

# Welfare State and Public Policy in India: A Study of Public Distribution System in Raipur, Chhattisgarh

**Thesis**

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**2022**

*Dedicated to*  
*My Beloved Parents*

## DECLARATION

I, **Vimlesh Kumar** declare that the thesis entitled “**Welfare State and Public Policy in India: A Study of Public Distribution System in Raipur, Chhattisgarh**” has been prepared by me under the supervision of Prof. Shashikant Pandey, Department of Political Science, School of Ambedkar Studies for Social Sciences, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow. No part of this thesis has formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma or fellowship previously.

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## CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis titled “**Welfare State and Public Policy in India: A Study of Public Distribution System in Raipur, Chhattisgarh**” submitted by Mr. Vimlesh Kumar is an original research work and has not been previously submitted in part or full for the award of any other degree or diploma to this or any other University.

The thesis submitted to Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University Lucknow satisfies all the requirements as stipulated in the PhD regulations amended in 2017 and it is fit for submission and evaluation for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University.

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**Vimlesh Kumar**

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## **ABSTRACT**

In India, The Public distribution system (PDS) is basically an Indian food Security System established under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food, and Public Distribution. (FCS &CA)/CAPD. The Public Distribution System (PDS) matured itself as an important component to tackle the scarcity of food grains at affordable rates through fair distribution channels. PDS operations are being run by the Joint cooperation of the Central and the respective State/UT governments and the responsibility of the whole initiative lies with the both governments. The objectives of the study was: to analyses the awareness of public distribution system among BPL families in Chhattisgarh, to examine the impact of PDS policies in Chhattisgarh from 2008-2018, to analyze the recent schemes under PDS and their performance in Chhattisgarh from 2014, to study the role of Local administration in monitoring and implementing the PDS scheme. The research questions in the study was: how has politics of the state driven the new model of public distribution system? The role of local administration and their experience in implementation of PDS? Why is there intra-regional variation in implementation of the programme? The present study has followed the empirical method using primary Data. Survey method has been followed for this study. By following purposive sampling two Panchayats viz., one backward and one developed were selected of Raipur District. Researcher also took the help of secondary sources such as government documents reports and papers released by Government of India and Chhattisgarh and other different national organization bodies on the related topics including books, journals and newspaper readings relevant to the research. Thus the findings of the study are presented in the chapter five the thesis.

## **PREFACE**

According to Amartya Sen, it is said that Food, Cloth and Shelter are basic human need for every people. Food is just as necessary for survival as air is to breathe. As Acharya Chanakya said that "The biggest sin for a king is death of any of his subjects due to hunger". Food insecurity causes hunger malnutrition and poverty. In a democratic society, it is the government's role to check that the general public has access to sufficient food. According to World Food Summit (1996). It is possible to achieve food security when all persons have physical and economic access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food choices in order to maintain an active and healthy lifestyle. In India, Public Distribution System (PDS) has been around for more than 50 years now as rationing was initially established by the Britishers in 1939 in Bombay as a strategy to promote equitable distribution of food grains to urban consumers in the face of growing prices. The present thesis has been divided in the following chapters. The first chapter is the Introduction where the researcher has focused on the history and conceptual framework of the thesis along with the objectives, research questions, and hypothesis and research methodology. In the second chapter researcher has focused on Politics of welfare and its impact in India as well global outlook related to PDS is discussed. In the third chapter Public Distribution System (PDS) in India is discussed with special focus on various policies and programme. In the Chapter four researcher took into consideration the Public Distribution System in Chhattisgarh and he Regulatory Mechanism. Here Researcher reflected on detailed description of the primary and secondary data along with the regulatory mechanism of the state. Certain reflections on PDS system across the country was also laid by the researcher. At the end major findings along with summary and conclusion is presented. The present study has followed the empirical method using

primary Data. Survey method has been followed for this study. By following multi-stage random sampling two block viz., one backward and one developed were selected of Raipur District. Researcher also took the help of secondary sources such as government documents reports and papers released by Government of India and Chhattisgarh and other different national organization bodies on the related topics including books, journals and newspaper readings relevant to the research. Thus the findings of the study are presented in the chapter five the thesis.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AAJ</b>	- Anna Antyodaya Yojana
<b>ANC</b>	- Antenatal Care
<b>ANM</b>	- Auxiliary Nurse Midwife
<b>ASER</b>	- Annual Status of Education Report
<b>BPL</b>	- Below Poverty Line
<b>CAG</b>	- Comptroller and Auditor General
<b>CG</b>	- Chhattisgarh
<b>CHC</b>	- Community Health Centre
<b>CM</b>	- Chief Minister
<b>CSS</b>	- Centrally Sponsored Schemes
<b>DLHS</b>	- District Level Household and Facility Survey
<b>DHFW</b>	- Department of Health and Family Welfare
<b>DPSW</b>	- Directorate of Panchayat and Social Welfare
<b>DTW</b>	- Department of Tribal Welfare
<b>DSE</b>	- Department of School Education
<b>GoCG</b>	- Government of Chhattisgarh
<b>GoI</b>	- Government of India
<b>ICDS</b>	- Integrated Child Development Services
<b>MDG</b>	- Millennium Development Goal
<b>MDMS</b>	- Mid- Day Meal Scheme MFP
<b>MHRD</b>	- Ministry of Human Resources Development
<b>MRD</b>	- Ministry of Rural Development
<b>NRC</b>	- Nutrition Resource Centre
<b>OECD</b>	- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>PDS</b>	- Public Distribution System
<b>PRC</b>	- Panchayat Resource Centre
<b>SC</b>	- Scheduled Caste (also known as Dalits)
<b>ST</b>	- Scheduled Tribe (also known as Adivasis)
<b>UNICEF</b>	- United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>WFP</b>	- World Food Programme

<b>FPS</b>	- Fair Price Shops
<b>RPDS</b>	- Revamped Public Distribution System
<b>TPDS</b>	- Targeted Public Distribution System
<b>NSFM</b>	- National Food Security Mission
<b>MGNREGA</b>	- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
<b>RTE Act</b>	- Right to Children and Free and Compulsory Education Act (RTE)
<b>GDP</b>	- Gross Domestic Product
<b>DPAP</b>	- Drought Prone Area Program
<b>ITDP</b>	- Integrated Tribal Development Projects
<b>DDP</b>	- Desert Development Programme
<b>DHA</b>	- Designated Hill Areas
<b>NFSA</b>	- The National Food Security Act
<b>NCAER</b>	- National Council of Applied Economic Research
<b>APC</b>	- Agricultural Prices Commission
<b>APL</b>	- Above the poverty line
<b>MSP</b>	- minimum support price
<b>CIP</b>	- Central issue price
<b>CEP</b>	- Consumer end prices
<b>CIP</b>	- Central issue price
<b>MKSY</b>	- Mukhyamantri Khadyan Sahayata Yojana
<b>CGFSA</b>	- Chhattisgarh Food Security Act
<b>JSY</b>	- Janani Suraksha Yojana
<b>PM- GKAY</b>	- Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana
<b>BJP</b>	- Bhartiya Janta Party

*Chapter I*  
*Introduction*

# CHAPTER- I

## INTRODUCTION

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### 1.0 Introduction

According to Amartya Sen, it is said that Food, Cloth and Shelter are basic human needs for every people. Food is just as necessary for survival as air is to breathe. As Acharya Chanakya said that "The biggest sin for a king is the death of any of his subjects due to hunger". Food insecurity causes hunger malnutrition and poverty. In a democratic society, it is the government's role to check that the general public has access to sufficient food. According to World Food Summit (1996). It is possible to achieve food security when all persons have physical and economic access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food choices in order to maintain an active and healthy lifestyle. In India, Public Distribution System (PDS) has been around for more than 50 years now as rationing was initially established by the Britishers in 1939 in Bombay as a strategy to promote equitable distribution of food grains to urban consumers in the face of growing prices. Thus, rationing in times of crisis such as famine and drought was the historical forerunner to national policies of food grain stabilization and management. Among the numerous Price Control Conferences held between 1940 and 1942, the sixth, convened in September 1942, established the fundamental foundations of an Indian Public Distribution System. The Food Department, which was established in December 1942, developed an All India Basic Plan that addressed matters like purchasing agent contracts, public distribution, procurement, storage and inspection. The primary goal of the then-new Policy was to keep food prices stable. The Food Grains Enquiry Committee (Balwant Rai Mehta

Committee Report, 1957) advocated for flexible indirect controls, the expansion of Fair Price Shops (FPSs), and the continuation of the zonal policy of bringing deficit and surplus areas within zones together while maintaining price control within each zone.

The Green Revolution and food self-sufficiency introduced a new dimension to the management of food grains. Farmers were given a fair procurement price to protect them against market anomalies, as well as buffer stocking, market price control, and public distribution of critical commodities. Food Corporation of India (FCI) was founded in 1965 as a self-contained corporation with the mission of purchasing, storing, moving, transporting, distributing, and selling food grains and other food products on a commercial basis. The Study Team on FPSs, led by Shri V.M. Dandekar (1966), found that foreign supplies were insufficient to supply the growing demand for food grains through FPSs<sup>1</sup>

The team suggested that FPS pricing be market-driven and that they should maximize their market share. The Food Grains Policy Committee (1966) argued for the formulation of a National Food Budget based on zonal restrictions, the implementation of statutory rationing in larger urban areas, increased procurement, buffer stock building, and a larger role for the Food Corporation of India in inter-state trade.

The Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85) had, *inter alia*, anticipated that the Public Distribution System would “have to be so developed that it remains hereafter a stable and permanent feature of our strategy to control prices, reduce fluctuations in them and achieve an equitable distribution of essential consumer goods”. Important Supplies Programme, introduced in 1982 as the 17th no. on 20 point Programme, intended to scale the PDS through more FPSs, including mobile FPSs, to make textbooks and exercise books available to students on a priority basis and to promote strong consumer

protection movement. The number of FPSs increased from 2.30 lakhs in January 1980 to 3.02 lakhs in January 1984. While the Government of India had itself shouldered the responsibility of supplying essential commodities, viz; wheat, sugar, rice, kerosene, soft coke and edible oils, the State Governments had the option to add other items considered vital by them. In 1984, the Government of India established the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies with two departments namely the Department of Food and the Department of Civil Supplies; the latter being in charge of PDS. During the Seventh Five Year Plan, an Advisory Committee on PDS led by the Union Minister for Food & Civil Supplies was constituted by the Government of India to review its work on a timely basis. At the district, block, and tehsil levels, Consumer Advisory Committees were to be formed.

The Public Distribution System (PDS) is a poverty-reduction initiative that adds to people's social well-being. Rice, sugar, wheat, kerosene, and other essential goods are provided to the population at inexpensive costs through the PDS. PDS is a blessing for those who live in poverty. The principal social welfare and anti-poverty programme of the Indian government is the Public Distribution System (PDS). The Government of India launched the Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS) in 1992 to service and distribute critical commodities to people living in distant, backward, and hilly areas. In 1997, the government implemented the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS). The federal government and state governments have both been actively involved in guiding the PDS's operations to ensure its success.

On June 1, 1997, the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) was launched. According to the TPDS, every State's population below the poverty line (BPL) would be identified, and each BPL family would be entitled to a set number of food grains at specially subsidized prices. While the BPL population received food grains at half the

cost, the above poverty line population, who did not have a set entitlement to food grains, received grains at their cost. In contrast to RPDS, which focused on 'all in poor areas,' TPDS plans to target the subsidized provision of food grains to 'poor in all places.'

In India, the bulk of the population lives in rural areas, where their level of living is low, and they cannot manage to pay market prices for basic items. To boost rice output by 10 million tonnes, wheat production by 8 million tonnes, and pulses production by 2 million tonnes by the conclusion of the eleventh plan, the National Development Council enacted a resolution on May 29, 2007. A Central government-sponsored scheme National Food Security Mission (NSFM) was launched in October 2007. The National Food Security Act of 2013 was signed into law by the President on September 10, 2013. It is a law that ensures people have access to appropriate quality food at cheap rates so they can live a dignified life.

In India, The Public distribution system (PDS) is basically an Indian food Security System established under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food, and Public Distribution. (FCS &CA)/CAPD. The Public Distribution System (PDS) matured itself as an important component to tackle the scarcity of food grains at affordable rates through fair distribution channels. PDS operations are being run by the Joint cooperation of the Central and the respective State/UT Governments and the responsibility of the whole initiative lies with both governments.

The Food Corporation of India (FCI) has been given the responsibility to Procure, Store, and Transport and bulk allocation of food grains to the respective state governments. Whereas the responsibility of the respective state governments is to channel the food grains through Fair Price Shops(FPS's), Depots which are managed and controlled by

the respective state/UT's Food civil supplies and Consumer Affairs Department. Food civil supplies and Consumer Affairs Department is also responsible for allocation within the state, identification of eligible families under appropriate categories, and Issue of ration cards to the beneficiaries. Under the PDS, currently, the commodities such as Rice, Wheat, Flour, Sugar and kerosene are being allocated to Union Territories/States for public distribution.

Some states/UTs also distribute Pulses, Edible oils, Iodized Salt, Spices, etc. through PDS outlets. To ensure the smooth functioning of these FPS and Depots, Tehsil Sales Offices have been established for the supervision of these outlets.

### **1.1 History of PDS in India**

The British Government introduced PDS in India during the onset of World War II. It was Bombay (Now known as Mumbai) where its first-ever functioning started. Gradually the scope of the reach enhanced to the 13 different cities and by the year 1946, the reach of the PDS system and its functioning crossed to around 771 cities of India. After the end of World War II, Most the countries in the year 1943 decided to shun this PDS system. After India gained independence, India decided to re-launch the PDS system again in the year 1950 as, after the end of World War II, the prices of the Cereals touched heights due to skyrocketing prices globally. At the time of Independence, India was lacking in the self-sufficiency of Cereals (including Food grains) and at that time due to a lack of financial liquidity and cash crunch, it was not possible for the country to procure Cereals to fulfil the needs of the whole Indian population at the mass level. Hence, it was the United States of America which introduced the PDS system in India under the PL-480 Act in the year 1956. The PL-480 act was based on the United States' distribution of foreign food aid. Even after the

end of World War II, the United States of America and the USSR (now known as Russia) were engaged in a state of the cold war. As part of the strategic and Political strategy both the countries were helping the other countries to cope with their economic crisis in order to seek their cooperation for their various strategic needs for their own vested interests. The United States supported the ideology of the Capitalist political system whereas on the other side the USSR was in the supported of the communist political system. Hence the two countries supported their own ideologies.

As a result, to block the USSR's move of extending their approach to the communist political system beyond their own geographical boundaries, the United States of America introduced the Marshall plan in 1948 which lasted till the year 1952 and its aim was to provide aid to western Europe under the aegis of ERP (Europe Recovery Plan) to help the war-ravaged countries to cope up with the post-war consequences like Poverty, Destruction, Hunger and to help such countries in their re-economic development and infrastructure remodeling through the various remedial measures. Around 12 billion monetary aid was given to Europe and agreed to provide India with 31 million Wheat and 0.19 million rice to fight the crisis of food shortage and for the distribution of the above-mentioned commodity, it was necessary to have a PDS system. This system continued till the year 1960 but unfortunately, it was abruptly stopped due to the Sino-Indian war in 1962 and the Indo-Pakistani war in 1965.

In 1965, the Food Corporation of India (FCI) came into existence and from the year 1979 PDS system has been completely functional. PDS had contributed to curbing the rise of the prices of the food grains and it ensured access to food to the beneficiaries gradually with the rise of the national agricultural production in the aftermath of the green revolution, the reach of PDS was extended to the far-flung tribal areas where the poverty level was substantially high in the 1970 and 1980s and this system was named

as Revamped Public Distribution System. The revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS) came into existence in June 1992. It was formed with a goal to strengthen and streamline the PDS operations and enhance its reach to the far-flung areas which are inaccessible due to the Droughts, Excessive Snowing, and Hilly, remote or are landlocked. Under this RPDS, the approach was widened and several other programmes like Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDP), Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP), and Desert Development Programme (DDP) in specific Designated Hill areas which were identified in consultation with the state governments for special consideration. For such areas, the food grains were issued to the states at 50 paise below the CIP (Central Issue Price) and the ceiling of issue quantity was up to 20 Kg per Ration Card. Not only limited to this but, RPDS included mapping of the left-out families and issuing of ration cards to them as well. It also helped in the projection of Infrastructure requirements viz. additional fair price shops, Storage Capacity etc. and the addition of other additional commodities such as Pulses, Tea, Salt, Soap etc. for distribution through PDS outlets. In June 1997, the GOI launched the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) with a special focus on the poor segment of the society. Under this Project, the states had to formulate and implement various infallible arrangements for identification of the poverty-stricken strata of the society for delivery and the distribution of the food grains in a transparent and accountable system at the FPS level and this scheme was intended to benefit about 6 Crore poverty-stricken segment of people.

The number of food grains in excess of the initially required quantity for below poverty line families (BPL) was granted to the state as “transitory Allocation” for which 103 lakh tons of food grains were reserved annually. Apart from the TPDS allocation, the states were allocated an additional allocation too. The transitory allocation was intended for the continuous benefit of subsidized food grains to the population who were above

the APL as sudden withdrawal of benefits which already existed under PDS for them was not considered desirable.

The transitory allocation was already issued at Subsidized rates but even after being getting Subsidized, the rates of the food grains were higher than the prices for the BPL Quota. Keeping in view the increasing allocation of food grains to the Below poverty line families and to provide the food subsidy, GOI increased the allocation of food grains to BPL families from 10 Kg to 20 Kgs of food grains per family per month at half of the economic cost and the allocation to the above poverty line families at economic cost wef.1-4-2000.

Similarly, Chhattisgarh is greatly benefitting from the PDS. About 80% of the APL (Above Poverty level) families have access to Ration shops during COVID Pandemic even when the economy of not only India but there was a global economic crisis all over. Chhattisgarh was one of the states where people got largely benefitted as, during the COVID pandemic when migrant labourers and workers returned from the other states to their home state among nationwide lockdown, Chhattisgarh witnessed an increase in the purchase of PDS rations by APL families. Under National Food Security Act, Antyodaya Anna Scheme for the disabled come under the BPL category and people who take ration at Rs. 10 per kg are considered as APL families and people who get ration at Rs 1 per kg come under the BPL category. Around 2.47 Crore people are provided rations under PDS in the state.

### **1.2 Take Away: Evolution of PDS in India Snapshots in Brief**

1. PDS was introduced around the happening of World War II as an emergency rationing measure. Before the period of 1960s, the distribution of food grains through PDS was totally dependent on the import of food grains.


2. In the year the 1960s, it was further extended as a response to the food shortages of the time; and soon after the Government of India established the Agriculture Prices Commission (APC) and the Food Corporation of India (FCI) to improve the Quality, Domestic procurement of food grains and its storage for PDS.
3. By the year the 1970s, PDS became a universal scheme for the distribution of the Subsidized food grains.
4. Till 1992, PDS was a general scheme entitled to all the consumers without any exclusion.
5. The Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS) was launched in the year June 1992 for strengthening & streamlining the PDS as well as to improve its preview to the far-flung, Hilly, Remote, Landlocked and inaccessible areas where a substantial section of the poverty-stricken and underprivileged classes reside.
6. In the year 1997, in the month of June, the Government of India launched the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) having the main emphasis on the poor.
7. Under the aegis of TPDS, beneficiaries were divided into two main categories:
8. Those Households who were below the poverty line are known as BPL.
9. Those Households that were above the poverty line were known as APL.

**Antyodaya Anna Yojna (AAY):** The aim of the introduction of the AAY scheme was to cater to the hunger needs of the poorest segments of the BPL population. A National Sample Survey pointed to the critical fact that about 5% of the total population in the

country don't have access to even two meals a day and even sleep hungry stomach. In order to extend the focus and target of TPDS to benefit such categories such as beneficiaries the "Antyodaya Anna Yojana" (AAY) was launched by the Govt. of India in December 2000 for almost one Crore poorest of the poor families. In September 2013, the Indian Parliament enacted the National Food Security Act, 2013. The Act relies largely on the existing TPDS to deliver food grains as legal entitlements to poor households. This makes it evident by making the right to food a justifiable right.

### **1.3 The functioning of the PDS System**

1. The Central and State Governments work in cooperation and jointly share responsibilities in order to provide food grains to the identified beneficiaries.
2. The centre government procures food grains from farmers at the minimum support price (MSP) and sells them to the states at central issue prices. It is wholly responsible for transporting the grains to food godowns in each state.
3. It is the responsibility of the States to transport food grains from these food godowns to each fair price shop (ration shop), where the beneficiary buys the food grains at the price even lower than the central issue price. Many states even further subsidize the price of food grains before selling them to beneficiaries to make them available to them at even more cheaply and more affordable prices to them.



### 1.4 Importance of PDS

1. It helps in ensuring the Food and Nutritional Security of the nation.
2. It has helped in stabilizing food prices and making food available to the poor at affordable prices.
3. It maintains the buffer stock of food grains in the warehouse so that the flow of food remains active even during the period of less agricultural food production.
4. It has helped in the redistribution of grains by supplying food from surplus regions of the country to deficient regions.

The system of minimum support price and procurement has contributed to the increase in food grain production.

### 1.5 Shortcomings or problems Associated with the PDS system in India

**1.5.1 Procurement:** Open-ended Procurement: Even if the buffer stock is available still all the incoming grains are accepted thereby creating a dearth in the open market.

- The implementation of the NFSA (National Food Security Act) would increase the quantum of the procurement of the food grains which will in turn result in the higher prices for food grains.
- The extended gap between the existing storage space and the required storage capacity for storing food grains.
- The option of MSP (Minimum Support Price) has further motivated farmers to channel their land from the production of coarse grains that are to be consumed by the poor segment of the society, to rice and wheat.

### **1.5.2 Storage**

- In the audits conducted by the CAG of India, they have time to time highlighted the issue of the inadequate storage capacity with the Food Corporation of India (FCI).
- The damaging and the rotting of the food grains.
- Foodgrains when stored for a considerable amount of time attract Government Expenditure which can be termed Capital wastage/Expenditure.

### **1.6 Identification of Beneficiaries**

Beneficiary identification is not Reliable/ Foolproof.

1. Errors may happen in the data of inclusion and exclusion of BPL (Below Poverty line) and APL (Above Poverty line) family members in Beneficiary data.
2. In the absence of proper official estimates of the actual income of households, targeting and mapping actual beneficiaries become a difficult task.

3. The deserving beneficiaries are deprived of being not mapped while some ineligible beneficiaries are getting undue benefits not actually meant for them.
4. Due to the ghost cards/fake ration cards which are made in the name of un-existing people in several states indicate that the grains are being diverted from the deserving beneficiaries to the open market for selling purposes.

### **1.7 Transportation**

1. Foodgrains may be subjected to Theft, Leakage and diversion during transportation.
2. Transportation of food grains during procurement and distribution after procurement to far-flung areas like Northeastern states incur time and costs. Cost advantage is lacking.

### **1.8 Other Issues**

1. Replacement of good quality food grains with poor quality and cheap food grains.
2. Public distribution system includes a fewer variety of food grains such as wheat and rice and it doesn't fulfil all the nutritional requirements of a person.
3. Unethical and lack of fair practices like Malpractices and black marketing of food grains by the Fair Price shop owners by selling food grains in the open market which are meant for the beneficiaries. It won't be wrong to say that in order to attain self-sufficiency and increase the surplus in food grains, the environment is being stressed by the overuse of fertilizers, and deteriorating soil

and water conditions. It was found that due to the cultivation of rice in the region of North West, the water table has gone down by 33cm in the year 2002-08.

### **1.9 Public Distribution System (PDS) and the State of Chhattisgarh**

Chhattisgarh is the first state in India to implement a food security act of its' own. Not only provisions for food security have been made in C.G. Food Security Act but provisions for nutrition security have also been made with the objective of increasing protein intake in food for the purpose of a balanced diet. Under the food security Act following criteria have been set for eligible families:-

- 1. Antyodaya households:** There is a provision to include families in the category of Antyodaya households who have been either currently eligible for the Andyodaya household scheme or to be included in vulnerable social groups. Such families are monthly entitlement to Rs 1per kg of rice; 2 kg free iodized Amrit Namak (Salt), Rs 5per kg to 2 kg of a gram in the scheduled area and Rs 10 per kg to 2kg of Lentils in non-scheduled area. According to the departmental database, 14.64 lakh Ration cards have been issued.
- 2. Prathmikta households:-** families which hold the Ration Card under the Mukhyamantri Khadyanya Sahayata Schene were put in Prathamik households. Such families are entitled to Rs 1per kg to 35 kg of rice; 2kg free iodized Amrit Namak (Salt), and Rs 5 per kg to 2 kg of gram per month in the scheduled area. According to the departmental database 42.60 lakhs, blue cover Ration Cards of Prathmik households have been issued.
- 3. Samanya households:** - Samanya households are defined as those which are not included in Antyodaya households and Apawarjit households. Such families are entitled to Rs 9.50-10 per kg of rice and Rs 5-6.75 per kg of wheat per month.

According to the departmental database, 4.19 lakh Ration Cards have been insured under this scheme.

The public distribution system provides food at a low cost to consumers. 11088 fair price shops were operating in the state till October'2014, out of which 4115 were being operated by panchayats, 4364 by service cooperative societies, 2412 by women self-help groups, 154 by forest security societies and 43 by urban bodies. There is an arrangement for issuing ration cards, to eligible persons under Chhattisgarh Food Security Act, 2012, to provide vital commodities to consumers through Reasonable price shops. Gram panchayats are been given the right to issue Antyodaya, Prathmik and Samanya cards in rural areas and municipal corporation/Nagar panchayat in urban areas are been given the similar right in their jurisdiction.

### ***Procurement of Paddy at Support Price***

The state procures paddy at the specified support price through its authorised agency, the Chhattisgarh State Co-operative Marketing Federation, via 1333 co-operative organisations. In the year 2000-01, the support price of the common category of paddy was Rs. 510 per 100 Kg and Rs. 540 per 100 Kg for the 'A' category of paddy which has been raised to Rs. 1360 per 100 Kg for common paddy and Rs. 1400 per 100 Kg for grade 'A' paddy in the year 2014-15. In the year 2013-14, 79.72 lakh tons of paddy were purchased at support price and the bonus of Rs.300 per 100 Kg was distributed to farmers in addition to the support price.

