pakistan signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Good Neighbourly Relations. The enduring and strategic depth between the two countries was succinctly summed up by no less a person than the former Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari in an op-ed where he wrote,

“No relationship between two sovereign states is as unique and durable as that between Pakistan and China”.

While bilateral relationship between China and Pakistan has its own resonance, India weighs heavily in this narrative of strategic nexus. After Pakistan started tilting towards China in the wake of the 1962 war between China and India, China also started displaying gestures of goodwill and political support to Pakistan during the Bangladesh War in 1971. On April 12, 1971, Zhou En-lai sent a personal message to President Yahiya Khan pleading China’s support to Pakistani people and Government in their struggle to safeguard their national sovereignty and independence, should the Indian expansionists “dare” to launch an aggression. China cast its earlier restraint aside and lashed out against the India-Soviet Treaty as an aggressive military

¹⁵⁷ Reshma Patil, (29 May 2011) “BFF: Pakistan and China”, New Delhi:Hindustan Times, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/World/BFF-Pakistan-and-China/Article1-703139.aspx>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁵⁸ “Wen calls on China, Pakistan to shape future by joining hands” (18 December 2010) Xinhua Net., at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-12/19/c_13655638.htm, accessed on December 31, 2012.

alliance. It also assailed India as a superpower, which was engaging in subversive activities in East Pakistan and threatening its smaller Asian neighbours.¹⁵⁹

In the United Nations, China also extended support to Pakistan in no uncertain terms. Besides being the only country to vote against the Soviet Draft Resolution, it also expressed reservation about the US Draft Resolution for which it voted, having failed to condemn India's armed aggression against Pakistan. On its part, China submitted a draft resolution on December 5, 1971, accusing India of launching a "**large scale attack on Pakistan**". It also called upon India to withdraw its forces immediately and unconditionally. Further it criticized India for dismembering Pakistan and creating a "**so called Bangladesh.**"¹⁶⁰

Sino-Pak Defence Cooperation

There are many facets to this lasting relationship, one important element of which is balancing India with whom Pakistan fought three major wars, if the Kargil war of 1999 is not counted as a major war. The history of Sino-Pak cooperation in security and defence and other vital areas dates back to the early 1960s when China extended financial and technical support to Pakistan to develop heavy industries and aeronautical complexes near Pakistan, which are now manufacturing main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers, and overhauling the whole range of combat aircrafts being flown by Pakistani Air Force.

Over the years, China has been supplying both conventional weapons and nuclear technology to Pakistan, which has security implications for India. The nuclear weapons supplied by China to Pakistan have the capacity to strike at cities all across India. China supplied the first batch of M-11 missiles (christened 'Ghaznavi' by Pakistan) in 1991-92. These missiles have a range of 300 km. In 1993, China started supplying Pakistan with nuclear capable medium range DF-15/M-9 missiles (called 'Shaheen 1' by Pakistan) with a range of 600-750 km. This supply was in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The M-9 has the range to target major cities and towns in North India. While the US sanctioned against Pakistan in 1965 and again in 1990, China has consistently supported Pakistan's military modernization. According to G. Parthasarathi, a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, a significant

¹⁵⁹ Nancy Jetly, (1979) "*India China Relations*", Radiant Publishers, pp. 267-270.

¹⁶⁰ Nancy Jetly, (1979) "*India China Relations*", Radiant Publishers, p 273

feature that has emerged is that military and missile technology that China acquires from Russia is finding its way to Pakistan.¹⁶¹

China has been supplying fighter jets to Pakistan for more than three decades. The Pakistani Air Force is currently flying Chinese made JF-17s, Karakoram-8 jet trainers as well as F-7, F-7PGs and A-5s combat aircrafts. The two countries jointly manufactured JF-17 aircraft, which has already been inducted into the Pakistan Air Force.¹⁶² Pakistani Navy has also inducted the first out of the four F-22P frigates that China has agreed to deliver as part of its efforts to boost defence ties between the two countries. The second and third ships are also nearing completion. They were scheduled to have been handed over to Pakistan in June 2010. The fourth ship is under construction at Karachi Shipyard and is expected to be completed by 2013. In November 2009, China agreed to sell Pakistan at least 36 advanced fighter jets in a land mark deal worth as much as 1.4 billion dollars. According to the deal, China will supply two squadrons of J-10 fighter planes in a preliminary agreement, which could lead to further sales in future.¹⁶³

In the wake of the killing of Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011, Pakistani sources claimed that China has agreed to provide Pakistan with fifty new JF-17 Thunder multi-role jets under the coproduction agreement. It was also mentioned that these fifty planes would be equipped with more sophisticated avionics.¹⁶⁴ There was, however, no confirmation by the Chinese sources. In fact, during a press briefing on May 19, 2011, the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson of China, Ms. Jiang Hu asked the question about China-Pakistan signing the new defence agreement. Enquired about the assertion by Pakistan's ambassador to China, Mashood Khan before Prime Minister Gilani's arrival that new defence contracts would be signed, he said,

“The two sides signed agreement in economy, technology, finance and energy sources. As to specific cooperation, please refer to relevant companies”.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ “Cruise Missiles in Sub Continent: The Sino-Pakistani Nexus”,(23 August 2009) The Hindu Business Line, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/bline/2005/08/23/stories/2005082300311100.htm>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁶² Swaran Singh, (2003) “China South Asia: Issues, Equations, Policies, New Delhi: Lancer Books,pp. 171-209.

¹⁶³ “China to sell 36 fighter jets to Pakistan” (November 11, 2009) UNI (United News of India).

¹⁶⁴ “China to give Pakistan 50 Thunder jets”, (May 29, 2011) New Delhi:The Asian Age.

¹⁶⁵ “China Asks US to Respect Pak's Sovereignty, Independence”, (20 May 2011) Economic Times, New Delhi,http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-05-20/news/29565072_1_pakistan-s-ambassador-pakistan-china-pakistan-media, accessed on December 31, 2012.

It can, be safely interpreted that China does not want to embarrass Pakistan on the matter, by denying such reports in the media.

China's Presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK)

China's presence in Pakistan occupied Kashmir¹⁶⁶ (PoK) is yet another matter of concern to India. As far as physical occupation of Jammu & Kashmir is concerned, it may be mentioned that while India holds 45 per cent and Pakistan controls 35 per cent, China occupies about 20 per cent of the Jammu & Kashmir territory.¹⁶⁷ China seized about 38000 sq. km. (14,670 sq. miles) of Indian Territory in Aksai Chin as well as another 5,180 sq. km. (2000 sq. miles) of Northern Kashmir that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963. The Karakoram highway, which connects China's Xinjiang region with Gilgit-Baltistan region, under Pakistan occupation, was constructed by both, Chinese and Pakistani engineers and was completed in 1986.

China is currently involved in several infrastructures in the disputed region. China and Pakistan signed a deal in 2006 to upgrade the Karakoram highway. Once the projects are completed, the transport capacity of this strategically significant region will increase significantly. The Karakoram highway will facilitate unfettered Chinese access to the oil-rich Gulf through the Pakistani port of Gwadar in Balochistan. During the visit of the Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari to China in August 2010 to China, he declared Kashgar as a Special Economic Zone like the Shenzhen. The announcement makes Kashgar in the north-west China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the sixth Special Economic Zone of China. Referring to the economic benefit that will accrue to China, the News of Pakistan reported on September 16, 2010,

“The Chinese will build Gwadar as a tax free industrial hub and network of roads and railways to China through the ancient Silk Route”.

An ambitious deal to build railways along the Khunjrab Pass has already been signed between Pakistan and China. The Chinese are more suited to develop the port and the network of rail and roads in Balochistan as they have experienced and muscle to work in the troublesome part of Pakistan. Welcoming the development an editorial in the newspaper the next day said,

¹⁶⁶ For detailed account see Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, Report May 2011, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi.

¹⁶⁷ Mohan Malik, (September 24, 2010) “China unveils the Kashmir Card”, China Brief, 10(19).

“There are a number of reasons, which would suggest that the Chinese may be more profitable partners for us at Gwadar. Not the least of these is the vast tonnage of shipping that they could be bringing in, the oil and gas terminals, they could develop and the potential for infrastructure development that would follow along. We have already inked an agreement with the Chinese for a feasibility study of a rail link roughly parallel to the Karakoram highway. It is by no stretch of imagination to see that the link running from Kashgar to Gwadar in next ten to 15 years. They are already working with us in Gilgit-Baltistan on upgrading the Karakoram highway to an all-weather highway, they are silent people and able to work in the sometimes difficult environment we present.”¹⁶⁸

During the visit of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani to China in May 2011, Pakistan claimed that China had accepted its request to take-over operations at the strategic Gwadar port as soon as the term of agreement with the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) expires. The request to take over the port was made during Prime Minister Gilani’s visit. Former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf had given the management and operation control of Gwadar port to the PSA in February 2007 for a period of 40 years. Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Chaudhary Ahamad Mukhtar in May 2011 said in Pakistan that Pakistan was grateful to the Chinese Government for the construction of the Gwadar port, and that Pakistan would be more grateful to the Chinese Government if a naval base was constructed at the site of Gwadar for Pakistan.¹⁶⁹ The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Ms. Jiang Yu, however, later said that she had not heard of the Pakistan Defence Minister’s offer of a Chinese Naval Base at the strategic Gwadar port.¹⁷⁰ The issue of overseas bases has recently raised a debate in the Chinese think-tanks and strategic communities.¹⁷¹

China and Pakistan, as mentioned above, are already working to strengthen the Karakoram highway to increase its operation in adverse weather condition. The highway is currently closed for around six months every year in winter. Kashgar is also known as the hotbed of Uighur separatists indulging in sporadic violence to press for their demands for an independent East Turkmenistan nation. China has been seeking both intelligence and military support from Pakistan to keep the Uighur separatists in check, and cut off their links with pro–

¹⁶⁸ Ruchika Talwar, (September 18, 2010) *“Print Line Pakistan”*, New Delhi: The Indian Express.

¹⁶⁹ *“China to take over Pak’s Gwadar Port”*, (May 23, 2011) New Delhi : The Asian Age.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ananth Krishnan, (2 June 2011) *“Neighbours Concern prompts debate in China on overseas bases”*, New Delhi: The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2068728.ece>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

Taliban forces. China and Pakistan have devised anti-terrorism programmes under which Pakistani security forces push back Uighur fighters trying to cross the border to seek sanctuary in terrorist camps in Pakistan. China and Pakistan have held anti-terrorism exercise in 2004 and 2006. The third round of joint military exercise between both the countries was conducted in July 2010 to blow down on Islamic militant groups like East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM viewed as a pro-Al Qaeda militant group, is active in Xinjiang, the Chinese Muslim Uyghur majority province neighboring Pakistan, and the Chinese officials have protested that their squads are being trained the terrorist camps in Pak-Afghan border. In July 2010, China Daily quoting Dong Manyuan, an anti-terrorist expert at the China Institute of International Studies, said that

“The military exercise against terrorism may result in joint action on ground in future. There is also the possibility that the two countries might conduct joint military actions against ETIM terrorists along the China-Pak borders one day, as there is still room for more anti-terrorism cooperation between China and Pakistan in future”

Dong said further

“The issue of ETIM militants figured high during the visit of Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani to China during which China sought Pakistan support for a crackdown on the militant group.”¹⁷²

Hydro – Power Projects

During the visit of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari to China in August 2009 the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on construction of a hydro-power station at Bunji in Northern Areas, a move which is a matter of concern to India. India is of the view that Pakistan cannot undertake any project in the territory under its illegal occupation. The MoU was part of over six Memoranda of Understanding signed during the visit of the Pakistani President to China. Besides this MoU on hydro power project, there were MoUs for cooperation in

¹⁷² K.J.M. Varma, (3 July 2010) *“China-Pak may contemplate joint-action against Terror Groups”*, DNA, http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_china-pak-maycontemplate-joint-action-against-terror-groups_1404803, accessed on December 31, 2012

education, fisheries, agriculture, dams and investment. However, the most important of them was the construction of the hydropower project on 'Build, Operate and Transfer' (BOT) basis, which means that all the investment would be made by Chinese entrepreneurs. The dam is estimated to cost between \$ 6-7 billion and will have a capacity to generate 7000 MW of electricity. During the visit, the Pakistani President also invited Chinese companies to bid for construction of over a dozen of small and medium sized dams in all the four provinces of Pakistan.

Development in PoK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)

While India all along has been wary of infrastructural development in the PoK region with the active support of China, a recent article by American journalist Selig S. Harrison in New York Times, quoting foreign intelligence sources, mentioned that Pakistan is quietly handing over de-facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in PoK to China. It reported that an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of China's PLA have already moved into this area to develop the railway system. Besides constructing the railway system, the article mentioned that the PLA men are extending the Karakoram Highway that was constructed to link China's Xinjiang province with Pakistan. Other PLA soldiers are working on dams, expressways and other projects.

It further mentioned that they (the PLA soldiers) are also constructing 22 tunnels in secret locations, where even the Pakistanis are not allowed to enter. It is being speculated that tunnels would be necessary for a projected gas pipeline from Iran to China that would cross the Karakoram through Gilgit. But they would also be used for storing missiles. They are also constructing a big residential complex that indicated that they would stay there permanently. Till now they are living in temporary accommodation.¹⁷³ China repudiated the fact contained in the article and held that landslides had cut off all links to Gilgit- Baltistan, making it difficult for the Government to ensure timely provision of the people's needs. Pakistan, therefore, sought urgent help from friendly countries, including China, whose engineers have the necessary experience, to repair the damage on this critically important highway. Harrison, however, stuck to his viewpoint.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Selig S. Harrison, (28 August, 2010) "*China's Discreet hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands*", New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/opinion/27iht-edharrison.html?_r=0, accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁷⁴ "*China's Presence in Pakistan*", (8 September 2010) Letter to the Editor, New York Times, accessed on 31st December 2012.

India has expressed its concern about the strategic nexus between China and Pakistan, on several occasions at various levels. In February 2011 in a talk in USA, Foreign Secretary Ms. Nirupama Rao said that the relationship between India and China

“Would be stronger when China shows more sensitivity on issues that impinge on our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Referring to China’s support to Pakistan’s nuclear ambition, she said that it was an area where India was “seeking more clarity and transparency” and “*welcomed an open discussion.*”¹⁷⁵

In an interview to the media, the former Chief of the Army staff of India, General V.K. Singh said that Pakistan is very closely allied to China.

“There are credible reports that, to further widen Karakoram Highway, some projects have been given to China. This has resulted in a fair number of Chinese coming in as workforce, along with security people who guard their camps. They have also been given inroads to what are termed as Northern areas. Also, projects have been given in Neelam Valley and near Mangla”,

he added. General Singh further said that China had plans to link Karakoram Highway to the main highways so that the trade up to Gwadar can move swiftly. They also want to develop Kashgar and Khotan further. There is a lot of activity in terms of infrastructure. According to him, in military terms they are significant and that India is keeping a watch on it. He, however, hoped that the responsible power status that China is seeking, they would factor in how they will be seen if they are to provide concrete assistance in case of military confrontation.¹⁷⁶ Pakistan never misses an opportunity to play the China card against India.

For example, when the two-day Siachen talks between India and Pakistan were held in New Delhi on May 30 and 31, 2011, Pakistan pushed for China to be represented during the negotiation on the ground that China controls the Shakshan Valley in the Siachen.

¹⁷⁵ “China should be more sensitive on Pak issues: Rao”,(14 February, 2011) New Delhi: Hindustan Times, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Americas/China-should-be-more-sensitive-on-Pak-issues-Rao/Article1-661995.aspx>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁷⁶ Interview of Manu Pubby with General V.K. Singh, “There is a logic to AFSPA. Once removed, it will be hard to re-impose”, (13 January 2012) Indian Express, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-there-is-a-logic-to-afspa-once-removed-itwill-be-hard-to-reimpose-/899068>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

Kashmiri Separatists and United Nation Security Council

Besides supplying arms and ammunitions, missiles, nuclear technology and developing infrastructure in the PoK, China has been extending open support to Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists through its opposition to the UN Security Council ban on the Jihadi organizations targeting India. Listing of terrorists and terrorist's organization under UNSC 1267¹⁷⁷ obliges countries to impose sanctions against them. China, which wields veto power in the UNSC, is empowered to block listings. India has been urging to impose sanctions against Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. China, however, has placed technical hold on the Indian request ostensibly on the ground that India did not provide sufficient information. According to a Wiki-leak revelation carried in The Hindu on June 7, 2011, the US State Department views China acting at the behest of Pakistan. There is also a perception that both China and Pakistan are cooperating in preventing India's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations' Security Council.

For example, when Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited China in September 2010 the Chinese President is reported to have told him that China will keep Pakistan informed about its plans for reforms in the UNSC.

The Stapled Visa Issue

The practice of issuing stapled visa to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir travelling to China, which the Chinese embassy in Delhi started from 2008 was yet another major irritant in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. In September 2010, China denied a visa to Lt Gen B.S. Jaswal, the GOC of the Indian Army's Northern Command for official talks in China on the grounds that he was commanding troops in disputed area.

The issue of the stapled visa was later discussed between the two countries at the highest level and the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi (India) issued proper visas to Indian journalists from Jammu and Kashmir, who accompanied the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh when he visited China in April 2011 to participate in the BRICS Summit in Sanya. In recent times, there is no report of stapled visas being given to Indian nationals from Jammu & Kashmir. This is suggestive of China's shifting of attitude. But there has been no official statement regarding this purposefully.

¹⁷⁷ Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and 1896 (2009) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/>

The reason being such an official statement will annoy Pakistan and secondly, it forecloses China's option of issuing stapled visas to Indian citizens of Jammu & Kashmir.

Sino-Pak Nuclear Deal

Yet another aspect of the comprehensive and strategic Sino-Pak relationship is the cooperation in the field of nuclear technology, which has grave security implications for India. China signed the first nuclear agreement with Pakistan in 1991 to supply a 300MW nuclear power plant at Chashma. The reactor was based on the first indigenous nuclear reactor developed by China at Qinshau, which became operational by 1993. The Chasma reactor became operational in 2000. China signed the second agreement with Pakistan after a gap of 13 years in May 2004, the year China joined the 46 member Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). Pakistan's penchant for nuclear energy picked up after 2005 when the Indo-US nuclear deal or the 123 agreement became a reality. Both China and Pakistan have been worried about growing economic, military and political ties between India and the US. It was in this backdrop that Pakistan claimed in October 2008 immediately after the visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China that China would assist Pakistan in building Chasma-3 and Chasma-4 reactors in Pakistan. As the NSG guideline stipulates that members can sell nuclear equipment and material only to countries that are party to Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or who accept full-scale safeguard, China was under obligation to obtain NSG's nod to supply two nuclear reactors to Pakistan.

On September 20, 2010, it was reported in the media that China's main nuclear energy corporation was in talks with Pakistan to build one Giga Watt atomic power plant in Pakistan. Qiu Jianguang, Vice President of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) said,

“Both sides are in discussion over CNNC's exporting a one Giga Watt nuclear plant to Pakistan and confirmed that the two countries have signed contracts to build number three and number four reactors of about 300 MW each in Chashma”.

It is worthwhile to mention that the Indo-US nuclear deal or the 123 Agreement was cleared by both, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the NSG. India also undertook to abide by its moratorium on nuclear testing, support international efforts to negotiate a verifiable Fissile Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), to implement rigorous export control norms and not to share enrichment and reprocessing technology with others. Thus, there are significant differences between the Indo-US Nuclear deal and the Sino-Pak nuclear deal. Defending the

nuclear deal with Pakistan, the deputy director-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament, Zhai Dequan said,

“Pakistan is also fighting a war on terror for the US as well as for itself and the country’s loss is greater than the US and other 12 coalition nations combined. The economic aid it has received is too little compared to its loss. Pakistan has an urgent need for more civil energy and that need should be looked after.”¹⁷⁸

The Sino-Pak nuclear issue came up for discussion before the NSG, which held its meeting at Christchurch, New Zealand on June 25, 2010, but it did not figure as an agenda item, especially after the numerous questions which China failed to provide clear answers to.

The IAEA gave its approval to a safeguard agreement that China is building at Chasma. The deal is perceived to be in contravention of China’s commitment as a member of the NSG, which bans the sale or transfer of technology to countries that have not signed Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although the deal was “inconsistent” with China’s energy commitments, the US reportedly defended the deal, linking it to acute energy requirement and instability in Pakistan.

The US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Robert Blacke told journalists in China that Pakistan was facing severe energy shortage in many parts of the country and that it was trying to help Pakistan to deal with these challenges.¹⁷⁹ Later in June, the NSG with acquiescence of the US approved China’s supply of two additional reactors to Pakistan in violation of its own NSG commitments. This is viewed by India’s foreign policy and strategic analysts as a blow to the country’s security interest.

According to Mr. Kanwal Sibal, a former Foreign Secretary,

“If China has got away with its NSG defiance; it is because the US has been unusually tolerant of China’s appalling proliferation record. China’s nuclear and missile proliferation activities primarily centered on Pakistan have deeply damaged India’s national security”.

The US has ignored the China-Pakistan proliferation nexus, to the point of covering it up in A.Q. Khan’s case even though India is most affected. China, in any case, has now become far

¹⁷⁸ “China may finance Pak reactors”, (23 June 2010) China Daily, at [http:// www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-06/23/content_10006302.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-06/23/content_10006302.htm), accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁷⁹ Ananth Krishnan, (March 20, 2011) “U.S. to give China a pass on NSG commitments for Pakistan nuclear deal”, The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article1554159.ece>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

too powerful to be forced to conform to codes of conduct established by the West.¹⁸⁰

The news about China's offer to build the giant nuclear plant in Pakistan has been a matter of concern for India. Foreign Secretary Ms. Nirupama Rao, while delivering a lecture at Harvard University said,

“We believe that the challenges of nuclear terrorism and nuclear security have to be addressed. We have been affected by clandestine nuclear proliferation in our neighbourhood. We are, naturally, concerned about the possibility of nuclear terrorism, given the security situation in our neighbourhood.”¹⁸¹

In the third week of March 2011, it was reported that the IAEA gave its approval to safeguard agreement for the two new reactors that China is building at Chasma (Pakistan).

While Pakistan's additional attainment of China's nuclear assistance to set up two more reactors will affect the balance of power with India at the same time in south Asian region, what is perplexing is the possibility of such nuclear capability falling into wrong hands, the non-state actors, and terrorists in particular. In the wake of Pakistan's earlier track record of secret supply of nuclear technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran, it is a matter of great concern to India that such fatal technology does not fall into the unwanted hands of undesired and harmful elements. India's point is that it is not opposed to Pakistan's genuine claim for energy, but it only wants the deal to be transparent, designed around a package of non-proliferation obligations. It is in the welfare of Indian region to alert both, the US and China about potential transfer of nuclear technology, which may be damaging to India's security issues and the regional stability.

In fact, India's Defence Minister A.K. Antony voiced his concern at the strategic nexus between China and Pakistan. Responding to a question after addressing the Unified Commander's Conference in New Delhi on May 20, 2011, he said,

“It is a matter of serious concern for us. The main thing is that we too will have to increase our military capabilities. That is the only answer”.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ “NSG Stamp for Sino-Pak pact Blow to India, Kanwal Sibal”, (July 12, 2011) Mail Today, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nsg-stamp-for-sino-pak-pact-a-blow-toindia/1/144445.html>.

¹⁸¹ “India concerned over new proliferation in neighbourhood”, (September 22, 2010) The Pioneer.

¹⁸² “China-Pak Strategic Nexus worries Antony”, (21 May 2011) The Times of India, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-21/india/29568390_1_nucleararsenal-antony-safe-havens, accessed on December 31, 2012.

According to security and intelligence officials, Pakistan has now acquired the capability to add eight to ten nuclear warheads to its weaponry every year. Pakistan's testing of surface-to-surface missiles meant for carrying small warheads has further confirmed the suspicion. According to Mr. S.D. Pradhan, India's former Chief of Intelligence Committee who has closely followed Pakistan's nuclear weapon program, Pakistan's desire for such weapons is one of the main reasons for the acceleration of its nuclear program.

“They are following the Chinese model of having low yield nuclear weapons. Pakistan believes these weapons will provide it a flexible response in case of an escalation with India and allow it to dominate” he said.

Officials and experts believe that Pakistan will use it only in case of any incursion made by Indian forces into Pakistani territory or what is known as India's cold start doctrine, which envisages that in the event of another Mumbai like terrorist attack, there is going to be real pressure on India to mount such an incursion and strike some of the terror camps. Indian officials reportedly said that the manner in which Pakistan has carried out work on the fourth reactor, of which there was no trace as late as 2009, suggest a constant supply of uranium and that this could only have been made possible by China. The official was quoted to have said,

“The cost involved is too high and then of course the amount of Uranium required. It's too much power for Pakistan to acquire without support from China.”¹⁸³

Terrorism: India and Sino-Pak

The issue of terrorism in South-Asia has added a new dimension to the complex triangular relationship between China, India, and Pakistan. The three countries – China, India and Pakistan, have been affected by terrorism. But, it is unfortunate that there is no common refrain among the three, although there has been a broader and general agreement about the menace of terrorism.

While India has been a victim of terrorism, aided and abated from across the border, the Afghan-Pak region has been a target of terrorism for the last ten years since the ouster of Mullah

¹⁸³ Sachin Parashar, (19 May 2011) *“Pak following China model of low-yield nuclear weapons”*, Times of India, <http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=TOINEW&BaseHref=CAP/2011/05/19&PageLabel=1&EntityId=Ar00104&ViewMode=HTML&GZ=T>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

Omar's regime. The killing of Osama bin Laden, the fountainhead of international terrorism, who masterminded the twin-tower attack on November 9, 2001, on Pakistani soil is the vindication of India's consistent position that Pakistan has been the breeding ground of terrorism, which has affected India a great deal. It is in this backdrop that India has been sensitising the international community for long to fight against the menace of terrorism.

India has also been impressing China to exert its clout on Pakistan, its 'all-weather friend'. China's response, however, has not been very encouraging or at best been lukewarm or rhetorical. True, China condemned the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, but China's response to terrorists attack on Mumbai in 2008, aided and abated by China has been muted.

When the Chinese journalists asked the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu if China would, in the wake of Bin Laden's killing, back India's efforts to take to justice the committers of the Mumbai attacks, she said,

“China will continue to firmly support Pakistan's formulating and implementing an anti-terrorist strategy based on national conditions”

and avoided any direct answer to the question¹⁸⁴. China's empathy with Pakistan in the context of the latter's estrangement with the US was very much evident in Jiang's statement that China will further support Pakistan's efforts to combat terrorism and that Pakistan has been at the forefront of the international fight against terrorism, and its Government has been dedicated to the cause.

In yet another report, the China Daily said,

“The US military assault that killed Osama bin Laden at his headway in Pakistan will inevitably alter Washington's approach to Pakistan and India may stand to gain”.

The report further added,

“...but with bin Laden's death fuelling doubts about the viability of the US-Pakistan relationship and removing the original reason for American

¹⁸⁴ Ananth Krishnan, (4 May 2011) *“China strongly backs Pakistan”*, The Hindu, New Delhi, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-strongly-backspakistan/article1988200.ece>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

military involvement in Afghanistan, Washington’s primary focus may shift back to India’s the region’s economic and political heavyweight.”

Quoting Karl Inderfurth, a former assistant secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the report mentioned,

“This further encourages closer US-Indian collaboration, intelligence sharing and cooperation in finding ways to work with India to address regional stability issues writ large”.¹⁸⁵

Obliquely acknowledging elements of strategic autonomy in India’s foreign policy, the report added,

“But India’s ability to benefit from strains in the US-Pakistan relationship may also be limited. While New Delhi’s ties with Washington are generally smoother than those of Pakistan, the limits of the relationship were made clear when India rejected bids from American companies for an \$11 billion jet fighter deal last month despite Obama’s personal lobbying during a trip last year”.

The report concluded with a statement attributed to Stephen Cohen, an expert on India at the Brookings, which said,

“Senior levels of the Indian Government no longer take pleasure in Pakistani agony. They know that if the Pakistani house burns down, the spark will blow over to India”.

India and China in their bilateral and trilateral meetings like the Russia-Sino-India (RIC) have discussed terrorism in very general terms. According to a Chinese expert on India, Zhang Li,

“The terrorist scourge in this region, as widely recognized, is entangled with protracted Indo-Pakistan rivalry and the Kashmir imbroglio in particular. Until recent years the complexity of the issue has limited China’s response towards the challenge that India has had to confront”.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ “India Could Benefit from US-Pak strains”, (5 May 2011) China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/binLadendead/2011-05/05/content_12448513.htm, accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁸⁶ Zhiang Li, (September 2010,) “China-India Relations: Strategic Engagement and Challenges”, Aie. Vision 34, p21. <http://www.ifri.org/?page=contributiondetail&id=6223&lang=uk>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

It may be mentioned that in the Kargil conflict of 1999 and the 2002 armed standoff between India and Pakistan, China restrained from the traditional side-taking posturing and played a constructive role in defusing the tensions, helping to avoid an all-out war. But India expects China to show sensitivity to India's concerns and given China's clout over Pakistan, the former can certainly exert its influence on the latter.

China's stand real or tactical

In recent years, particularly after coming to terms with the Indo-US nuclear deal, China has been extending the olive branch to India to improve relationship with Pakistan. Similarly it has been prodding Pakistan to mend its relationship with US and India. Pakistan has also been showing interest to improve its relationship with India. In early 2008, immediately after winning elections in Pakistan, President Asaf Ali Zardari said, **“Pakistan and India should develop trade first before solving the Kashmir dispute”**, and that the two should leave controversies behind to the next generation.