### **1.10 The Chhattisgarh Model**

- 1. Computerization of Paddy Procurement:*** In the Kharif year 2007-08, the whole system of paddy procurement at support price has been computerized. This year 59 new paddy procurement centres have been opened for the convenience of farmers. In the Kharif year 2012-13, paddy has been purchased from farmers

through computers in 1975 paddy procurement centres of the state. Information regarding the farmers i.e. name of the farmer, total land was recorded in the system before the start of paddy procurement itself. Computer-generated cheques are provided immediately after the sale of paddy by farmers at procurement centres. Information on procurement on daily basis from farmers is immediately available to the state government due to the computerization of the paddy procurement process. Information on the farmer of every district of the state, who has sold their paddy via this software, is available on the website of the Food Department.

2. ***Transparency in Public Distribution System:*** Following actions are taken by the state government for transparency and effective control in the allotment of ration material, supply to reasonable price shops and distribution of ration material to beneficiaries, under the public distribution system.
3. ***PDS Online System:-***Computerization of PDS was started in the year 2007 and till now, whole activity from the state level up to supply centres of Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation has been computerized. All District's food offices have been connected to the State headquarters via the internet by computerization of the Public distribution system. Database of all 11088 Reasonable price shops was prepared for allocation of ration material and since January 2008, shop wise ration material is being allotted by the Food Directorate through a computerized system of the basis of ration cards registered with shops but at present 123000 Reasonable price shops exist.
4. ***Rice Festival:*** Rice festival has been started by the state government in February 2008 for regular monitoring of the distribution of ration material through the

Public distribution system. The Rice Festival is also organized on the first day of Haat-Bazaar. The rice festival is organized on the 7th of each month. Ration material can be procured by the ration cardholder on the specified date during this festival.

5. **Call Centre:** Adequate arrangement has been made by the Food Department through the use of information technology to achieve the state government's objective of promoting transparency and public participation in the distribution of ration material under the Public distribution system. The call centre is operated by the Food Department since January 2008. The toll-free number is 1800-233-3663 through which any citizen case obtains information about the Public distribution system and other schemes being run by the Food Department and can also register his complaint. A total of 16914 complaints have been registered till now. 16392 complaints have been resolved out of the total complaints received.
6. **Public Participation Website:** Public participation website ([www.cg.nic.in/citizen](http://www.cg.nic.in/citizen))<sup>2</sup> is a new experiment of the state government. All citizens can register themselves on this website free of cost. After registration, citizens send in complaints and suggestions concerning Food Department through e-mail.
7. **E-Kerosene Scheme:** E-Kerosene scheme has been launched by the state government in August 2012, to make the kerosene allocation and supply process more transparent and accountable for reasonable price shops, under this scheme, shop wise online allotment is being done on the basis of numbers of ration cards registered with reasonable price shops from the state level. The database has

been prepared of all 98 wholesale kerosene dealers and 11088 reasonable privet shop operators of the state including their mobile numbers. Information of kerosene pock up by wholesale dealers from oil depot is given in official server through SMS on registered mobile numbers.

8. **Awards-** National E-Governance Award, Manthan Award, E-India Award and C.S.I. E-Governance Award, C.S.I. Nihilent E-governance Award has been received for the computerization of the Public distribution system.

### **1.11 Criteria for Inclusion under NFSA**

- All Antyodya Anna Yojna Families
- Households without shelter
- Households with destitute persons who are living on alms.
- Household which is headed by a widow or a single woman (unmarried/Separated /deserted)
- Households headed by specially abled or individual having disability of above forty percent or terminally ill.
- Transgender Person
- Household headed by a minor or an orphan
- Household dependent on daily wage labour.
- Households with old age Persons having age 60 years and above with no regular Income, Support or no assured means of subsistence.

- If all earning members in a household are irregular wagers such as Slumdweller, Rag Pickers, Unskilled Workers, Shikarawalas and Ponywalas, Domestic Workers, Sweepers etc.

### **1.12 Criteria for Exclusion**

- Households with at least one member as income or Professional taxpayer.
- Businessman having business turnover of Rs 25 lacks/year.
- Persons having land holding above 10 kanals in case of individuals and 20 kanals in case of joint family in urban areas. In rural areas, the same shall be 30 Kanals and 50 Kanals respectively (all based on self-declarations)
- All gazette officers or equivalent ranks in Corporations, Boards, PSU etc.
- All persons holding constitutional authority/positions and
- Any household having an annual family income of more than 5 lacks.

### **1.13 Review of Related Literature**

**Vasudha, Chhotray, Anindita, Adhikari & Bahuguna (2018)** conducted a study on food security and political circumstances that support state capacity for welfare promotion With powerful popular mobilizations for the Right to Food around the world, the idea of governmental responsibility for food security has gained ground; nonetheless, important disparities exist in both the articulation of demands and political responses. The reason consists in the interconnected components of political competitiveness, societal demands, and political enablement of bureaucratic capability. This research adds to the growing literature on the political conditions that allow the state to promote welfare.<sup>3</sup>

**Tillin, Deshpande & Kailash (2015):** Comparing the Politics of Welfare across States in India, this book presents an agenda for the study of comparative subnational politics and social policy in India. The first and second chapter links these unusual decisions to the ‘policy frames’ shared by politicians, bureaucrats, and academics alike, that have emerged from long-term patterns of political mobilizations and institutional development despite the different health economics of the two states. The second chapter by Rajeshwari Deshpande focuses on social security for workers in West Bengal and Maharashtra. The third chapter by Tillin, Saxena and Sisodia addresses the reform of the classic subsidy programme, the PDS, in the neighboring states of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh which were bifurcated in 2000. The chapter highlights the role of leadership and its relationship with the bureaucracy, to explain the different outcomes in the two states. The next chapter by Rajesh Dev compares the local dynamics of MGNREGA’s implementation in the two ‘tribal’ states of Meghalaya and Jharkhand. Dev compares the implementation of ‘MGNREGA’ in the fifth Scheduled area of Jharkhand where elected Panchayati raj institutions exist to the situation in the Sixth Scheduled area of Meghalaya where structures to implement the scheme have been grafted onto customary governance institutions. The next chapter by Jerkins and Manor offers a different reading of the implementation of MGNREGA in the regional settings of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh and focuses on a programme which has expanded the political capacities of the poor in rural areas. The last chapter focuses on this question through a comparative study of education policy. RTE Act in the two urban centres of Delhi and Chandigarh. The chapters in this volume offer an exploration of how local political environments shape the context for policy implementation; a critical endeavour in order to appreciate the opportunities and frustrations inherent within India’s emergent regime.<sup>4</sup>

*Dev & Sharma (2010)* analyzed the performance of food security in terms of availability, access, and absorption of nutrition, as well as the problems and policies associated with it. It has been discovered that all three are interconnected. For example, increasing the availability and accessibility of food can improve the nutritional status of households. Access to food can be improved by greater employment as a result of the expansion of labor-intensive industries and/or the implementation of social security programmes. The issue of malnutrition encompasses a far broader range of issues than the issue of food access. India has malnutrition rates that are nearly twice as high as those in many African countries. This necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach that addresses diet diversity, including micronutrients, women's empowerment, health, education, clean drinking water, hygiene and sanitation, among other things.<sup>5</sup>

*Krishnamurthy, Pathania & Tandon (2014)* suggest that The National Food Security Act has commended Chhattisgarh's public distribution reforms as a model for other states to follow. His findings imply that sustained reforms with a political and social will can improve PDS access, but that advances without these characteristics may not be considerable or lasting.<sup>6</sup>

*Drèze & Khera (2013)* According to them, estimations of the impact of India's Public Distribution System were made using data from the National Sample Survey conducted in 2009-10 and official poverty lines. According to them, PDS has the potential to bring down a poverty-gap index of rural poverty by 18 to 22 percent at the national level in all of India. The equivalent statistics are far higher in states with a well-functioning public distribution system, for example, 61 to 83 percent in Tamil Nadu and 39 to 57 percent in Chhattisgarh, respectively. Present estimates of the impact of India's Public Distribution System using National Sample Survey data for 2009-10 and official poverty lines. At the all-India level, the PDS is estimated to reduce the poverty-gap

index of rural poverty by 18 to 22 percent. The corresponding figures are much higher for states with a well-functioning PDS, e.g. 61 to 83 per cent in Tamil Nadu and 39 to 57 per cent in Chhattisgarh.<sup>7</sup>

#### **1.14 Objectives of Study**

1. To analyse the awareness of the public distribution system among BPL families in Chhattisgarh.
2. To examine the impact of PDS policies in Chhattisgarh.
3. To analyze the recent schemes under PDS and their performance in Chhattisgarh.
4. To study the role of Local administration in monitoring and implementing the PDS scheme.

#### **1.15 Research Questions**

1. How has the politics of the state-driven the new model of public distribution system?
2. What is the role of local administration and their experience in the implementation of PDS?
3. Why is there intra-regional variation in the implementation of the programme?

#### **1.16 Hypothesis**

1. Lack of accountability on the part of implementing agency lead to failure of PDS.
2. The use of modern technology reduces scam and enhance transparency in PDS.

**1.17 Research Methodology**

The present study has followed the empirical method using primary Data. A survey method has been followed for this study. By following purposive sampling two-Panchayats' viz., one backward and one developed were selected in Raipur District. The researcher also took the help of secondary sources such as government documents reports and papers released by the Government of India and Chhattisgarh and other different national organization bodies on the related topics including books, journals and newspaper readings relevant to the research.

**1.18 Chapters under Study**

- Chapter 1: Introduction
- Chapter 2: Politics of welfare and its impact: A Theoretical Analysis.
- Chapter 3: Public Distribution System (PDS) in India.
- Chapter 4: Public Distribution System in Chhattisgarh: The Regulatory Mechanism.
- Chapter 5: Findings of the Study
- Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion

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*Chapter II*

*Politics of Welfare and Its*

*Impact: A Theoretical Analysis*

## CHAPTER-II

### POLITICS OF WELFARE AND ITS IMPACT: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

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#### 2.0 Historical Background Welfare State

If we clear the meaning of the welfare state by distinguishing it from the socialist states, it can be explained that they are different from each other. It is observed that the term Socialism has been used for many decades. Thus the main means of this is to make an effort to plan the whole economy, referred to as “central planning”. The planning under socialist states included such as paper production, food, clothing, medicines, vehicles and other goods. The finest examples of the socialist states are Russia and its clients, Cuba, and China. But when we talk about the welfare state there may not be state ownership of the means of production as a whole, though there may be major state ownership in some sectors or industries, which is generally linked and associated with certain services, such as "education," "medical care," "recreation," and housing, which are all related with "welfare." Thus welfare state do not undertake and manage all productive activity, but the main focus of the state is to protect the interests of the people and remained responsible for the welfare. Along with this, it is responsible for justice, defence against aggression and rule of law, making efforts to create peaceful conditions where people feel free and secure. Accordingly, “welfare states tend to influence, or even to monopolize, provision of retirement security, medical care, education, and income security, and organize massive transfer payments, which are often unjustified in the name of transferring income from the "haves" to the "have nots," but which typically shuffle—or churn—the vast majority of the transfer payments among the "haves," according to the authors. Welfare governments do not only or even largely

benefit the poor. Welfare states victimize the poor to benefit those who can manipulate the system better. (The same welfare states that provide “food stamps” and other food subsidies to the poor boost food prices through agriculture subsidies, import restrictions, and legislated minimum prices.) Hence Welfare states achieve political stability including every section of the society from the wealthiest to the poorest. The origin of the welfare state is estimated in the late 1800s in Germany in the political maneuvering and “state building” of the German statesman Otto von Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor who defeated France and Austria militarily and unified the other German states into the “Second Reich” on the basis of “Iron and Blood.”

In this regard, Bismarck waged a long political fight in Germany against the free-trade classical liberals; who preferred and encouraged peaceful means of establishing a peaceful and prosperous nation, creating peace with Germany’s neighbors and ignoring the war, colonization, and militarism. As a part of his state-building program in Central Europe, Bismarck pioneered the welfare state, which has since come to colonize much of the political territory of the globe. Bismarck promoted and worked for the welfare state as a German welfare state through various and number of compulsory insurance schemes for accidents, disability, health, and old age in the 1880s. The militaristic Chancellor Bismarck called his measures “State Socialism,” and in 1882 stated that “Many of the measures which we have adopted to the great blessing of the country are Socialistic, and the State will have to accustom itself to a little more Socialism yet.”(after “the welfare state, Edited by Tom G. Palmer (online book) Published by Students For Liberty & Atlas Network / Jameson Books, Inc”). It emerges historically as a top-down solution to the problem. This was the focused that how social protection of the people can be possible and social security can be maintained with respect to an urbanized capitalist economy.

## **2.1 Meaning and Nature of Welfare State**

The concept of the welfare state is not defined very clearly and often, a long Definition is given by Briggs who is considered to be a historian makes some adequate reflections on the concept. As it was defined that “A welfare state is one in which organized power is used (through politics and administration) to try to change the way the market works in at least three ways: first, by giving people and families a set amount of money, no matter how much their work or property is worth; second, by giving people and families the ability to deal with certain "social contingencies" (for example, sickness, old age, etc.). It was written by Briggs in 1961.

In a broader sense welfare state alternates the effect of the market. There are certain positive points that can be taken into consideration in the context of the welfare state such as it supports “minimum guarantee (mitigating poverty); covering a range of social risks (security), and providing certain Services (health care, child and elder care, etc.)” at the optimum level. Hence if we talk about the definition of Briggs it is related to the tradition of thinking about social policy in terms of citizenship. Other scholars such as TH Marshall and Richard Titmuss, Walter Korpi and Gøsta Esping-Andersen have carried out the same in a progressive way.<sup>1</sup>

There are many explanations for welfare state development. One of them is “Structural” explanations which have a great link with the market economy, industrialization and modernization (Wilensky, 1974).<sup>2</sup> Inequality and insecurity among the people are removed in the welfare state and in the modern capitalist, industrial society. Hence plays a significant role in the welfare of the people and to maintain social cohesion. This way functionalist thinking explains why it is important and necessary to have a welfare state. This conflict approach emphasize the class interests. In addition to this,

it is associated with the inception of an industrial working class. Along with this its organization in trade unions and Social Democratic parties are also promoted. Class and party alliances with old or new middle-class groups were focused on this. In this (Korpi, 1983 & Andersen, 1990).<sup>3</sup> Hence it is argued that welfare states crystallize in different regimes – “frozen landscapes” that are resistant to change (Pierson, 1994), or when exposed to exogenous pressure, they at least evolve in regime-specific ways (Swank, 2001; Kautto & Kvist, 2002).<sup>4</sup> As per the structural elucidation of welfare reform is concerned it is found that family structures got changed, ageing populations. Along with this globalization and migration were also seen etc. But most important thing is that ideational and institutional theories are critical in elucidating change. Let us take an example of some old-age support, the Danish old age support of 1891 was purposely introduced to be distinct from the first old age. Thus introducing disability insurance was one of the landmark initiatives taken by Bismarck two years earlier. The Danish welfare state included all citizens without taking care of their employment track record and gender. Danish old age support scheme was emulated by New Zealand when it emerged as a third country in the year 1898. Most scholars would apparently agree with the statement that the welfare state is co-responsible. Hence decision-makers and also public opinion is in the support of the positive impression of the welfare state.

### **2.3 Nature/Functions of the Welfare State**

1. While defining the functions of the welfare state democracy and commitment to social justice cannot be ignored. Hence it can be understood by considering these five pillars of the welfare state functions:
2. Public good
3. Citizen’s right

4. universal accessibility
5. Financed from tax revenue
6. Education.
7. Another function of the welfare state can be included such as
8. Education, at least for elementary and secondary levels;
9. Health access to all, in terms of services and funding mechanisms;
10. Social protection in its components of contributory
11. Social security and tax-funded social assistance
12. Active labour market policies to generate employment
13. Family policies, such as child-related policies and welfare services.
14. Environmental policies and measures that address environmental sustainability – have been seen as integral to welfare state policy (UNRISD 2014). Along with this various countries which social welfare they promote more. These countries show some form of welfare state functions, with policies covering the areas such as education and health, social protection, and labour market schemes.

#### **2.4 Western Theories of Welfare State: Reflection on Gosta Esping Anderson and associates**

Gosta Esping-Andersen and John Myles have seen the concept in the different angles. Along with this, it does not mean that the welfare state automatically generates more equality. It is to be discussed and commented on after the various social reforms that welfare state was not only pursued for fair reasons. Hence the foundation of the welfare state is done by the conservative reformers who, like Bismarck. They believe it is more important to maintain existing social hierarchies than to change them. Socialists pushed

for social policies when they get the opportunities and when it is to be considered that these social policies would better the worker's condition, eliminate poverty, and equalize opportunities.

Barr (2001) stated that “the welfare state is mainly a collective piggy bank designed to insure against social risks and therefore not a vehicle for equality. It is also Robin Hood to the extent that it aims to ameliorate need and poverty or, more generally, reduce welfare disparities. The balance between the two functions will in great measure dictate the equalizing impact of redistribution”.

If we want to understand the redistribution of the welfare state it is useful to differentiate between these three systems of redistribution.<sup>5</sup>

1. Horizontal,
2. Vertical and
3. between-group redistribution (Hills, 2004).

In this way, under horizontal distribution, there is a design of social insurance in which income across the life cycle is reallocated. Thus Rowntree (1901) attempted to emphasize this aspect by pioneering work on poverty. It is said that citizens have to face alternate periods of want and plenty during and across their life cycle. Further, he has recommended the requirement of vertical redistribution.<sup>6</sup>

The role of Robin Hood promoted the concept of taking from the rich to giving to the poor. In this regard tax system is most important in the vertical redistribution. In this system, the poorest people receive a disproportionate share of social spending. In this regard, we can take social assistance as the best example. Hence social assistance benefits to the low-income citizens are given. As per inter-group redistribution is

concerned it includes family benefits such as transfers from the childless to those with children and national health care which means redistribution between the healthy and the diseased. Thus it is noticed that no country with a welfare state has a true original income distribution yet as policies are of great concern in this system and affects directly and indirectly its shape. There are two major ways in which it happens. The first one is that where state it creates substantial inequality artificially. The example for this could be as it results in enormous numbers of people with no market income, such as retirees or women on maternity leave. In the same way, it is observed that work incentives and, as a result, incomes may be affected by social protection and tax systems. (Beramendi, 2001).<sup>7</sup> Secondly, it is the important task of the welfare state to provide resources to citizens which may affect their earnings potential. Thus it is very important to discuss here that the social welfare state makes the policies where inequalities in peoples' lifetime earnings power are dictated. Hence the policies which promote the structure of equal opportunity will inevitably also decrease disparities in the distribution of market income.

It is argued here that the distribution of the wellbeing is affected by the most of the provision of social services but there we see that these goes unmeasured in income data. Social insurance plays a significant role in the smooth and regular incomes across the life cycle. Thus the appropriate redistributive effects must be related to income on a lifetime basis. Along with this if we take care and determine the impact of 'Robin Hood redistribution' it would seem more significant to focus on poverty alleviation. These basic three issue need to be taken care of in the social welfare or in the social welfare state. The first one is that "welfare states hold different redistributive principles, some of which may encourage more equality of results or opportunities, while the second

may actually work in the opposite direction. Pension systems is one the illustrative example of this. You would see that most rich nations combine three pension pillars:

1. “Earnings-related insurance”
2. “Tax-subsidized private pension plans”
3. “General revenue-financed basic pension guarantee”

Hence the latter is likely to be more redistributive in benefit of low-income retirees whereas tax deductions for private schemes benefit the wealthy.

It is to be argued that “Economic theories see the welfare state as replacing insurance markets to compensate for market and information failures” (Barr, 2003).<sup>8</sup> It is to be said that government may be a more resourceful and competent insurer of risks, particularly under conditions of strong information asymmetry, credit limits and unfavorable selection. Along with this heightened economic weakness or susceptible in global markets is set in intensifying social risks. In this way it is needed to describe that what is the reason behind exceptionality of the welfare states in very open economies (Rodrik, 1998; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Garrett, 1998).<sup>9</sup> Hence Esping Anderson in 1999 reflected that “If the welfare state is primarily an insurer, its role in creating equality would appear irrelevant. But there are three kinds of social risks, each with its unique redistributive logic: *life course risks*, *inter-generational risks*, and *class risks*”. Pooling life cycle risks, such as old age infirmity, necessitates largely primarily horizontal redistribution over the life course – Barr’s ‘piggy bank’. But horizontal redistribution is obviously clearly ineffective for dangers that develop early in life, such as child poverty. Vertical redistribution will be required in order to address these issues. As a result of social inheritance, inter-generational hazards are linked to life chances in the sense that social backgrounds influence life outcomes. The policies that are

applicable in this case are those that promote equal opportunity. In the current degree of inequality in the parental generation, it is hypothesized that differences in parental investment in their children's life chances will dictate differences in a parental investment. If this is the case, there is a compelling rationale for vertical redistribution. Class risks are those that are concentrated in specific social groups: miners are more likely to be injured on the job than professors in college; the unskilled are more susceptible to low wages and unemployment. Class risks have prompted a variety of policy responses, including targeted assistance to the most vulnerable, corporate risk pooling (such as separate insurance plans for high-risk clients, such as miner's insurance), and universal risk pooling of the entire population, regardless of risk profile (such as universal child benefits or the Scandinavian tradition of a "people's pension"). Risk pooling can result in a complicated mix of redistributive logics and as economic theory often assumes, be equated with horizontal redistribution. The Robin Hood theory assumes that giving advantages to the poorest people will have the greatest redistributive effect. This has been challenged by the 'paradox of redistribution' thesis (Korpi and Palme, 1998).<sup>10</sup> The difference of opinion is that narrowly targeted policies are typically ungenerous and potentially stigmatizing due to a deficit of broad electoral support. On other hand, universal benefits garner widespread citizen support and will, hence, provide more substantial assistance that additionally will reach all the needy with more assurance. In this view, we should expect that pro-targeting welfare states, like the American, produce less income equalization than universalistic ones. Political theories provide a second source of guidance. One tradition links redistribution to the legislative power of left parties. The simple reasoning is that left-wing parties represent the poor, and that if they achieve enough political power, they will redistribute wealth

in their favour. There is substantial, evidence to support this thesis (Korpi, 1983; Huber and Stephens, 2001).<sup>11</sup>

“Moene and Wallerstein (2003) offer an explanation for these ambiguous findings. They show that the theory is meaningless for significant things like pensions and health care, while some, like unemployment insurance, do appear to respond to levels of pre-redistribution inequality — but not in the way that theory predicts”.<sup>12</sup> They discovered that countries with more equitable distributions spend more generously. Most interestingly, they show that rising inequality generates a dual, counteracting effect: on one hand, it increases demand for redistribution, and on the other hand, it increases demand for (non-redistributive) insurance. Thirdly, much research has been influenced by derivatives of Wagner’s Law, which states that once we get to a certain degree of development, the public expenditure would expand disproportionately faster than GDP growth.

The origins of welfare states stretch to the late 1800s, but social expenditure grew initially very slowly. This is understandable given that population coverage was sometimes insufficient and entitlements were low. And, once in place, large-ticket things like pensions required extremely extensive maturation periods. Before WWII, social spending in Europe rarely topped 3% of GDP. The welfare state concept arose in the post-war decades. By 1960, the rich democracies' median social expenditure was 10% of GDP. A huge wave of social change aimed at increasing benefit generosity and population inclusion ushered in the 1970s. By 1990, the median amount of social expenditures was 24% of GDP, although there was wide regional variation, ranging from 15% in the US to 30% in Scandinavia. Except for laggard countries in Southern Europe, spending has been flat. Due to the high cross-national association between

welfare state size and equality, the 'size-redistribution theory' appears plausible. Earlier comparative research assumed causality (Cutright, 1967 & Ringen, 1987).

It was practically similar to a sort of 'welfare capitalism' that flourished in Western Europe in the decades after WWII. There have been numerous patterns of welfare capitalism – or constellations of connections between states, families and markets – identified over the course of history. Diversity clusters of welfare regimes are now well acknowledged as a phenomenon of late capitalist development, not just in industrialized industrial countries, but also in developing countries. Systematic patterns of divergence in the connections between state, markets, and labour have also been discovered through cross-national comparative studies in lower and middle-income nations.

### **2.5 The Welfare States and Poverty**

Poverty reduction is very certainly the most important indicator of welfare state redistribution, it should come as no surprise that empirical research has tended to favour this indicator. It theoretically serves as a good test of Rawl's maximum principle of justice, which states that any redistribution should help the poorest people the most. It also speaks most directly to vertical, Robin Hood-redistribution. For two reasons, research has especially centered on child poverty. One is that childhood poverty is known to have substantial negative effects on subsequent outcomes such as education, social integration and health (Duncan & Gunn, 1997; Smeeding, 2001).<sup>13</sup> A welfare state's investment in children's well-being is a potentially very strong tool for fostering more equality of opportunity (Andersen, 2007). Virtually all studies conclude similarly that poverty reduction, in particular among families with children, is closely linked to with levels of social expenditure. The Nordic countries are typically the most

redistributive whereas the Anglo Saxon (especially the US) are the least (McFate et.al., 1995; & Smeeding, 2005).

## **2.6 Welfare States and Income Dynamics**

One-year based snapshots of income inequality can be misleading if there are significant cross-national disparities in the relative salience of transitory and persistent low (or high) income. There have been two approaches taken to the research. One strategy is to obtain measurements of 'permanent income,' that is, income that is measured over a long period of time in order to minimize short-term (and potentially immaterial) variations. In an ideal world, income disparity may be measured in terms of lifetime earnings. Another is to concentrate on the persistency of poverty over several years, as do Whelan et.al. (2003). Limitations on data pose severe obstacles for international comparisons, however, the little research on permanent and lifetime income inequality all imply that overall inequality is much lower when examined in this manner than when looking at one-year snapshots. In the study of perseverance, we face two issues. The first, addressed by Whelan et.al. (2003) and Nolan and Marx (this volume), is that there may be a large group of recidivists who depart and then again enter poverty over a period of years. The second point is that we must distinguish between "genuine" and "trivial" poverty exits. The second issue is addressed that leaving must entail a move over the 60% poverty line. As previously stated, we focus on child families and track poverty persistence over a period of three years or more, beginning with the first year of poverty measurement. The welfare regime distinction isn't very useful in this scenario. Denmark does exceptionally well in terms of avoiding long-term poverty (almost 60% of people leave poverty after the first year, and by the third year, there is virtually no one remaining), but Germany and the United Kingdom are not far behind. Poverty persists in Italy and the United States, which can be traced

back to the welfare state in both cases. Their basic safety nets are woefully inadequate and indiscriminate.