Commenting on the emerging thaw between India and Pakistan, a Chinese scholar Cai Jiahua wrote,

“As neighbours of South Asian countries, China is pleased to see that Indo-Pak relations have improved and are gradually moving from confrontation to dialogue, which run parallel with the Chinese foreign policy of building friendly relations and partnership with neighbours”, and **“fostering an amicable, secure and prosperous neighbourly environment”** towards its peripheral countries.¹⁸⁷

Continuing its support to the India-Pakistan thaw, China supported the India-Pakistan foreign secretary level talks held in February 2010 after a 14-month hiatus in bilateral relations. These talks had been suspended following the Mumbai terrorist attack. Commenting on the development, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Qingng said

“We are delighted to know that foreign secretary level consultations between India and Pakistan has taken place. We hope the

¹⁸⁷ Cai Jiahua, (2008) *“India Pakistan are moving from confrontation to dialogue”*, International Strategic Studies, Beijing, (4), p. 6.

dialogue and consultation between them can make substantive results and we also hope momentum of such dialogue and cooperation can be kept.”¹⁸⁸

China reiterated its overture to India to rebalance its ties with India vis-à-vis Pakistan in June 2011. This was articulated by Qu Xing, a member of the influential Foreign Policy Advisory Group (FPAG), which provides input to the Chinese Government on foreign policy issues. While briefing the media on foreign policy priorities for the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-15), Mr. Xing, who is also the President of the China Institute of International Studies said,

“China indeed has a closer cooperation with Pakistan than with India. However, improvement in the bilateral relationship between China and India, we sincerely hope that we can take the relationship forward to make a better relationship.”

The best solution,

“...is that we should try to have such kind cooperation (with India), equal to that of China and Pakistan”,

Indicating that China should try to restore “a balance” it struck in relations with both the countries in the 1950s. **“While pursuing the further development of friendship with Pakistan, we are also working actively to promote friendship between China and India”,** added Ma Zhenggang, a former ambassador to the United Kingdom, **“To be frank, the Chinese people do not wish to see suspicion between India and Pakistan concerning China’s relation between either countries.”¹⁸⁹**

China’s support for Indo-Pak cooperation and friendship received a fresh impetus when President Asif Ali Zardari paid a private visit to India in April 2012 to offer his prayers at the shrine of the revered Khwaja Naimuddin Chisti’s *dargah* (mausoleum) at Ajmer.

Echoing the sentiment of President Zardari that the Sino-India model of bilateral trade notwithstanding, the border issue could help improve the relationship between India and Pakistan, China said that it was **“happy to witness continuous improvement of India-Pakistan ties.”** The two countries’ efforts in warming of their ties certainly are welcomed and applauded by the international community, including China, which neighbours both the nations and

¹⁸⁸ “*Indo-Pak talks will yield results: China*”, (February 20, 2010) New Delhi: The Pioneer.

¹⁸⁹ Ananth Krishnan, (25 June, 2011) “*China rebalance ties with India, Pakistan*”, New Delhi :The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2132123.ece>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

maintains significant ties with them, said the commentary by Yu Zhixiao, a commentator for the Xinhua News Agency.¹⁹⁰

If approaches to study of international politics and more particularly to the study of bilateral relationship between two countries can broadly be categorised as realist and liberal intuitionist, advocates of CBMS like defence cooperation and military engagement can be put in the category of the latter nomenclature. Liberal intuitionists as distinguished from the realists, point out that international cooperation is not only possible but also highly desirable because it reduces transaction costs and makes interstate relations more predictable¹⁹¹.

There exists, what may be called, a persistent security dilemma between India and China.¹⁹² Although, there have been no major conflicts between the countries after 1962, there have been reports of border incursions from time to time, and tension has also built up across the border. In the post-1962 period, and after the restoration of the diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1976, the relationship between the two reached its nadir when the Sumdorong Chu incident took place in 1986. This incident brought the two countries almost to the brink of war, which in turn impelled the two sides to explore ways and means for defence cooperation and military engagement.

It is in this backdrop that it is significant to revisit the working of the CBMs between India and China in the field of defence cooperation and military engagement particularly at a time when there is, as mentioned earlier, a security dilemma and some degree of trust deficit between the two countries, which can be discerned from the bolstering of defence capabilities of both the countries.

¹⁹⁰ Ananth Krishnan, (April 9, 2012) “China ‘happy’ to see improved New Delhi-Islamabad relations”, The Hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/chinahappy-to-see-improved-new-delhiislamabad-relations/article3293952.ece>, accessed on December 31, 2012.

¹⁹¹ Robert O. Keohan, (1986) (ed.), “*Neorealism and Its Critics*”, New York: Columbia University Press.

¹⁹² Jonathan Holslag, (December, 2009) “*The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India*”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(6), pp. 811-840.

Chapter-7

Political Initiatives to Resolve Conflict in Border Areas

Last sixty years India and China have tried for solve their border disputes. Difficulties of the one is, in this friendly relation is 'so called' historical facts of border disputes. As far as the Chinese are worried any paper produced by India, such as the 1690s treaties between Tibet and Ladakh or the 1842 treaty between Tibet and Kashmir , refuse to accept on the grounds that Tibet had no right to sign any treaty as it was not independent. The Chinese policymakers compare these treaties equally to the 1914 Shimla Convention. This approach begs to ask the question as to how Tibet was so daring as to sign these treaties if it was really under Chinese control. In fact from 1914 to 1950 Tibet was an independent state, the Chinese having no control or presence over its governance (See the Map No. 3.1 & 3.3).

Both the countries have a number of territorial disputes along their roughly 4,000 kilometer-long border. Some of the disputed areas border the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and are geographically significant, with Tibetan refugees and the Tibetan government-in-exile (Central Tibetan Administration) in the neighboring Himachal Pradesh state. This Chapter discusses how the main territorial disputes have challenged Sino-Indian relations and resolved the border conflict.

Sino-Indian relations and territorial issues start with India's independence in 1947 and the People's Republic of China established in 1949, when both countries needed to reassess their roles, especially under the light of the Cold War, and saw a redefining of relations. After establishing diplomatic relations in 1950, a central component of border relations was Tibet. China and India signed the five principles of peaceful coexistence/Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, which lasted for eight years. Minor clashes occurred from the mid-1950s, and in 1959, Tibetan refugees settled in Himachal Pradesh to the north of India (south of Jammu and Kashmir), and China found this an encroachment of territory.

Conflicts culminated in the 1962 border war that changed the political landscape – China taking control of much of the disputed territories to the west, and India gaining control of the Arunachal Pradesh region to the east in 1987. Sino-Indian relations deteriorated further in 1960 and 1970 with China supporting Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, India signing a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1971, and skirmishes occurring between China and India in 1967 (Chola Incident)¹⁹³ in Sikkim and 1987 in Arunachal Pradesh. Map showing the entire region before and after 1962 Sino-India War;



Map 7.1. Before & after 1962 Sino-India War

Source: The Economist.

Bilateral relations have improved since the 1980s, with eight rounds of border negotiations occurring between 1981 and 1987 (though without concrete agreements achieved) and dialogue through the Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on the border issue between 1988 and 1993, and a border agreement signed in 1993. In recent years, however, the disputes continue to affect bilateral relations and seem far from resolution. Below, the following tables summarize the major disputed territories, divided into the western and eastern areas.

Table 7.1. *Western Disputes Territory*

¹⁹³ The 1967 Sino-Indian skirmish also known as the *Chola incident*, was a military conflict between Indian troops and Chinese People's Liberation Army who had infiltrated on 1st October, 1967 in Sikkim, then a protectorate of India. On 10 October, once again both sides had the conflict, the Defence Minister of India, Sardar Swaran Singh addressed that Government is looking after the developments across the borders. During whole conflict Indian losses were 88 killed, and 163 wounded, while Chinese casualties were 300 killed and 450 wounded in Nathula, and 40 in Chola. The end of the battle saw the Chinese Army leave Sikkim. Sikkim became an Indian state in 1975, which was not recognized by China. In 2003, China recognized Sikkim as an Indian state, on the condition that India accepted Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China. This mutual agreement led to a thaw in Sino-Indian relations.

Western Disputes Territory (West of Tibet Autonomous Region)			
	Axsai Chin	Jammu and Kashmir	Shaksgam Valley and Trans-Karakoram Tract
Claim	PRC, India	PRC, India, Pakistan	PRC, India
Current Administration	PRC's XUAR	India (Indian State with autonomy and own constitution)	PRC's XUAR
Notable Conflicts	<p>1962: Sino-India Border Conflicts</p> <p>1967: Chola Incident</p> <p>2014 : PRC Troops seize Some areas (Chumar Daulat beg Oldi Sector)</p>	<p>1947: India-Pakistan War (First Kashmir War), UN ceasefire and Line Of Control established</p> <p>1965: India-Pakistan War(Second Kashmir War), UN ceasefire</p> <p>1971-72: India-Pakistan War(Third Kashmir War), Bangladesh created</p> <p>1999: India- Pakistan War Also Known as Kargil War</p>	<p>1963: Sino- Pakistani Border Agreement (Pakistan Ceded Control to China)</p>

Table 7.2. Eastern Disputed Territory

Eastern Disputed Territory (South of Tibet Autonomous Region)	
Arunachal Pradesh	
Claim	PRC (Part of Tibet), China, India
Geopolitical Significance	Forests, Agriculture, Proximity to Tibet (home to Tawang Buddhist Monastery)
Current Administration	India (Indian Statehood in 1987)
Conflicts and Developments	<p>1914: McMahon Line drawn under Shimla Accord, not accepted by China</p> <p>1950: India affirmed McMahon Line boundary</p> <p>1962: Sino-India Border Conflict (area under India Control)</p>

	<p>1986-87: India gave Statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, India and China sent troops to the region</p> <p>2006: China referred to the area as “South Tibet”</p> <p>2009-10: China sought to block India’s Asia Development Bank (ADB) Loan</p>
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The Jammu and Kashmir dispute is predominantly an Indo-Pakistani conflict that has seen open conflict over the decades. The issue has affected Sino-Indian relations and Sino-Indian-Pakistani relations, and China has supported Pakistan’s claims. India reportedly declared Jammu and Kashmir as well as Arunachal Pradesh to be within its “core” interests in December 2010 during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India.

Foreign Policy of NDA Government

Since its inception, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has projected itself as a nationalist party that promises the ‘vigorous’ pursuit of India’s national interests and one that seeks a more assertive role for India in the international system as befits ‘It’s great and ancient civilisation’. Nationalist overtones characterise all aspects of the party’s discourse. While populist slogans such as “**Shaktishali Bharat ke liye Shaktishali BJP**”¹⁹⁴ (A strong BJP for a powerful India) may not serve as accurate indicators of policy positions, they do point to an explicit consensus from the party’s brain to its grassroots **karyakartas**¹⁹⁵ on the ideology of nationalism as the guiding principle of the party.

It is this consensus that forms the backbone of much of the BJP’s foreign policy thinking. Nationalism, in the context of foreign policy, essentially equates to an explicit emphasis on national security issues and territorial integrity. Thus, it can be argued that there is remarkable continuity in the BJP’s foreign policy, especially with regard to China. China as a factor looms large in India’s strategic calculations. The psychological ramifications of India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the unresolved border dispute continue to challenge the Indian

¹⁹⁴ “BJP Vision Document 2004”, http://www.bjp.org/Press/mar_3104a.htm

¹⁹⁵ Party Workers

policymaker in crafting a credible China policy. It is relatively easy to judge the strategic stance of a nationalist government against a weak state like Pakistan.

BJP in Opposition: UPA Regime

Hence, what emerges from the above deposition is that a conventional foreign policy actor, no matter how nationalist, will find itself acting in a limited geopolitical space. Nonetheless, there are signs that the BJP has learnt from historical experience and is evolving a coherent China policy in the post-2004 milieu as it finds itself sitting in the opposition against the Congress (I)-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). Perhaps the most detailed and contemporary exposition of the BJP's strategic thought on China can be found in a document on foreign policy and national security, released by the party's National Executive in June 2008. Unlike in 2003, the BJP takes a hard line on Tibet and asserts that "India's security is inextricably entwined with what happens in Tibet"¹⁹⁶ and that the "Government of India must come out clearly on the side of the people of Tibet in this hour of their oppression and trial."¹⁹⁷ What "come out clearly" actually entails, is left to the imagination, but it seems clear that the BJP intends to use the "Tibet card" on China one way or the other.

In fact, the BJP has been particularly vociferous in attacking the incumbent stance as "blatant appeasement towards China"¹⁹⁸. This ratcheting up of rhetoric took place in the context of a popular uprising in Tibet of March 2008 that was quelled in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

The BJP even led a walk-out of the *Lok Sabha* to protest against the "hesitation of the Government of India to condemn the violence in Lhasa"¹⁹⁹. While the BJP's criticism of the ruling UPA in this circumstance is valid, a certain hypocrisy robs this critique of its full impact. As is aforementioned, it was Vajpayee who bartered away India's prime diplomatic trump card

¹⁹⁶ "BJP National Executive- Foreign Policy-National Security and UPA's Disastrous Governance" http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm Accessed Date 27/04/2015

¹⁹⁷ "BJP National Executive- Foreign Policy-National Security and UPA's Disastrous Governance" http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm Accessed Date 27/04/2015

¹⁹⁸ "BJP slams govt's appeasement of China" (27th March 2008), <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2902634.cms> Accessed Date 27/04/2015

¹⁹⁹ "Foreign minister says no change in China policy, BJP walks out" (March 17, 2008) <http://www.nerve.in/news:253500135615> Accessed Date 27/04/2015

by recognising Tibet as “an inalienable part of China”²⁰⁰ in exchange for paltry concessions on Sikkim on his 2003 visit to Beijing. Vajpayee’s ‘one China policy’ ended decades of useful ambiguity on the issue. In any case, Tibet remains a central issue in Sino-Indian relations and necessitates a nuanced approach from New Delhi. Arun Shourie, Disinvestment Minister in the BJP-led NDA Government is emblematic of the increasing maturity in the BJP’s policy discourse on China. He has encouraged his fellow politicians to “wake up to China’s ambitions and to Tibet as a potential trouble spot.”²⁰¹ To return to the foreign policy document, the party links the “long, unsettled border” to the warning that the “PRC will transform its newly acquired economic progress into military might.”²⁰² The BJP illustrates this using the examples of various high technology military assets being consolidated by the Chinese such as the upgrading of a missile base in Qinghai province “just 1900 km north east of New Delhi”²⁰³, the development of solid-fuel missiles and the creation of a new nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island. While the party is correct in drawing attention to these clear military threats to India’s security, what is worth mentioning here is that seemingly innocent, “infrastructural” developments can have equally lethal security implications. The train that traverses heights of 16,000 feet to connect Lhasa to China proper can carry tourists, no doubt, but men and material for the PLA as well. The BJP document failed to address this aspect.

Yet, the central point retains focus. By placing the border dispute in the “context” of China’s military modernization, the BJP quite clearly envisages a situation in which China’s unceasing investment in force projection may result in an outcome detrimental to India’s territorial interests.

Hence, while working towards a meaningful final settlement, the centre should speed up the construction of defence infrastructure “that our forces need to repulse foreign troops in the Northeast.”²⁰⁴ However, it would be in the interest of the BJP to adopt a more holistic vision for the Northeast’s future rather than one that is purely motivated by defence concerns. A more

²⁰⁰ “India, China ink two agreements” (June 24, 2003) Rediff India Abroad, <http://ia.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/23china3.htm> Accessed Date 27/04/2015

²⁰¹ “India, China ink two agreements” (June 24, 2003) Rediff India Abroad, <http://ia.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/23china3.htm> Accessed Date 27/04/2015

²⁰² “BJP National Executive- Foreign Policy-National Security and UPA’s Disastrous Governance” http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm Accessed Date 27/04/2015

²⁰³ “BJP National Executive- Foreign Policy-National Security and UPA’s Disastrous Governance” http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm Accessed Date 27/04/2015

²⁰⁴ “BJP National Executive - Foreign Policy-National Security and UPA’s Disastrous Governance,” http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm. Accessed date 24/02/2014

sustainable approach to the Northeast dilemma necessitates a long-term investment in transport links that connect India's periphery to India proper and development projects that create stakes for Northeast Indians in India's economic progress. This will serve to end the extreme geopolitical isolation of the Northeast from the Indian state that began with the partition of the Subcontinent and continues to haunt Indian strategists 60 years on.

In fact, this is the precise thesis propounded by Kiren Rijiju, the BJP MP for Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese claim Arunachal Pradesh in its entirety. Rijiju provides a simple and effective panacea to the Northeast dilemma: "Don't fear China, just do your job. Help the people of border areas with roads, schools, hospitals, telecom facilities. This is the solution."²⁰⁵

As a further matter, Rijiju's assertions that "**Chinese intrusions are happening in a slow, creeping manner. Inch by inch...**"²⁰⁶ are a direct challenge to the Army Chief of Staff, General Deepak Kapoor's position in accordance with reason of the incursions by chalking them up to "**different perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC)**"²⁰⁷. Jaswant Singh, the leader of the opposition in the Rajya Sabha termed Gen. Kapoor's statements "**irresponsible**" and "**unacceptable**"²⁰⁸. Indeed, the BJP alleges that this disconnect is part of the UPA's overall pusillanimity on China. It cites a catalogue of diplomatic blunders such as the failure to adequately react to "**such extreme diplomatic snubs as summoning our Ambassador at 2 a.m.**"²⁰⁹, and the "craven" response to China's audacious claims over Arunachal Pradesh.

Hence, the BJP advances the argument that the lack of an appropriate response to China's military and diplomatic aggression "endangers India - for it tempts China."²¹⁰ Crucially though, Rijiju makes an important point about the prevailing foreign policy orientation of India's security establishment.

²⁰⁵ "It is time to wake up to Chinese incursions," (March 4, 2008) *Rediff.com*, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/04inter1.htm>. Accessed date 24/02/2014

²⁰⁶ "It is time to wake up to Chinese incursions," (March 4, 2008) *Rediff.com*, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/04inter1.htm>. Accessed date 24/02/2014

²⁰⁷ "Chinese incursions due to different perception,"(February 23, 2008) *The Indian Express*, <http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/Chineseincursions-due-to-different-perception-India/276320/>. Accessed date 24/02/2014

²⁰⁸ "Army chief made irresponsible statements,"(March 9, 2008) <http://www.businessstandard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=316165> Accessed date 24/02/2014

²⁰⁹ "BJP National Executive - Foreign Policy-National Security and UPA's Disastrous Governance," http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm. Accessed date 24/02/2014

²¹⁰ "BJP National Executive - Foreign Policy-National Security and UPA's Disastrous Governance," http://www.bjp.org/Press/june_2008/june_0208_p.htm. Accessed date 24/02/2014

Rijju argues that

“All the brains of the Ministry of External Affairs and the think tanks in India are obsessed with...Pakistan.”²¹¹

The Kashmir dispute with Pakistan takes up

“the energies of our politicians and our resources.”²¹²

Thus, it would seem that the Indian establishment is suffering from the same limited, Pak-centric strategic outlook that characterised the Jana Sangh’s foreign policy discourse in the 1960s. Rijju asserts the following,

“Don’t forget that Kashmir is claimed by a small country which does not economically or militarily match India, while Arunachal is claimed by a nation far superior to India.”²¹³ Thus, “unless we know what China is, India is not safe”²¹⁴

Today, however, even as much is made of the growing economic relationship between India and China, there are regular reports in the Indian press of Chinese “incursions” across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the two countries. Meanwhile, even on the economic front, the relationship has shown signs that things are increasingly unsatisfactory. For the Chinese, economic discontent has arisen because of the continued Indian reluctance to enter into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and discrimination against Chinese companies and investments on security grounds; and on the Indian side, there are apprehensions owing to the rather unbalanced nature of the relationship with India- exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods from the Chinese, the growing trade deficit and the opaque Chinese pricing and regulatory mechanisms. Thus, the two countries appear to be at a stage where the initial momentum of rediscovering and reestablishing contacts with each other that began in the 1990 and any goodwill or accommodation that ensued as a consequence – have run out. In the present context of their simultaneous rise economically and politically, and of the substantially changed

²¹¹ “It is time to wake up to Chinese incursions” (March 4, 2008)<http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/04inter1.htm> Accessed date 24/02/2014

²¹² “It is time to wake up to Chinese incursions” (March 4, 2008)<http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/04inter1.htm> Accessed date 24/02/2014

²¹³ “It is time to wake up to Chinese incursions” (March 4, 2008)<http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/04inter1.htm> Accessed date 24/02/2014

²¹⁴ “It is time to wake up to Chinese incursions” (March 4, 2008)<http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/mar/04inter1.htm> Accessed date 24/02/2014.

geopolitical environment post- 9/11, the two countries need to find new ways to both resolve their long-standing boundary dispute and to provide their relationship with the ballast necessary for cooperation towards sustained regional and global peace and stability.

BJP in Power: National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Era

It is with this strategic heritage, albeit a milder, more pragmatic version, with which the BJP sought to frame its China policy. Hence, a clear link can be drawn between the Jana Sangh's strategic thought on China and the BJP's China-specific policy in the six-year period that it governed India, leading the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). This point is illustrated by multiple nuclear tests conducted by the BJP in 1998. In the BJP's 1998 election manifesto, the party had expressed its concern at the People's Republic indulging in the transfer of "**advanced weapons and technologies**"²¹⁵ to Pakistan. While the manifesto refrains from openly using the term "nuclear," the implication is clear.

The BJP's foreign policy intent vis-à-vis China becomes all the more transparent when attention is focused on a televised interview of the NDA's Defence Minister, George Fernandes of the Samata Party. In polemical fashion, Fernandes termed China as India's "**potential threat number one**"²¹⁶. However, he imbued this statement with a certain strategic logic. He cited an upswing in Chinese military activity in the Indian Ocean as the harbinger of a containment strategy directed against India. This signaled a shift in India's threat perceptions and hence a concurrent shift in India's wider geo-strategy, especially her stance on nuclear weapons:

"Earlier nuclear weapons were not ruled out; today they have been ruled in."²¹⁷

This shift was made patent quite dramatically by the 1998 nuclear tests when India declared itself to be a nuclear weapons state. The tests were undoubtedly an exercise in jingoist chest-thumping and in pacifying bourgeois India's status aspirations. But, the rationale of overt nuclear weaponization lay in what Prime Minister Vajpayee termed as "**the deteriorating security environment**"²¹⁸ caused by China helping Pakistan to become a "**covert nuclear**

²¹⁵ The BJP's 1998 Manifesto, Chapter 7, <http://www.bjp.org/manifes/chap7.htm> , Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

²¹⁶ "China is enemy No. 1: George" (May 4, 1998) Express News Service, <http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19980504/12450024.html> Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

²¹⁷ "China is enemy No. 1: George" (May 4, 1998) Express News Service, <http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/ie/daily/19980504/12450024.html> Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

²¹⁸ Prime Minister Vajpayee's Letter to President Clinton <http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/pmletter.htm> Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

weapons state.²¹⁹ Vajpayee further labelled the “**unresolved border problem**”²²⁰ as contributing to the “**atmosphere of distress**” that was symptomatic of India’s relations with China. Thus, this retrospective justification alludes not only to the BJP’s recognition of China as a threat to national security, but to an undeniable ideological consistency in the formulation and implementation of China-focused policy as well.

Another major foreign policy initiative taken by the Vajpayee government was the visit of the Prime Minister to China in 2003. Displaying remarkable diplomatic naiveté, Vajpayee made a clear departure from traditional Indian ambiguity by recognizing “**Tibet Autonomous Region as an inalienable part of China**”²²¹ in exchange for China’s apparent recognition of Sikkim as an Indian state. There are two reasons why this proved to be an unsatisfactory *quid pro quo*. First, Vajpayee bartered away India’s prime diplomatic trump card on China and a useful ‘pressure point’ to push Beijing into granting territorial concessions.

As the home of the Tibetan government-in exile, India had tremendous political and moral grounds to take a line contrary to Chinese perceptions of Tibet. Second, despite this generous diplomatic gift to the Chinese, PRC skillfully avoid dealing with expectations of recognizing Sikkim as ‘**an inalienable part of India**’ in turn. Rather, the People Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to assert that Sikkim is “**an enduring issue left over from history**”²²². In another words, this was a “**diplomatic fiasco**” as was pointed out by the editor of *Organiser*, a publication allied to the BJP.

Boundary Negotiations

After the 1962 conflict, the first negotiations between India and China on their boundary dispute began in December 1981, following the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua to New Delhi. Talks continued until November 1987 but the final two years of this phase also saw tensions in the wake of India’s Operation Chequer board and establishment of the state of

²¹⁹ Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Letter to President Clinton <http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/pmletter.htm> Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

²²⁰ Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Letter to President Clinton <http://www.indianembassy.org/indusrel/pmletter.htm> Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

²²¹ G. Parthasarathy (July 18, 2003) “*Vajpayee visit — Foreign policy lessons from China*” (<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2003/07/18/stories/2003071800030800.htm>) Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

²²² G. Parthasarathy (July 18, 2003) “*Vajpayee visit — Foreign policy lessons from China*” (<http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2003/07/18/stories/2003071800030800.htm>) Accessed Date 27/02/2015.

Arunachal Pradesh. It take a new shape after the visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in December 1988 to regain talks and reach an agreement to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary disputes. The JWG had its first meeting in the December month and before June 1993 met five more times, resulting in the September 1993 done the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC in the India-China Border Areas. Regulations on the work of the India-China Diplomatic and Military Expert Group were agreed upon in 1994 and talks continued with the group meeting three times in 1995 and being tasked in the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas to assisting the JWG **“in devising implementation measures under the Agreement.”**²²³

The next major movement on the boundary negotiations came following the visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to China in June 2003, when the two sides agreed to appoint Special Representatives (SRs) to **“explore, from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship, the framework of a boundary settlement.”**²²⁴ In the April 2005 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary disputes²²⁵ soon followed, signed during the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to New Delhi.

In 2008, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visited to China, both sides, for the first time, expressed their own drafts on a possible agendas agreement involving territorial concessions as a way towards to resolution of the boundary dispute. While this may be interpreted as a forward movement, the positions themselves appear to specify little change.

Republic of India insisted that the final settlement of the boundary problem could not involve transfer of settled populations, while People Republic of China is believed to have proposed the division of populated areas into larger and smaller sectors based on population size

²²³ *“Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas”* (29 November 1996), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of China. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg/yzs/gjlb/2711/2712/t15914.htm> Accessed date 7/05/2014

²²⁴ , *“Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India”* (25 June 2006), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the People’s Republic of China. <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t22852.htm> Accessed Date 05/07/2014

²²⁵ *“Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question”* (11 April 2005), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. <http://mea.gov.in/treatiesagreement/2005/11ta1104200501.htm> Accessed Date 05/07/2014

and then considering some displacement. This Chinese position in influence, suggests a continuing claim to Tawang. India and China did agree to put the Tawang issue aside for the moment and to concentrate on areas where there is “**least disagreement**” but it appears that the SR mechanism has not succeeded in dropping differences or bridging gaps in perceptions in any significant manner. The most telling indication of this is surely in the fact that the SRs found it necessary to set up another working group to look at the two different drafts of the framework²²⁶ a process that adds one more, larger tier to the negotiation process with perhaps all its attendant delays and complications. This appears to suggest that the two sides have been unable to completely break free from their mutual suspicions, and are unable also to attempt new ways of dealing with the dispute.

In all, before the meeting of the SRs, eight rounds of border talks between India and China had been held between 1981 and 1987 and another fourteen meetings of the JWG between 1988 and 2003. For now, the SRs have held 14 rounds of talks so far, with the first taking place in October 2003 and the last in November 2010.

Resolving the Boundary Dispute

India and China have for great about time on the disputes of their common borders since the mid-fifties. The talks between the both sides through the fifties shaped no treaty and ultimately led to a war for the period of October-November 1962, ending with the defeat of the Indian Army arranged along the border in the western (Ladakh area) sector and the eastern (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh) sector. The Chinese government declared a ceasefire and take out beyond the Himalayan peak line with a some exceptions in the eastern sector, but sustained to occupy the area taken in the western sector (Ladakh area). Since then an anxious peaceful has existed along the India-China border interrupted by the strange armed clash.

Since before there was an interruption in any effort to treasure a solution to the Border problem and it was only in 1981 that a treaty to start official level talks was touched. After that talks at several levels and by several groups have sustained but with no seeming progress on the real settlement of the border dispute. On September 7, 1993, the both sides signed an agreement on maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control. Going on April 11, 2005 an additional treaty on the guiding principles for the settlement of the India-China

²²⁶ Pranab Dhal Samanta, (16 January 2008), “*Delhi, Beijing agree on roadmap to settle border,*” Indian Express <http://www.indianexpress.com/story/261973.html> Accessed Date 05/07/2014

boundary dispute was signed. In March 2006, at the finish of the meetings, the Indian National Security Advisor, M.K. Narayanan, the leader of this delegation, specified that

“It would take at least a couple of rounds to reach an agreement on the basis for a settlement.”

Borders were hardly ever clear either on maps or defined on the ground by a sequence of boundary posts as they are now. The many powerful empires, such as the Mauryan Empire after that the Mughal Empire, protracted well beyond what may call the geographical boundaries of the Indian subcontinent. Both empires protracted beyond the Himalaya to included huge parts of Afghanistan. Similarly the Cholas of South India, at one stage acquired control of a sum of strategic places on the Straits of Malacca.²²⁷ Parallel was the situation with most parts of the world, with China, with borders between countries changing as one country grew more powerful or less powerful. The Conference of Vienna in 1815 which meet after the Napoleonic Battles that the first time well-defined boundaries of several European states as well as their colonial possessions. In fact it was the growing of colonial properties that led to a wave of boundaries being clear on maps and demarcated on the ground to identify areas occupied by each of them.

The succeeding progress was when a big and strong Chinese force occupied Tibet, the then Dalai Lama run-away to India (1959). The Chinese forces also focused in the neighbourhood of Sikkim and close to Rima’s area on the Indo-Burma border. This awakened the British to the risk of Tibet fully underneath in Chinese control and the essential to define and demarcate a definite boundary in this area. A series of trips and surveys were conducted between 1911 to 1913, which give to reports and maps, wherefrom the Himalayan crisis area was found, which in turn controlled to the defining of the McMahon Line.