### **2.7 The Welfare States are divided into three groups by Esping-Andersen**

- 1. Liberal Welfare State:** “limits of welfare equal the marginal propensity to choose welfare overwork” in this model, The regulations governing entitlements are quite stringent, The gains are minor, and receiving these benefits is associated with social stigma, the eligibility or entitlement rules are very strict, the benefits are modest, and receiving these benefits is associated with the social stigma. In such states, the government encourages market competition by providing the bare necessities or subsidizing privately managed social programs. The United States, Canada, and Australia are the three largest countries that follow this Welfare State Model.
- 2. Corporatist/Conservative Welfare State:** This welfare state maintains the social structure of class and position by upholding status differences in terms of rights. They don't urge the market to take on the job of welfare provider; instead, they strive to push the market out of the Welfare State's domain. Women are typically excluded from social insurance, and social aid will encourage childbearing. According to strategies, the state will only intervene when individual ability to provide for its welfare has been lost. Austria, France, and Germany are the primary countries that follow this system.
- 3. Social Democratic Welfare States:** It oversees ensuring the greatest possible level of equality and is governed by social democratic ideas. It promotes policies that are largely decommodifying and universal while yet responding to a variety of needs. The dichotomy between the market and state, or among the middle

and lower classes, is fundamentally minimized to guarantee that all people have the same social rights and that benefits are distributed based on their income. This approach also fosters a strong sense of community among the beneficiaries, who are more likely to support it. As a result, it is a fusion of both Work and Welfare. It aspires to achieve full employment since that is the only way people can survive. Sweden and Norway are the greatest examples of nations that follow this rule. Although there are significant differences in method and attitude across these three welfare regimes, none of them exist in their purest form.

## **2.8 Models of PDS and Welfare Regime: A Comparative Study of Lower and Middle-Income Countries**

Multiple patterns of welfare capitalism or constellations of relations between states, families and markets have been discovered. It is now widely recognized that diverse clusters of welfare regimes are not only a phenomenon of late capitalist development in advanced industrial countries. Systematic patterns of divergence in the connections between state, labour, and markets have also been discovered through cross-national comparative studies in lower and middle income nations. These point to the presence of various approaches to social policy even in contexts where labour markets are characterized by significant levels of informality and social policy provisions do not resemble those found in more fully fledged 'welfare states' (Holliday, 2000 & Rudra, 2007).

Rudra (2007), like other literature on social policy regimes in East Asia (Holliday, 2000), describes 'productivist' social policy strategies that promote human capital formation through education or health investment as opposed to 'protective' social

policies that protect workers through a combination of worker protections and reliance on public-sector employment. Rudra says that 'productivist' techniques are prevalent in nations that have historically been exposed to international market competition through export-led industrialization, as opposed to import-substituting industrializers with more closed economies and more worker rights, such as India. Developing countries' welfare regimes aren't just shaped by how much they rely on markets and how much they rely on public policy. Due the high level of informality in most developing countries, non-market and non-state factors such as community, family and NGO's play a significant role in supporting livelihoods and managing with risk. For this reason, Gough and Wood (2004) coined the term "informal security regimes" to describe a type of welfare regime in which the domains of state, family, market and community are porous, compromising the state's ability to act independently to compensate for risks posed by market dependence or to challenge social relation's hierarchical or dependent patterns (Wood, 2004). Patterns of dominance and exclusion based on scriptive identities, such as religion and cast in India, are likely to shape markets on social structures of accumulation in India, (Harriss & White, 2003). Gough and Wood contrast these informal security regimes with 'welfare state regimes,' in which 'people can reasonably expect to meet (to a different amount) their security demands via participation in financial markets, labour markets and the finance and provisioning function of a "welfare state" (Gough, 2004).

The role of families as an element of the welfare mix is closely related to the sexual division of labour and the place of women as workers and/or caregivers. Feminist scholars have long argued that traditional welfare state analyses paid very little attention to gender as an organising principle, and that welfare regimes should be examined not just on the basis of decommodification, but also on the basis of defamilialization

(Lewis, 1992 & Sainsbury, 1999). Familialist regimes are ones that emphasize the family as the major locus of welfare provision through intra- and intergenerational mutual aid (Abe et al., 2016). Defamiliarization requires allowing women to participate in the labour market and appreciating the benefits of unpaid about caregiving. The majority of research on family policy or defamiliarization or family policy as a component of welfare regimes has been conducted in advanced industrial environments, with welfare regimes in Southern Europe and East Asia being characterized as the most heavily familial (Abe et al., 2016). Franzoni (2008) is one of the rare attempts to develop an integrated typology that considers interactions between commodification, decommodification, and defamilialization in welfare regimes marked by labour market informality. Franzoni identifies three clusters of social welfare systems in Latin America: state productivist regimes (where social protection is used to encourage labour market participation), state protectionist regimes (with high levels of labour commodification and protections for formal sector workers), and familialist regimes (marginal state provision with welfare provided by family/community).

When it comes to worker safeguards, the majority of the studies summarized so far emphasize on employment-related social insurance. They haven't traditionally featured large-scale state-funded social assistance programmes to help 'outsiders' in the labour market, which were implemented by many emerging economies as their expansion accelerated in the 2000s (Barrientos, 2013; & Duckett, 2017). As Seekings (2017,) argues, many developing nations have shown that expanding the capacity of states to build more inclusive, pro-poor welfare states through the growth of moderately effective, non-contributory social assistance programmes like cash transfers or social award programmes has been surprisingly straightforward.' As conventional forms of trade unionism and corporatist state–market–labour interactions lost their primacy as

means for achieving market social control, social assistance became more essential (Agarwala, 2013). The adoption of a rights-based approach to social policy in India was linked to the expansion of unemployment-related social assistance programmes, which were recognised as permanent, statutory rights or entitlements of citizenship, rather than patronage bestowed by a selective state through legislation. The relative degrees of decommodification and defamiliarization, according to this review of the cross-national literature, are the most important components for a comparative analysis of welfare regimes in the context of labour market informality, and in capturing the nature of decommodification, it is important to pay attention both to patterns of employment (some of which are linked to worker protections and social insurance), and to non-employment linked forms of social assimilation.

It's impossible to compare income distributions before and after the welfare state. One can look at how policy changes (such a pension reform) affected the income distribution, but we aren't evaluating total welfare state effects. The measuring of welfare state redistribution confronts significant challenges, both in terms of collection of methodology and data. But drawbacks remain. The data for any given country may represent an atypical year, due for example, to external economic shocks. It also means we can't tell whether a household's reported income reflects a temporary or permanent position. The mix of transient and persistent poverty may alter across countries. A second major drawback is that we have generally no information on the distribution of public service usage which, we know, varies hugely across welfare states.

A huge amount of research has focused on welfare states' effectiveness in reducing poverty and this implies the need to define a meaningful poverty line. "One hotly debated issue is whether to adopt a relative or 'absolute' measure. The reason that the vast majority prefer the former is to capture the meaning of being poor within the

society one lives in". An American family with a \$10,000 annual income will appear wealthy to a Senegalese, but they will struggle to make ends meet in the United States. Buhmann et.al. (1988) present a detailed review of alternative equivalence scales depending on where the poor are located. A notable example is the United Kingdom, where we usually find very high poverty rates when the line is put at 50% of median income, but poverty rates drop dramatically when the line is drawn at 40%. The reason for this is that in the United Kingdom, public income support is normally set at a level of support that is below 50% but above 40%. In all circumstances, drawing the line will result in some artificiality of evaluation. There may, for example, be a large population that falls just immediately below the line. They would be considered poor whereas those with just a few more Euros would not. The standard approach that has been adopted in most studies is the 50-per cent of the median line, although the EU has officially chosen a 60-per cent line. Studies that want to measure the 'poverty gap', i.e. how far below the line the poor find themselves, calculate either a gap measure or use several poverty lines (Mitchell, 1991; & Kenworthy, 1999).<sup>14</sup>

The general view is that income statistics should be measured by the number of household members. Because of the amount of people who need to be fed and clothed, a single person and a family of four with some salaries will obviously have different welfare levels. Following "Atkinson et.al. (1995), most studies adopt the square-root scale according to which the adjustment equals the square root of a household's size. A second methodological challenge lies in the difficulty of distinguishing between flux and stability. Cross-sectional data conflates the two and this means that short-lived, transitory low (or high) income is given the same importance as persistent levels". This problem is most acute in studies that focus on poverty. We know that poverty is transient among a significant share of poor households.

**2.9 The three models are tentatively described as follows:**

**1. Model A: The Residual Welfare Model of Social Policy:** The private market and the family are two 'natural' (or socially given) avenues via which an individual's wants are appropriately supplied, according to this definition. Social welfare institutions should only be used when these fail. As Professor Peacock puts it: "The true object of the Welfare State is to teach people how to do without it". The theoretical basis of this model can be traced back to the early days of the English Poor Law, and finds support in organic-mechanistic biological constructs of society advanced by sociologists like Radcliffe-Brown and Spencer, and economists like Friedman, Hayek and the founders and followers of the Institute of Economic Affairs in London.

**2. MODEL B. The Industrial Achievement-Performance Model of Social Policy:** This includes a substantial role for social welfare institutions as adjuncts of the economy. It holds that social needs should be supplied based on the basis of merit, work performance and productivity. It is based on a number of economic and psychological theories concerned with incentives, effort and reward, and the formation of class and group loyalties. The 'Handmaiden Model' has been coined to describe it.

**3. MODEL C. The Institutional Redistributive Model of Social Policy:**

Using this approach, social welfare is seen as a critical integrated institution in society, delivering Universalist services outside of the market on the basis of need rather than market competition. It is founded in part on beliefs regarding the many effects of social development and the economic system, and in part on the concept of social equality, both of which are supported by evidence. It's

essentially a paradigm that incorporates redistribution systems in command-over-resources-over-time. These three models are, of course, only very broad approximations to the theories and ideas of economists, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists. A variety of more advanced variations could be created. However, these (Peacock, A.1960). Approximations do serve to highlight the significant variations – the extremes of the value spectrum – in the beliefs about the means and purposes of social policy held by individuals. All three models take into account the work ethic and the family institution in contemporary culture. The three conflicting models of social policy each represent a distinct set of decision-making criteria. The following chapter examines the ramifications of Model A, and subsequent chapters relate to it and the other models. (Richard, M. Titmuss, 1974).

### **2.10 Indian Perspective on Welfare State: A Subnational Comparative Analysis**

India is known for being a welfare state. It also covers a few additional countries. Why are they referred to be such? What does the term "welfare state" mean? The way government thinks about how to keep and improve the social and economic well-being of its people. The concepts of equality of opportunity and equitable income distribution underpin a welfare state. It also emphasizes the government's duty for people who are unable to get even the most necessities of existence. The state is accountable for the well-being of its citizens. There was no such thing as a welfare state in India before independence. The Britishers were not particularly concerned with safeguarding and boosting the wellbeing of the people. Focused on themselves rather than the interests of the Indian people. India had several issues and obstacles when it gained freedom. There was a lot of social and economic disparity. India's economic position was dreadful. India had a lot of social difficulties as well. There were societal disparities,

and the most vulnerable members of society were denied access to necessities. The framers of the Constitution were aware of the issues. As a result, they resolved to make India a welfare state. India is characterized as a "sovereign socialist secular democratic republic".

As a result, the Constitution contains several provisions ensuring the social and economic well-being of the Indian people. Two provisions have been established in this respect, first "Fundamental Rights" and the other "State Policy Directive Principles". The Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution, which ensure that Indian people have access to civil freedoms and basic rights. Any other legislation of the nation is superseded by these civic freedoms. Individual rights are often found in liberal democracies constitutions. "Equality before the law, freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, and the right to constitutional remedies for the preservation of civil rights" are only a few of the essential rights. However, this was insufficient. Indian folks required economic and social development changes as well. This is why the Indian Constitution has Part IV on State Policy Directive Principles. Equal opportunity, equitable income distribution, and public accountability are the foundations of a welfare state for individuals not able to get the bare necessities of life. The Indian Constitution contains directive principles aimed toward the people's socio-economic growth. Directive principles are unjustifiable and unenforceable in any court of law. However, because these principles are regarded as important in the country's administration, Governments must adopt them while creating legislation in order to create a country with a just society.

Directive principles are classified into the following groups:

- Principles encouraging socio-economic equality

- Principles associated with Gandhi's philosophy
- Peace and Security Principles at the International Level
- Miscellaneous Principles.

Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles are not the same things, yet they are complimentary. These basic concepts have been implemented by the federal and state governments, but much more must be done to achieve the aims of the state. The term "social welfare" is derived from "individual welfare," but it refers to a community's or nations collective well-being. For several, social assistance may now be obtained through a variety of channels, including family, the market, and the government. Family is the primary caregiving social system, followed by the market, in which people or communities struggle to protect their interests, and finally, when both family and market fail to protect society's well-being, the state steps in. As a result, it is a result of all 3 mediums: market, family, and state, and is frequently referred to as a mixed economy of welfare.

As a result, the Welfare State notion developed from the rising necessity for the government to act as a welfare provider. And by welfare, they mean a set of basic health, housing, income, and education criteria that residents cannot fall below in the national interest. As a result, the Welfare State was viewed as a kind of social safety net. Since old times immemorial, the notion of welfare has been embedded in people's brains of social structures. , The history of welfare states cannot be properly portrayed as a series of events. However, many contend that the theories for its origin frequently yield contradictory results, such as whether it was a result of industrialization or a result of political struggle.

Industrialization, according to most historians, takes priority over political rivalry. The necessity for the state to step in and satisfy people's social needs arose as a result of

industrialization, which was one of the primary pushes towards urbanizing and industrial societies. In his report, Beveridge emphasized the Five Great Social Evils that had harmed British society before World War II: ignorance, illness, idleness, poverty, and hunger. He went on to say that the state, as a portrayal of the entire population, has the duty to ensure that Britain's society is free of these five main social evils. Others say that state welfare was developed by politicians representing many interest groups, including the working class, ethnic minorities, women, and persons with disabilities. As a result, in many nations, the political party in power and the interests it reflects the form and focus of welfare states. Welfare State Researchers have categorized the Welfare States based on the ideas that govern them, how they present themselves, and how they support the delivery of social services to the public. Heterogeneity across welfare states stems from a variety of schools of thought. In “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, Gosta Esping Andersen divides states into 3 type for simplicity of understanding: Neo-Liberal, Social Democratic, and Corporatist (Esping-Anderson, 1990). He focuses on three key ideas that explain the welfare state's political economy. The first is the Systematic/Structuralist Theory, which emphasizes the necessity for a welfare state. Given, that forces such as modernization, mobility, individualism, and market dependency eventually erode the pre-industrial way of life that included family, religion and so on. And, because the market is unable to meet people social demands because it caters to people working in it, we need a Welfare State to ensure that everyone is taken care of. The second premise of the Institutional Approach focuses on protecting the market from political intervention and advocating for a free market economy. Majoritarian demands are the foundation of democracy, which includes both workers and capitalists, in requests to compensate for market weakness, there will be increased pressure on government spending. It also emphasizes the need for voter

mobilization, which is inextricably linked to party politics in a democracy. When democratic rights are strengthened and guarded in society, welfare states flourish.

The Class Mobilization Thesis is the third approach, which recognizes social classes as a key actor of change. It highlights that the distributional results are determined by the balance of class power. It also adheres to the notion that Parliament is a crucial institution for transforming popular mobilization into desired social reforms and policy. Welfare not only alleviates social ills but also strengthens labor movements by providing wage earners with critical power resources. In addition, because the class mobilization theory is built on a linear power structure, there are inherent inconsistencies in this school of thought. With a market that is always changing, and a continuous progression in the countries' social demands, focusing solely on the traditional working class to sustain mobilization may become unrealistic wishful thinking.

### **2.11 Distinguishing a Welfare State from a Non-Welfare State**

A variety of methods are used to determine whether a state is a welfare state. One criterion, for example, stipulates that most of a state's spending must be directed toward satisfying the society's welfare requirements. However, this theory might lead to most nations being the Non-Welfare States until the 1970s. The second method attempts to outline it in terms of institutional or residual welfare. Institutional welfarism argues that the entire population should be cared for and welfare measures should be universalistic and institutionalized, but residual welfarism states that the state must give welfare when other forms of welfare, such as family or market, fail. This method dismantles linear norms for rating welfare states and allows for a comparative study of different types of welfare states. Third, this approach encourages the use of theoretical criteria to

distinguish between several types. This may be accomplished by evaluating the programs and welfare quotient in its state policies with other models. Because this is a historical approach, it suffers from the insufficiency of qualities or goals adopted by our historical players during their battle for the welfare state.

India's Social Security System India as a country had various societal difficulties and challenges after independence. It was a freshly independent country with the world's most varied society, rife with economic and social inequity. Consequently, the framers of the constitution faced a difficult task in ensuring that society was free of not just colonialism, but also centuries of social and economic subjugation. As a result, India became a Welfare State, with the Indian Constitution Preamble describing it as a "sovereign socialist secular democratic republic." As a result, our constitution includes measures to protect both our social and economic well-being through Fundamental Rights and State Policy Directive Principles. Every person of this country is guaranteed civil freedoms as well as basic rights under the Constitution. Along with civil liberties, the Indian Constitution prioritizes the people's socioeconomic growth, thus these rights are protected by Directive Principles. These are the guidelines that the government use in developing public policies and safeguarding people's social and economic rights.

These principles guide states in developing policies to guarantee that:

- All citizens have the right to a sufficient means of subsistence.
- Resources are put in a way that benefits the public good the most.
- Both men and women receive equal compensation for equal effort.

- Employees and children under the age of fourteen are not exploited, and they are not forced into professions that are improper for their age or strength due to economic need.
- The resources are provided to grow up in a secure, fair, and dignified manner.

The constitution included some rights in the Directive Principles to safeguard people's social and economic rights, which are as follows:

- Right to adequate means of livelihood: article 39 (a)
- Right against economic exploitation: article 39(b)
- Right of both sexes to equal pay for equal work: article 39 (d)
- Right to work
- Right to rest and leisure: article 43
- Right to public assistance in case of old age or sickness unemployment: article 42
- Right to education: article 41
- Right to just and humane conditions of work: article 42
- Right to maternity relief: article 42
- Right to free and compulsory education of children: article 45

Welfare programs have been designed to give economic and social benefits to the people of the country while also addressing the country's inhabitant's vulnerabilities and marginalization. (Ojha, 2011). To determine whether India's states might form different welfare regimes, we must first comprehend how India's federal government designs, finances, and implements social policy. This section will examine whether

governments have enough authority to develop and maintain unique systems of market social control. In terms of social policy, India's states have significant constitutional obligations, which are shared with the government. Education and Health were both designated as state subjects in India's 1950 constitution, with social security on a concurrent list over which the Centre and states have joint jurisdiction (Tillin, 2021). In 1976, education became a concurrent topic. Since 1980, the central government has grown increasingly involved in social policy, launching a slew of "centrally supported programs" in regions that are on the state's purview. These centrally planned programs, which involve many of the new rights-based policies adopted by the UPA, sometimes need state matching funds. Most of these centrally established programmes are implemented by states, and they are also empowered to launch their own social policies or layer new features on top of central schemes to expand their generosity or coverage. While India's central government plays an important role in the development of national social policy, there is a significant geographical disparity in service delivery and performance. As a result, India under the UPA stood apart from other federal nations like Brazil, where the role of governors at the memo level in executing social programs had been curtailed. (Fenwick, [2016](#)).

Beyond constitutional requirements and the structure of fiscal federalism in the social sector, the makeup of the party system has a significant impact on the contours of regional and central power. Federal relations are affected by political dynamics, particularly the arrangement of political power at the centre, as Saxena, and Sharma explains in the introduction to this special issue (Saxena et al., 2021). As with other policy areas, the federal and state government's relative control over social policy has shifted over time. This illustrates a time of multi-party fragmentation during which the party system was more 'state friendly' than in previous or subsequent periods.

**Table 1.** Shows the Revenue sources for the states.

State	Own tax (%)	Share central tax (%)	Grants (%)
Assam	28%	36%	28%
Bihar	29%	51%	18%
Himachal Pradesh	33%	16%	40%
Odisha	35%	31%	17%
Jharkhand	36%	34%	16%
Uttar Pradesh	40%	37%	13%
Uttarakhand	42%	21%	29%
Madhya Pradesh	44%	30%	16%
Chhattisgarh	45%	25%	15%
Rajasthan	45%	25%	12%
West Bengal	49%	32%	16%
<i>Average (all states)</i>	49%	23%	17%
Andhra Pradesh	58%	20%	8%
Kerala	65%	15%	8%
Haryana	67%	9%	11%
Tamil Nadu	68%	15%	8%
Punjab	69%	13%	10%
Karnataka	70%	15%	10%
Gujarat	70%	12%	9%
Maharashtra	72%	11%	9%

Source: "Author calculations based on Reserve Bank of India State Finances: A Study of Budgets (2016)".

The conclusion will briefly discuss the post-2014 scenario since the return of single-party rule at the Centre. Social welfare has become a prominent electoral topic in numerous states' elections since the mid-1990s. In the 1990s and early 2000s, regional parties participation in the Indian Parliament rapidly increased. When it came to coping with the paradoxes of increasing inequality with rapid economic growth, political regionalization and economic liberalization worked for hand in hand to put state governments in the driver's seat. The social basis of political parties in various parts of India has shifted as a result of political assertion by lower castes and classes, as well as the emergence of new regional parties. Coalition administrations including national and regional parties have become the norm at the national level. State chief ministers were increasingly able to take political credit for nationally planned and supported initiatives like the MGNREGA under this environment during the 2000s. (Tillin & Pereira, [2017](#)).<sup>15</sup>

## 2.12 Cluster Analysis

The first level of categorization divides states into two broad groups: rich and poor. The clusters are then split into two groups, each indicating more disparities in their welfare regimes.

**Table 2.** Subnational welfare regime clusters.

Cluster 1. Rich states		Cluster 2. Poor states	
Cluster 1a	Cluster 1b	Cluster 2a	Cluster 2b
Kerala, Maharashtra,	Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu,	Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Odisha	Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh,

Uttarakhand, and Haryana	Punjab, Himachal Pradesh		Assam, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar
Decommodifying familial	Commodifying with Protection	Commodifying with Protection	Commodifying insecure

Second, all states in the cluster have higher-than-average rates of paid employees and lower-than-average rates of self-employment, implying that they have a higher level of labor market formalization than cluster 2. Third, they have a similar demographic profile that is comparable to Cluster 2, with a population under 14 that is below normal and a population over 60 that is above average, indicating that they are further along in the demographic transition than Cluster 2. Despite these similarities, there are two distinct groups among the wealthier states.

Cluster 1a forms a decommodifying family cluster, as detailed here. The states in this cluster have the lowest overall labor participation rates of all Indian states, with an average of 515 persons per 1000. They also have the lowest proportion of women in their reproductive years in the workforce as a group. They have a greater amount of public sector employment than the other states in Cluster 1. They also have the greatest per capita amounts of social sector spending. As a result, the states in Cluster 1a have a more decommodified labor market and a higher dependence on public employment and labor rule. Cluster 1b, the second category, is made up of states that are more commodifying in terms of labour market regulations, but supplement this with publically sponsored social assistance. Commodifying with protection is a good description for this cluster. These states have the greatest overall labour force participation rate (586 per 1000 persons) and the highest female workforce participation rate. However, this high rate of labour force participation is followed by social

assistance investment. Cluster 2 includes states that are more impoverished than cluster 1 and contribute several additional features. They have a greater rate of informality in the labour market and a lower rate of public sector employment than cluster 1. However, there are two distinct subgroups within this cluster of impoverished states. Cluster 2a is made up of states that mix relatively high levels of commodification with social security investment. They have a lot in common with Cluster 1b, therefore they're classified as commodifying with protection. Their cluster average for PDS coverage and MGNREGA workdays, as well as their per capita social expenditure, is similar to the national average. Overall, this is a sub-cluster of states that make better use of social aid in conjunction with commodification. Their welfare mix resembles that of Cluster 1b more than that of the other poor states.

Cluster 2b, the final cluster of states, is labelled as commodifying insecure. These states have the greatest percentage of self-employment and the least-paid workforce of any state, and their social sector expenditure and PDS and MGNREGA performance are much below the national average. They have the greatest poverty rates and the lowest per capita income

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*Chapter III*  
*Public Distribution System*  
*(PDS) in India*

## CHAPTER-III

### PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN INDIA

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#### 3.1 Conceptualization and Evolution of PDS in India

The Public Distribution System (PDS) was developed as a way to manage scarcity by giving out food grains at low costs. PDS has become a significant aspect of the government programme for managing the country's food economy over the years. PDS is supplemental in nature, and it is not meant to fulfill a household or a part of society's full requirement for any of the commodities supplied under it. The PDS is run jointly by the central and the state/UT governments. The Food Corporation of India (FCI) has taken over the acquisition, transportation, storage and bulk allotment of food grains to state governments on behalf of the government. State governments have operational responsibility for things like allocation within states, issuing Ration Cards, identifying eligible household and overseeing the operation of Fair Price Shops (FPSs), among other things. Rice, wheat, sugar, and kerosene are among the commodities allocated to States/UTs for distribution under the PDS. Edible oils, pulses, iodized salt, spices, and other commodities of mass consumption are also distributed through PDS shops in several states/UTs.<sup>1</sup>

#### 3.2 History of Public Distribution System

During the interwar period, the country had public distribution of necessary commodities. However, PDS grew out of the 1960s food shortages, focusing on distributing food grains in urban areas. PDS has helped to restrain the growth in food grain costs and ensured food access to urban consumers. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the

country's agricultural output increased due to the Green Revolution, PDS was extended to tribal areas and poor communities.

### **3.3 Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS)**

The Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS) was established in June 1992 with the aim of streamlining and strengthening the PDS while also expanding its reach into far-flung, isolated, hilly and inaccessible areas where a significant portion of the poor population reside. “It covered 1775 blocks where area-specific programmes like the Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP), Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDP), and Desert Development Programme (DDP) were implemented, as well as certain Designated Hill Areas (DHA) that were identified for special attention in consultation with state governments”. The States were provided food grains for distribution in RPDS regions at a discount of 50 paise off the Central Issue Price. The issue weight per card was up to 20 kg.