While all these matter was going on, the Manchu dynasty in China was defeated in October 1911 and a Republic of China was proclaimed. The Chinese incursion of Tibet collapsed. The Tibetans revolted and throw out the Chinese forces, some of whom escaped into India. Sun Yat Sen, the new President of China on one hand stated that Tibet, Mongolia and Sinkiang were equal to provinces of China and thus an essential part of the country; at that same

²²⁷ The Strait of Malacca is a narrow, about 805 km (500 mi) stretch of water between the Malay Peninsula (Peninsular Malaysia) and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. It is named after the Malacca Sultanate that ruled over the archipelago between 1414 and 1511.

time he realized that Tibet could not be appeased till the Dalai Lama came back and so invited the Dalai Lama to return with full honor. The Dalai Lama returned in January 1913, rejected to Chinese suzerainty and declared Tibet an independent state.

Tibet, as an independent state or as a full-fledged province of China, was not acceptable to the British. They were better-off with the previous preparation of a Tibet with a unlimited deal of independence but under control Chinese suzerainty. It was below these conditions that the British assembled the Shimla Conference in 1913-14. The British purpose was to divide Tibet into an inner and outer Tibet, as had previously done in the case of Mongolia. Inner Tibet would be completely under Chinese control, outer Tibet would be under the Chinese suzerainty but functionally autonomous under the Dalai Lama. The Chinese firstly objected to the manifestation of a Tibetan representative at this conference, but finally relented.

No treaty was reached despite more conversation. To break the impasse, Sir Henry McMahon, the British delegation leader, produced a map which defined the borders of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet. The Chinese delegate leader, Ivan Chen after stating that India was not authorised to discuss Tibet borders with India, ultimately signed the document. The Chinese denial of this agreement was only in relation to the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet and not between Tibet and India. In fact the Chinese recognized the concept of Inner and Outer Tibet and Tibetan self-sufficiency as evident by the memorandum given by the Chinese foreign minister to the British foreign minister in Peking on 30 May 1919. Where he states,

“In the past the Chinese government has treated Mongolia and Tibet in the same manner. Outer Mongolia has already been permitted to enjoy autonomy; it follows that no opposition will be placed in the way of Tibetan autonomy.”²²⁸

Though, the escape of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959 and India giving asylum to him upraised Chinese diseases. This, joint with the boundary dispute in the western sector, led to the Chinese claiming the area south of the McMahon Line up to the plains. They, still, have not been able to influentially explain the basis of their claim. It seems to have been more of a pressure tactic to force India to give up its claim on the western sector. In the 1962 war the Chinese were

²²⁸ Lt Col D.K. Banerjee, (1992) *“Sino-Indian Border Dispute”*, New Delhi: International Publishing House, p. 108.

able to progress up to their claim lines but then evacuated the areas and returned beyond the border.

While this specifies that they had no thoughtful resolved of occupying the area, there were also good military motives for the pull back. In the winter time the passes on the watershed would close and they could not have sustained their troops positioned south of it. The present position is that the Chinese are generally north of the watershed, except in some locations where there is a dispute on the actual arrangement of the watershed himself.

There is also the Chinese feeling to renounce any agreements and treaties signed by former Chinese governments. In September 1949 there was a announcement on reexamination of former treaties '**concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments**'²²⁹. On March 8, 1963, this was additional expanded and the Kuomintang was replaced by the phrase, '**former Chinese Governments**', thus expanding the possibility of renouncing agreements even more.

There has frequently been talk of a realistic solution to the Sino-Indian boundary disputes which contains the Chinese giving all claim to the regions in the east and in yield India giving up its assertion to the Aksai Chin region. While this solution looking attractive, it is unfair. The Chinese are creating no concessions, they allow to this area which was never theirs, to increase another to which their claim, at best, is tenuous. It becomes even more unbalanced if India is expected to surrender all that the Chinese claim in Ladakh, which is much more than just the Aksai Chin. The ceding of such a large portion of territory which the people of India have been controlled to believe is theirs, is unlikely to have comprehensive political or public support. Public support is essential in a democracy, particularly when it includes border territory.

Achievements of the Border Negotiations

After the 1980, the Sino-India border talks have experienced three stages, with every stage covering roughly one decade. The first stage covered the 1980 culminated in Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988. The second stage started the 1990 and ended with India's nuclear tests in 1998; and the third stage covered the past 10 years marked with Indian President Pratibha Devi Singh Patil's China trip during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of Sino-India diplomatic relations in May 2010.

²²⁹ ibid

Border Dialogues Between India and China

In 1980s the eight-round border talks took place in the period from aggression to detente in the India-China relations. The talks clearly eased the tensions in countries bilateral relations and resulted in treaty on the disagreements. These talks reassured both country of pressing too hard on matters of substance while procedural difference seemed to be employed as reason for no-progress. This proposes that neither government found it urgent to solve the border dispute in the 1980s. India and China hoped to decrease tensions and steady and improve bilateral relations, but they realized it early to proceed to resolve their border disputes.

In 1988 India China summit was the first meeting of the leaders of the both countries in 28 years since Chinese premier Zhou Enlai's visit to India in 1960. Rajiv Gandhi's Beijing visit in December 1988 escorted in a new age of India-China relationship. With the agreement prevailing in the world during the last years of the Cold War, Indian diplomacy missing the pivot of India-Russia strategic partnership while China's diplomacy gone the pillar of China-US cooperation. India and China suddenly start that they needed to re-orient their relations within the framework of the changed world power structure. The five principles of peaceful co-existence again became the common base of their relation reorientation.

In his introductory address on December 31, 1984, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi worried the continuance of a non-alignment policy and stated his wish to improve relations with neighboring countries.²³⁰

Chinese president Huang Hua's India's visit was marked by the agreement to open talks on the border dispute and the improvement of India China relations. There followed eight rounds of India China meetings as an official channel of the India- China dialogue on the border dispute.

China's plan on the eight-round border talks covered two main aspects. One was the insist on a package agreement, and the second was to improve their bilateral relations in other fields with the border dispute being deferred. During his meeting with Krishna Kumar, the editor of *Vikrant*, on June 21, 1980, Deng Xiaoping changed the "package" approach on the border dispute. Deng stated that China would be ready to accept the watershed principle in the eastern sector in exchange for India's rejection of claims to Axsai Chin. In another words, both sides

²³⁰ Xuecheng Liu (June 2010) *Revisit Sino-Indian Border Dispute*, China Institute of International Studies, No.3, Toutiao, Taijichang, Beijing www.ciis.com

should approve to accept the current line of actual control as their boundary. During his meeting with Indian foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in February 1979, Deng said that

“We shall seek common ground while reserving our differences. We can solve the boundary question through peaceful consultation. This question should not prevent us from improving our relations in other field”.²³¹

Republic of India maintained on sector-by-sector negotiations and declined People Republic of China’s package deal and both sides failed to thin their differences during the eight rounds of talks. Though, all the ideologies and concerns put on the table by both sides founded some jointly acceptable principles for essential discussions on the border disputes. Both sides carefully inched forward without getting bogged down in opposing interpretations.

At the eighth round border talk held on November 14 to 17, 1986 in New Delhi, India gave up its situation of **“boundary settlement or nothing.”** People Republic of China had accepted the approach of the sector-by-sector evaluation within the framework of inclusive settlement in 1986. Both country agreed that undecided a settlement of the border issue, the both governments should improve friendly relations and make stronger cooperation in other fields. India and China agreed that peace and tranquility should be maintained all along the border. Both sides were ready for Rajiv Gandhi’s Visit to China. Seemingly, the stage was set for raising the border dispute dialogue to the political level.

The eight rounds talk on the border dispute in the 1980s displayed that India’s policy on the border talks different first from **“non-negotiation to negotiation”**, and then from **“boundary settlement or nothing”** to total development in all fields. India-China dialogue of the 1980 substituted India-China Detente for their hostility.

Rajiv Gandhi’s visited represented the general tendency of transition from hostility and confrontation to detente and dialogue. The 1988 meeting also marked a departure from the earlier approach, political settlement approach relieved for the legalistic approach. Both sides reduced their stress on historical papers and attentive instead on their respective security interests by attaching importance to joint bargaining and joint understanding.

²³¹ ibid

Beginning the 2012, a month after India and China held the fifteenth round of border talks, a comment in a Chinese newspaper asked India's claims on Kashmir (Axsai chin) and asserted that the only dispute was over the position of Arunachal Pradesh. The Communist Party-run Jiefang Daily, or Liberation Daily newspaper said

“The disputed western section of the border including the Axsai Chin region, which is now under China's control — was not part of the dispute”,

Underlining how far apart both countries' positions continued even after 15 rounds of border talk.

The Chinese Jiefang Daily newspaper said,

“The Indian side believes that the border dispute between China and India covers not only the eastern region of 90,000 sq km but also the western region of 30,000 sq km and the western region is India's too. This wrong argument, which totally disregards the history, still has supporters in India.”²³²

At that time the India's National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo, the two Special Representatives in New Delhi, discussed a framework for the settlement of disputes in all three sectors — western, middle and eastern. This was in caring with the 2005 agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles, which obvious the ending of the first of three stages of negotiations.

According to Article III of the 2005 agreement between India and China, the boundary settlement would be **“final, covering all sectors of the India-China boundary.”** While this continues to keep on the official position, both sides have constantly stressed their claims on the territories under their operative control — Arunachal Pradesh in the east and Axsai Chin in the west — ruling out any concessions, resulting in a stalemate.

²³² Ananth Krishnan (February 16, 2012) *Month after border talks, Chinese paper says Axsai Chin is a closed chapter*, Beijing: The hindu, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2897629.ece> Accessed Date March 12, 2015.

There were two dissimilar disputes in the western sector, first is Aksai Chin and second is the area from a 1963 Chinese-Pakistani Agreement.²³³ Under the 1963 China-Pakistan treaty, which, Taylor said, **“contrary to the conventional wisdom in India”** favoured Pakistan, China ceded around 5,300 sq. km of land that Pakistan occupied, but transferred to China 1,942 sq km of area in the Oprang Valley and released claims to another 1,554 sq km of land.

“So, China acknowledges a dispute with India in the Western sector of Aksai Chin, but does not acknowledge a dispute with India over its border with Pakistan adjacent to Kashmir.”

He noted the Chinese newspaper *Jiefang Daily* report was not specific enough on this point. **“The main barrier”** to become peaceful the boundary dispute came from India and its persistence **“that the border line between China and India should be based on the McMahon Line left by British colonists.”** It also written to India's multi-party political structure, where not the same parties **“have different understandings on the India-China border disputes”** and India's persistence that China should make a concern slightly have **“common accommodation”** as another sticking points.²³⁴

In current scenario China had raised up objections to the Dalai Lama's as a spoke person at the Buddhist conference held in New Delhi on January 16, 2012, at the same time when India and China were planned to hold talks. The Chinese sources say, wanted this event to be scuffled. Asking the Chinese ultimatum *"outrageous"*, India decided not to cave in and put off the boundary meetings which were to take place in New Delhi on 16-17 January.

India china border talks had been put off the first time in this manner. Sources said that both sides were then annoying to work out a jointly convenient date. The 15th round of Special Representative-level meetings were to discussion upon the long-pending boundary issue. Chinese Special Representative Dai Bingguo was to come to Delhi for talks with his Indian Special Representative Shivshankar Menon and to track up on their talks in Beijing in November, the previous year. Mr. Dai Bingguo and Mr. Menon were likely to discuss tapping in domicile a mechanism for border management mooted by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during

²³³ M. Taylor Fravel is the Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who has written extensively on the border dispute.

²³⁴ Ananth Krishnan *“Month after border talks, Chinese paper says Aksai Chin is a closed chapter”* <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2897629.ece> Accessed date 13/10/2012.

his official visit to India, the year before. A conclusion to set up the mechanism was engaged at a meeting Wen Jiabao had with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at Sanya in April 2005. Previous that month, government sources had said that India would be hosting the Special Representatives talks in last November. This dialogue was a three-phase exercise which started in 2005, start with the declaration of the Guiding Principles and Political Parameters. The second stage was finding the framework for resolution of the boundary issue and the third stage is that apply that framework. The mechanism was established in 2003, when Menon was India's ambassador to Beijing.²³⁵

Table 7.3. Sino-India Border Negotiations or Achievements

Event	Date
1st Round of border talks	Dec 10-14, 1981
2nd Round of border talks	May 2-20, 1982
3rd Round of border talks	January 28- February 2, 1983
4th Round of border talks	October 25-30,1983
5th Round of border talks	October 17-22, 1984
6th Round of border talks	November 4-10, 1985
7th Round of border talks	July 21-23, 1986
8th Round of border talks	November 16-18,1987
Rajiv Gandhi state visit to Beijing	December 23, 1988
Establishment of the Joint Working Group (JWG)	
1st Round of JWG	June 30-july 4, 1989
2nd Round of JWG	August 30-31,1990
Established Periodic Meetings between Military Commanders	
3rd Round of JWG	May 13, 1991

²³⁵ “India-China border talks put off after row over Dalai Lama”(Jan 16, 2012) New Delhi <http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-china-border-talks-put-off-after-row-over-dalai-lama-153197> Accessed date Oct 13, 2012

4th Round of JWG	February 20-21, 1992
5th Round of JWG	October 28-29, 1992
Agreement on the maintenance of Peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control	September 7, 1993
6th Round of JWG	June 25-26, 1993
1st Meeting of Experts Group	February 2-4, 1994
2nd Meeting of Experts Group	April 21-22, 1994
7th Round of JWG	July 6-7, 1994
3rd Meeting of Experts Group	March 2-4, 1995
8th Round of JWG	August 18-19, 1995
Agreement to Dismantle some Military Posts	
9th Round of JWG	October 1996
Agreement of Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control	November 29, 1996
10th Round of JWG	August 4-5, 1997
11th Round of JWG	April 27-28, 1999
12th Round of JWG	April, 2001
13th Round of JWG	July 31, 2001
14th Round of JWG	November 21, 2002
Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation (Appointment of Special Representatives)	June 23, 2003
1st Special Representative Meeting	October 26, 2003
2nd Special Representatives Meeting	January 12-13, 2004
3rd Special Representatives Meeting	July 26, 2004
4th Special Representatives Meeting	November 18-19, 2004
5th Special Representatives Meeting	March 10-12, 2004
15th Round of the JWG	March 30-31, 2005
Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Measures in Military Field	April 11, 2005
6th Special Representatives Meeting	September 26-28, 2005

7th Special Representatives Meeting	March 11-13, 2006
8th Special Representatives Meeting	June 25-27, 2006
9th Special Representatives Meeting	January 17-19, 2007
10th Special Representatives Meeting	April 24-27, 2007
11th Special Representatives Meeting	September 24-26, 2007
12th Special Representatives Meeting	September 18-19, 2008
13th Special Representatives Meeting	August 7-8, 2009
14th Special Representatives Meeting	November 29-30, 2010
15th Special Representatives Meeting	January 16-17, 2012
Agreement on the establishment of a working Mechanism for consultation and Coordination	
1st meeting of the Working Mechanism	March 5-6, 2012
2nd meeting of the Working Mechanism	November 29-30, 2012
16th Special Representatives Meeting	June 28-29, 2013
Border Defence Cooperation Agreement	October 23, 2013
17th Special Representative meeting	February 10-11, 2014, New Delhi
16th Round of the JWG	March 2015

India and China assessing the success of the elaborate process depends very much on the principles used. Both sides can boast of at least one major achievement; thanks to a set-up of confidence-building measures and border management initiatives there has not been a major dispute at the border since the 1967 skirmish at Nathu La²³⁶. The second achievement of the border talks was to break the post war diplomatic ice between India and China, allowing them in 1980 to reach common ground on an important principle; India and China border development of the bilateral relationship would no longer be held hostage to the unresolved territorial disputes.

²³⁶ In 1967 a military conflict between Indian army and Chinese People's Liberation Army who had infiltrated on 1st October, 1967 in Sikkim, then a protectorate of India. On 10 October, once again both sides had the conflict, the Defence Minister of India, Sardar Swaran Singh addressed that Government is looking after the developments across the borders. During whole conflict Indian losses were 88 killed, and 163 wounded, while Chinese casualties were 300 killed and 450 wounded in Nathula, and 40 in Chola. The end of the battle saw the Chinese Army leave Sikkim. Sikkim became an Indian state in 1975, which was not recognized by China. In 2003, China recognized Sikkim as an Indian state, on the condition that India accepted Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China. This mutual agreement led to a thaw in Sino-Indian relations.

After the Sumdorong Chu incident (1887), Rajiv Gandhi made a visit to China, and a new border resolution mechanism was agreed to solve their border disputes in the form of “Joint Working Group” which meet fourteen times between 1988 to 2003. The Joint working group was criticized as a “**largely bureaucratic exercise**” but it established the foundation for a couples of landmark border agreement signed in 1993 to 1996.²³⁷

Clarification on Line of Actual Control

In 1987-88, the eight rounds of border talks between India and China, demonstrated that their conflicting border types, based on historical-legalistic advices, could not find common ground because no commonly acceptable border agreements occurred. The eight rounds of border meetings raised the hope for a political solution to the border dispute.

In 1991, Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India and signed an agreement on Sino-Indian Joint Communique on December 16, 1991. In the joint communiqué, they reiterated their independent foreign policy and the five principles of peaceful co-existence. The both sides interested for joint efforts for the establishment of a new international political and economic order. India restated its position that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and it does not permit Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India.

After the two meetings in 1988 and 1991, India-China relations shifted from the border dispute to the identification of a jointly acceptable line of actual control along the India-China border. In 1993, Indian Prime Minister Narsimha Rao visited China and signed an agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility along the line of actual control and reduced military forces in the border regions. This peace pact, under which both sides agreed to respect and observe the Line of Actual Control, is a big phase forward in exploring a long-lasting border solution, eliminating fears about actions such as the Sumdorong Chu incident which nearly sparked another border war in 1987. Under the Line of Actual Control agreement in 1993, the both sides agreed that the boundary disputes shall be resolved through diplomatic, peacefully and friendly discussions.

Both side will keep its military forces in the border areas along the Line of Actual Control to a minimum level well-matched with the friendly and good-neighbourly relations

²³⁷ Zorawar Singh,(2012) “*Himalayan Stalemate: Understanding the India-China Disputes*”, London: Straight forward Publishers , p. 27

between the both countries. Both sides shall effort out effective confidence-building measures (CBM) in the areas along the Line of Actual Control. However, the both sides agreed that references to the Line of Actual Control in this agreement do not prejudgment their particular positions on the boundary disputes.

Under CBMs agreement, both sides decided that each side of the India-China Joint Working Group on the boundary disputes shall appoint diplomatic and military experts, advising the Joint Working Group on resolution of alterations on the alignment of the Line of Actual Control and address issues involving to military redeployment in the border regions along the Line of Actual Control.

The Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited India in 1996 and both sides decided to progress a cooperative and constructive partnership, further rising the political level of bilateral cooperation between the both countries. Though, the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 and the Chinese leaders indicating India's nuclear tests to counter-China's nuclear threat sunk the healthy momentum of China-India relations in the late 1990.

Apparently, India-China relation in the 1990 dedicated on political and security area. The LAC, the CBMs in the areas along the India- China border, and importance on the establishment of an international political and economic order and even India's nuclear tests, all point to political and security measurement of the India-China relations.

Settlement of the Border Dispute in the New Century

Starting the 21st century, India and China, the two Asian emerging power, are rising at the same time. Their bilateral relationship has effect its regional and global significance. As the two largest emerging country in Asia and the world, their roles have played out far beyond the bilateral framework. Certainly, their border dispute, particularly the border dispute, has forced each other's capability to play their responsible role in the bilateral and global affairs.

If they had focused on smoothing their relations and securing their border areas in the 2000s, they could have shifted their attention to the settlement of their border dispute by increasing their political and economic relations while taking tangible and functional measures to resolve the border dispute. India and China understand that their border problems have complicated their policy coordination and cooperation in the regional and global issues. Their

bilateral differences have tended to be manipulated by other powers to serve their geostrategic interest.

Last few decade, in terms of the border dispute, they have taken three essential steps to increase their efforts to resolve it:

- The leading phase is that India has accepted Tibet is an autonomous region of China, inferring that India has given up the intention to use Tibet as a buffer zone between India and China. India had recognizes China's sovereignty over Tibet. However, while India does not permit the Tibetans in India to involve in Anti-China political activities, it still hosts the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile. After that China has recognized Sikkim's status as a state of India's alliance by signing the agreement on the cross-border trade with India.
- The second step is that India and China signed a treaty on political parameters and guiding principles on the settlement of the India China border dispute. This document is regarded as a big breakthrough in the joint efforts for resolving the border dispute.
- The third step is that Indian and Chinese governments have appointed their special representatives to promote the negotiations on a context of the border settlement. Both governments have paid importance to the annual meetings of the both special representatives member. At that time the Chinese special representative is State Councilor Dai Bingguo and the Indian special representative is India's National Security adviser M. K. Narayanan.

After the India and China were appointed two special representatives, they started to work together for a context settlement of the border dispute permitting to the agreed political parameters and guiding principles. Under the current circumstances, both governments continue to work on the settlement of the border dispute, peace, stability, and tranquility in the border areas have continued. No armed conflicts or even skirmishes happened although some media has played up such noises of China's invasions into India's territory dozens or hundreds of times.

Prospects of Resolving China-India Border Dispute

Starting the 21st Century, some security experts such as Mr. Bharat Verma, the editor of *Indian Defence Review*, Guess about China's military attacks on India before 2014, or even within 6 months. However, such voices cannot halt the legendary wheels of India-China partnership from rolling forward. As the two new emerging powers, their leaders know clearly that each is not a threat to the other. China has been called the workshop while India the office. In their rising period, the challenges they will face are the same or similar. They need more policy coordination and more useful cooperation in the world dominated by the developed nations in the global stages such as G20, BRIC, BASIC, and India-China-Russia trilateral Dialogue. India and China joined hands last year during the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, successfully presenting the stance of emerging economies and developing countries on climate transformation.

Last 15 years, both governments have made joint efforts to boosting and strengthen their bilateral relations. In 2003, Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee visited China and signed Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China. Both sides declared that they would promote a long-term beneficial and cooperative partnership.

India and China emphasized that their common interests overshadow their differences. Both countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other. They are dedicated to qualitatively enhancing the bilateral relationship at all the levels and in all areas while talking differences through peaceful means in a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable way. They emphasized that the differences should not be permissible to affect the inclusive development of bilateral relations.

On the border problem, they repeat their determination to seek a fair, reasonable, and mutually suitable solution through meetings on an equal footing. They agreed to search that pending an ultimate solution, they should work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas, continue implementation of the agreements signed for this resolve, including the clarification of the line of actual control. Both the governments decided to appoint special representatives to endorse the process of the border negotiations. As one of the thoughtful issues in the India-China relations, India recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the

People's Republic of China and India does not allow Tibetans to involve in anti-China political activities in India.

In recent years, the trade relationship between the two countries has been seen in a crucial driver of overall bilateral relations, amid continuing political strains over the long-running border dispute. China became India's largest trading partner in 2013, with bilateral trade reaching about \$100 billion. Trade fell to \$43 billion on account of the financial crisis, but has recovered in the first two months of this year with Indian exports, mainly driven by iron, mineral, rising 75 per cent.²³⁸ It is expectable that rapid development of trade relations will certainly affect bilateral political relations in a positive manner.

Fast rising trade relations have come under increasing strain with India's trade deficit continuing to expand. India filed a record number of anti-dumping inquiries against China at the World Trade Organization in 2009. India's current restrictions on the import of Chinese telecom equipment, in light of security worries, have added to the list of strains. The telecom issue, however, was not raised by China during the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh ongoing visit. With the bilateral trade rapidly growing, these transformations or disputes are normal. We believe that all these problems can be resolved by bilateral discussions. Describing trade and economic cooperation as a support of bilateral ties, Indian president Mrs. Pratibha Devi Singh Patil said India and China should work together to realize the trade target of US\$ 100 billion in 2015 that had been set.

In 2006 Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India and the both sides agreed on a 10-pronged strategy to expand and intensify bilateral strategic and cooperative partnership. In 2008, during the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to China, the both countries decided a "**Shared Vision for the 21st century**", which procedures the basis for bilateral cooperation on global issues.

India and China had agreed to improve political, economic ties and strengthen people-to-people contact during a summiting between Indian President Pratibha devi Singh Patil and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on May 27, 2010. President Hu Jintao held talks with her. President Patil said India-China relations were of global and strategic significance, and all political parties in India were helpful of further advancing such relations. President Hu Jintao said that India and

²³⁸ *The Hindu*, May 31, 2010. P. 9.

China should work more carefully to address global issues such as economic downturn, climate change, food security and energy security. The both countries should maintain close communication and coordination within multidimensional mechanisms such as India-China-Russia, BRIC, BASIC, and G20, in a bid to increase the voice of emerging countries.

Border Talks in the Modi-Xi Era

In 2014 Lok Sabha election BJP's win the Maturity²³⁹, a leading member of the party openly stated that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would start a great emphasis on relations with China, and said the hope for effective partnership between these two governments. China has permanently given importance to Sino -Indian Relation in its foreign policies based on its acknowledgement of India's roles as a neighbour, major power, emerging country, and an significant character on the platform of a multipolar world. That is why people Republic of China had worried the importance of preserving, developing and enhancing bilateral relation, and additional strengthening partnership on the multilateral stage. After the Modi's election, there was a cause to believe that Sino-India relations would go in a promising new stage with efforts by both sides.

Republic of India and People Republic of China held direct negotiations about their border issues this time, the major such talks since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in India's general elections last May 2014. Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have met to solve the different issues. During Xi's visit to India, both Xi and Modi indicated their importance about start talks in serious on resolving the border dispute. India and China, Asia's two largest country, share about 3400 kilometer border. There are currently two main disputed territories: Axsai Chin, which China's administers but India claims, and Arunachal Pradesh, which India administers as a state but China claims called south Tibet.

Modi and Xi have cordially raised the border issue to the top of the India-China bilateral programme, both the governments continue to kind moves that reduce a long-term resolution of the disputes unsustainable. On the Indian side, Chinese border incursions remain a major irritant. The grimmest incursion in recent history took place in April 2013, when a People's Liberation Army platoon set up camp for near three weeks on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control

²³⁹ In May 2014 After Loksabha Election, BJP came in to power and since then started "Modi Era".

(LAC) in Axsai Chin Area. In the same way, Xi Jinping's inaugural trip to Narendra Modi's India in September 2014 was outshined by a similar incursion.²⁴⁰

It is seeming that the both sides are cautiously imminent negotiations. Still, a high-level discussion can only be positive. The previous major diplomatic agreement was the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), which previous Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed on his previous official trip to China before leaving office. The BDCA was a nuts-and-bolts crisis organization mechanism, envisioned to help both sides deescalate tensions should a border issues take place. China and India do not stance as threat to each other and their mutual interests far overshadow their differences. The both countries should understand and respect each other's main national interests and major concerns, accurately handle their issues, and seek common development and a good situation. A respectable India- China relationship makes both winners while an argumentative one makes both losers.

Senior members of the Chinese side visited with Indian central government to Arunachal Pradesh are a constant source of concern. Furthermore, despite the positive rhetoric from India on the border issue, the Modi government is main prioritize the development of Arunachal Pradesh's border areas with China — a scheme ignored by India's previous Congress-led governments. Kiren Rijiju, an Arunachal Pradesh native and minister of Home Affairs under the Modi government, has additional initiated plans to build a 2,000 km highway along the disputed border (in a bid to match Chinese activities in southern Tibet). The Indian government is also planning on actively encouraging settlements along the Eastern border.

²⁴⁰ Ankit Panda, (March 24, 2015) "*What to Expect From India-China Border Talks in the Modi-Xi Era*" The Diplomat, Central Tibetan Administration. <http://tibet.net/2015/03/25/whattoexpectfromindiachinabordertalksinthomodixiera/2/2> Accessed date 4/28/2015.

Chapter-8

Conclusion & Suggestions

India-China border disputes are one of the most prominent factors in the relationship of both the countries. Border disputes began influencing the relationship between China and India after the end of the Second World War. This resulted into a full-fledged war in 1962. This further worsened the situation between the two countries that for a long time there was an impasse resulting into a kind of severe cold war between the two great nations in Asia. This helped the erstwhile Super Powers i.e. USA-USSR and their allies in many respects. The long drawn silence and enmity benefited the western powers more in economic sense as they traded with both the countries directly whereas India and China closed their doors for each other. This deadlock was broken in 1981 during Mrs Indira Gandhi's tenure and was taken forward by Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988. Though the process of diplomatic dialogue got accelerated after the end of cold war in 1991 in the wake of Soviet Collapse resulting into positive gesture in 2003 when the two countries got together to find a stable compromise on their border disputes over Tibet but they could not reach a solution on disputes over the Aksai Chin Plateau and Arunachal Pradesh.

There is no doubt in saying that the levels of engagement between India and China have increased certainly to a greater extent. India, at the same time, requires adopting sophisticated approach to deal with the emerging strategic challenges emanating from China. Despite the fact that China has become increasingly assertive not only at the regional level but also at the global level, India has not shown any displeasure so far in strong terms. India had recognized China as an independent sovereign country within two months of the establishment of People's Republic of China. Among non-communist countries, India was the second country to do so after Burma. Also, India fought for China's entry into the world body organization subsequently. India always stood for China's cause in all fronts –national and international. India supported China in establishing a sound society and nation building when China was passing through formative phases. In 1954 India and China signed the five principles of peaceful co-existence or Panchsheel, assuring each other of territorial integrity and peaceful coexistence.