The RPDS included an area approach to ensure effective reach of PDS commodities, their delivery by State Governments at the doorsteps of FPSs in identified areas, additional ration cards for left-behind families, infrastructure requirements such as storage capacity, additional Fair Price Shops, and additional commodities such as salt, pulses, soap, tea, and other items for distribution through PDS outlets.<sup>2</sup>

### **3.4 Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS)**

The Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS), which concentrates on the underprivileged, was inaugurated by the Indian government in June of 1997. States were expected under the PDS to implement and develop failsafe plans to identify the impoverished and deliver food grains in a responsible and transparent way at the FPS

level. When it was first implemented, the initiative was meant to help roughly 6 crore poor families, with a total of 72 lakh tonnes of food grains set aside each year. The States identified the poor under the scheme using the technique of the "Expert Group on the calculation of proportion and number of poor," headed by Late Prof Lakdawala, based on the Planning Commission's State-by-State poverty estimates for 1993-94. Food grains were allocated to States/UTs based on average consumption in the past, i.e. average yearly off-take of food grains under the PDS for the previous ten years at the time of the TPDS's implementation. Food grains in excess of the needs of BPL families were given to the state as a 'transitory allocation,' for which a total of 103 lakh tonnes of food grains were set aside each year. States were also awarded additional funding in addition to the TPDS allocation. The temporary allotment was meant to ensure that the population Above the Poverty Line (APL) continued to gain from subsidised food grains, as any abrupt withdrawal of benefits provided under the PDS was not regarded desirable. The temporary allotment was supplied at subsidised prices that were higher than the prices for the BPL food grain quota. With effect from 1/4/2000, the Government of India raised the allocation of food grains to BPL families from 10 kg to 20 kg per family per month at 50% of the economic cost, and the allocation to APL families at the economic cost, in response to a consensus on increasing the allocation of food grains to BPL families. The allotment of APL families was maintained at the same amount as when TPDS was introduced, but from that date forward, the Central Issue Prices (CIPs) for APL were established at 100 percent of economic cost, allowing the entire consumer subsidy to be channelled to the benefit of the BPL population. Despite the fact that procurement costs have increased significantly, the CIPs set in July and December 2000 for BPL and AAY, and in July 2002 for APL, have not been revised upwards since then.<sup>3</sup>

With effect from 1<sup>st</sup> December 2000, the number of BPL households was increased by moving the base to the Registrar General's population predictions as of 1/3/2000, rather than the earlier population forecast of 1995. With this increase, the overall BPL families increased up to 652.03 lakh, up from 596.23 lakh when the TPDS was first implemented in June 1997. The end retail price was determined by the States/UTs under the TPDS after taking into account wholesaler/retailer margins, transport expenses, municipal taxes, levies and other variables. The states were previously asked to provide food grains for BPL families at a cost of not more than 50 paise per kilogramme over and above the CIP. However, States/UTs have had more flexibility in establishing retail issue prices since 2001, when the restriction of 50 paise per kg over and above the CIP for distribution of food grains under the TPDS was removed.

#### **Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY)**

AAY was the first step toward TPDS concentrating on hunger reduction among the BPL population's poorest segments. According to a National Sample Survey Exercise, approximately 5% of the country's population sleeps without eating two square meals every day. This group of people could be referred to as "I'm hungry." The TPDS was redesigned to be more focused and targeted at this population group "In December of 2000, the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) was started for one crore of the poorest of the poor families.

AAY entailed identifying 1 crore of the poorest of the poor families from among the number of BPL families covered by the TPDS in each state and giving them with food grains at a heavily subsidised rate of Rs.2 per kg for wheat and Rs.3 per kg for rice. The distribution costs, including margins to dealers and retailers, and transportation costs, were to be borne by the states/UTs. As a result, the plan passed on the entire food

subsidy to the consumers. The scale of the issue that was initially 25 kg per family per month was increased to 35 kg per family per month with effect from 1st April 2002.

**3.5 In recent years, the AAY Scheme has been widened to include 2.50 crore poor households in the following ways:**

**1. First Expansion**

As part of the AAY Scheme's expansion in 2003-04, 50 lakh BPL households managed by ill, widows or people with disability, people 60 years old or more who have no guaranteed means of living or community assistance were included. On the 3rd of June, 2003, an order to this effect was issued. As a result of this increase, 1.5 crore families (or 23 percent of BPL families) were also covered by the AAY.

**2. Second Expansion**

Following the announcement in the Union Budget for 2004-05, the AAY was further enlarged by an additional 50 lakh BPL households by adding, among other things, all homes at risk of starvation in the AAY programme. On 3rd of August, 2004, an order to this effect was issued. According to the rules, the following conditions must be met in order to identify these households:

- a) Agricultural laborers, farmers, rural artisans/craftsmen and other people who make their living on a regular basis in the informal sector, including porters etc. and other similar categories from both urban and rural areas.
- b) People over the age of 60, or household looked by widows, ill people, people with disabilities, who have no reliable sources of income or community assistance.
- d) The primitive tribal families.

### **3. Third Expansion**

As promised in the Budget for 2005-06, the AAY was extended to an additional 50 lakh BPL homes, bringing the total number of homes covered by the scheme to 2.5 crore (i.e. 38 percent of BPL). On the 12th of May, 2005, an order to this effect was issued.

### **3.6 Major goal of India's PDS**

A major goal of India's PDS is to provide a food safety net for the vulnerable and poor population who live below the poverty line. The distribution and availability of food grains in the Public Distribution System (PDS) have changed through time. In 1997, the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) was implemented, which replaced the practically universal public distribution system that had previously been used. Rice and wheat are the most commonly sold food grains by the TPDS through Fair Price Shops, which sell them at prices that are much lower than those found in the market. Different states have implemented a variety of reform strategies to enhance the functioning of the TPDS. Despite the fact that the TPDS provides services to more than 65 million low-income households, it has not been devoid of criticism. According to some, the TPDS has indeed been condemned for its ineffective identification of recipient as well as its inefficiency in distribution and leakages. The National Food Security Act (NFSA) was passed in 2013 and amended the TPDS programme, shifting it away from a welfare-based approach to social protection and toward a rights-based approach to social protection. Under the National Food Security Act, qualifying beneficiaries are legally entitled to receive 5 kg of food grains from the TPDS at heavily subsidized prices.<sup>4</sup>

The NFSA has already been implemented by a few states, and the remaining states are in the process of implementing it. In this connection, the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) was commissioned by the Department of Food and

Public Distribution (Govt. of India) to conduct an evaluation study of the TPDS in six selected Indian states. The NFSA has been implemented in three states: Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, and Bihar. West Bengal, Assam and Uttar Pradesh were still pursuing the TPDS. In the NCAER study, the primary goal was to determine the degree and shortcomings of previous evaluation studies of the TPDS which were sufficiently addressed by state governments. In this NCAER, two levels of evaluation were carried out: a beneficiary-level evaluation to assess outcomes at the household level, and a systems evaluation to assess beneficiary targeting errors such as exclusion and false inclusion, as well as the extent of food grain leakage or diversion across beneficiary categories.

An additional basis for comparison was offered by selecting three states that had migrated to the NFSA from three states that had not. Based on a main survey done by NCAER in each of the six states, the evaluation of beneficiaries was completed. The TPDS Survey conducted by the NCAER in 2014 included 6,734 beneficiary and 1,000 non-beneficiary families, as well as other stakeholders. The survey was carried out between October 2014 and December 2014, and the results were published in December 2014. The NCAER 2014 TPDS Survey and the systems evaluation revealed that, while the overall performance of the PDS has improved over time, there is still significant space for improvement, with the poorest performing states lagging well behind the top performing ones in terms of performance.

According to the NCAER study, the PDS meets a major amount of the entire demand for food grains from poor people, but they do not always obtain their full entitlement of food grains as a result of a delivery system that is still in need of improvement. Beneficiaries may also find themselves paying more than the amount that was originally agreed upon. In a few states, qualified beneficiaries are still unaware of their

entitlements and the price they should pay for PDS food grains, despite the fact that the programme has been running for decades. The identification of vulnerable households under the TPDS programme continues to be a source of great worry. States have developed their own identification standards under the NFSA, while the baseline is 2012 Socio-Economic and Caste Census, which was performed by the United Nations Development Programme.<sup>5</sup>

Recipients were chosen on the basis of former BPL censuses conducted in states that were still in compliance with the TPDS. Chhattisgarh had the lowest exclusion error, accounting for only 2 % of all eligible families, while Assam had the largest, accounting for 71% of all eligible households. Bihar had the lowest inclusion error rate, with 18 % of all homes who should have been ineligible for benefits, and West Bengal had the highest, with 47 % of all households who should have been disqualified. External variables such as political ties and caste appear to have a role in determining whether or not a person is eligible for benefits at times. The NCAER examines the diversion of food grain by estimating the amount of leakage that occurs. Chhattisgarh has the lowest leakage rate, followed by Bihar, according to the findings. West Bengal, Assam and Uttar Pradesh have relatively high rates of leakage. Unless the methods for monitoring the supply chain are tightened, it will be impossible to control leakage. According to the study, the PDS continues to have a beneficial impact on household well-being. Respondents from low-income and vulnerable households uniformly agreed that the public distribution system had a critical role in alleviating hunger in their communities. However, there is much more that can be done to increase the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the public transportation system. Following the Government of India's directive, this NCAER study did not examine concerns relating to the supply chain of PDS grain, from the announcement of the Minimum Support Price for grain

procurement to grain storage and transportation, as well as the overall impact on inflation, in accordance with its mandate. Moreover, it did not examine the influence of the TPDS and the NFSA on nutrition outcomes, particularly in children.

This work builds on previous food security research conducted at the NCAER in the past few years. NCAER's Targeted Public Distribution System: Inefficiencies and Performance research from 2010; a 2014 conference on Undernutrition in India and Public Policy; and a recent presentation by Van Neman and Desai (2015) in NCAER's India Policy Forum 2014-15 on the National Food Security Act (NFSA) and nutrition.

The PDS is India's largest food subsidy programme. In total, it reaches nearly 11 crore families and gives customers food grains at a government-subsidized price. Rationing was a method adopted by the British during World War II (1939–45), and the same system was maintained as a vital component of social policy during the process of planned economic development, which began in 1951 and continues to this day. It served as the foundation for the policy of growth in harmony with justice. It was expanded to include all rural areas that were suffering from chronic food shortages during the First Five-Year Plan (1951–56), which ran from 1951 to 1956. The Agricultural Prices Commission (APC) and The Food Corporation of India (FCI) were established in 1965, respectively.

Over the years, the system has been maintained as a carefully planned social policy to provide food grains. Until 1997, PDS provided food subsidies to all eligible recipients without discrimination. Despite the fact that it helped millions of poor people in the country, it has been widely criticized for failing to serve the entire population below the poverty line, having a strong urban bias, having a limited geographic reach, and lacking in accountability and transparency (Sawant and Jadhav, 2013).<sup>6</sup>

Jha (1992) observed that 40 to 50 percent of the population takes advantage of the distribution system, with approximately half of those being non-poor. This implies that a significant portion of PDS benefits went to the non-poor, and that the distribution system has had little impact on the nutritional status of the targeted population as a result. In this context, it was felt that focusing the PDS on the poor was a fundamental reform that could not be postponed for much longer than was necessary.<sup>7</sup>

In order to provide food grains to a targeted population living below the poverty line, the project had two goals (BPL). Food grains were sold to this group at half the cost of production, while food grains were offered to those living above the poverty line (APL) at cost of production. For BPL families, a fixed monthly allocation of food grains consisting of wheat/atta and rice, but there was no such claim for APL families. The entitlement for families living below the poverty line has increased throughout time. In 2000, a supplementary food security scheme, dubbed the Antyodaya Anna Yojna, was introduced to assist the poorest of the poor strata of society (AAY). Following a Supreme Court order, a set of five criteria was used to identify these households. The entitlement was set at 35 kg per month per AAY-covered family. To extend coverage, the programme was expanded in two parts, in 2003 and 2004. Governments is responsible for ensuring that beneficiaries can access commodities sold under the PDS, coordinating the entire supply process from FCI godowns to beneficiaries, and monitoring PDS activities. Assuring that beneficiaries may receive PDS commodities sold by state governments, coordinating the entire supply process from FCI godowns to beneficiaries, is the responsibility of the central government. Because beneficiaries purchase subsidised PDS items through the FPS, fair pricing stores (FPSs) that operate under the PDS are vital nodes.

The PDS Control Order 2001 (GOI 2001), issued by the Department of Food and Public Distribution, elaborates on the system of licensing FPSs and monitoring compliance through vigilance committees and other government personnel. The FCI buys food grains from farmers at the minimum support price (MSP) and distributes them to all states at the same uniform central issue price (CIP). The CIP is less than the central government's economic cost of procuring food grain. The essential components of economic cost are payments to growers, as well as expenses for handling, storing, transporting and distributing the grain, as well as the cost of keeping the approved buffer stock. The gap between the economic cost and the CIP is covered by a food subsidy paid by the central government from its annual non-Plan budget. The states, notably for the poor, set consumer end prices (CEP) at the FPS level that are no more than Re.0.50 per kilogram higher than the central issue price (CIP). States can also use their own finances to expand coverage under the BPL category and give subsidies. The literature on PDS reforms and performance is divided. The TPDS has gotten a lot of attention in the social science literature because it's such a crucial part of India's food security programme. During the first ten years of its deployment, it was chastised for supply chain leakage, mistargeting, and inefficiencies. Only Re.1 of every Rs.3.65 spent by the government of India reaches BPL households, according to the Planning Commission (GOI 2005).

According to Khera (2008), only one-third of Rajasthan's households have access to the PDS, based on a survey done in 2002. This has been ascribed to challenges with implementation due to a lack of coordination and information exchange between the federal and state administrations. Using NSS data from 2004–05, Arora (2013) finds that the system failed to reach the poor in most states, with the exception of Tamil Nadu,

Kerala and Andhra Pradesh in the south. According to studies, the TPDS process has improved with time.<sup>8</sup>

Between 2004–05 and 2011–12, Rahman (2014) found progress using different rounds of National Sample Survey data. The degree of progress, however, differs per state. As late-mover states, Bihar and Jharkhand saw considerable improvements in the PDS process between 2009–10 and 2011–12. Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, for example, continued to perform well.<sup>9</sup> The National Council of Applied Economic Research (Kumar 2010) performed a twelve-state study that found high levels of satisfaction with key PDS metrics, such as grain quality and quantity, as well as the performance of the FPSs.

Beneficiaries receive 84–88 percent of their entitlement, according to a PDS survey conducted in nine states in 2011. (Khera 2011).<sup>10</sup> According to the survey, 80% of respondents believe the PDS is "extremely important" for meeting family requirements. Himanshu and Sen (2013) go on to say that the PDS has grown in relevance over time, particularly in feeding the poor at a time when food inflation is on the rise in the country. Since its creation, the TPDS has been criticized for its operation. A considerable body of research has focused on estimating identification mistakes using field survey data. (Mahamallik & Sahu 2011) and calculated the leakage, using mainly different rounds of NSS data. While several studies criticize the identification exercise due to corruption, poor data quality and coverage, poor survey design and imprecise scoring methods others suggest that the situation is gradually improving and that the TPDS continues to provide food security to the poor (Aggarwal 2011).<sup>11</sup>

It's encouraging to see that estimated leakage has decreased over time, particularly after 2011–12, when many states implemented various PDS system improvements (Drèze &

Khera 2015). In Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu, and Himachal Pradesh, improvement measures included nearly universalization of the PDS. In Orissa, the PDS was virtually universally implemented in the KBK region (Kalahandi–Balnagar–Koraput) (Chatterjee 2014), which is one of the country's most hungry places. Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh have all seen an increase in coverage. In Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Orissa, the PDS price was reduced to below the central issue rates, resulting in an increase in the amount of implicit subsidy. Many states have added products to the PDS that aren't rice, wheat, or sugar.<sup>12</sup>

Apart from the normal PDS goods, Chhattisgarh offers 2 kg of chanadal and 2 kg of iodized salt on each card. Tamil Nadu, Chhattisgarh, and Andhra Pradesh, for example, have improved their monitoring systems. In addition to the criteria provided by the BPL census, many states have utilized their own criteria to identify target households. Those states include Jharkhand, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh. Since the early 2000s, Chhattisgarh has been at the forefront of PDS reforms. It implemented two major changes between 2000 and 2004. First, the state made it possible for private sellers to apply for FPS licenses. Second, the state raised the amount of PDS rice sent to beneficiaries while also covering the expense. Private FPS dealers were no longer allowed to operate after the Chhattisgarh PDS control order was implemented in 2004. Instead, it has mandated that FPS operations be administered primarily by cooperatives and self-help organizations. The system has been strengthened through social audits and inspections. The state-run Mukhyamantri Khadyan Sahayata Yojana (MKSY) plan, which began in April 2007, increased PDS coverage even more. To reduce leakages, the state government distributed food grain straight to the doorsteps of approved FPSs.

Between 1999 and 2009, Krishnamurthy, Pathania, and Tandon (2014) predicted a significant 5 increase in rice consumption from the PDS in Chhattisgarh.<sup>13</sup>

Puri (2012) showed that 88 percent of respondents in a two-district research in Chhattisgarh were satisfied with the state's TPDS system's performance. In 2001, Andhra Pradesh, another high-performing PDS state, launched TPDS with nearly universal coverage (Dutta and Ramaswamy 2001). Food coupons for rice distribution were introduced in the year 2000 and issued by the Department of Civil Supplies to cardholders. These vouchers are used to collect the rations for the beneficiaries. It contributed to a decrease in the number of bogus ration cards in the system (Ravi and Indrakant 2003). While adopting further measures to strengthen the PDS mechanism in 2009, the state expanded the system's scope even more, particularly in rural areas.<sup>14</sup>

In addition, beginning in the same fiscal year, the state launched a low-cost food programme, with rice sold at Rs. 2 per kilogram to BPL cards. However, according to Deb (2009), the Andhra Pradesh government would have to adopt a more cost-effective PDS policy because it will be impossible to absorb the greater subsidy load that will inevitably emerge from distributing food grains at such cheap rates over time. From 2007, Bihar implemented a coupon system for recipient households in order to reduce leakages. It was thought that this would discourage FPS dealers from selling PDS commodities on the open market. Each home with a card used to get 12 coupons for wheat, rice and kerosene.

The coupon stated their entitlements as well as the price to be paid for each commodity. Under the supervision of authorities from the block development office, the coupons were distributed at village camps organized by panchayats. Beneficiary households used to receive one voucher every month, which they could use to purchase supplies

from the local FPS. The FPS owner transmitted these vouchers to district officials at the end of the month in order to acquire supplies for the following month. According to a field survey conducted in a western Bihar district, the coupon system could not completely eliminate PDS fraud in Bihar (Chotihani & Prichard, 2015).

In some cases, homes received expired coupons, and FPS dealers compelled beneficiaries to deposit multiple coupons for only a month's worth of rations. In the middle of 2014, the coupon system was briefly suspended. Bihar's administration intends to reintroduce it later this year. Interestingly, a high-level committee report (GOI 2015) questioned whether recent state changes had any influence on PDS leakage; it was based on a skewed estimate of leakage computed by Gulati and Saini (Drèze & Khera 2015).<sup>15</sup>

Many states continue to confront challenges in implementing the PDS. According to Kaur and Rashpaljeet (2014), almost 76% of food grains in Punjab are diverted to the open market, and another 13% is diverted to APL households; only around 10% of the grains reach BPL beneficiaries. The omission of eligible beneficiaries from the PDS list, according to a research by Jadhav and Sawant (2013)<sup>16</sup> based on a survey of the Satara district in Maharashtra, causes difficulties such as leakage and benefits spilling over to the non-poor. Universalizing the PDS is one strategy to reduce inclusion and exclusion errors, as well as related rent-seeking behaviour. Drèze and Sen (2011), citing the successful case of Tamil Nadu, argue that while the initial cost will be higher, it will result in long-term budgetary and public efficiency. Drèze and Khera (2013) also found that if the PDS is well-functioning and inclusive, it has a positive influence on rural poverty. A group of social policy academics and practitioners have proposed directing cash transfers to the bank accounts of recognized beneficiaries to reduce identification errors and stop food grains from leaking from the central and state pools (Lensink &

Yadav 2013). They claim that direct cash distribution has the ability to maximize efficiency improvements, which is nearly difficult to do through the rationing system. Svedberg (2012) went on to say that if cash transfers were designed properly, they would allow for higher payments to the poorest households than the amount of subsidy available under the TPDS. According to him, this technique can also remove the possibility of exclusion errors. However, it is too early to speculate on how well such a shift from the PDS to direct cash transfers may perform in the future.

### **3.7 Food Grain Purchase and the Public Distribution System**

The PDS ideally guarantees that necessary food grains are available to the most disadvantaged members of society who lack the purchasing power to purchase them at market prices. Ration shops mostly sell rice and wheat at low costs under the PDS. Under the PDS, a few states also sell pulses and coarse grain. In this study, we just look at rice and wheat. In this chapter, we will analyze food grain entitlement versus purchase, food grain pricing in the PDS, and the welfare impact of this food security plan. 4.2 Food grain purchases from various sources Poor individuals, particularly in rural regions, buy food grain from the PDS, from the market, or from other sources such as home production. Because the market price of wheat and rice is typically many times higher than the PDS price, it is expected that impoverished people use up their PDS quota and purchase the remainder of their needs from the market or other sources.

In this case, we also suppose that a household consumes whatever it buys. The total consumption of dietary grains, which primarily consists of wheat and rice, ranges from 8 to 13 kg per inhabitant per month on average. In Bihar, Assam, Karnataka, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, the share of total grain offtake from the PDS for a BPL cardholder was 36 percent, 5 percent, 44 percent, 22 percent, and 25 percent,

respectively, in 2004–05. (GOI 2005). Using our survey data, the numbers in rural areas of the five states climbed to 56 percent, 38 percent, 65 percent, 53 per cent, and 37 per cent in 2014–15. The high increase in food grain purchases from the PDS can be attributed to expanded coverage and increased entitlement quantities. In six states, we've shown the percentage of grain purchased from various sources by different cardholder types. Background of the PDS 5.1 service delivery mechanism Fair price shops (FPSs) are an important part of PDS's service delivery system.

It is the final link in the supply chain, and it deals directly with recipients. In other words, for beneficiaries, the FPS is the face of the PDS. We present a qualitative assessment of FPS functioning from the beneficiaries' perspective in this chapter. This type of feedback is critical for improving supply chain efficiency. To withdraw PDS items from an FPS, eligible beneficiaries must present ration cards as evidence of identity? The government issues the cards for a nominal cost of Re.1. Beneficiaries, many of whom are uneducated and for whom the food security programme is administered, are unaware of their rights. Poor beneficiaries were obliged to store their ration cards with FPS dealers in the 1990s, according to reports. However, as a result of NGOs, media campaigns, government measures, and other factors, the situation has improved over time.

According to our field survey, 94 percent to 100 percent of respondents in all states, with the exception of Bihar, keep their ration cards with them. Ration cards are with beneficiaries in 87 percent of cases in Bihar, while ration merchants have 8 percent of beneficiary cards. Only 5% of the total responders acquire their ration based on their name on the dealer's list. During the field survey in Bihar, the process of card cancellation and issuing of new cards was being carried out. As a result, many truly

poor people did not have access to ration cards during that time. Even getting a new ration card costs extra money for eligible beneficiaries.

People in Karnataka and Assam have paid Rs 2000 and Rs 3000 for a PHH/BPL card, respectively. The only state where the average cost of obtaining a new BPL card is nearly insignificant is Chhattisgarh. The bribe and agency fees, as well as travel time and lost pay, make up the overall cost of a new card. 55 5.2 Distribution of food grains and FPS Beneficiaries pick up PDS commodities from the FPS on specific days each month. All of the states studied use a monthly distribution system for PDS commodities, with the exception of West Bengal, which has been using a weekly distribution system for a long time.

Depending on whether the supplies from the FCI go down or wholesale dealer, FPSs usually distribute food grains at the beginning of the month. If the dealer does not receive goods on time or if there is a delay in receiving supplies, FPS distribution will be delayed as well. In an ideal world, the FPS dealer would personally visit beneficiaries in rural or call them in urban areas to tell them of any changes in distribution days or times. Beneficiaries in many localities learn about the day of commodities distribution through their neighbours. In other words, word of mouth is the primary means of spreading information about the day of distribution or the availability of food grains at the FPS. We used a set of qualitative questions in our family schedule to elicit opinions on how FPSs work. The quality of food grains provided by FPSs differs per state. Rice quality is more of a problem than wheat quality. Beneficiaries used to complain about the low quality of rice from the PDS in the 1980s and 1990s, and it was widely assumed that the quality was bad because it was subsidized. Over time, the situation has improved. In Uttar Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the field crew noted inadequate grain storage quality in a few businesses.

### **3.8 Evaluation of the Public Distribution System's Performance**

In India, the TPDS was implemented in 1997 as a redesigned food security programme, replacing the nearly universal PDS. The major goal was to identify persons living in poverty and offer them with food grains at subsidised costs all around the country. Academics and policymakers, on the other hand, have been critical of the initiative since its inception. The following were the two primary criticisms: (i) incorrect identification of target homes, the frequency of ghost cards and unidentified households, (ii) massive food grain leakage, poor accessibility, supply chain malpractices, and so on. The NFSA, a modified version of the TPDS, was implemented in India in 2013 to increase low coverage and reduce supply chain leakages. Several jurisdictions have already adopted the NFSA since 2013, while the rest are still in the process. This chapter examines the system evaluation of PDS in the six states under investigation in depth. The system evaluation has two major parameters: In assessing implementation and identification mistakes, and (ii) estimating the quantity of food grain leakage, errors in PDS identification. The proper targeting of recipients is critical to the successful implementation of a government programme. The challenge of identifying disadvantaged homes for the TDPS was difficult. Misclassification or non-classification of poor families causes targeting problems. Poverty is a fluid situation. As a result, determining the criteria by which a household can be classified as poor is challenging. To select the target households, the Indian government employs variables such as income, expenditure, land ownership, and asset ownership.

States have also developed their own standards to classify the impoverished at times, based on local economic situations. In 2013, the PDS mechanism transitioned from broad allocation under the TPDS to food as a legal right under the NFSA. Following state-specific identification criteria, the impoverished have been re-identified. In 2013,

three of the study's three states — Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Karnataka — shifted from the TPDS to the NFSA. The NFSA was fully implemented in Bihar in March 2014, while it was partially implemented in Karnataka and Chhattisgarh under the names 'Anna Bhagya Yojna' and 'Chhattisgarh Food Security Act (CGFSA),' respectively. The NFSA was implemented in Karnataka in July 2013 and in Chhattisgarh in September 2013.

Karnataka and Chhattisgarh have embraced the standards set by state-level expert panels for identifying the impoverished. Families below the poverty line, as well as a proportion of those who formerly belonged to the APL category, are now classified as priority households (PHH) under the NFSA. Following a state-specific identification study conducted in 2011–12, Bihar has recognised PHH. The criteria for identification are broader than the income/expenditure criterion used in the previous BPL censuses in 1992 and 1997. The automatic inclusion requirements for the identification mechanism are homeless, manual scavengers, destitute living on alms and so on. These two states have adopted the standards for defining the poor specified by state-level expert groups. Under the NFSA, families living below the poverty line, as well as a percentage of individuals who previously fell into the APL category, are now designated as priority households (PHH). Bihar has recognised PHH as a result of a state-specific identification study undertaken in 2011–12. The identification criteria are broader than the income/expenditure criterion used in the 1992 and 1997 BPL censuses. Homeless, manual scavengers, the impoverished living on alms and others are automatically included in the identification method. (National council for applied economics (2015).