The Sino-Indian relationship entered into a bright phase in 1955. India sincerely wanted China's participation in international affairs. In April 1955 an Afro-Asian Conference was held in Bandung, where China participated and this became possible because of good offices of Nehru. China got an opportunity to enter into world diplomacy and at the first instance could succeed to woo the Afro-Asian nations away from India's leadership. China had the ambition to lead the uncommitted block and to become the spokesman of Asia. Nehru was the stumbling

block to the Chinese designs. From 1954 to 1957 the Sino-Indian relations were very cordial and it was called as honeymoon period. The foreign policy of China had a dual role to perform on one hand, it had to show that being a good neighbour was its perennial concern and on the other, that it had the most important military strength in Asia.

The worsening of the relationship afterwards was unfortunate. The bitterness of relationship grew over the cartographic invasion of China. India was surprised to see an officially circulated Chinese map where incorrect boundary alignment between India and China was shown and that also incorporated 50,000 sq. miles of the Indian Territory in China. For nearly a decade, India sincerely wanted a peaceful and good neighbourly relationship China. But, the imperial image pursued by China could not provide friendly atmosphere. Beside, Dalai Lama seeking asylum from India created even more tensions. In July 1959 an Indian army group, patrolling the Axsai Chin area, was caught by some Chinese troops who had entered into the Ladakh region, similar incident was also carried out in NEFA in August 1959. It was as if to show by force that these regions belonged to China and the Indian personnel were wrongfully found on their land In September 1959 Chou En Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, demanded 50,000 sq miles of the Indian territory and within two weeks the Chinese forces landed up in Ladakh and dared to start a small scale war.

In April 1960, the two Prime Ministers meet but their talks did not result in resolution of differences. In 1961 under pressure from the opposition, Nehru adopted a forward policy, the purpose of which was to establish some symbolic military posts in Ladakh and NEFA. The creation of these Indian military outposts became an obvious display of marking out Indian Territory. Naturally, it provoked the Chinese to cross the McMahon Line on September 8, 1962 and by October 20, 1962, they begin a large scale war on both the eastern and western sectors. Surprised by the full-fledged attack, the Indian outposts suffered heavy casualty but the Indian Government refused to back down or stop its retaliation when the Chinese offered ceasefire after having gained sufficient entry into Indian Territory. The Indian Government wanted the Chinese to withdraw and maintain the border which was there before the conflict. On November 21, 1962, China declared unilateral ceasefire and its decision to withdraw. However, the Chinese attack was a great unexpected shock for India. China exhibited its 'middle kingdom' attitude towards a harmless neighbour India in South Asia. The entire momentum of friendship and spirit of Panchsheel shattered down at that time.

With the election of Janta Party regime in India in 1977, the new External Affairs Minister, Shri A.B. Vajpayee visited China in 1979. He identified the border problem as the key obstacle in the process of negotiated settlement. The Chinese assurance of stopping support to insurgency in the northeast and the gesture of reopening the holy places of Kailash and Mansarover to Indian pilgrims were positive steps towards negotiated settlement.

The direct contact at the highest political level began in 1980's when Mrs. Gandhi came back to power. In May 1980, the Prime Ministers of both countries met at Belgrade and decided to continue the process of improvement in bilateral relations. The Border talks started in 1981 and concluded in 1988. Eight rounds of official level talks were held to resolve the border issue alternatively in Beijing and New Delhi at Vice-Ministerial level. The first four rounds were focused primarily on the development of basic negotiating principles, and the second four dealt with **“the situation on the ground”**. Among these, five were held during Indira Gandhi's regime, and three during Rajiv Gandhi's Prime Ministership.

Rajiv Gandhi followed Indira Gandhi's China policy, but modified it to suit the changing international scenario as well as keeping in mind the rapid economic changes occurring in both India and China. He showed keen interest in improving ties with China. In his first meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Zhao Ziyang at New York, both agreed that there was a need to put effort to finding an equitable solution to the border problem and to promote friendship between the two countries. The years 1986 and 1987, however, became tensed once again because of the Chinese intrusion in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. China also lodged a protest against India's decision of granting statehood to the union territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides, however, did not allow bilateral relations to deteriorate. By the end of 1987, the eighth round of official level talks had made little progress, with each side reiterating its stated position.

Rajiv Gandhi then decided to make a bold move to visit China in December 1988. The historic visit of Rajiv Gandhi to China was a great leap forward in the process of negotiated settlement of Sino-Indian boundary dispute, as no Indian Prime Minister had visited China since 1954. During his visit, two Joint Working Groups on border and economic relations were constituted. The commission was to make concrete recommendations for an overall solution of the boundary question within a definite time frame; and to ensure peace and tranquillity in the border areas. Joint Working Group was an advancement of the previous mechanism. The leaders of two countries also agreed to increase cooperation in economic, cultural and technological

fields. The both sides expressed full faith in the five principles of Panchsheel and indicated their desire to promote good neighbourly and friendly relations on the basis of these principles.

At the political level, as a result of the Prime Ministerial Summits of 2002 and 2003, Sino-Indian bilateral relations improved a lot. In particular, Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee's China visit was quite successful and may be put in the same league as that of Rajiv Gandhi's in 1988 and Narasimha Rao's in 1993. A significant progress had been made during A.B. Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in June 2003, in solving some of the questions related to Tibet and Sikkim, which helped in improving bilateral relations between India and China. Similarly, the resumption of defence relations and high level defence exchanges enabled the military establishments to enhance mutual trust and understanding.

On the border issue, positive steps could be seen by ways of maintenance of peace and tranquillity, initiation of various confidence-building measures, exchange of maps according to sectors and seeking clarifications on each other's position. Furthermore, with the appointment of special representatives on the border issue, another step forward was taken in the right direction. It seemed that the adoption of political approach could go a long way in resolving this long standing problem in Sino-Indian relations. From 2003 to 2007, special representatives have held eleven rounds of talks. By then both India and China had adopted a pragmatic approach to solve their boundary as well as other disputes.

The end of the cold war had provided a suitable global environment for China's growth. It withstood the impact of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union by quickly introducing the reforms, which benefited millions of population. Between 1988 and 2007, there was some exchange of highest-level visits by Presidents, Vice Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers between India and China. In this connection, two agreements were very important.

- I. Agreements on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in Sino-India border areas (September 1993).**
- II. Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in military field along the Line of Actual Control in Sino-India border areas (1996).**

Taken together these two agreements reflected the political determination of the decision making authorities of the two countries. On the whole, the relationship between India and China has become more meaningful, where differences are managed through discussions and where governments act as facilitators for a wide spectrum of activities to be undertaken by diverse

sections of the Indian and Chinese people within and outside the two governments. After Pranab Mukherjee's visit to China in May 2006 and Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to New Delhi in November 2006, the year 2006 has been declared as the year of Sino-Indian friendship.

In order to safeguard the precarious balance of power between India and Pakistan, China gradually developed a close defence relation with Pakistan and carefully nurtured it. Chinese arms transfer and nuclear assistance to Pakistan can prove counterproductive to India. India was against China's attempt to supervise the subcontinent in following the May 1998 nuclear test (Pokhran) or to mediate in New Delhi-Islamabad rivalry during Kargil conflict in May 1999, because India perceived China as part of the problem rather than a part of the solution.

Another important factor that many times hindered the Sino-Indian negotiation is divergent perception for their capacities to dominate South Asian region. Not only India and China but there are others also who play vital role, negative or positive, in regional power balance like Soviet Russia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan etc. But the primary factors have been the Sino-Soviet prestige issue and the Sino-Indian territorial tensions.

China perceived itself as part of South Asia because of geographical reasons, historical, linkages and common heredity with the Mongoloid group of people in India, Nepal and Bhutan. Consequently, China considers itself in the intra-regional affairs of South Asia. On the other hand, India had its own thoughts about its role and perception because of its 'big brother' attitude. It viewed China's attempt to forge close relations with its South Asian neighbours as hostile act. These differences create problems in the peace process. If these two major powers accept each other's importance in South Asia and remain 'non-egoistic' on some important issues like leadership, resources, territory and ideology and relations with neighbours, both may come much closer to each other. And, while coming closer to each other, India and China may form a pan-Asian solidarity.

India has become very important for USA in South Asia. Also, USA and India share the same challenge of getting dominated by the rising power of China in the world and in South Asia. Another perception from the Chinese side is that, India, by virtue of its geopolitical situation, naval capabilities, unresolved boundary disputes and history of hostility with China, is an ideal country for the USA to ally up in case of any conflict with China. China wonders whether India is going to line up with USA against China or join China and Russia to push for a multi-polar world order against the global domination of the USA. If India did not participate in keeping control over Chinese domination, over the years, China's rapid development would

lessen the strategic pressure of USA on India and if India joins forces with the USA to contain China, the future years may be very challenging to India.

Understanding between the two countries is essential. Border question would be resolved by negotiations involving ‘**give and take**’ diplomacy on both sides along the Line of Actual Control. The need for confidentiality should not be a pretext for keeping the public completely in the dark about the negotiations on the boundary questions. In the recent past China has resolved many boundary disputes with Russian states (CIS), ASEAN states and Japan. Thus, one can hope that the boundary issue with India would also be resolved, going by the other strategic, trade, economic and political relations between India and China being successfully established in the recent past.

However, there is a strong need for determination and adjusting approach on both sides. India and China would have to hold on to some perseverance and patience also. Careful policy-making from applicable strategies, determined mind set, expedite practices and unselfish spirit to resolve the problem, may bring out the permanent solution. In the changed geopolitical situation in the world, both sides may adopt benign approach towards each other. This is the right time to show political will and obliterate the dark cloud of 1962 that has eclipsed the bright sun over Sino-Indian amity.

In the current circumstances, it is clear that trade has become an increasingly important driver of relations to both sides; especially in the light of lingering political mistrust on a number of wide ranges of issues, spanning from the long running border dispute to China’s close relationship with Pakistan. The regular reports of incursions by Chinese troops and more aggressive patrolling in disputed areas have certainly created strain on India-China relations.

The emergence of China as India’s biggest trading partner in the year 2015 signals that both the countries have been ushering in a new phase of relationship that is mostly guided by economics and commerce factor. The signing of an Agreement on “**Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Border Dispute**”, by both India and China has shown that both the countries, India and China are moving ahead in terms of reaching a consensus on this major issue. It has also been agreed upon that both sides would maintain peace and tranquillity on the border. But, at the same, it requires careful assessment especially on the intent and declarations.

China has also been following the tenets of the 'Monroe Doctrine'. The attempt has always been to deny access to other powers in the regions that it considers exclusive to its sphere of influence. Such Chinese actions have been damaging the interests of other regions, especially, the countries in the East and South East Asia. Many of China's actions in this part of the world would require very careful handling by India. It may be important for India in the current context to understand China's intentions and fundamental goals. India will always promote constructive engagement with China and avoid any direct confrontation. It would also be in China's interest if it forges greater and robust partnership with India in the twenty first century.

After 2010, a tensed environment has been created in this region of South Asia, where India and China are fighting war of words. Chinese put a strong claim on India's North Eastern province of Arunachal Pradesh & a part of Kashmir, objected to the meetings of Indian Prime Minister Mr. Manmohan Singh with Dalai Lama, made frequent deep intrusions into the Indian Territory, sailed over the Indian Ocean near Indian Territory, supported Pakistan Army, and helped them build infrastructure in the disputed Indian Kashmir. Finally, when China started pushing opium and fake money into the Indian market, India took to the dialogue process more seriously with China. India's deployment of 200 Su 30MKI in the Arunachal Pradesh was an answer but India did not want any military action.

Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh is totally baseless as they have neither ruled nor they have ever communicated with this part in the complete history. China claims that this part belongs to Tibet which it has been controlling till now, but Dalai Lama has recently mentioned clearly that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. While there are daily media reports on various small and big issues along the border, the government of India is maintaining a soft approach towards China, probably, in view of the billion dollars' worth bilateral trade.

China has built up strategic alliances with almost all immediate neighbours of India and in one sense has surrounded India from all the sides. Some analysts are of the view that if India does not retaliate soon enough, China might succeed in exerting direct and indirect influence over India and maintain its monopoly in the entire South Asian region. However, before such retaliation, India needs to develop a vibrant economy, good international relations, and strong military. Then India can put up a strong front to restrain and restrict Chinese influence.

- 1. Maintain Nepal:** India has been pouring financial assistance in billions to help Nepal build infrastructure. India should also think of maintaining the relationship with Nepal especially after the formation of new government which is pro Chinese.

2. **Recognition of Tibet:** Again it will be a very aggressive move. Tibet was an independent country before 1951 which was later forcibly annexed by China. If China doesn't recognize Kashmir as India's part, then India has good reasons to not recognise Tibet as part of China. For past four decades, India has been providing shelter and market to Tibetan refugees. If China can't take care of these innocent people who are fleeing to India every day, then China on no grounds can call Tibet as China.
3. **Good relations with Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Afghanistan:** It is important to maintain good relations with all of the neighbours for India. Although many of them have already fallen under China's influence, it is still not too late. If India makes excellent relations with them as well, these countries will ensure that China won't use them against India. Further India should be quick to grab tenders, deals, and development projects in these countries.
4. **Mongolia Factor:** This factor can only be played when India and China will stand on the same status. Good relation with Mongolia will be necessary to set up bases and camps on the northern border of China to pressurize it from both the sides. India already enjoys good relations with Mongolia, but a little more effort is required to convert this relation into a strategic one.
5. **Recognition of Taiwan:** India enjoys very good relations as well as trade relations with Taiwan. China claims Taiwan as its territory and Taiwanese hate China for this reason. People of Taiwan like India and believe India has the potential to do something on the international forum about China and Taiwan issue in coming future. India still does not officially recognise Taiwan, as it would be a very aggressive move, with dangerous consequences. However, cordial relations with Taiwan are nurtured to keep scope open for future association.
6. **Central Asia Factor:** Energy rich Central Asia is needed for the growth of the country, China has already sealed many deals with these countries. India shouldn't be late to grab a few deals as well.
7. **Japan Factor:** China and Japan relation had always been bitter. India may like to use this card when it will be strong enough to prevent any aggressive move by China. That is, having a good trade with Japan will be in India's interest. In this case, either

China will force India to close ties with Japan or will start a dialogue with India to sort out the issues which is in India's interest.

8. **Russian Factor:** Soviet Union always preferred India over China, but it had to maintain good relations with its communist neighbour as well. That is why Russia couldn't do much during India-China war in 1962. Now that such condition do not exist, a strong Russia is needed to solve the issues if war breaks out between India and China, as Russia maintains relations with both.
9. **Good Relations with Pakistan:** This one is unlikely to happen in near future. China has been developing infrastructure in Pakistan, training their army and providing them weapons and technology just to make Pakistan equal to India so that it can keep India and Pakistan busy and allow them not to grow. China and Pakistan are friends because both consider India as enemy. If India makes good relations with Pakistan. China will not find Pakistan of much use.

As we see the government stand in India has been diverse in different regimes. NDA government, although under the influence of RSS, has taken necessary steps to exhibit India's stern policy and uncompromising behaviour. A nationalist ideology has allowed the BJP to make itself electorally synonymous with "**robust nationalism and an unyielding commitment to national security**".²⁴¹ This was made patent by India's dramatic nuclear weaponisation in 1998 and its hawkish stance whilst in opposition. But in its search for the international reality and a viable definition of India's enlightened national interest, the BJP is faced with myriad challenges, domestic and international. But it is evident that the earlier spell in power has introduced a maturity in the BJP's China policy, influenced as it was by the Jana Sangh's militant nationalism. By taking the BJP's policy discourse on China into account, it is clear that the party appreciates the multifaceted opportunities and challenges that will present themselves in the conduct of India-China relations. Perhaps Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister in the NDA government put it best when he said that we are all for good relations with China but I would humbly suggest that good relations do not mean that we surrender.²⁴²

²⁴¹ "Now, Get On With It", (September 10, 2008) http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Editorial/Now_Get_On_With_It/articleshow/3464511.cms Accessed date 24/02/2014.

²⁴² "Foreign minister says no change in China policy, BJP walks out" (March 17, 2008) <http://www.nerve.in/news:253500135615> Accessed date 24/02/2014.

As either a competitor, or potential partners, relation between India and China will have a tremendous effect on the stability of South Asia as well as on the leadership alignments within the third-world in the emerging global system. Both India and China, as two most important Asian powers, must come forward with creative initiative to build on effective structure of Asian peace and stability. The rise and peaceful development of China would be incomplete without the comprehensive improvement of its relations with India. Conversely, India's success is positioning itself as a global or strategic partner to major powers – US, EU, Russia, Japan, ASEAN, Central Asia, France and Italy etc. would have not been achieved without the rapid improvement in Sino-Indian relations. Their determination to work together in different fields i.e. strategy, economy, security, terrorism, ecology, global warming, territorial demarcations and other global commons - is an indicator that two civilized states would have a beneficial impact on Asia in the first decade of the new millennium. The world would see more positive results and changes in the long journey of Sino-Indian negotiation process in the time to come.

The current phase of negotiations has recently started. The visit of the President of India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi later this year would likely to emphasise on “Consistency in Policy” and position and it should further be insisted on removing the basis for “misunderstanding”. It cannot be foretold how much time and efforts would be required to solve the boundary issue completely but still there are positive anticipations for a bright future.

Major Findings:

1. The major disputes in between India and China is due to the lack of properly demarcated border line. In 1950s, India was surprised to see an officially circulated Chinese map where disputed boundary alignment between India and China was shown. According to Chinese Map Mcartney-McDonald line is Correct, it is approximately the same as the present Line of Actual Control but it is not accepted by India. The official Chinese map had shown 50,000 sq. miles area of the Indian Territory and they possess that area after India-China war 1962. In July 1959 an Indian army group, patrolling the Axsai Chin area, was caught by some Chinese troops who had entered into the Ladakh region, similar incident was also carried out in NEFA in August 1959. It was to show by force that these regions belonged to China and the Indian personnel were wrongfully found on their land In September 1959 Chou En Lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, demanded 50,000 sq. miles of the Indian territory and within two weeks the Chinese forces landed up in Ladakh and dared to start a small scale war. For nearly a decade, India sincerely wanted a peaceful and good neighbourly

relationship with China but from time to time the border disputes disturb Political and Economic relations.

2. Another reason of Disputes between India and China is the asylum of the Spiritual Leader of Tibet, Dalai Lama seeking from India. In 1959 Chinese had possessed over Tibetan region and Dalai Lama seeking their asylum in India. Now Dalai Lama is reside in India (Dharmashala) and opposing the Chinese possession over Tibet.
3. On the border issue, positive steps could be seen by ways of maintenance of peace and tranquillity, initiation of various confidence-building measures, exchange of maps according to sectors and seeking clarifications on each other's position. Furthermore, with the appointment of special representatives on the border issue, another step has been taken in the right direction. It seemed that the adoption of political approach could go a long way in resolving this long standing problem in Sino-Indian relations. From 2003 to 2007, special representatives have held eleven rounds of talks. By then both India and China had adopted a pragmatic approach to solve their boundary as well as other disputes.
4. Both the countries had adopted different mechanism from time to time to resolve the boundary dispute but could not fully reach its final solution due to different reasons such as lack of political will, differences existing on claims from both sides, Sino-Pak collaboration, USA factor, differences of opinion on both sides, domestic problems, Tibet problem, lack of proper preparatory work, India-Soviet encirclement, India's nuclear test, small incidents on border areas and recently the wording of Chinese Ambassador Sun Yuxi, "**Arunachal Pradesh as Chinese territory**". All these casted negative impact upon the process of negotiation. It always seemed that after a particular negotiation or visit of leaders, when the expectation of producing concrete results and solutions were highest, some incident or comment damaged the relationship once more, and the problems remained the same.
5. The fast changing political climate has to face the diverse challenges. Most importantly, these challenges appear in the form of non-compromising behaviour, USA and Pakistan factor, lack of political will or to only linger on the issue etc. In order to safeguard the precarious balance of power between India and Pakistan, China gradually developed a close defence relation with Pakistan and carefully nurtured it. Chinese arms transfer and nuclear assistance to Pakistan

can prove counterproductive to India. India was against China's attempt to supervise the subcontinent in following the May 1998 nuclear test (Pokhran) or to mediate in New Delhi-Islamabad rivalry during Kargil conflict in May 1999, because India perception is that intervention of China in India-Pak relationship maybe problematic.

6. Another important factor that many times hindered the Sino-Indian relationship is divergent perception for their capacities to dominate South Asian region. Not only India and China but there are others also who play key role, negative or positive, in regional power balance like Soviet Russia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan and Myanmar etc. China perceived itself as part of South Asia because of geographical reasons, historical linkages and common heredity with the Mongoloid group of people in India, Nepal and Bhutan. Consequently, China considers itself in the intra-regional affairs of South Asia. On the other hand, India had its own thoughts about its role and perception because of its 'big brother' attitude. It viewed China's attempt to forge close relations with its South Asian neighbours as hostile act.
7. The Crucial role of USA which has been directly affected the Sino-India relations, India-Pakistan relation and Pakistan-China relations. From cold war to post cold war and from post-cold war to the era of terrorism, the USA has been taking keen interest in South Asia but since 2001 attack on WTC, it has completely got involved in South Asia and Central Asia and USA has tried to implant its military roots in the entire region in the name of '**war against terrorism**'.
8. Both India and China have express their worried about different moves of USA in relation to their own security status. India worries that China may use its permanent membership in UN Security Council and its relationship with Washington to block New Delhi from taking its appropriate place on the world stage. After the cold-war era, the USA paid more attention to China in comparison to India in Asia Pacific and world affairs. India was identified as being friendly with the USSR. Thus the policies of USA concentrated more on equation with China, alliance with Gulf countries and stable defence relations with Pakistan etc. It did not consider India a significantly important country. Also, both the USA and China have a common interest to make India sign up the international non-proliferation treaty and give up nuclear weapons.

Validation of Research Hypotheses

The research hypotheses that have been put up in the beginning of the study are either validated or proved null through this research.

- ❖ The first hypotheses states that '*The border disputes play a very crucial role in shaping and organizing relationship between the two countries*'. Neither India nor China has allowed the bilateral relation to be hijacked by the border disputes alone, but even from time to time the border disputes disturb Political and Economic relation. Bilateral relations have improved since the 1980s, with eight rounds of border negotiations occurring between 1981 and 1988 and dialogue through the Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on the border issue between 1988 and 1993, and a border agreement signed in 1993. Even though these relations keep on unstable and competitive, both side have required to reduce tensions. Despite India China border disputes, rejection of market access, and strict words against the Dalai Lama, leaders of the both countries realise the dangers of permitting problems to overpower the relationship. Burgeoning economic agreement between the global two fastest- developing economies country have become the most prominent aspect of their bilateral relationship. Bilateral Trade flows have increased rapidly, from a worthless in 1993, \$350 million to \$70 billion in 2012, and could exceed \$100 billion in 2015. Some joint projects in power generation, consumer goods, chemicals, minerals, steel, mining, transport, info-tech, infrastructure and telecommunication are in the pipeline. Increasing trade, commerce, and tourism could decline the risk factor for China in its relationship with India. The positive side, both share mutual interests in maintaining local stability (for example, combating Islamist fundamentalists), manipulating economic opportunities, and maintaining access to energy bases, and markets.
- ❖ The second hypotheses reads as, '*Geo-political and colonial factors are responsible for the Sino-India border disputes*'. The Sino-India border dispute invented from the British and Russian expansion in Central Asia in the end of 19th century and early 20th century. In the era of 21st Century, there has been a shifting pattern in Chinese mischief along the Indian borders: Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim then Ladakh (Aksai Chin). China's vested interests Axsai Chin out of security

concerns that relate to its economic interests, Beijing would be highly unlikely to let go of Aksai Chin because, firstly, NH 219 is the only veritable all-weather road that connects Tibet and Xinjiang. In that capacity, the road not only facilitates the ability to mobilise troops, but it also provides connectivity between two of China's least developed regions. Infrastructure allows the increase of trade volumes and the movement of people and thereby contributes to regional development. Secondly, Aksai Chin is located at the north-western part of the Tibetan plain, clamped between the Kunlun mountain range to its north that separates Tibet from Xinjiang, and the Karakoram Range of the Himalayas to its west which forms a natural barrier between China and India. If it was to fall under Indian control, it would leave China strategically exposed. Arunachal Pradesh is one of the most strategically placed states because of its common international border with China, Bhutan and Myanmar. Arunachal Pradesh, comprising the mountainous areas lying to the north and east of Assam, is located between the cultivable plantations and oil, Minerals, Natural resources rich basin of Brahmaputra, Lohit River and the Tibetan frontier. China might plan to link the two major oceans of the world i.e. Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

- ❖ . The third hypothesis is, '*Pakistan plays as a fulcrum in the Sino-India Dispute*'. Pakistan is important factor in Sino-India Relations but it is not fulcrum, there are other various factor which are responsible for the Sino-Indian disputes. China and USA are pursuing their own interest in cooperating with Pakistan. The Chinese involvement in Pakistan is driven purely by its strategic interests. It seems to be devising a multi-pronged agenda to deal with the growing USA influence in the region. The USA and Chinese policy on Kashmir (POK) till the end of the cold war was detrimental to Indian interests. During that time, POK did not figure in the US strategic calculus and Pakistan's control over the region was regarded as legitimate and in the American interests. In a changing regional and global context, the US seems to have revised its policy towards POK as the Chinese interest are expanding towards POK. However, apart from their common concerns about the growing Chinese presence in the region, India and the US may not have similar positions on the status of POK. As in the past, the US has agreed to participate in the ongoing projects in POK, to which India has objected at time to time. The US involvement offers some

degree of legitimacy to Pakistan's illegal occupation of the region. But at the same time, the US foray into POK will certainly countervail the Chinese strategic presence there. This may indirectly address some of India's concerns about the growing China-Pakistan nexus in this sensitive region. China and Pakistan have been close allies after the 1962 war between India and China. It has become stronger with the sudden action by USA to eliminate Osama Bin Laden violating Pakistan's sovereignty. The secret operation rendered Pakistan helpless nuclear power.

Future: Problems and Prospects

It is important to further explore the points made above regarding greater interaction in the economic sphere among the two countries and in particular between India and China, not just in the interest of a resolution of the Border dispute but in the interests of better relations among two countries. China aims to have stability in its neighbourhood and increased market penetration in South Asia, and for both, stability in Kashmir and peace between India and Pakistan are essential. China's Western Development Strategy (WDS) for its interior provinces include Tibet and Xinjiang.

Problem Areas

- **Border agreement on Line of Actual Concern.**
- **Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh.**
- **Development of Tibet.**
- **Nepal is in the Circle of Influence of China.**
- **Sri Lanka- Chinese have increased military and economic Cooperation.**
- **Pakistan- Supply for technology**
- **Kashmir- Shifting stands; visa issue.**
- **Chinese hold over Myanmar; Bay of Bengal/ Indian Ocean.**
- **Developing the Coco Island**

Prospect Areas

China and India-the two fastest growing economies are expected to shape the new world order in the 21st century; China will overtake USA as number one economic power by 2030 and India is likely to emerge as number two by 2050. Border problems are unlikely to be resolved for a few decades and China's claims on Arunachal Pradesh will remain;

Both are required to following global challenges:-

- **Terrorism;**
- **Maritime Piracy;**
- **Narcotics and Drugs trafficking;**
- **Global Warming and Climate change;**
- **Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon;**
- **Secular nature of the state in both the countries;**

The general feeling is that Sino-Indian relations have entered a phase of pragmatic maturity and cooperation.

Strength and Limitation of the Study and Scope for Further Research

Some specific limitations felt during the present study are that most of the information documents in respect of the border areas or declaration of boundaries and most importantly the sources of their origin and constant timely changes by the governments which constrains access. However, this constraint of access did not affect the conclusions of the study. Historical as well as current analyses of the topic of study subjecting it to a comprehensive frame of capturing both Indian and Chinese contexts, factors, trends and forces competing each other as well as in possible combinations constitute the strength of the present research. The specific aspect was found that there were always variation in the declared maps by the governments and the maps of the territory in documents. Moreover, all the time it was not so easy to access the original documents of MOUs between the governments of both of the nations from the embassies.

Another limitation is politico-economical context of the unfolding of the regional or boundary level talks within the specific area. This context is characterized by uncertainties even about the near future. For a while there is clarity about the inevitability of inter-connectedness of ideas among various governments in vastly internationalized phenomena, there are strong undercurrents of uncertainty about the results of the future for the bi-lateral relations. There is

also a confusing dichotomy of there being both a steady growth of resolutions into the race of internationalization and regionalization processes and a virtual stillness, which may be momentary in relative terms, in the evolution of a new international politico-relationship. The present study is contextualized by such type of unique limitations, which can be equally read as historical and factual, and not necessarily the limitation of the specific study.

There is scope for recurring academic quest to enquire about the nature of the change of the context in which baseline of the resolution of boundary dispute will evolve in near or farther future and whether it will evolve as presented by the findings of the present study.

Despite the above limitation and future scope for the study, it can be concluded that China has also been following the tenets of the 'Monroe Doctrine'. The attempt has always been to deny access to other powers in the regions that it considers exclusive to its sphere of influence. Such Chinese actions have been damaging the interests of other regions, especially, the countries in the East and South East Asia. Many of China's actions in this part of the world would require very careful handling by India. It may be important for India in the current context to understand China's intentions and fundamental goals. India will always promote constructive engagement with China and avoid any direct confrontation. It would also be in China's interest if it forges greater and robust partnership with India in the twenty first century.

Another perception from the Chinese side is that, India, by virtue of its geopolitical situation, naval capabilities, unresolved boundary disputes and history of hostility with China, is an ideal country for the USA to ally up in case of any conflict with China. China wonders whether India is going to line up with USA against China or join China and Russia to push for a multi-polar world order against the global domination of the USA. If India did not participate in keeping control over Chinese domination, over the years, China's rapid development would lessen the strategic pressure of USA on India and if India joins forces with the USA to contain China, the future years may be very challenging to India.

This fact in itself is an ample proof of the positive spirit of both of the nations which are extending their base to the international community and their ever increasing negotiating capacity on the issue of borderline in the interests of the nation. There has been drawn a drastic change in the efforts at the government level and increase in defence personnel participation.

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