The Green Revolution and food self-sufficiency introduced a new dimension to the management of food grains. Farmers were given a fair procurement price to protect them against market anomalies, as well as buffer stocking, market price control, and

public distribution of critical commodities. Food Corporation of India (FCI) was founded in 1965 as a self-contained corporation with the mission of purchasing, storing, moving, transporting, distributing, and selling food grains and other food products on a commercial basis. The Study Team on FPSs, led by Shri V.M. Dandekar (1966), found that foreign supplies were insufficient to supply the growing demand for food grains through FPSs. The team suggested that FPS pricing be market-driven, and they should maximize their market share.

The Food Grains Policy Committee (1966) advocated for the formulation of a National Food Budget based on zonal restrictions, the implementation of statutory rationing in larger urban areas, increased procurement, buffer stock building, and a larger role for the Food Corporation of India in inter-state trade. The Public Distribution System would "had to be so developed that it stays afterwards a steady and permanent part of our strategy to control prices, decrease volatility in them, and achieve a fair distribution of vital consumer commodities," according to the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85). The Essential Supplies Programme, launched in 1982 as the 17th item of the New 20-Point Plan, aimed to extend the PDS by establishing more FPSs, especially mobile FPSs, to make exercise books and text books more readily available for students, and to develop a strong consumer protection movement.

The Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies was established in 1984 by the Government of India, with two departments: the Department of Food and Department of Civil Supplies, with the latter in responsibility of PDS. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the Government of India established an Advisory Committee on PDS, chaired by the Union Minister for Food and Civil Supplies, to assess its operations on a regular basis. At the district, block, and tehsil levels, Consumer Advisory Committees were to be formed.

In 1992, the Essential Supplies Programme was replaced by the Revamped PDS (RPDS), which focused on underserved areas. According to the RPDS, 1752 blocks were recognised as economically and socially backward under the Desert Development Programme (143), Drought Prone Areas Programme (602), Integrated Tribal Development Projects (1073), and Designated Hill Areas (69). There were 135 of them, and some of them overlapped. Wheat, rice, levied sugar, imported edible oil, kerosene, and soft coke were all provided at subsidised prices in the RPDS blocks. Food grains were to be provided at a rate of 20 kg per month per family (@5 kg per individual) through FPSs.

The project also included the construction of PDS infrastructure, such as godowns for storing food grains and Mobile Vans for delivering PDS supplies to FPSs and ultimate distribution of these items in inaccessible locations, on a 50 percent subsidy and 50 percent loan basis. To ensure adequate distribution, vigilance committees were to be formed at various levels. Though the RPDS was generally beneficial to the vulnerable section of the population across regions and states, there were still issues in the implementation, such as the availability of very limited door delivery services to FPSs, FPS level gaps in opening time, working hours, regularity of distribution, and communicability and insufficient facilities for storage at FCI indicating the quality of grains, and (Analysis of the Targeted Public Distribution System's Performance) (TPDS, 2005).

### **3.9 Changes in the Public Distribution System (PDS) under the Modi Administration/Leadership**

The goal of large-scale public investment in the Public Distribution System (PDS) in India has been to eliminate malnutrition and poverty. The PDS is the world's largest welfare programme, providing subsidised food grains to low-income families. This

study uses the public distribution system (PDS) in India to investigate the extent of stunting and underweight among children from poor and non-poor households. “Poverty is a direct cause of malnutrition, mediated by inadequate nutritional intake, a lack of medical care, a lack of access to sanitation and hygiene, and a poor environment.” The focus of emerging countries has been on reducing malnutrition and poverty through various welfare initiatives. While the national and local governments have implemented numerous welfare schemes to reduce poverty in the important domains of health, nutrition, livelihood, and education, the effectiveness of these programmes varies by kind of service, end variable, and country. Malnutrition in children is linked to poverty and has a number of negative short and long-term repercussions, including cognitive impairment, ill health and childhood death in the short term.

#### **Announcements made by BJP and Congress, Chhattisgarh**

<b>Year</b>	<b>BJP</b>	<b>Congress</b>
2003	Interest-free loans for farmers were introduced by the BJP. Along with this complete withdrawal of land, the tax was initiated by the Govt. The setting up of a Farmer Welfare Fund was also introduced by the Govt.	
2008	Interest-free loan for farmers was initiated by the Govt. Along with this free 5 HP electricity for farmers was taken into consideration. Farmer Welfare Fund (recycled from 2003)	Free power was initiated by the govt. The promise of rice at Rs.2 per kg to all ration cardholders in Chhattisgarh were taken into consideration. Along with this,

Year	BJP	Congress
	<p>was introduced. The promise of rice at Re.1 per kg to the extremely poor was initiated by the govt. In 2007, promised Rs.50 bonus per quintal in addition to the Rs.50 already was introduced by the Centre. BJP reacted to Congress' announcement of Rs.250 as a bonus by announcing Rs.270 as a bonus per quintal. On winning the elections, they gave the bonus for one Kharif marketing season, but refused to do so from the next year onwards.</p>	<p>they promised Rs.250 in their own manifesto.</p>
2013	<p>Interest-free loan for farmers were introduced by the Govt. Free 5 HP electricity for farmers (recycled from 2008) were taken into consideration. 'Kisaan Kalyan Kosh' or Farmer Welfare Fund to be established by the Govt. (recycled from 2003 and 2008). Bonus Rs.300 per quintal on paddy (no bonus in 2009, 2010 and 2011). MSP Rs.2100 per quintal for paddy. Provision of Re.1 per kg of rice to the poor. 'Fasal Beema guarantee' or Crop</p>	<p>35 kg of free rice in a month to BPL and APL families □ Free power supply to peasants for 5Hp pumps □ Rs.2000 per quintal procurement price for paddy, out of which Rs.500 to be paid to the woman members of their family were introduced</p>

Year	BJP	Congress
	Insurance Guarantee Scheme for farmers. A policy to be formulated for immediate compensation in cases of crop failure. Special agro-forestry zones (not created)	
2018	'Bonus Tihar' from 3 to 13 October 2017 around Diwali to give paddy bonus of Rs.300 per quintal procured from them. This will amount to Rs.2100 crore as a bonus to 13 lakh paddy cultivators.	The state Congress Legislature Party leader, T. S. Singhdeo, has appealed to people from all sections of the society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and intellectuals to send their suggestions and recommendations for the party's manifesto

(Chhotray, Adhikari & Bahuguna, 2018)<sup>17</sup>

In developing countries' poverty reduction programmes, nutrition-sensitive treatments for kids are becoming increasingly important. Public initiatives that are successful in decreasing poverty have an inherent comprehensive approach to malnutrition reduction. Despite this, progress in reducing money-metric poverty and malnutrition is slow and inconsistent over the world. In 2018, an estimated 736 million people in developing nations were living in poverty (1.90 USD per day in Purchasing Power Parity) and 151 million children under the age of five were stunted. A great number of studies from different nations and within countries point to a strong and significant link between economic issues and malnutrition. While only a few studies employ income as an economic metric, many others use consumer expenditure and an asset-based index

(referred to as the wealth index) to explain malnutrition. Malnutrition is negatively associated with the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, according to cross-country studies. Due to the lack of direct income data in many lower-middle-income nations, studies have linked absolute income with malnutrition. The reduction of malnutrition among children and adults is linked to household consumption spending, particularly food expenditure.

Malnutrition is now being linked to asset-based metrics in a rising number of research using data from demographic health surveys (DHSs). Several research shows that, despite decreasing disparity across socioeconomic classes, malnutrition remains higher for the poor and disadvantaged, and this is true across countries. Many non-economic factors, such as social identity, household environment, sanitation and water are regarded as significant predictors of child malnutrition at the household level, in addition to economic factors. Malnutrition is linked to maternal features such as maternal education, anthropometry, and mothers' sanitary practices, as well as individual traits such as child's sex, birth order, birth weight and immunization, and In India, poverty estimation and beneficiary identification for assistance programmes are done independently. The Government of India estimates poverty at the state level using consumption expenditure data collected on a regular basis by the National Sample Survey (NSS). However, impoverished households are determined through an independent survey conducted by the state government in accordance with federal criteria. Poor families are granted a Below Poverty Line (BPL) card, which entitles them to benefits from different federal and state government welfare programmes. The first BPL survey in India was conducted in 1992, and four rounds of BPL surveys have since been conducted (the most recent in 2011–12). The criteria used to identify the beneficiaries for each round were not uniform. In the 1992 BPL survey, a household

income restriction of Rs. 11,000 per year was applied to define impoverished people. The exclusion and inclusion criteria were used in the 1997 round of the poll. A set of 13 socio-economic factors were utilized in the 2002 BPL survey to calculate household well-being and identify the poor. The three-step approaches outlined by the Saxena committee report were used in a recent BPL survey. BPL recipients are classified using a 0–10 scoring system based on the weighted score of a set of variables. According to studies, a portion of the impoverished households are not eligible for the BPL card. Errors in inclusion and exclusion criteria, political interference, and corruption have all been blamed for such exclusion.

In India, BPL households have long been prioritized in the welfare programmes of the central, state, and local governments. Initially, the Public Distribution System supplied free/highly subsidised rations to BPL members (PDS). It has since been expanded to include a broader range of goods and services, including as housing, cooking fuel, employment, health insurance, old-age pensions and sanitation. The benefits are distributed through a variety of welfare programmes, including the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana, the Swachh Bharat Mission, the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), the Ayushman Bharat Yojana, and the PM Ujjwala plan. The government of India, for example, donated 9.2 crore toilets to underprivileged homes as part of the Swachh Bharat Mission. The Indian government has unveiled the Ayushman Bharat Scheme, a health insurance programme that will cover the poorest 40% of households with hospitalization coverage of up to five lakh rupees.

The BPL card is a welfare card that includes not just free or discounted food but also other benefits. As a result, getting a welfare card entitles a poor family to a slew of benefits that have a direct and indirect impact on India's malnutrition rate. The distribution of subsidised rations via welfare cards attempts to ensure that food is

available to low-income families. The study is based on the notion that a welfare card entitles a household to subsidised rations, as well as other free/subsidized goods and services, all of which have a direct impact on the reduction of child malnutrition in households. A household that is not enrolled in the welfare programme (i.e., does not have a welfare card) is more likely to be vulnerable. Despite the fact that studies have highlighted the elements that contribute to malnutrition and poverty, no research has been done on the relationship between poverty, welfare card distribution, and nutritional outcomes. The purpose of this study is to look at the link between asset deprivation, welfare cards, and stunting and underweight among Indian children. As a result, children from low-income families who do not qualify for government assistance are more likely to suffer from severe malnutrition.

PDS is one of the government's largest welfare programmes, assisting farmers in selling their produce at fair prices and assisting the underprivileged sectors of society in purchasing food grains at reasonable prices. Its effectiveness can be improved using technology driven solutions, as evidenced by some states' achievements in this area. Shifting to DBT is another option, although it should be approached with caution. In a study on state finances, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) encouraged states that are considering switching to cash transfers to proceed with caution. While replacing subsidised PDS supplies with DBT, the Economic Survey 2016-17 also stressed the need for greater vigilance and stronger infrastructure. The best way ahead is to strengthen the existing TPDS system by training and capacity building of the implementing authorities, as well as attempts to plug leaks.

Increased public participation through social audits, as well as the participation of SHGs, cooperatives, and NGOs in maintaining the transparency of the PDS system at the ground level, can enhance it further. Bio-fortified foods must be given through the PDS

to improve the nutritional status of the masses, making it more relevant in the face of widespread malnutrition in India.

### **3.10 Initiatives taken as a special campaign**

Here are the some of the Initiatives taken as a special campaign to distribute ration cards and food grains to the poorest and most vulnerable members of society.

1. Operation of FPSs for adequate duration during the COVID period. In this initiatives representations are being received in this Department stating that during the current lock-down in some States/UTs, Fair Price Shop (FPSs) timings have been curtailed due to which the intended beneficiaries might not be getting adequate time to lift their entitled food grains. Thus the Government of India has taken pro-poor measures to minimize the economic hardships being faced by the NFSA beneficiaries during the second wave of Covid-19 by providing them additional food grain for the month of May-June 2021 under Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PM-GKAY III), free of cost, @ 5 kg per person per to all NFSA ration card holders to ensure the food security of around 80 crore poor and needy beneficiaries with es covered under NFSA apart from regular food grain distribution under TPDS as per norms of NFSA so that they do not suffer on account of non-availability of food grains during the ongoing period of crisis. Along with this considering the obligation to be fulfilled on the part of the States/UTs to ensure that this additional food grain is to be made available to all the beneficiaries in a safe and time bound manner, duly observing COVID -19 protocol, it becomes all the more imperative to ensure that adequate time is provided to both the FPSs and the beneficiaries alike to carry out the necessary transactions. Hence all States/UTs were advised

to ensure the opening of FPSs for distribution of PMGKAY and NFSA food grains preferably on all days of the month. FPS dealers should prominently display the minimum requisite information on all required aspects, including the available grievance redressal mechanisms. Distribution of food grains may be done in a staggered manner throughout the day to avoid accumulation/queuing up of a large number of beneficiaries/persons at the FPSs/one place at any time. States/UTs may take necessary action to ensure that FPSs are exempted from the restricted hours of opening of the regular market, as food grains are covered under essential items. Appropriate social distancing, and hygiene may be observed and the presence/visits of non-essential persons at FPSs etc. should be avoided. In view of the above, it was advised to take all the necessary steps for the timely distribution of food grains without causing any hardships to the beneficiaries. Wide publicity may be given to this measure in local and vernacular language in all parts of the state using all media platforms.

2. Allocation of food grain to the Migrant @ 5kg per person per month for 2 months for free as part of Economic measures (Atma Nirbhar Bharat). Allocation of food grain for stranded migrants, who are not covered under the National Food Security Act (NFSA) or State Scheme PDS Cards @ 5 kg per person per month free for a period of two months of May & June, 2020.
3. Allocation of food grains to the persons not covered under NFSA during COVID-19 it was decided to allocate foodgrains @ 5kg per person per month to all the beneficiaries not covered under NFSA in respect of persons having valid ration cards issued by the State Governments under their own schemes but who are not covered under NFSA as well as the standardization of ration cards.

### **3.11 India and subnational welfare regimes: The role of state governments in social policy of India**

Here we'll look at the term 'social policy' and ask a lot of questions about it. We will unavoidably have to consider multiple definitions of related ideas and category labels - social administration, social welfare, social security, social service, welfare states, and so on - in order to do so. We'll have to ask ourselves why we're studying social policy in the first place, or why we're studying society's reaction to social needs and issues in the first place. Are we concerned with principles and objectives about certain areas of social life and organization - or with social engineering: with methods and techniques of action, management, organization and the application of games theory? Whatever response we come up with, we will undoubtedly become deeply entangled in concerns of moral and political principles. Indeed, political propaganda frequently hides behind the guise of social policy. What exactly do we mean when we say "social policy"? Inextricably linked to this is the equally essential question of whose social policy it is. For our purposes, the term 'policy' refers to the principles that guide activity oriented toward certain goals. The idea denotes action in terms of both methods and ends, implying change in situations, systems, practices, and behaviour. And it's worth noting that the concept of policy is only useful if we feel we can influence change in some way. We don't have weather policies because we don't have the power to do anything about it right now. However, we have policies (or can have policies) concerning illegitimate children because we believe we have some authority over their lives - for better or worse, depending on whether you are the policymaker or the illegitimate child. The term 'policy' is used here in a problem-solving and action-oriented sense. The collective 'we' refers to government activities that convey the 'general will' of the people, whether in the United Kingdom, China, or Nigeria. Of fact, the meaning and

legitimacy of a concept of "universal will" are strongly challenged. The word 'social' causes the most difficulty in terms of semantics. It's not made any easier now by the fact that so many disciplines, professions, and groups claim it as a Christian name and, in fact, promote it as something entirely different. Social geography, social psychology, social psychiatry, social planning, social administration, social law, social work, social linguistics, social history, social pathology, social medicine, and so on are all examples. Even Bank of America formed a new executive vice-president in charge of social policy in January 1972! Why not use social theology as an example? Is it really essential to hammer home the idea that all of these subjects and organizations' are concerned in some way with man in society, especially non-economic variables in human relations? Aren't they all, in essence, emphasising that man is a social being, not just an economic person, and that society cannot be modelled using mechanistic-organic or physiological models? It's possible that much of the current 'social' craze is a reaction to economists, political philosophers, experimental psychologists, and sociologists' earlier sillier views of man in society. For example, the attempts of the Victorian economists to create a competitive, self-regulating total market.<sup>18</sup>

### ***Social Policy***

“The organic nature of society is a truth”, according to Radcliffe-doctrine Brown's (as one of the "fathers" of contemporary anthropology). Solidarity and Integration must be 'natural' qualities of all social systems, according to such a concept. 'Social structures are just as real as individual organisms,' he wrote. A complex organism is made up of living cells and interstitial fluids that have been organised in a certain configuration. Another anthropologist, Edmund Leach, a social anthropologist, had this to say about the doctrine: 'If you are convinced, on a priori grounds, that all types of social stress must result in a reaction that restores or even reinforces societal cohesion, you will

rapidly convince yourself that war is peace and conflict harmony. You could argue that if social strains fix themselves naturally (like in a self-regulating market economy), then there is no need for a risky idea like social policy. However, it is possible to claim that social policy is merely a component of the self-regulatory processes inherent in a 'natural' social order. This would imply that the evolution of social services in the United Kingdom since the turn of the twentieth century was in some ways predetermined; that it was destined to occur due to a 'natural' propensity in the social system toward equilibrium and order. This equilibrium-order concept is supported in part by Talcott Parsons' theory. Fundamentally, it is a conservative ideology analogous to the philosophy of 'All is for the best in the greatest of all possible worlds,' or, to use another example, akin to neo-classical economic theory, which envisions the best possible self-regulating supply and demand private market.<sup>19</sup>

However, we must not conclude that social policy, as conceived in this or any other way, is necessarily beneficent or welfare-oriented in the sense of providing more welfare and benefits for the poor, the so-called working classes, elderly pensioners, women, deprived children, and other social poverty categories. A redistributive social policy can redistribute control over material and non-material resources from the poor to the wealthy; from one ethnic group to another; from working life to old age within income groups and social classes - as in middle-class pension systems - and in other ways. Many people in South Africa today would not consider certain social measures to be beneficial or welfare-oriented. In several Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, social insurance programmes serve as hidden multipliers of inequality, transferring resources from the poor to the wealthy. In Nazi Germany, Hitler devised social policies – these were called social policies – for the mentally sick and retarded, Jews, and other ethnic groups. The use of human beings for medical study, sterilization,

and the gas chamber were the ultimate goals of these instruments of social policy, according to world public opinion. When we use the word "social policy," we must not instinctively associate it with charity, care for others, equality, and so on. We therefore cannot assume that just because the United Kingdom - or any other country - has a social policy or developed social services, they would be used to achieve the goals of progressive redistribution, equality, and social altruism in practice. Gunnar Myrdal has written extensively on the consequences of fooling ourselves and others about our values and prejudices in his economic and social policy writings. He has criticized sociologists and anthropologists for believing in the viability of a value-free method in their studies of social organization.

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*Chapter IV*

*Public Distribution System in*

*Chhattisgarh: The Regulatory*

*Mechanism*

## CHAPTER-IV

### PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN CHHATTISGARH: THE REGULATORY MECHANISM

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#### 4.0 Introduction

Chhattisgarh is the first state in the country to implement food security act of its' own. Not only provisions for food security have been made in C.G. Food Security Act but provisions for nutrition security has also been made with the objective of increasing protein intake in food for balance diet. In this Act following criteria has been set for eligible families:

1. **Antyodaya households:** - There is provision to include families in category of Antyodaya households who have been either currently eligible for Andyodaya household scheme or to be included in vulnerable social groups. Such families are monthly entitlement to Rs 1per kg of rice; 2 kg free iodized Amrit Namak (Salt), Rs 5per kg to 2 kg of gram in scheduled area and Rs 10 per kg to 2kg of Lentils in non-schedules area. According to departmental database 14.64 lakh Ration cards has been issued.
2. **Prathmikta households:-** families which holds the Ration Card under the Mukhyamantri Khadyanya Sahayata Scheme were put in Prathamik households. Such families are entitled to Rs 1per kg to 35 kg of rice; 2kg free iodized Amrit Namak (Salt), Rs 5 per kg to 2 kg of gram per month in scheduled area. According of departmental database 42.60 lakhs blue core Ration Cards of Prathmik households has been issued.
3. **Samanya households:-** Samanya households is defined as those which are not included in Antyodaya households and Apawarjit households. Such families are entitled to Rs 9.50 per kilogram for 10 kilogram of rice and Rs 6.75 per kilogram

and for 5 kg of wheat per month. According to the departmental data base 4.19 lakh Ration Cards have been insured under this scheme.

Consumers can avail of food at 6501 fair price shops. 4532 PDS shops were opened after formation state. 11088 are in use as on October'2014, 4115 are under the panchayats, 4364 by service cooperative societies, 2412 by women self-help groups, 154 by forest security societies and 43 by urban bodies. There is an arrangement for issuing ration cards, to eligible persons under Chhattisgarh Food Security Act, 2012, to offer consumers with required supplies through the use of Price Shops at reasonable rates. The panchayats have been given the authority to grant Antyodaya, Prathmik and Samanya cards in the respective areas and municipal corporation in urban areas are been given the similar right in their jurisdiction.<sup>1</sup>

#### **Acquisition of Paddy at a Support Price**

Paddy is acquired at support price through the agency of Chhattisgarh State Co-operative Marketing Federation through co-operative societies at reasonable prices. In the year 2000-01, the cost of paddy was Rs. Five hundred ten per quintal and Rs. Five hundred fourty per quintal for 'A' category of paddy. This rose to Rs. 1360 per quintal and Rs. 1400 per quintal respectively in 2014-15. In the year 2013-14, 79.72 lakh ton of paddy were acquired at support price and bonus of rupees three hundred per quintal was distributed to farmers in addition to support price.

#### **4.1 Chhattisgarh's model**

In the Public Distribution System, Chhattisgarh is regarded as a model state (PDS). Government have commended the states actions, and other governments have been ordered to follow its example. The PDS system was primarily reformed in three phases by the state.

### **First phase**

After a thorough review, the Chhattisgarh Government issued the Chhattisgarh PDS (Control) Order, 2004 in the first phase, which created a series of improvements to the PDS distribution and procurement systems. Importantly, it removed the intermediaries, therefore eliminating corruption. In this phase, there are also substantial reforms such as:

- All ration stores were de-privatized and turned over to Van Suraksha-Samitis panchayats, self-help groups, and other organizations to guarantee that they ran well.
- In each gram panchayat, ration shops were constructed.
- Timely delivery of rations to cardholders.

### **Second phase**

- Efforts to promote openness were stepped up by including the public and putting the system online.
- All through the state, call centers were constructed.
- All data about ration collecting at PDS locations has been made public by posting it on the internet.
- People have been sent SMS warnings about ration movements, and all supplies, transactions, and other records were electronically.

### **Third phase**

The procedure of procuring paddy was made more efficient, and an online service was put in place. The payment was to be made straight to the farmer's bank account, thus arrangements were made. As a result of all of this, Chhattisgarh has surpassed Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, and other states as a major provider to the Centre's pool.<sup>2</sup>

#### **4.2 The PDS system in Chhattisgarh has a number of notable features**

- The state supplies pulses, gramme, sugar, and iodized salt to the recipients in order to ensure nutrition as well as food security.
- Food and nutritional security have been supplied to about 90% of the people in Chhattisgarh.
- The state was the first to establish the “Right to Food” a legal right for its citizens.
- 2.32 Crore people are benefiting from the Chhattisgarh Food-Security Act. Small farmers or landless labourers with up to 5 acres of land, and unorganized labourers like barbers, shoemakers, and carpenters have all been added to the list.
- In 2012, the government introduced the 'Meri-Marji' programme, which is currently operational in a few districts. Under the Core PDS system, consumers can purchase rations from any retailer of their choice.
- It was stated in the budget that by March 2017, in the project about 3 lakh of the country's 5.35 lakh fair pricing stores would be equipped with automation.

There are considerable obstacles to overcome in order to improve the PDS' efficiency and transparency. As demonstrated in the state of Chhattisgarh, digitization and computerization will clearly benefit in the implementation of accountability, and be implemented in other states as well. To accomplish this, PDS workers must be technologically literate in order to handle digital devices and automation. To capture the needed information fast and correctly, efficient hands are required. To take the advantage of Food Security Act, it would be good to study and apply the Chhattisgarh model, with revisions as needed to meet the needs of the states and regions affected. It

is the state's responsibility to ensure that rations are delivered on schedule to qualified residents and that the system is efficient, transparent, and accountable.<sup>3</sup>

### **4.3 PDS reforms in Chhattisgarh**

Three phases can be identified in Chhattisgarh's PDS reforms. Reforms began in 2004 with the de-privatization of the FPS network and its transfer to public authorities. De-privatization, efforts were made to make the shops sustainable by boosting commissions paid to shopkeepers, allocating (practicable) space for shops for PDS, offering accounting training, and providing soft loans for infrastructure and working capital.


After these, and only then did initial changes gain traction did the Chhattisgarh state government initiate what we may refer to as the second phase: ICT-based reforms. The first few years of ICT reforms were devoted to boosting transparency and accountability all across the distribution process, which included computerizing the whole acquisition process; issuing bar-coded ration cards to prevent infringing and repetition; building a web-based management information system to track the distribution network; and utilizing SMS technologies to strengthen tracking are just a few of the initiatives underway (by sending alerts regarding the time, date, and quantity of food graded). These two waves of initial reforms were successful in considerably reducing corruption and streamlining the supply chain in the PDS.

Specific figures collected from field surveys indicate that leakages have decreased to five percent of the total (Right to Food Campaign, 2013). But all these two waves of reform missed the mark of tracking transactions all the way to its last hour, resulting in the concealment of activities at the shop-floor level. Because the information system adopted in phase two was incapable of handling this type of data, this was a major contributing factor. Nonetheless, a number of flaws originate at the store level. When

recipients try to use the service during business hours, they frequently find that the stores are closed. In spite of the fact that they do have stock available, shopkeepers announce that they have "no stock available." Shopkeepers may under- or over-charge for food grains, a problem that illiterate customers are unaware of. Thousands of miles are travelled by migrants in order to receive their rations, or they risk losing their benefits, because rations can only be obtained from specially designated outlets.<sup>4</sup>

A steady welfare performer, Chhattisgarh is recognized for its demonstrated commitment to a broad social policy agenda, which has been proved throughout time. It continues to prosper despite the fact that the country's political leadership is dominated by a small socioeconomic elite and poorly organized lower classes and castes. When it comes to predatory states, Jharkhand is considered to be a "extreme case," one in which the political regime has demonstrated no consistent commitment to a broad-based social policy agenda, power is personalized, political parties are fragmented, and the bureaucracy's authority is limited to at best some discretionary power (Tillin, et al., 2015). However, the authors do not explain why Jharkhand did not profit from the same 'administrative rewards' as Chhattisgarh, despite the presence of other 'enabling' variables.

**The Public Distribution System in India: Stakeholders and Responsibilities**



(Adhikari & Bahuguna 2018)<sup>5</sup>

As it has been shown in the above figure that there is a chain of distribution of food grains starting from the Central government to Food Corporation of India and then to the state food corporation at the state level and District food office at district level and at last Fair Price shops and beneficiaries. Thus it has been mentioned above in the figure that procure and storing of grains from farmers across the country through FCI for Central beneficiaries is done with the help of Central Government. Along with this decentralized procurement in states is done where local production of grain is high for central beneficiaries. The distribution is possible only with the help and coordination for Distribution of food grain between state food corporation and the department of food and civil supplies. At the very grassroots level the of district level selection and removal of FPSs based on the inspection by food inspectors. The At village level/and at the level of fair price shop sells of grain to consumers and beneficiaries is done.

#### **4.4 Department of Food & Public Distribution**

The Department of Food and Public Distribution's main policy goal is to secure the country's food security by procuring and distributing food grains timely. This includes the acquisition of various food grains, the building up and maintenance of food stocks, their storage, movement, and delivery to distribution agencies, as well as the monitoring of food grain production, stock, and price levels. The focus is on incentivizing farmers through a Minimum Support Price mechanism, distribution of food grains to Below Poverty Line (BPL) families and covering poor households at risk of hunger under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), establishment of grain banks in food-scarce areas, and participation of Panchayati Raj Institutions in the Public Distribution System (PDS). The Department is also in charge of formulating policies relating to the sugar industry, such as determining the Fair and Remunerative Price (FRP) of sugarcane payable by sugar factories, as well as the development and regulation of the sugar industry (including sugar technology training) and the regulation of free-sale sugar supply. Food grain, sugar, and edible oil export and import policies are also developed by the Department.<sup>6</sup>

#### **4.5 Food Corporation of India**

The Food Corporation of India was established under the Food Corporations Act 1964 in order to achieve the objectives of the Food Policy, which were as follows:

1. Farmers' interests are protected by effective price support activities.
2. Food grain distribution for the public distribution system across the country.
3. Ensuring National Food Security by maintaining enough operating and buffer stockpiles of food grains.


4. Efficient food grain acquisition, storage, and distribution at the Minimum Support Price (MSP).
5. Using suitable policy instruments to ensure the availability of food grains and sugar, particularly the management of food grain buffer stockpiles.
6. Making food grains affordable to the poor and vulnerable parts of society through the Public Distribution System (PDS).

FCI has played a key role in India's success in changing a crisis-oriented food security system into a stable security system since its foundation.

#### **4.6 Directorate of food civil supplies and consumer protection department, Government of Chhattisgarh**

The vision of the department is to ensure Food and Nutrition Security to the citizen of the state. As per the mission of the department is concerned Procurement of Paddy and Maize from the farmers in Minimum Support Prize fixed by the GoI, its Storage and disposal. To maintain a buffer stock of food grains and to ensure availability of food grains and sugar through appropriate policies. To provide food grains, iodized salt, chana and sugar to needy and weaker sections of the society through Public Distribution system, at the minimum price fixed by the state government. There are certain targets being fixed by the department the first one is the Implementation of national Food Security Act, 2013 and the Chhattisgarh Food and Nutritional Security Act, 2012. The target is the procurement of Paddy and Maize at a support price. Along with this Strengthening of the Targeted Public Distribution System was initiated. Development of Warehouses and Improvement of public services is to be done by the department.<sup>7</sup>

**Organisation Chart**



**Controller Food and Drugs Administration, Government of Chhattisgarh**

In order to carry out its mandate to have proper and effective control over the illegal import, manufacture, sale, and distribution of not of standard quality, misbranded, spurious, adulterated, and banned drugs, as well as adulterated and unsafe food products in the state of Chhattisgarh, the Food and Drugs Administration under the Health and Family Welfare Department of the Government of Chhattisgarh is implementing the following major acts and various Rules and Regulations made thereunder.

**Statutory Functions under the Food Safety & Standards Act 2006**


When it comes to the food business, the Food Authority and the State Food Safety Authorities are responsible for monitoring and ensuring that the relevant requirements of the law are met by all parties involved in the food business at all stages. Ensure that a system of control and other activities, such as public communication about food safety and risk, food safety surveillance, and other monitoring activities, are in place and cover

all stages of the food business. The food Safety Officers shall enforce and execute within their area the provisions of this Act. The Commissioner of Food Safety and Designated Officer shall exercise the same powers as are conferred on the Food Safety Officer and Follow the same procedure specified in the Act.<sup>8</sup>

### **Raipur District Chhattisgarh**

The primary policy purpose of the Department of Food and Public Distribution is to guarantee food security for the country by procuring and distributing food grains in a timely and efficient manner. This includes the procurement of various food grains, the establishment and maintenance of food stocks, the storage, transportation, and delivery of food grains to distributing agencies, as well as the monitoring of food grain production, stock, and price levels. The emphasis is on incentivizing farmers by providing them with a fair price for their produce through the Minimum Support Price mechanism, distribution of food grains to below-poverty-line (BPL) families and poor households at risk of hunger under the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), establishment of grain banks in food-scarce areas, and participation of Panchayati Raj Institutions in the Public Distribution System (PDS).<sup>9</sup>

### **Map of Raipur District**



**Table 4.1 Details of the Respondents**

<b>Sr. No</b>	<b>Dimensions</b>	<b>Details</b>
1.	Age Coverage	25-63 years
2.	Sex	Females & Male
3.	Educational Level	Highest 8 <sup>th</sup> class
4.	Marital Status	Almost Married
5.	Religion	Hindu
6.	Category	All

As it has been reflected in the above table that the participants under study was covered between the age group of 25-63 years of age. Both male and female were considered but the majority of the participants was females. It was revealed during the data collection that the majority of the respondents were not even attended primary schools. Very few of them were found in middle class pas and matric. Thus the majority of the participants were married and belong the Hinduism. All the social categories were included in the study without any demarcation.

**Table 4.2 Household Details**

<b>Number of Household Members</b>	<b>Type of Household</b>	<b>Type of Dwelling</b>	<b>Whether Built Under Indira Awas Yojana</b>	<b>Main Occupation of the Household</b>	<b>Agricultural Land owned</b>	<b>Type of Ration Card</b>
Almost 6 members in the family	Majority of respondents have Kacha House	Rural	There was no house built under IAY	Majority of the respondents are labourer	Approx. 1% of the people in the villages owned near about 8 Acre of land 99 % of the respondents have land minimum to 1 Acre	Majority have Prathmikta Cards

As far as household details of the participants are concerned, it was reflected that majority of the families have almost 5 to 6 members in the family. The majority of families have Kacha house and belongs to the rural area of the Raipur district of the Chhattisgarh. There was no house built under Indira Awas Yojna. The majority of the respondents and villagers are labourers' and labour work is only their source of income. Approx. 1% of the people in the villages owned near about 8 Acre of land 99 % of the respondents have a land minimum of 1 Acre.

**Table 4.3 Commodities bought with the Ration card at the PDS outlet**

<b>Sr. No</b>	<b>Commodities</b>	<b>Price/ Kg</b>
<b>1.</b>	Rice	1kg @1 Rs.
<b>2.</b>	Wheat/Atta (specify)	Did not receive
<b>3.</b>	Pulses	Did not receive
<b>4.</b>	Sugar	1kg @10 Rs.
<b>5.</b>	Kerosene	Did not receive
<b>6.</b>	Black Chana	Did not receive
<b>7.</b>	Salt	2 kg Per Card at every month


As far as the commodities are concerned it is reflected here that the people get rice at Rs.1 per 1 kg. They get sugar at Rs. 10 per kg and salt at 2 kg Per Card at every month. But it can be discussed and reflected here that wheat/ flour, pulses, black Chana etc. is equally important to maintain the balance diet. Government need to focus on this and should initiate the distribution of these commodities essential for the balanced diet.

**Table 4.4 normally amount to be paid for Wheat and Rice**

Commodity	Quantity (kg)	Price (Rs/kg)	Total Paid
Wheat	0	0	0
Rice	35 kg @ Antoyodhya card/	1	35

**Table 4.5 shows the Quota sold in the open market or appropriated by someone else**

Several Times	Sometimes	Never	Unclear
0%	100%	0%	0%



**Figure 4.1 Quota sold in the open market or appropriated by someone else**

Above table and figure shows the data regarding Quota sold in the open market or appropriated by someone else. It is shown that 100% of the respondents responded that it happened sometimes when dealers sold in the open markets or the commodities were appropriated by someone else.

**Table 4.6 Whether agreed with the entries of last three months**

<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Not sure</b>	<b>Not applicable</b>
Majority of the respondents responded yes to the statement	Only 3 respondents replied no to the statement	0	0

It was revealed by the respondents that the majority of them agreed with the entries. Only 3 of the total respondents responded no to the statement. But in an interview with the respondents, they replied that they are not satisfied with the quantity of rice and sugar. They need at least 45-50 kg of rice for a month, but they receive only 35kg. So it is insufficient for the month. The other reason for dissatisfaction is the appropriateness of the ratio to someone else.

**Table 4.7 Irregularities in the maintenance of the ration card**

<b>Missing Entries</b>	<b>Fake Information has been entered</b>	<b>Some entries have been over-written</b>	<b>Entries are illegible</b>	<b>Other irregularities</b>
0	Yes sometimes	0	0	0

While interaction with the respondents no respondent have responded that there are missing entries, some entries have been over-written, entries are illegible or other irregularities. But it was revealed from the responses that fake information is entered sometimes by the dealer to maintain the record.


**Table 4.8 Reasons for not getting full quota of Ration**

<b>Problems in grain supply</b>	<b>Lack of information regarding the opening of PDS outlet</b>	<b>Lack of cash at the time of availability</b>	<b>Not interested to buy the grain from PDS</b>	<b>Poor quality of grain</b>	<b>Grain out of stock</b>	<b>Dealer refused to give full quota</b>	<b>Other responses</b>
sometimes	No	No	No	Sometimes-old/ insects	1%	No	-

As far as reasons for not getting a full quota of ration is concerned none of the respondent replied for Lack of information regarding the opening of PDS outlet, Lack of cash at the time of availability, Not interested to buy the grain from PDS or Dealer refused to give full quota. But sometimes Problems in grain supply is noticed by the respondents and only 1% of the respondent replied for grain out of stock.

**Table 4.9 Rating about the quality of the grain received**

<b>Poor</b>	<b>Average</b>	<b>Good</b>	<b>Unclear</b>
3%	6%	91%	0%



**Figure no.2 rating about the quality of the grain received**

The above table and figure shows the results regarding the quality of the grain received. It was revealed that 3% of the respondents considered the quality as poor, 6% as average and 91% as good quality of the grain. Thus it can be reflected here that the majority of the respondents are considering the quality of the grain as good.

**Table 4.10 Distance of PDS outlet from home**

Village	0 to 1	2 to 3 km	3 to 5 km	Above 5 km
Champaran	Majority	-	-	-
Uparwara	Majority	-	-	-

It was found that almost both the villages have PDS outlet at the distance of 0 to 1 KM.

**Table 4.11 Number of days PDS outlet remains open**

Uparwara	Champaran	Number of days Fixed/Not fixed
10-12	10-15	-

It was responded by the respondents that the PDS outlet in the village Uparwara remain open for 10-12 days and in Champaran it remains open for 10-15 days. It is convenient to all availing of the services of the PDS. Few of the respondents have responded that it should stay open during the whole month and cited various reasons for the same.


**Table 4.12 Intimation/ Information Regarding the opening of PDS outlet**

<b>Regarding Opening</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Informed	100	0
Appropriateness of the days	Appropriate	Not appropriate
	95	5- due to labour work / other work/money

Responses regarding intimation/ information regarding the opening of PDS outlet is reflected in the above table. It was reflected here that 100% of the respondents said that they get information regarding the opening of the PDS. As far as the appropriateness of the days is concerned 95% of the respondents responded that it is appropriate but 5% of them have said that due to labor work, problem of money and other personal reasons they did not get ration.

**Table 4.13 Attitude of the Dealer**

<b>Villages</b>	<b>Helpful</b>	<b>Indifferent</b>	<b>Unhelpful</b>	<b>Unclear</b>
Champaran	95%	0%	5%	0%
Uparwara	100%	0%	0%	0%




**Figure no.3 Attitude of the Dealer**

The above table and figure shows the results regarding the attitude of the dealer at PDS outlet. At village Champaran, 95% of the respondents responded that the attitude and behaviour of the dealer is good and appropriate and at the village Uparwara it was revealed that all the respondents are satisfied with the behaviour of the dealer.

**Table 4.14 Importance of PDS for families**

Very Important	Quite Important	Not Important	Unclear
100%	0%	0%	0%




**Figure no. 4 Importance of PDS for families**

As far as the responses regarding the importance of the PDS for the families is concerned it was reflected that 100% of the respondents considered it very important.

**Table 4.15 Satisfaction with the functioning of local PDS outlet**

Highly Satisfied	Reasonably satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very dissatisfied	Unclear
0%	98%	2%	0%	0%




**Figure no. 5 Satisfaction with the functioning of local PDS outlet**

The above table and figure show the results regarding the Satisfaction with the functioning of local PDS outlet. It is reflected here that 98% of the respondents are reasonably satisfied with the functioning of the local PDS outlet but 2% are somewhat satisfied.

**Table 4.16 Comparison with the functioning of Today PDS and PDS of Five Year back**

Better	Same	Worse	Can't Say	Unclear
91%	1%	4%	4%	0%



**Figure no.6 Comparison with the functioning of Today PDS and PDS of Five Year back**

The above table and figure show the results regarding the functioning of Today's PDS and PDS of Five Year back. Thus 91% of the participants considered it better than the previous, 1% consider it the same, 4% consider it worse and 4% of them say nothing about the statement.

**Table 4.17 Comparison with the following respect**


Accessibility	Regularity	Quantity supplied	Quantity of grain	Description of the main points
Better in all aspects				

**Table 4.18 Average consumption of grain**

Average consumption in the family	They get
40-50 kg in a month	35 kg

**Table 4.19 Enough to ensure no one goes hungry**

Yes	No	Unclear
100%	0%	0%



**Figure no. 7 Enough to ensure no one goes hungry**

The above table and figure shows the results with respect to ensuring that no one sleeps hungry. It is found that 100% sleep with proper diet but they have to manage with extra

efforts/ labour work. The quantity of grain followed in the outlets is not sufficient to meet the needs.

**Table 4.20 Average spending in a month to run household**

Average spending
4000-5000

### **Primary Observation of the Researcher**

As far as the observation of the researcher is concerned the main issue in the PDS is Quantity issue. The quantity of the grain they get is not sufficient. Regardless they have to manage the grain from other sources. Secondly only distributing rice and sugar is not enough to ensure the balanced diet of the people. Govt. has to work on it and should distribute dal chana, gud, milk etc. Majority of the people in both the villages are labourer. Hence it is difficult for them to manage household expenses along with the education of their children. Thus benefits should be given to these people with a sound policy which can uplift their social-economic standard. Another problem is noticed by the researcher that the process of registration for ration card is time consuming. It takes 2-3 months to reach the card to the beneficiary. In, this way the FastTrack process of card preparation should be initiated by the Govt.

### **4.7 Critical PDS Reforms**

**Integration of AADHAR:** With the Integration of Aadhar with TPDS will eventually help in better identification of beneficiaries and will help in solving the problem of inclusion and exclusion errors. As per a study conducted by the UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India Ltd) using Aadhar with TPDS will help in

eliminating the Ghost ration cards and will make the identification of beneficiaries more accurately.

**TPDS reforms (Technology-Based) implemented by the states/UT:**

The Supreme court of India formed a committee known as the “Wadhwa Committee”, and as per the findings of the committee it states that certain states had implemented digitalization and other technology-based reforms in TPDS which have helped them in plugging various leakages of food grains during TPDS. Chhattisgarh implements a universal PDS in which every household becomes entitled to subsidized food grains. States like Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh have implemented various Information Technology measures to streamline TPDS with the help of digitalization of the ration cards, tracking of delivery through GPS and SMS based services for citizens.<sup>10</sup>

**Technology-based reforms of TPDS undertaken by some states**

<b>Type of reform</b>	<b>Benefits of reforms.</b>	<b>States implementing reforms</b>
The Digitization of ration cards	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Online entry updation and verification of beneficiary data.</li><li>2. Online and Real time updation of information of monthly and daily entitlement of beneficiaries, number of dependants, off take of food grains by beneficiaries from FPS, etc.</li></ol>	AndhraPradesh, Chhattisgarh, TN, MP, Karnataka, Gujarat, etc.

<b>Type of reform</b>	<b>Benefits of reforms.</b>	<b>States implementing reforms</b>
Digitalized allocation to FPS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Digitalized FPS allocation, declaration of stock balance, Web-based truck challans, etc.</li> <li>2. Allows Transparent, quick &amp; efficient tracking of the transactions.</li> </ol>	Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, etc.
Issuance of smart cards in place of ration cards	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Highly Secure electronic devices are used to store beneficiary data.</li> <li>2. Stores data such as beneficiaries' name, their address, biometrics, an economic category they belong to BPL/APL and monthly entitlement of beneficiaries and family members.</li> <li>3. Curbs counterfeiting</li> </ol>	Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha etc.
Use of GPS technology	Use Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to track the movement of trucks carrying food grains from state depots to FPS.	Chhattisgarh, Tamil Nadu.
SMS based monitoring	Allows monitoring by citizens so they can register their mobile numbers and	Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu.

<b>Type of reform</b>	<b>Benefits of reforms.</b>	<b>States implementing reforms</b>
	send/receive SMS alerts during dispatch and arrival of TPDS commodities.	
Use of web-based citizens' portal	Grievance redressal machinery in the Public domain, such as the toll-free number for call centres to register complaints or suggestions.	Chhattisgarh

#### **4.8 PDS vs. Cash Transfers**

The National Food Security Act of 2013 provides for specific reforms in the TPDS including schemes such as Cash transfers for the provisioning of food entitlements.

Whereas, the Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) aims to:

1. Will help in reducing the need and effort for huge physical movement of food grains.
2. Delegate greater autonomy to beneficiaries as per their consumption needs.
3. Will help in enhancing dietary variety.
4. Helps in curbing leakages.
5. Helps in more specific targeting of the target population.
6. Helps in aiding and promoting financial inclusion.

## 4.9 Recognition of Ration Cards

### 1. Blue Ration card :



The blue Colored ration card is generally issued to the families who are living below the poverty line category. It may also be in Yellow or in Green color in some states. In the rural areas, this ration card is issued to such families with an annual income ceiling of up to Rs 6400. In case of urban areas, a family with a maximum annual income ceiling of Rs 11,850 can get this ration card. The holder of this ration card is entitled to get subsidized food grains along with the kerosene the quantity of grain varies from state to state.

### 2. Pink colored Ration Card:



The holder of this ration card is given to those families whose total annual income ceiling is more than the limit prescribed for the poverty line category. In rural areas, this card is issued to a family earning more than Rs 6400 per annum. Whereas, In urban areas, families earning more than Rs 11,850 per annum can get this card. Subsidized food grains are available on this card.

Source: <https://navbharattimes.indiatimes.com/business/business-dictionary/ration-card-news-blue-white-pink-how-many-types-of-ration-cards-are-there-and-what-does-they-mean/articleshow/83911583.cms>

### 3. Antyodaya Anna Yojna (AAY) Ration Card

This ration card was being issued to the families whose annual income is below 15000 is entitled to get food grains at a cheaper cost.

S. No	Name of the Commodity	Price
1	35 Kg of rice and Wheat	Rs.1 per kg

#### 4. Priority House Hold (PHH) Ration Card

PHH ration card is provided to those people who belong to the rural households. The beneficiaries under this category are entitled to receive food grains on a monthly subsidized price.

S.No	Name of the Commodity	Price
1	35 Kg of rice and wheat	Rs.2 per kg
2	2 Kg of Iodized Salt	Nil
3	2 kgs of pulses	Rs 10/Kg
4	2 Kg of chana	Rs 5/Kg



#### 5. APL (General households) Ration Card

APL ration card is the Above Poverty line Ration card

Name of the commodity	Price
15 kg of rice and wheat	Less than 50% of the Minimum Support Price.

Source: <https://www.indiafilings.com/learn/chhattisgarh-ration-card/>

#### **4.10 PDS Model of Chhattisgarh**

Chhattisgarh is praised as the role model state for its Public Distribution System (PDS). It has earned huge praise of the Central government as well as of the Supreme Court of India which have ordered other states to follow its Public Distribution Model. The state made some critical reforms to the PDS system mainly in three following phases.

##### **First phase**

Under the first phase, the state government brought in the Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2004 with an aim to bring about a number of changes to the PDS delivery and procurement system. Most significantly, it eliminated the middlemen putting an end to the corruption. The various other significant reforms in this phase are as under:

1. It de-privatized all ration shops and ensure its smooth functioning by handing it over to the Self-help groups, Gram panchayats, van Suraksha Samitis and other community institutions.
2. Ration shops were established in each gram panchayats to make them accessible for villagers.
3. Timely distribution of Ration to the beneficiaries.

##### **Second phase**

1. In order to bring more transparency, the information was put on the Public domain online to make it accessible to the citizens.
2. Establishment of the Call centers throughout the state.
3. Timely SMS alerts were sent to the concerned people informing them of ration movements and all records pertaining to supplies, sales, etc.

### **Third phase**

Under the third phase, the Paddy procurement process was even more strengthened and an online system was introduced for the same. The arrangements were even made to directly transfer the payment to the bank accounts of the farmers. Due to all these positive efforts, Chhattisgarh become an important contributor to the Centre's pool after the states like Punjab, Andhra Pradesh etc.

#### **4.11 Significant highlights of the Chhattisgarh's PDS system**

1. In order to ensure the nutrition security of the beneficiaries, the state also provides Pulses, Grams, Sugar, and Iodized salt in addition to the aim of achieving food security.
2. Both Food and Nutritional Security have been provided to at least around 90% of the people in Chhattisgarh.
3. Chhattisgarh became the first state to provide 'Right-to-Food' to its people and introduced a law on it.
4. Chhattisgarh Food Security Act covers around 2.32 Crore people who are reaping the benefits. These include Landless labourers, small farmers having a land holding capping of up to 5 acres, unorganized labourers like barbers, shoemakers, carpenters etc have been included in the priority list under the act.
5. From the year 2014, the implementation of the Core PDS scheme got started by the state government. Under the preview of this scheme, the ration shop owners were answerable to the consumers. This scheme has won many national awards.
6. 'Meri Marji' scheme was launched by the Chhattisgarh in 2012 which is in operation in selected districts. According to this scheme, ration can be bought by the consumers from the shops of their choice under the Core PDS system.

#### **4.12 Replication of the Chhattisgarh Model in Rest of the Country**

1. There are a lot of challenges that need to be addressed first so that efficiency and transparency could be brought in the PDS. No doubt, with the integration of digitalization and computerization transparency, can be achieved to a large extent as seen in Chhattisgarh's model and can also be replicated across PAN India but to make it happen at the ground level it is important to increase digital literacy among the PDS staff to handle the hand held digital devices and automation.
2. In order to capture the required information correctly and quickly, efficient hands are required. It would be sensible if the model of the Chhattisgarh is thoroughly studied and implemented with the customized changes as per the requirements of the concerned states and regions in order to reap the benefits of the food security act. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the state to ensure that the eligible citizens are getting their due on time so that the system could self-enjoy and survive with greater Efficiency, Accountability and Transparency.

Chhattisgarh has been able to implement one of the most innovative implementation of the century which has managed to convert PDS into a model-scheme in the state. In the year 2004, the elected Chhattisgarh government introduced the CPDS i.e. Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2004 leading to numerous reforms to the PDS delivery and procurement system.

(Reform Summary is given in Table 1)


#### 4.13 Reforms did in PDS in Chhattisgarh between the year 2000 and 2009-10

Year	Reform	Description
2004	Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2004	De-privatized FPSs and constituted a number of transparencies/auditing mechanisms for food grain distribution.
		Passed in December 2004.
		The De-privatization was implemented starting September 2005 after legal challenge.
2007	List price reduction	PDS Food grains were offered PDS below the Central Issue Price.
2007	Mukhyamantri Khadyann Sahayata Yojana	Increased the number of people entitled to the most preferential PDS subsidies

(Krishnamurthy, Pathania, & Tandon, 2014)<sup>11</sup>

These reforms initiated the implementation of a number of measures to be undertaken leading to improvements in the overall implementation of the scheme itself. These measures were as follows:

1. **Enhancing Ownership:** The transfer of all the fair price shops to the Gram Panchayats, cooperative societies, self-help groups and forest protection committees. This led to an increase in transparency and accountability as the FPSs were now being run by people from the villages themselves.



- Downsizing Supply chain:** By downsizing the supply chain by the way of by getting food grains delivered to the FPSs directly, not only help in eliminating the middle man in between but will also help in lowering the chances of pilferage from the system.
- Monitoring Improvements:** The government trucks carrying PDS ration are painted in yellow color to make them easily distinguishable.



4. **Increased Accountability:** By strengthening of vigilance systems at the ground level by motivating people to take part in accountability by the series of different methods like making all the general records available to the common people by publishing them in the Public domains, Social audits, etc.
5. **Enhancing Coverage:** In the year 2007, the government launched the Mukhyamantri Khadyann Sahayata Yojana (MKSY) scheme. Under this scheme, an additional 1.9 million households (who had been excluded from the 2002 BPL survey due to the capping done by the Planning Commission on poverty numbers) were added to the 1.33 million households which were already receiving subsidized food grains from the central government at that time. Hence, the state-led initiative helped Chhattisgarh PDS increase coverage to approximately 80% of the rural population, which in turn helped reduce the exclusion errors.
6. **Implementation of the Core-PDS:** The Core PDS scheme was introduced based on the latest technology and this scheme has been running successfully in the Raipur district and is now being scaled-up. Under CORE PDS, beneficiaries can swipe their smart cards just like their debit and credit cards and take the delivery of their ration from any shop as per their convenience in their city as they are all mapped to a central server which in turn has also helped in reducing pilferage since the system is now electronically monitored where the government in real-time can match the amount dispatched with the stock received by the shops along with knowing how much of this stock received was sold to the card holders.

#### **4.14 Fair Price outlets of CORE PDS**

1. The Fair Price outlets/Shops play a vital role in the technology-enabled food security net. The distribution of FPS as per ownership viz. Coop societies, Self-help Groups and Panchayats, account for 99 per cent of ownership.
2. 90 per cent of FPS are supplied with the e-PoS machine.
3. As per the Directorate of Food Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs, Chhattisgarh, 200 epos machines have been installed in urban FPS.
4. FPS in rural regions utilizes tablets, and the ration has been distributed via clicking the photograph of beneficiaries. Such systems can obscure the transparency of UPDS in the State, which flaunts the promises of technology-enabled CORE PDS.
5. Chhattisgarh's model of UPDS symbolizes "food for all" and is a milestone which denotes to the credibility and portability of the PDS.
6. CORE PDS offers freedom and convenience to the beneficiaries in selecting FPS or salespersons.
7. The National Food Security Act (NFSA) was introduced by the Government of India in 2013. Under its aim, it has kept the provision of subsidized food grains to up to 75% of the rural population and 50% of the urban population of all states and Union Territories (UTs).
8. The food grains would be provided at highly subsidized prices under the Public Distribution System.

9. This Act ensures proper nutritional support to women and children. Pregnant and lactating women would be entitled to nutritious meals, free of charge under the MDM and ICDS schemes.
10. All Children in the age group of 6-14 years would also be entitled to free nutritious meals under the MDM and ICDS schemes.
11. Under this scheme, a Maternity benefit of not less than Rs.6000 is also provided to pregnant women and lactating mothers.
12. This Act also empowers women by identifying the eldest woman of the household as the head of the household to issue ration cards.

The Central Government shall allocate the required food grains from the central pool to the State Governments under the TPDS.

The State Government shall be responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the various schemes.

Apart from the above, numerous other measures were undertaken to improve transparency and accountability: They are listed below:-

1. **Increased commission rates:** An increased commission is paid to the shop owners from Rs. 8 to Rs. 30 per quintal of rice and are being provided interest-free loans to shop owners, thereby raising the FPS owner's incentive which hinders them to indulge in unethical trade practices and indulge in black marketeering of grains.
2. Only about 10% of the FPSs in Chhattisgarh reported food either going missing or being stolen in 2009-10.

3. By making the use of electronic weighing scales mandatory in all FPSs.
4. Verification drives are conducted from time to time to identify and cancel bogus ration cards.
5. Setting up of Surveillance committees at the local level to increase accountability.
6. GPS tracking – With the introduction and installation of the Global Positioning System, SMS's are being sent out whenever the goods leave the godowns and those trucks could be tracked easily through the navigation systems fitted into them so that they can be monitored on a real time basis. Hence, with the introduction of these measures have eventually led to an increase in transparency and accountability to a significant extent.

Conclusion: Hence, with this, we can conclude that in case of Chhattisgarh, there had been a lot of comprehensive and sustained reform measures together which could only become possible in the presence of a strong political will and effort from the civil society as well.

According to an Investigation by Bloomberg, Approximately \$14.5 billion worth of food has been siphoned off from Uttar Pradesh PDS alone in the past 10 years. These small changes if implemented will drastically help in plugging the leakages, preventing corruption and will eventually help in reducing poverty and hunger. The Chhattisgarh model of PDS which has shown itself worthy of praise can act as a road map and a lesson if emulated to the fullest.

#### **4.15 Take away from Chhattisgarh's model of 'Food for all'**

1. First, due to the ICTs-driven Centralized Online Real-time Electronic (CORE) PDS, the UPDS has become accessible and portable to the State beneficiaries. CORE PDS is an online distribution system but allows limited offline transactions in the case of temporary connection problems at Fair Price Shops or 'salespersons' outlet. Now in most of the states, offline transactions from the stores having PDS machines are barred.
2. Second, the beneficiaries who have been mapped in the CORE PDS are allowed to access their ration from any state provided they authenticate themselves through any of the multiple instruments permitted. These include Smart Ration Card issued by the State Food and Civil Supplies Department, the Rashtriya Swastha Beema Yojana card issued by the State health department, a registered mobile number using a one-time password or Aadhar enabled fingerprint system.
3. Third, The FPS Depot manager/salesperson uses his own fingerprint initially to authenticate the device. This feature is provided to avoid theft and misuse by means of Aadhar based fingerprint authentication.
4. Third, the FPS salesperson Swipes/inserts the ATM type smart card in the slot provided in the electronic Point of Sales (ePoS) device that reads the ration card number and sends it to the server through GPRS to obtain the entitlement balances available to the beneficiary.



5. Fourth, the FPS salesperson enters the quantity to be issued to the beneficiary and submits the transaction details. The server updates the transaction and generates a success report along with the amount that needs to be paid by the beneficiary (excluding the free ration scheme). A receipt is then printed, and the commodities or food grains are issued to the beneficiaries.

While concluding, it is understandable that e-POS and digitalization has the power to address the challenges of fake/bogus ration cards but what is even more challenging is to drive awareness among the masses. It is also advised to paste citizen charter and other informative materials inside and outside of the FPS sale center and helpline numbers for increased awareness, public reach and to discourage overcharging and unethical trade practices done by FPS salesperson.<sup>12</sup>

#### 4.16 Schemes Launched Related to PDS

Name of Scheme	Scheme Information
1. DECENTRALISED FOOD PROCUREMENT SCHEME	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="815 371 1394 622">1. The decentralized Food Procurement Scheme has been launched in Chhattisgarh state and has been implemented in the state in April, 2002.</li><li data-bbox="815 667 1394 1137">2. This scheme aims for paddy procurement through Chhattisgarh State Cooperative Marketing Federation and rice procurement through the Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation which is the authorized agency of the state government.</li><li data-bbox="815 1182 1394 1653">3. In the previous Kharif marketing season of the year 2016-17, 69.58 Lacks Ton paddies has been procured from 13.27 lacs farmers, at the support price already fixed by the Government of India, through various 1,287 cooperative societies of the state.</li></ol>
2. MUKHAMNATRI KHADYAN SAHAYTA YOJNA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="815 1695 1394 1942">1. This scheme entitles 35 Kg rice@ Rs.1/kg to 7.66 Lakhs AAY families of the Chhattisgarh state; entitles 10 kg of rice free of cost, to 60,277 destitute</li></ol>

Name of Scheme	Scheme Information
	<p>ration card holders and 10 kg rice @ Rs. 1/kg to 8,194 disabled / Specially abled persons of the state every month.</p> <p>2. Under this scheme budget provision of Rs.3, 000 Cr. is there in the current FY. 2017-18.</p>
3. ANTYODYA ANNA YOJNA	<p>1. Since the inception of this scheme in the state of Chhattisgarh in the year, 2001, March, the poorest of the poor have got benefitted from it. This scheme entitles beneficiaries, 35 Kgs of rice @ Rs 1/ Kg to each family and is to be provided every month.</p> <p>2. Currently, there are about 14.58 Lac of ration cards under this scheme, out of which 7.19 lacs is of AAY families that have been approved by the GOI and the rest 7.66 lacs AAY families have been approved by the Chhattisgarh state government.</p>
4. ANNAPOORNA SCHEME	<p>1. This scheme of the Central Government scheme got implemented in the Chhattisgarh state in October, 2001. This scheme entitles 10 Kg of rice, free of cost</p>

<b>Name of Scheme</b>	<b>Scheme Information</b>
	<p>to the old age citizens and to the destitute people.</p> <p>2. Under the aegis of the Chhattisgarh Food and Nutrition Security Act, 2012, the existing ration card holders of the Annapoorna Scheme have been specially issued the “Special Antyodaya ration cards” also. In these “Special Antyodaya rationcards”, the beneficiaries are entitled to get 10 Kg of rice, free of cost and 25 kg of rice @ Rs.1/kg every month.</p> <p>3. Currently around 7,916 beneficiary ration card holders are being benefitted under this scheme.</p>
<p>5. SUPPLY OF FOOD GRAINS TO WELFARE INSTITUTES.</p>	<p>1. This Scheme entitles each beneficiary of the welfare institutes of the state to be eligible to get 15 Kg of food grains every month at the rates prescribed for the BPL beneficiaries.</p> <p>2. With the consent of the GOI, the state government of Chhattisgarh is providing rice to "Dal-Bhat" Centers @ 2Rs./kg,</p>

Name of Scheme	Scheme Information
	out of the allocation received under this scheme.
6. PRADHANMANTRI UJJWALA YOJNA	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. This scheme got implemented in the state of Chhattisgarh on 13th August, 2016, especially for the women of the state.</li><li>2. Financial assistance of Rs.200 is being provided by the state government to the beneficiaries of this scheme.</li><li>3. Under this scheme, the beneficiaries are also being provided gas connection, a double burner gas stove and the first refill of the cylinder absolutely free of cost.</li><li>4. The target of this scheme is to provide gas connection to nearly 25 Lakhs eligible families within the 02 years.</li><li>5. Nearly 10 lacs gas connections have already been issued to the women belonging to the BPL category in the financial year 2016-17.</li></ol>
7. Scheme for the distribution of Refined Iodized AMRIT Salt.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. By virtue of this scheme, the beneficiaries belonging to the Antyodaya and priority household families are being distributed refined iodized salt worth 2kg</li></ol>

<b>Name of Scheme</b>	<b>Scheme Information</b>
	<p>free of cost in scheduled areas and 1Kg of refined iodized salt in non-scheduled areas.</p> <p>2. The budget provision of Rs.75.81.00 Cr. was there in the FY 2017-18.</p>
8. Chana Distribution Scheme.	<p>1. This scheme entitles the beneficiaries of all Antyodya and Priority families of Tribal Blocks of the Chhattisgarh state 2Kg Chana @ 5Rs/Kg every month since January, 2013.</p> <p>2. The budget allocation for this scheme was Rs.400.00 Cr. in the FY 2017-18.</p>
9. ANNAPOORNA "DAL-BHAT" SCHEME.	<p>1. This scheme aims to provide meals to poor and needy people at the very minimum rate of Rs.5/- .</p> <p>2. Annapurna Dal-Bhat Scheme got introduced in Chhattisgarh in the year 2004.</p> <p>3. At present, there are 158 "Dal-Baat centers in the state.</p> <p>4. To incentivize such humanitarian stores the state government has also kept a provision to give Gas Stove and Pressure</p>

<b>Name of Scheme</b>	<b>Scheme Information</b>
	<p>cooker, free of cost, to the "Dal-Baat" centers.</p> <p>5. In addition to the above, the Dal Baat centres are also being provided rice@ Rs2/kg, chana @Rs.5/kg and salt, free of cost.</p> <p>6. Around15-20 thousand beneficiaries are being benefitted under this scheme daily.</p>
<p>10. Lifting of rations for Inaccessible areas, in advance.</p>	<p>1. In the areas where roads become inaccessible during the rainy season, Snowing, it becomes challenging to deliver food grains and the other essential commodities like Food grains, Sugar, Amrit salt and kerosene to beneficiaries, hence these commodities are lifted in advance, that is before the rainy season.</p> <p>2. To pile up these commodities in advance for four months, the state government provides loan to the fair price shop agencies without charging a penny from them in the form of interest rate.</p> <p>3. Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation has been given Rs. 250</p>

Name of Scheme	Scheme Information
	Lakhs for the advance lifting of ration for those inaccessible areas of the Chhattisgarh state in the year 2016-17.
11. Computerization of Fair Price Shops.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. With an aim to achieve an end to end digitalization of the targeted public distribution system of the GOI, digitalization of all the services of the state public distribution system is to be done in the state.</li><li>2. The final step is the computerization of Fair Price shops, which has already been started since, March, 2012 by Core PDS.</li><li>3. Apart from the Core PDS, digitalization of Fair Price shops through Android based Tablet has been started since, August, 2015.</li><li>4. Currently around, 12,068 FPS are digitalized by the Android based Tablets in the state of Chhattisgarh.</li></ol>

Source: [https://khadya.cg.nic.in/PlanScheme\\_En.aspx](https://khadya.cg.nic.in/PlanScheme_En.aspx)<sup>13</sup>

**4.17 Report on Category wise number of Ration Card in District “Raipur”**

District	Raipur
AAV Cards	63400
Antyodya Card Members	178171
Destitute Cards	3071
Destitute Card Members	3071
Annapurna Cards	0
Annapurna Card Members	0
Priority cards	361065
Priority Card Members	1441426
Specially abled cards	1018
Specially abled card Members	1203
APL cards	126931
APL card members	414966
Total Cards	555485
Total Members	20388837

Source: [www.khadya.cg.nic.in/rationcards/rcmodule/Reports/RptRationcardDetailsDistrict.aspx](http://www.khadya.cg.nic.in/rationcards/rcmodule/Reports/RptRationcardDetailsDistrict.aspx)

The table above is an illustration showing the number of ration cards issued and the beneficiaries benefitted from the introduction of PDS. Ration card is issued by the state government. Therefore, you can see the difference in the ration card of different states.

The benefits available on this are also not the same in the states.

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*Chapter V*  
*Findings of The Study*

## CHAPTER - V

### FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

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Presenting Findings is also an important part of the research. After the analysis and interpretation of the data, it is required that results and findings should be presented in the sequence so that it is easy to understand. Hence the researcher has presented the findings of the study in this chapter.

#### **Major Findings of the study**

1. As far as findings related to household details of the participants is concerned, it was found that the majority of the families have almost 5 to 6 members in the family. Majority of families have Kacha house and belong to rural area of the Raipur district of the Chhattisgarh. There was no house built under Indira Awas Yojna. Majority of the respondents and villagers are labourers and labour work is only their source of income. Approx. 1% of the people in the villages owned near about 8 Acre of land 99 % of the respondents have a land minimum of 1 Acre.
2. As far as the findings related to commodities are concerned it is reflected here that the people get rice at Rs.1 per 1 kg. They get sugar at Rs. 10 per kg and salt at 2 kg Per Card at every month. But it can be discussed and reflected here that wheat/ flour, pulses, black Chana etc. is equally important to maintain a balanced diet. Government need to focus on this and should initiate the distribution of these commodities essential for a balanced diet.
3. Findings related to Quota sold in the open market or appropriated by someone else has shown that 100% of the respondents responded that it happened

sometimes when a dealer sold in the open market or the commodities been appropriated by someone else.

4. It was revealed by the respondents that the majority of them agreed with the entries. Only 3 of the total respondents responded no to the statement. But in an interview with the respondents, they replied that they are not satisfied with the quantity of rice and sugar. They need at least 45-50 kg of rice for a month, but they receive only 35kg. So it is insufficient for the month. The other reason for dissatisfaction is the appropriateness of the ration to someone else.
5. It was found that no respondent have responded that there are missing entries, some entries have been over-written, entries are illegible or other irregularities. But it was revealed from the responses that fake information is entered sometimes by the dealer to maintain the record.
6. As far as findings related to reasons for not getting a full quota of ration is concerned, none of the respondent replied for Lack of information regarding opening of PDS outlet, Lack of cash at the time of availability, not interested to buy the grain from PDS or Dealer refused to give full quota. But sometimes Problems in grain supply is noticed by the respondents and only 1% of the respondent replied for grain out of stock.
7. It was found that 3% of the respondents considered the quality as poor, 6% as average and 91% as good quality of the grain. Thus it can be reflected here that the majority of the respondents are considering the quality of the grain as good.
8. It was found that the PDS outlet in the village Uparwara remain open for 10-12 days and in champaran it remains open for 10-15 days. It is convenient to all availing the services of the PDS. Few of the respondents have responded that it should stay open during the whole month and cited various reasons for the same.

9. It was found in the study that 100% of the respondents said that they get information regarding the opening of the PDS. As far as the appropriateness of the days is concerned 95% of the respondents responded that it is appropriate but 5% of them have said that due to labor work, problem of money and other personal reasons they did not get ration.
10. The results regarding the attitude of the dealer at the PDS outlet shows that at village Champaran 95% of the respondents responded that the attitude and behavior of the dealer is good and appropriate and at the village Uparwara it was revealed that all the respondents are satisfied with the behavior of the dealer.
11. As far as the findings related to the importance of the PDS for the families is concerned it was reflected that 100% of the respondents considered it very important.
12. The results regarding the Satisfaction with the functioning of the local PDS outlet have revealed that 98% of the respondents are reasonably satisfied with the functioning of the local PDS outlet but 2% are somewhat satisfied.
13. The findings regarding the functioning of Today's PDS and PDS of Five Year back have reflected that 91% of the participants considered it better than the previous, 1% consider same, 4% consider it worse and 4% of them say nothing for the statement.
14. The findings with respect to ensuring that no one sleep hungry have reflected that 100% sleep with proper diet but they have to manage with extra efforts/ labour work. The quantity of grain followed in the outlets is not sufficient to meet the needs.

*Chapter VI*

*Summary and Conclusion*

## CHAPTER- VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

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#### Summary

The British Government introduced PDS in India during the onset of World War II. It was Bombay (Now known as Mumbai) where its first ever functioning started. Gradually the scope of the reach enhanced to the 13 different cities and till the year 1946 the reach of PDS system and its functioning crossed to around 771 cities of India. After the end of the World War II, Most of the countries in the year 1943 decided to shun this PDS system. After India gained independence, India decided to re-launch the PDS system again in the year 1950 as, after the end of World War II, the prices of the Cereals touched heights due to skyrocketing prices globally. At the time of Independence, India was lacking in the self-sufficiency of Cereals (including Food grains) and at that time due to a lack of financial liquidity and cash crunch, it was not possible for the country to procure Cereals to fulfil the needs of the whole Indian population at the mass level. Hence, it was the United States of America which introduced the PDS system in India under the PL-480 Act in the year 1956. The PL-480 act was based on United States distribution of foreign food aid. Even after the end of the World War II, the United States of America and USSR (now known as Russia) were engaged in a state of cold war. As part of the strategic and Political strategy both the countries were helping the other countries to cope up with their economic crisis in order to seek their cooperation for their various strategic needs for their own vested interests. The United States supported the ideology of Capitalist political system where as on the

other side the USSR was in the support of communist political system. Hence the two countries supported their own ideologies.

As a result to block the USSR move of extending their approach of communist political system beyond their own geographical boundaries ,the United States of America introduced Marshall plan in 1948 which lasted till the year 1952 and its aim was to provide aid to the western Europe under the aegis of ERP (Europe Recovery Plan) to help the war ravaged countries to cope up with the post war consequences like Poverty, Destruction, Hunger and to help such countries in their re-economic development and infrastructure remodeling through the various remedial measures. Around 12 billion monetary aids was given to Europe and agreed to provide India was with 31 million of Wheat and 0.19 millions of rice to fight the crisis of food shortage and for the distribution of the above mentioned commodity it was necessary to have PDS system. This system continued till the year 1960 but unfortunately it was abruptly stopped due to the Sino-Indian war in 1962 and Indo-Pakistani war in 1965.

In 1965, Food Corporation of India (FCI) came into existence and from the year 1979 PDS system has been completely functional. PDS had contributed in curbing the rise of the prices of the food grains and it ensured access of food to the beneficiaries and gradually with the rise of the national agricultural production in the aftermath of the green revolution, the reach of PDS was extended to the far flung tribal areas where the poverty level was substantially high in the 1970 and 1980s and this system was named as Revamped Public Distribution System. The revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS) came into existence in June, 1992. It was formed with a goal to strengthen and streamline the PDS operations and to enhance its reach to the far flung areas which are inaccessible due to the Droughts, Excessive Snowing, and Hilly, remote or are landlocked. Under this RPDS, the approach was widened and several other programmes

like Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDP), Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP), and Desert Development Programme (DDP) in specific Designated Hill areas which were identified in consultation with the state governments for special consideration. For such areas, the food grains were issued to the states at 50 paise below the CIP (Central Issue Price) and the ceiling of issue quantity was up to 20 Kg per Ration Card. Not only limited to this but, RPDS included mapping of the left-out families and issuing of ration cards to them as well. It also helped in the projection of Infrastructure requirements viz. additional fair price shops, Storage Capacity etc. and the addition of other additional commodities such as Pulses, Tea, Salt, Soap etc. for distribution through PDS outlets. In June 1997, the GOI launched the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) with a special focus on the poor segment of the society. Under this Project, the states had to formulate and implement various infallible arrangements for identification of the poverty stricken strata of the society for delivery and the distribution of the food grains in a transparent and accountable system at the FPS level and this scheme was intended to benefit about 6 Crore poverty stricken segment of people.

The amount of food grains in excess of the initial required quantity for below poverty line families (BPL) was granted to the state as “transitory Allocation” for which 103 lakh tons of food grains was reserved annually. Apart from the TPDS allocation, the states were allocated an additional allocation too. The transitory allocation was intended for the continuous benefit of subsidized food grains to the population who were above the APL as sudden withdrawal of benefits which already existed under PDS for them was not considered desirable. The transitory allocation was already issued at subsidized rates but even after being getting subsidized, the rates of the food grains were higher than the prices for the BPL Quota. Keeping in view the increasing allocation of food

grains to the Below poverty line families and to provide the food subsidy, GOI increased the allocation of food grains to BPL families from 10 Kg to 20 Kgs of food grains per family per month at half of the economic cost and the allocation to the above poverty line families at economic cost wef.1-4-2000.

Similarly, Chhattisgarh is greatly benefitting from the PDS. About 80% of the APL (Above Poverty level) families have access to Ration shops during COVID Pandemic even when the economy of not only India but there was a global economic crisis all over. Chhattisgarh was one of the states where people got largely benefitted as, during COVID pandemic when migrant laborers and workers returned from the other states to their home state among nationwide lockdown, Chhattisgarh witnessed an increase the e in purchase of PDS rations by APL families. Under National Food Security Act, Antyodaya Anna the scheme for disabled the come under BPL category and people who take ration at Rs 10 per kg are considered as APL families and people who get ration at Rs 1 per kg come under the BPL category. Around 2.47 Crore people are provided rations under PDS in the state.

### **The Chhattisgarh Model**

- 1. Computerization of Paddy Procurement:** In the Kharif year 2007-08, the whole system of paddy procurement at support price has been computerized. This year 59 new paddy procurement centers have been opened for the convenience of farmers. In the Kharif year 2012-13, paddy has been purchased from farmers through computers in 1975 paddy procurement centers of the state. Information regarding the farmers i.e. name of the farmer, total land was recorded in the system before the start of paddy procurement itself. Computer-generated cheques are provided immediately after the sale of paddy by farmers at procurement centers. Information on procurement on daily basis from farmers

is immediately available to the state government due to the computerization of the paddy procurement process. Information of farmer of every district of the state, who has sold their paddy via this software, is available on the website of the Food Department.

2. ***Transparency in Public Distribution System:*** Following actions are taken by the state government for transparency and effective control in the allotment of ration material, supply to reasonable price shops and distribution of ration material to beneficiaries, the under public distribution system.
3. ***PDS Online System:-***Computerization of PDS was started in the year 2007 and till now, whole activity from the state level up to supply centers of Chhattisgarh State Civil Supplies Corporation, has been computerized. All Districts' food offices have been connected to the State head quarter via the internet by computerization of Public distribution system. Database of all 11088 Reasonable price shops was prepared for allocation of ration material and since January' 2008, shop wise ration material is being allotted by the Food Directorate through computerized system of the basis of ration cards registered with shops but at present 123000 Responsible price shops exist.
4. ***Rice Festival:*** Rice festival has been started by the state government in February 2008 for regular monitoring of the distribution of ration material through the Public distribution ion system. Rice festival is also organized on the first day of Haat-Bazaar. The rice festival is organized on 7th of each month. Ration material the l can be procured by ration card holder on the specified date during this festival.

5. **Call Centre:** Adequate arrangement has been made by the Food Department through the use of information technology to achieve the state government's objective of promoting transparency and public participation in the distribution of ration material under Public distribution system. Call center being operated by the Food Department since January, 2008. The toll free number is 1800-233-3663 through which any citizen can obtain information of the Public distribution system and other schemes being run by the Food Department and can also register his complaint. A total of 16914 complaints have been registered till now. 16392 complaints have been resolved out of the total complaints received.
  
6. **Public Participation Website:** Public participation website ([www.cg.nic.in/citizen](http://www.cg.nic.in/citizen)) is a new experiment of the state government. All citizens can register themselves on this website free of cost. After registration, citizens send in complaints and suggestions concerning Food Department through e-mail.
  
7. **E-Kerosene Scheme:** E-Kerosene scheme has been launched by the state government from August, 2012, to make kerosene allocation and supply process more transparent and accountable. Reasonable price shops, under this scheme, shop wise online allotment is being done on the basis of numbers of ration cards registered with reasonable price shops from the state level. Data base has been prepared of all 98 wholesale kerosene dealers and 11088 reasonable private shop operators of the state including their mobile numbers. Information of kerosene pick up by wholesale dealers from oil depot is given in official server through SMS on registered mobile numbers.

**Some of the related studies are discussed below:**

Vasudha, Chhotray, Anindita, Adhikari & Bahuguna (2018) conducted a study on food security and political circumstances that support state capacity for welfare promotion. With powerful popular mobilizations for the Right to Food around the world, the idea of governmental responsibility for food security has gained ground; nonetheless, important disparities exist in both the articulation of demands and political responses. The reason consists in the interconnected components of political competitiveness, societal demands, and political enablement of bureaucratic capability. This research adds to the growing literature on the political conditions that allow the state to promote welfare. Tillin, Deshpande & Kailash (2015): *Comparing the Politics of Welfare across States in India*, this book presents an agenda for the study of comparative subnational politics and social policy in India. First and Second chapter links these unusual decisions to the 'policy frames' shared by politicians, bureaucrats, and academics alike, that have emerged from long-term patterns of political mobilizations and institutional development despite the different health economics of the two states. Second chapters by Rajeshwari Deshpande that focuses on social security for workers in West Bengal and Maharashtra. Third chapter by Tillin, Saxena and Sisodia addresses the reform of classic subsidy programme, the PDS, in the neighbouring states of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh which were bifurcated in 2000. The chapter highlights the role of leadership and its relationship with the bureaucracy, to explain the different outcomes in the two states. The next chapter by Rajesh Dev compare the local dynamics of MGNREGA's implementation in the two 'tribal' states of Meghalaya and Jharkhand. Dev compare the implementation of 'MGNREGA' in the fifth Scheduled area of Jharkhand where elected Panchayati raj institutions exist to the situation the in Sixth Scheduled areas of Meghalaya where structures to implement the scheme have been

grafted on to customary governance institutions. Next chapter by Jerkins and Manor offers a different reading of the implementation of MGNREGA in the regional settings of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh and focuses on a programme which has expanded the political capacities of the poor in rural areas. The last chapter focuses on this question through a comparative study of education policy. RTE Act in the two urban centers of Delhi and Chandigarh. The chapters in this volume offer an exploration of how local political environments shape the context for policy implementation; a critical endeavour in order to appreciate the opportunities and frustrations inherent within India's emergent regime. *Dev & Sharma (2010)* analyzed the performance of food security in terms of availability, access, and absorption or nutrition, as well as the problems and policies associated with it. It has been discovered that all three are interconnected. For example, increasing the availability and accessibility of food can improve the nutritional status of households. Access to food can be improved by greater employment as a result of the expansion of labor-intensive industries and/or the implementation of social security programmes. The issue of malnutrition encompasses a far broader range of issues than the issue of food access. India has malnutrition rates that are nearly twice as high as those in many African countries. This necessitates a multi-disciplinary approach that addresses diet diversity, including micronutrients, women's empowerment, health, education, clean drinking water, hygiene and sanitation, among other things. *Krishnamurthy, Pathania & Tandon (2014)* suggest that The National Food Security Act has commended Chhattisgarh's public distribution reforms as a model for other states to follow. His findings imply that sustained reforms with a political and social will can improve PDS access, but that advances without these characteristics may not be considerable or lasting. *Drèze & Khera (2013)* According to them, estimations of the impact of India's Public Distribution System were made using

data from the National Sample Survey conducted in 2009-10 and official poverty lines. According to them, PDS has the potential to bring down a poverty-gap index of rural poverty by 18 to 22 percent at the national level in all of India. The equivalent statistics are far higher in states with a well-functioning public distribution system, for example, 61 to 83 percent in Tamil Nadu and 39 to 57 percent in Chhattisgarh, respectively. Present estimates of the impact of India's Public Distribution System using National Sample Survey data for 2009-10 and official poverty lines. At the all-India level, the PDS is estimated to reduce the poverty-gap indexer in central poverty by 18 to 22 percent. The corresponding figures are much higher for states with a well-functioning PDS, e.g.61 to 83 per cent in Tamil Nadu and 39 to 57 per cent in Chhattisgarh.

### **Objectives of the Study**

1. To analyses the awareness of the public distribution system among BPL families in Chhattisgarh.
2. To examine the impact of PDS policies in Chhattisgarh.
3. To analyze the recent schemes under PDS and their performance in Chhattisgarh.
4. To study the role of Local administration in monitoring and implementing the PDS scheme.

### **Research Questions**

1. How has the politics of the state driven the new model of public distribution system?

2. The role of local administration and their experience in the implementation of PDS?
3. Why is there intra-regional variation in the implementation of the programme?

**Hypothesis**

1. Lack of accountability on the part of implementing agency lead to failure of PDS.
2. The use of modern technology reduces scam and enhance transparency in PDS.

**Research Methodology**

The present study has followed the empirical method using primary Data. A survey method has been followed for this study. By following purposive sampling two-panchayats viz., one backward and one developed were selected of Raipur District. Researcher also took the help of secondary sources such as government documents reports and papers released by Government of India and Chhattisgarh and other different national organization bodies on the related topics including books, journals and newspaper readings relevant to the research.

**Major Findings of the study**

1. As far as findings related to household details of the participants is concerned, it was found that majority of the families have almost 5 to 6 members in the family. Majority of families have Kacha house and belongs to rural area of the Raipur district of the Chhattisgarh. There was no house built under Indira Awas Yojna. Majority of the respondents and villagers are labourers and labour work is only their source of income. Approx. 1% of the people in the villages owned

near about 8 Acre of land 99 % of the respondents have land minimum to 1 Acre.

2. As far as the findings related to commodities are concerned it is reflected here that the people get rice at Rs.1 per 1 kg. They get sugar at Rs. 10 per kg and salt 2 kg Per Card at every month. But it can be discussed and reflected here that wheat/ flour, pulses, black Chana etc. is equally important to maintain the balance diet. Government need to focus on this and should initiate the distribution of these commodities essential for the balanced diet.
3. Findings related to Quota sold in open market or appropriated by someone else has shown that 100% of the respondents responded that it happened sometimes when dealer sold in open market or the commodities been appropriated by someone else.
4. It was revealed by the respondents that majority of them are agreed with the entries. Only 3 of the total respondents responded no for the statement. But in an interview with the respondents they replied that they are not satisfied with the quantity of the rice and sugar. The need at least 45-50 kg of rice for a month, but they receive only 35kg. So it is insufficient for the month. The other reason for dissatisfaction is appropriateness of the ration to someone else.
5. It was found that no respondent have responded that there are missing entries, some entries have been over-written, entries are illegible or other irregularities. But it was revealed from the responses that fake information is entered sometimes by the dealer to maintain the record.

6. As far as findings related to reasons for not getting a full quota of ration is concerned, none of the respondent replied for Lack of information regarding opening of PDS outlet, Lack of cash at the time of availability, not interested to buy the grain from PDS or Dealer refused to give full quota. But sometimes Problems in grain supply is noticed by the respondents and only 1% of the respondent replied for grain out of stock.
7. It was found that 3% of the respondents considered the quality as poor, 6% as average and 91% as good quality of the grain. Thus it can be reflected here that the majority of the respondents are considering the quality of the grain as good.
8. It was found that the PDS outlet in the village of Uparwara remain open for 10-12 days and in champaran it remains open for 10-15 days. It is convenient to all availing the services of the PDS. Few of the respondents have responded that it should stay open during the whole month and cited various reasons for the same.
9. It was found in the study that 100% of the respondents said that they get information regarding the opening of the PDS. As far as the appropriateness of the days is concerned 95% of the respondents responded that it is appropriate but 5% of them have said that due to labor work, problem of money and other personal reasons they did not get ration.
10. The results regarding the attitude of the dealer at the PDS outlet shows that at village Champaran 95% of the respondents responded that the attitude and behavior of the dealer is good and appropriate and at the village Uparwara it was revealed that all the respondents are satisfied with the behavior of the dealer.

11. As far as the findings related to the importance of the PDS for the families is concerned it was reflected that 100% of the respondents considered it very important.
12. The results regarding the Satisfaction with the functioning of the local PDS outlet have revealed that 98% of the respondents are reasonably satisfied with the functioning of the local PDS outlet but 2% are somewhat satisfied.
13. The findings regarding the functioning of Today's PDS and PDS of Five Year back have reflected that 91% of the participants considered it better than the previous, 1% consider same, 4% consider it worse and 4% of them say nothing for the statement.
14. The findings with respect to ensuring that no one sleep hungry have reflected that 100% sleep with proper diet but they have to manage with extra efforts/labour work. The quantity of grain followed in the outlets is not sufficient to meet the needs.

### **Conclusion**

The Public Distribution System (PDS) is a poverty-reduction initiative that adds to people's social wellbeing. Rice, wheat, sugar, kerosene, and other essential goods are provided to the population at inexpensive costs through the PDS. PDS is a blessing for those who live in poverty. The principal social welfare and anti-poverty programme of the Indian government is the Public Distribution System (PDS). The Government of India launched the Revamped Public Distribution System (RPDS) in 1992 to service and distribute critical commodities to people living in distant, backward, and hilly areas. In 1997, the government implemented the Targeted Public Distribution System

(TPDS). The federal government and state governments have both been actively involved in guiding the PDS's operations to ensure its success. Chhattisgarh is the first state in India to implement food security act of its' own. Not only provisions for food security have been made in C.G. Food Security Act but provisions for nutrition security has also been made with the objective of increasing protein intake in food for the purpose of balance diet. The public distribution system provides food at a low cost to consumers. 11088 fair price shops were operating in the state till October'2014, out of which 4115 were being operated by panchayats, 4364 by service cooperative societies, 2412 by women self-help groups, 154 by forest security societies and 43 by urban bodies. There is arrangement for issuing ration cards, to eligible persons under Chhattisgarh Food Security Act, 2012, to provide vital commodities to consumers through Reasonable price shops. Gram panchayats are been given the right to issue Antyodaya, Prathmik and Samanya cards in rural areas and municipal corporation/nagar panchayat in urban areas are been given the similar right in their jurisdiction. In this study researcher took an initiative to analyses the awareness of public distribution system among BPL families in Chhattisgarh. Along with this the impact of PDS policies in Chhattisgarh from is also examined. Various recent schemes under PDS and their performance in Chhattisgarh is discussed. Monitoring and implementing the PDS scheme is also discussed which is very important to understand the overall system of PDS in the country and in a particular state. It can be concluded and discussed here that various recent initiatives have been taken by the government such as Interest-free loans for farmers were introduced by the Govt. Free 5 HP electricity for farmers (recycled from 2008) was taken into consideration. The government will establish a 'Kisaan Kalyan Kosh', or Farmer Welfare Fund, to assist farmers (recycled from 2003 and 2008). On paddy, there is a bonus of Rs.300 per

quintal (no bonus in 2009, 2010 and 2011). Paddy receives a minimum support price of Rs.2100 per quintal. Poor people are given one rupee per kilogramme of rice. Farmers can benefit from the 'Fasal Beema guarantee' or Crop Insurance Guarantee Scheme. In the event of crop failure, a policy should be developed to provide immediate compensation. Zones dedicated to agro-forestry (not created). From the 3rd to the 13th of October, around Diwali, they will be offering a paddy bonus of Rs.300 per quintal of paddy purchased from them under the banner of 'Bonus Tihar.' 13 lakh paddy cultivators will receive a bonus of Rs. 2100 crore, a sum totaling Rs. 2100 crore. PDS is one of the government's largest welfare programmes, assisting farmers in selling their produce at fair prices and assisting the underprivileged sectors of society in purchasing food grains at reasonable prices. Its effectiveness can be improved using technology-based solutions, as evidenced by some states' achievements in this area. Shifting to DBT is another option, although it should be approached with caution. In a study on state finances, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) encouraged states that are considering switching to cash transfers to proceed with caution. While replacing subsidized PDS supplies with DBT, the Economic Survey 2016-17 also stressed the need for greater vigilance and stronger infrastructure. The best way ahead is to strengthen the existing TPDS system by capacity building and training the implementing authorities, as well as attempts to plug leaks. It can be concluded and suggested here that the main issue in the PDS is the Quantity issue. The quantity of the grain they get is not sufficient. Regardless they have to manage the grain from other sources. Secondly only distributing rice and sugar is not enough to ensure the balanced diet of the people. Govt. has to work on it and should distribute dal chana, gud, milk etc. Majority of the people in both the villages are labourer. Hence it is difficult for them to manage household expenses along with the education of their children. Thus benefits should be given to

these people with a sound policy which can uplift their social-economic standard. Another problem is noticed by the researcher that the process of registration for ration card is time consuming. It takes 2-3 months to reach the card to the beneficiary. In, this way the FastTrack process of card preparation should be initiated by the Govt.

#### The PROS and CONS of PDS and other delivery mechanisms

Mechanism	PROS	CONS
<b>PDS</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Helps in immunizing against high prices.</li> <li>2. Insulates beneficiaries from inflation &amp; price volatility.</li> <li>3. It ensures that the entitlement is used only for food grains.</li> <li>4. Robust network of FPS ensures access to food grains even in remote areas.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Low off-take of food grains from each household.</li> <li>2. High leakage and diversion of subsidized food grains.</li> <li>3. Problem of Adulteration of the food grains.</li> <li>4. Lack of viability of FPS due to low margins.</li> </ol>
<b>Cash transfers</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cash in the hands of the poor increases their choices.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cash can be used to buy non-food items.</li> <li>2. Exposure to price volatility and inflation.</li> </ol>

Mechanism	PROS	CONS
	<p>2. Cash may help in relieving financial constraints faced by the poor.</p> <p>3. Administrative costs of cash transfer programmes may be significantly lesser than that of other schemes</p> <p>4. There is enough Potential for making an electronic transfer.</p>	<p>3. There is poor access to the banks and to the post offices in some areas.</p>
<b>Food coupons</b>	<p>1. Freedom of choice to buy food from anywhere.</p> <p>2. Increases incentive for competitive prices and assured quality of food grains among PDS stores.</p>	<p>1. Food coupons being not indexed for inflation; may expose recipients to inflation.</p> <p>2. Hard to administer; there have been known delays in issuing of food coupons and their reimbursing shops.</p>

Mechanism	PROS	CONS
	3. Ration shops get full food grains for the poor, no incentive to turn the poor away.	

The PDS has proven to be India's one of the biggest welfare programmes of the government with an aim to assist the farmers to sell their products at the best prices. It also aims to help the poorest sections of the society to buy food grains at the rates affordable to them. Time to time technology up gradation can help in more effectiveness.

- ❖ The Economic Survey 2016-2017 also laid emphasis for the need of more caution while replacing Subsidized PDS with DBT (Direct Benefit Transfer).
- ❖ It will also help in the strengthening of the present TPDS system with the help of capacity building measures and training of the implementing authorities to plug leakages in the best possible way.
- ❖ To further strengthen it, an increase flow of public participation is required through social audits and participation of self helps Groups (SHG), Non – Government Organizations (NGO), and Cooperatives for ensuring the transparency of the PDS system at the grass root level.

In order to enhance the nutritional level, bio fortified foods need to be distributed through the PDS that will help in eradicating malnutrition from INDIA. J&K is one of the states which have started the issuance of Bio fortified food to the beneficiaries.

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# *Appendices*

## APPENDICES

### PDS Survey, (Household Questionnaire)

#### Introduction

This survey questionnaire is adopted by Vimlesh Kumar, Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University under the supervision of Professor Shashikant Pandey, Professor, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow, U.P. India. This tool is developed by Dr. Reetika Khera, Associate Professor- Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi.

#### Topic of Research:

“Welfare State and Public Policy in India: A study of Public Distribution system in Raipur, Chhattisgarh.”

I request you to provide me information regarding the Public Distribution. There is no positive and negative answers. You have to respond on the basis of your experience and accessibility. Hence the responses will be kept confidential and will be used for research purpose only.

Village: /\_\_\_\_\_ /Gram Panchayat: /\_\_\_\_\_

Block: \_\_\_\_\_ / District: \_\_\_\_\_ /

Name of respondent: /\_\_\_\_\_ / Date: /\_\_\_\_\_ /

	<b>(GENERAL QUESTIONS)</b>	
	<b>A. Respondent's Details</b>	
1.	Age (years):	/____/
2.	Sex: [1 = Female; 2 = Male]	/____/
3.	Education level: [1 = Illiterate; 2 = Literate (below primary); 3 = Primary]	/____/

	(Class V complete); 4 = Upper Primary (class VIII complete); 5 = Secondary (class X complete); 6 = High School (class XII complete); 7 = Above High School; 9 = Unclear]	
4.	Marital Status: [1 = Married; 2 = Widowed; 3 = Divorced, Abandoned or Separated; 4 = Unmarried; 5 = Other (specify); 9 = Unclear]	/ ____/
5.	Religion: [1 = Hindu; 2 = Muslim; 3 = Christian; 4 = Other (specify); 9 = Unclear]	/ ____/
6.	Category: [1 = SC; 2 = ST; 3 = OBC; 4 = Other; 9 = Unclear]	/ ____/
	<b>B. Household Details</b> The term "household" in this section refers to the household unit as perceived by the respondent. Usually this would correspond to members of a family who share the same "chulha".	
7.	Number of household members: [Investigator: Fill all entries in this table (write "0" if applicable) and make sure that the row total is the same as the column total.] Female _____ Male _____ Total Children (below 14 years)____/ ____/____/ ____/____/ ____/ Adults (aged 14-65 years)____/ ____/____/ ____/____/ ____/ Aged persons (above 65 years)____/ ____/____/ ____/____/ ____/ Total____/ ____/____/ ____/____/ ____/	
8.	Type of household [1 = Nuclear family; 2 = Nuclear family with dependent(s); 3 = Joint family (with several nuclear families); 4 = Other (specify); 9 = Unsure]	/ ____/
9.	Does the household have an NREGA job card? [1 = Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Unsure]	/ ____/

11.	Type of dwelling: [1 = Kachha; 2 = Semi-pukka; 3 = Pukka; 9 = Unclear]	/ ___/
12.	Was the house wholly or partly built under Indira Awas Yojana? [1 = Yes, wholly; 2 = Yes, partly; 3 = No; 9 = Unclear]	/ ___/
13.	[Investigator: Please note below the details of the respondent's house, based on your own observations.]  a. Number of <i>pacca</i> rooms:  b. Number of <i>kaccha</i> rooms:  c. Number of semi- <i>pacca</i> rooms	/ ___/  / ___/  / ___/
14.	Main occupation(s) of the household: [Investigator: Enter two codes (one in each box) if necessary, starting with the main occupation.] [1 = Self-employment (agriculture); 2 = Self-employment (non-agriculture); 3 = Casual Labour; 4 = Regular Employment ( <i>naukri</i> ); 5 = Other (specify); 9 = Unclear]	/ ___/  / ___/
15.	Amount of agricultural land owned: [Investigator: Please convert local units into acres. If you are unable to convert, note the answer as given by the respondent, outside the box, and convert later on the same day.]	/ ___/ acres
16.	Household assets. [Investigator: Please note below, preferably based on direct observation (and otherwise by asking), whether the household has the following possessions/facilities (1 = Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Not sure).]  Electricity Pressure cooker Fan  Television Motorcycle/scooter Four-wheel vehicle Mobile	/ ___/  / ___/

	<p>phone Latrine</p> <p>Piped water</p>	<p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p>
	<b>C. Ration Cards</b>	
17.	<p>“Does your household have a Ration Card?”</p> <p>[1 = Yes (only one); 2 = Yes (several, same type); 3 = Yes (several, different types); 4 = No; 9 = Unclear]</p> <p>[Investigator: If the respondent does not have a Ration Card, note the reasons in the space below and end the interview. If he/she has a Ration Card, ask to see it. If the household has several Ration Cards, select one Ration Card at random for further probing.]</p>	/ ____/
18.	<p>Type of Ration Card:</p> <p>[1= APL; 2 =BPL; 3 =Antyodaya; 4 = Annapoorna; 5 = Other (specify); 9 = Unclear]</p>	/ ____/
19.	<p>“Since how many years you have had this Ration Card?”</p> <p>[Investigator: Please note the date (year) of issue of the card, if available, in the space provided below, and the number of years since the card was issued in the box provided in the adjoining column (if the card was issued less than one year ago, write “0” in that box).]</p> <p>Year of Issue: / ____/</p>	/ ____/

20.	<p>“Did you have to pay anyone any money to obtain your Ration Card, or for other associated expenses?”</p> <p><i>[Investigator: Please note amount; if there was no charge, write “0”.]</i></p> <p>Ration Card:</p> <p>Other expenses (specify):</p>	<p>Rs. / ____/Rs. / ____/</p>
21.	<p>“Are you in possession of your Ration Card at the moment, or is it with someone else?”</p> <p><i>[1 = In possession; 2 = Someone else; 9 = Not clear]</i></p>	<p>/ ____/</p>
22.	<p>“If it is with someone else, where is it?”</p> <p><i>[1 = Pradhan/Sarpanch; 2 = Sachiv; 3 = Other GP functionary (specify); 4 = Ration dealer; 5 = Other (specify); 9 = Unclear]</i></p>	<p>/ ____/</p>
<b>D. PDS Utilization</b>		
23.	<p>“Can you tell us what commodities you are supposed to be able to buy with your Ration Card at the PDS outlet?”</p> <p><i>[Investigator: If the household is not entitled to a particular commodity, write “0” in the quantity column on the right. If the respondent is unable to tell, enter a question mark (“?”). Avoid blanks as far as possible.]</i></p> <p>Price (Rs./kg or Rs./lt)</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Rice ____/ ____/</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Wheat/atta (specify) ____/ ____/</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Pulses (type 1) ____/ ____/</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Sugar ____/ ____/</p>	<p>/</p> <p>____/kg/month</p> <p>/</p> <p>____/kg/month</p> <p>/</p> <p>____/kg/month</p>

	<p><i>Others (specify clearly below)</i></p> <p><i>Kerosene / _____/</i></p> <p><i>Black Chana / _____/</i></p> <p><i>[Investigator: Before proceeding, please explain to the respondent how much grain (wheat + rice) he/she is supposed to be able to buy from the PDS outlet. Then discuss with the respondent how much grain he/she actually receives.]</i></p>	<p>/</p> <p>____/kg/month</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>lt/month</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>lt/month</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>lt/month</p> <p>/</p> <p>____/kg/month</p>
24.	<p>“In an ordinary month, how much grain (wheat and rice) do you normally get from the PDS outlet?”</p>	<p>Kg./ ____/</p>
25.	<p>“How much do you normally pay for this?”</p> <p><i>[Investigator: Please note the total amount paid in the box on the right, and, if possible, the breakdown in the table below. Make sure that the "total paid" entries add up to the total amount entered in the box on the right hand side.]</i></p> <p><b>Quantity (kg)____Price (Rs/kg)____Total paid</b></p> <p><i>Wheat</i>____ _____</p> <p><i>Rice</i>____ _____</p>	<p>Rs. / ____/</p>
26.	<p>“How much grain (wheat and rice) did you buy the last time you bought grain from the PDS outlet and how much did you pay?”</p>	<p>Kg./ ____/Rs.</p> <p>/ ____/</p>
27.	<p>“Is the quota for any of these months still awaited?”</p> <p><i>[1 = Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Unclear]</i></p>	<p>/ ____/</p>

28.	<p>“Has it ever happened in the past 6 months that your quota for a particular month was sold in the open market or appropriated by someone else?”</p> <p><i>[1 = Yes, several times; 2 = Yes, once; 3 = No; 9 = Unclear]</i></p>	/ ____/
29.	<p>“Do you agree with the entries for the last three months (for grain) given on the Ration Card?”</p> <p><i>[Investigator: Please discuss with the respondent whether he/she agrees with the information given on the Ration Card, as far as grain purchases are concerned.]</i></p> <p><i>[1 = Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Not sure; NA = Not applicable (Ration Card not available)]</i></p> <p><i>[Investigator: The question below should be answered by you, based on careful examination of the respondent’s Ration Card (if available).]</i></p>	/ ____/
30.	<p>Did you notice any of the irregularities below in the maintenance of the Ration Card? Please check the entries for grain (wheat and rice) from March onwards. <i>[1 = Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Not sure; NA = Not applicable (Ration Card not available)]</i></p> <p>Missing entries</p> <p>Fake information has been entered. Some entries have been over-written. Entries are illegible.</p> <p>Other irregularities (please specify below)</p>	<p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p>
31.	<p>“In months when you have not been getting your full quota of grain (during the last three months), what was the main reason for not getting the full quota?” <i>[Investigator: Please</i></p>	

	<p><i>discuss this issue with the respondent and enter the relevant codes.]</i></p> <p><i>[1=Yes; 2=No; 9=Unsure]</i></p> <p>a. Grain supplies did not reach the PDS outlet</p> <p>b. Lack of information about opening times of the PDS outlet</p> <p>c. Lack of cash at the time when grain was available at the PDS outlet</p> <p>d. Not interested in buying grain from PDS outlet</p> <p>e. Grain supplied at the PDS outlet is of poor quality</p> <p>f. Grain supplies "ran out" by the time we went to buy</p> <p>g. Ration dealer refused to give us full quota</p> <p>h. Other responses (please specify) _____</p>	<p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p> <p>/ ____/</p>
32.	<p>“Suppose that the PDS outlet was open every day and that grain was always available. In that case, would you buy your full ration every month?”</p> <p><i>[1=Yes; 2=No; 9=Unclear]</i></p>	<p>/ ____/</p>
33.	<p>[If not] “Why not?”</p> <p>/ ____/</p>	
34.	<p>“How would you describe the quality of the grain you received the last time you bought grain? Poor, average or good?”</p> <p><i>[1=Poor; 2=Average; 3=Good; 9=Unclear]</i></p>	<p>/ ____/</p>

35.	“How far is the PDS outlet from your house?”	/ ____/km
36.	“Last time you went to purchase your PDS ration, how long did it take you to go to the PDS outlet, obtain your grain ration, and come back home?”	/ ____/ mins
37.	“How many days does the PDS outlet usually open in a month?”	/ ____/days
38.	“Are these days fixed for each month?” [1= Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Unclear]	/ ____/
39.	“If not, do you get to know in advance that the PDS outlet is going to open?” [1= Yes; 2 = No; 9 = Unclear]	/ ____/
40.	“Do you feel that the opening days of the PDS outlet are adequate?” [1=Yes; 2=No; 9=Unclear]	/ ____/
41.	“Do you feel that you have adequate information about the opening days of the PDS outlet?” [1=Yes; 2=No; 9=Unclear]	/ ____/
<b>E. Perceptions of PDS</b>		
42.	“How would you describe the attitude of the PDS dealer: helpful, indifferent or unhelpful?” [1=Helpful; 2= Indifferent; 3= Unhelpful; 9=Unclear]  / ____/	/ ____/
43.	“How would you describe the importance of the PDS for your family’s welfare? Very important, quite important or not important?” [1=Very important; 2=Quite important; 3= Not important; 9=Unclear]	/ ____/
44.	“Are you satisfied with the functioning of the local PDS outlet?” [1=Highly satisfied; 2=Reasonably satisfied; 3=Somewhat dissatisfied; 4=Very dissatisfied; 9 =Unclear]	/ ____/
45.	“How would you rate the overall functioning of the PDS	/ ____/

	<p>today compared with 5 years ago?”</p> <p><i>[1=Better; 2= Same; 3= Worse; 4=Can't say; 9=Unclear]</i></p> <p>“How would you rate the PDS today compared with 5 years ago in the following respects?”</p> <p><i>[1=Better; 2= Same; 3= Worse; 4=Can't say; 9=Unclear]</i></p> <p>Accessibility Regularity Quantity supplied Quality of grain</p> <p>Please summarise the main point(s) below</p>	<p>/ ___/</p> <p>/ ___/</p> <p>/ ___/</p> <p>/ ___/</p>
46.	<p>“Do you have any suggestions for improving the PDS?”</p> <p><i>[Investigator: Please note in detail. Continue at the bottom of this page if necessary.]</i></p>	
	<b>F. Food and Consumption</b>	
47.	<p>“How much grain does your household consume in an average month?”</p>	/ ___/ kg
48.	<p>“Is this enough to ensure that no-one goes hungry at any time?”</p> <p><i>[1=Yes; 2=No; 9=Unclear]</i></p>	/ ___/
49.	<p>[If not] “How much grain would be required, in a month, to ensure that no-one goes hungry at any time?”</p> <p><i>[Investigator: If you don't get a credible answer, write “NR”.]</i></p>	/ ___/kg
50.	<p>“Leaving food aside, how much do you spend in an average month (approximately) to run your household?”</p>	Rs / ___/